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CORRESPONDENCE,

DESPATCHES, AND OTHER PAPERS,

OF

VISCOUNT CASTLEREAGH,

SECOND MARQUESS OF LONDONDERRY.

EDITED BY

HIS BROTHER,

CHARLES WILLIAM VANE, MARQUESS OF LONDONDERRY,

G.C.B., G.C.H., G.B.E., ETC.

THIRD SERIES.

MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC.

IN FOUR VOLUMES.—VOL. I.

LONDON

JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET.

1853.

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3. Lord Castlereagh to Mr. Edward Thornton, transmi papers relative to the Hanoverian levies, and repo movements of the Austrian army . .

3. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Aberdeen, acknowledging receipt, through Lord A., of a letter from Caul court, assuring him (Lord Castlereagh) of pers protection and facilities . . . .

4. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Clancarty, transmitting pa received from Baron Stein, relative to the pr sional administration of certain parts of the I Countries . . . .

4. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Clancarty, forwarding a spatch addressed by him to Mr. Thornton .

5. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Aberdeen, remarking u the payment of Mr. Robinson's expenses by the Fre officer appointed to conduct him from Calais to C tillon . . . . .

5. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Bathurst, acknowledging receipt of his despatch sent by Mr. Robinson

5. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool, adverting to (Lord C.'s) remarks on Count Lieven's letter, to discussions at Troyes, and to the military positio the Allies . . . .

5. Lord Clancarty to Lord Liverpool, on the military m of Holland and probable operations of its forces,

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12. Lord Castlereagh to Sir Henry Wellesley, transmittii copy of the treaty just signed with the Allied Sov reigns, and desiring to be informed of the sentimer of the Spanish Government respecting its policy
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March 14. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Clancarty, adverting to deputations sent to the Allied Sovereigns by the people of the Netherlands . . . . . .

14. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Clancarty, referring to arrangements proposed for the administration of the Low Countries . . . . . .

15. Lord Castlereagh to Mr. Edward Thornton, communicating successes of the Allies . . . .

15. Lord Aberdeen to Lord Castlereagh, transmitting a report of Conference, and adverting to successes of Lord Wellington . . . . .

15. Lord Aberdeen to Lord Castlereagh, transmitting a memorandum stating his reasons for differing in opinion from his Colleagues on a point relating to the proceedings of Conference . . . . .

15. Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh, conveying various articles of intelligence, with enclosures: . . .

12. Mr. Johnson to Lord Clancarty, relating to the mission of an officer from the French General Maison to the Prince Royal of Sweden . . . .

Extract of a Letter from Brussels, relative to plans of Carnot, Governor of Antwerp . . .

16. Lord Aberdeen to Lord Castlereagh, adverting to the course to be pursued by the Plenipotentiaries at Chatillon . . . . . .

18. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Clancarty, referring to the apparent rupture of the negociations; to the situation of Bonaparte; to the mission of deputies from Brabant to the head-quarters; and to the determination of the Allies to incorporate the Low Countries with Holland . . . . . .

18. Lord Cathcart to Lord Castlereagh, reporting proceedings of the Conference of that day . .

18. Lord Cathcart to Lord Castlereagh, referring to the equipment supplied for the siege of Dantzig, and the plan of employing it in the siege of Hamburg .

19. Mr. Hamilton to Lord Castlereagh, transmitting miscellaneous intelligence . . . . .

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March 22. The Hon. Sir Charles Stewart to Mr. Edward Cooke, on the termination of the Conferences at Chatillon and the proceedings of Bonaparte . .

22. Lord Walpole to Lord Castlereagh, adverting again to General Vaudoncourt, and his plan for organizing the Italian prisoners of war in Russia, and transporting them to Italy; and to the wretched state of the Russian finances, with enclosures: . . .

22. The Duke de Serra Capriola to the Prince of Villa Franca—Remarks on the politics of the Allies .

22. The Duke de Serra Capriola to Prince Castelcicala, representing the hostility of foreign Ministers at Petersburg to England . . .

22. The Duke de Serra Capriola to the Hereditary Prince of Naples, animadverting on the political principles of the Austrian Cabinet . . . .

22. Mr. Hamilton to Lord Castlereagh, adverting to the treaty just concluded by him . . .

22. Mr. Edward Cooke to Lord Castlereagh, relating to the success of Wellington, and to the movements of Soult

22. Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh, reflecting on the conduct of the Prince Royal of Sweden, and stating the amount of military force in the territories of the Prince of Orange . . . .

23. Lord Castlereagh to Mr. George Rose, referring to the treaty recently concluded with the Allied Sovereigns, as evidence of their desire to include Bavaria in their defensive system; and to the termination of the Conferences at Chatillon . . . .

23. Lord Clancarty to Lord Bathurst, conveying assurances from the Prince of Orange of his most cordial co-operation, to the utmost of his power, in the general cause, and stating means at his disposal . .

25. Mr. Edward Thornton to Lord Castlereagh, informing him of his arrival at Aix-la-Chapelle, and movements of the Prince Royal . . . .

26. The Hon. Sir Charles Stewart to Lord Castlereagh, reporting military operations . . .

27. The Hon. Sir Charles Stewart to Lord Castlereagh, with a further Report of military operations . .

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March 27. Lord William Bentinck to Lord Castlereagh, representing the inefficiency of Marshal Bellegarde as Austrian Commander-in-Chief in Italy . . .

28. W. Wilberforce, Esq., to Lord Castlereagh, conveying a suggestion on the subject of the Slave Trade .

29. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Bathurst, adverting to the Conferences at Chatillon . . . . .

29. The Hon. Sir Charles Stewart to Lord Castlereagh, reporting operations of the Allies in their advance upon Paris . . . . . .

29. Lord Clancarty to Lord Bathurst, transmitting letter from Sir Thomas Graham, relative to Antwerp, and adverting to the Dutch West India Colonies .

29. Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh, relative to Dutch affairs . . . . . .

30. Lord Castlereagh to Lord William Bentinck, transmitting instructions to communicate to Marshal Bellegarde and Murat the dissatisfaction of his Government that so little had been done in Italy towards the expulsion of the French . . . . .

Articles of Agreement entered into, on the part of the British Government, by Lord Viscount Castlereagh, with Count Münster, on the part of the Government of Hanover, stipulating for the equipment and subsidising of a corps of 15,000 Hanoverians . .

30. The Hon. Sir Charles Stewart to Lord Castlereagh, reporting the particulars of the attack and surrender of Paris . . . . . .

April 1. The Hon. Sir Charles Stewart to Lord Bathurst, adverting to the preponderance of Russia in the affairs of the Allies, and to the state of Paris . . .

1. The Hon. Sir Charles Stewart to Lord Bathurst, informing him that the French Senate, being deserted by Napoleon, had declared for Louis XVIII. . .

1. The Hon. Sir Charles Stewart to Lord Castlereagh, transmitting the capitulation of Paris, and describing the enthusiastic reception given to the Emperor of Russia, the King of Prussia, and Prince Schwarzenberg, at their entry . . . .

1. The Hon. Sir Charles Stewart to Lord Castlereagh, re-

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ferring to the reports of Colonels Lowe and Cooke for further details of the battle of Paris .

April 1. Mr. Edward Thornton to Lord Castlereagh, accounting for his dating from Nancy, and adverting to the intention of the Prince Royal to proceed to the head-quarters of the Emperor of Russia . .

2. Mr. Edward Thornton to Lord Castlereagh, transmitting Gazettes and despatch from Major-General Taylor . . . . . .

2. Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh, reporting the demonstrations of attachment received by the family of the Prince Sovereign while at Amsterdam, the acceptance of the Constitution, and military movements in Brabant . . . . . .

2. Lord Clancarty to Lord Liverpool, communicating nearly the same information as the preceding letter, and adverting to military proceedings in Flanders, and to the Belgic levies 4

3. Lord Castlereagh to Lord William Bentinck, relative to Murat and affairs in Italy, and adverting to their promising state in France . . . 4

3. Lord Castlereagh to Lord William Bentinck, instructing him to make certain explanations to the Hereditary Prince of Sicily 4

3. Lord Castlereagh to Lord William Bentinck, conveying instructions relative to Italian affairs . .

3. Lord Castlereagh to Lord William Bentinck, referring to the appointment of Mr. à Court to his diplomatic situation at the Court of Sicily during his absence with the army 4

3. Lord Castlereagh to Lord William Bentinck, expressing a strong wish that he should not withdraw from co-operation with the Austrians . . . 4

4. The Hon. Sir Charles Stewart to Lord Liverpool, representing the political state of Paris . .

4. The Hon. Sir Charles Stewart to Lord Liverpool, communicating that Marshal Mortier, with his whole corps, and several other officers of note, had declared in favour of Louis XVIII., and adverting to the situation of the Allied army . . . 4

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April 5. The Hon. Sir Charles Stewart to Lord Castlereagh, urging him in the strongest manner to come on to Paris . . . . . .

5. The Hon. Sir Charles Stewart to Lord Castlereagh, reporting the abdication of Bonaparte, and the offer of the island of Elba, with an income of 3,000,000 livres, and the like sum to be divided among his brothers and sisters . . . . . .

5. Lord Castlereagh to Lord William Bentinck, informing him of the surrender of Paris, and detailing some preceding military operations . . . .

5. Lord Clancarty to Lord Liverpool, adverting to the surrender of Paris, and to preparations for the projected attack on Antwerp . . . . .

6. The Hon. Sir Charles Stewart to Lord Castlereagh, informing him of Bonaparte's acceptance of the terms offered by the Allies . . . . .

7. The Hon. Sir Charles Stewart to Lord Castlereagh,[1] adverting to his having sent home Colonel Lowe, with all the official documents of the French Government which he could procure and an abstract of the Constitution . . . . . .

7. The Hon. Sir Charles Stewart to Lord Bathurst, anticipating the danger of assigning Elba to Bonaparte .

8. Lord Clancarty to Lord Liverpool, communicating intelligence relative to the affairs of Holland . .

9. Lord Castlereagh to Mr. J. M. Johnson, signifying his appointment as Chargé d'Affaires to the Provisional Government about to be established at Brussels .

9. Mr. Edward Cooke to Lord Castlereagh, relative to political affairs in general . . . . .

10. Mr. Edward Thornton to Lord Castlereagh, introducing deputies from Liege, sent to the head-quarters of the Allies . . . . . .

12. Lord Blayney to Lord Castlereagh, representing expenses incurred by him for the relief of English prisoners of war in France . . . . .

[1] I make no doubt that this letter was addressed to Lord Liverpool. EDITOR.

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April 13. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool, urging him t hurry off Louis XVIII., and stating his intention t send his brother to Lord Wellington, to learn hi views . . . . . .

13. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool, conveying the sen timents of the Allied Ministers in Paris relative to th course of their proceedings, and suggesting the utilit of a visit of the Allied Sovereigns to England

13. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Wellington, expressing ar earnest desire that he should come to Paris for a short time, and accept the embassy there, upon a peace . . . . . .

14. Mr. Edward Cooke to Lord Castlereagh, conveying remarks on the French Constitution, on the character of the Emperor of Russia, and on our commercial relations with that country . . .

14. Lord Castlereagh to Mr. Liston, stating the general nature of recent events, and enclosing a series of French papers . . . . . .

15. Mr. H. Newman to Mr. Edward Cooke, communicating the arrival of American Commissioners at Gottenburg, and the arrest there of Mr. Gulnpalm, a Dane .

16. Mr. Alexander Gibbon to Lord Bathurst, representing the state of a plantation in Demerary, as connected with British claims on property in that colony .

17. Lord Keith to Lord Castlereagh, communicating information relative to naval matters . . .

Lord Keith to Lord Castlereagh, complaining of restrictions imposed on officers landing by the Commandant of Rochelle . . . . . .

18. Mr. Hamilton to Lord Castlereagh, reminding him of vacant diplomatic posts . . . . .

19. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool, speculating on the difficulties likely to occur in the negociation of peace with France . . . . . .

19. Official Statement of Prisoners of war in Great Britain .

19. Lord William Bentinck to Lord Castlereagh, adverting to proceedings with Murat, and other Italian affairs, with enclosure: . . . . .

13. Le Maréchal de Camp Minutolo to Lord William

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Bentinck, transmitting Extract of a Letter from Murat to Minutolo 4

April 20. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool, expressing a wish that an invitation should be sent to the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia to visit England with the Emperor of Russia 4

20. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool, representing the necessity for the King's immediate and personal presence in France 4

20. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool, reporting result of a conference with Talleyrand . . . 4

20. Lord Camden to Lord Castlereagh, congratulating him on the late brilliant events, as connected with his public character 4

20. Lord Castlereagh to the Lords of the Treasury, recommending an application from Prussia for an advance of £100,000 4

20. Lord Castlereagh to Admiral Young, requesting him to permit certain vessels at Flushing to proceed to England, to transport French prisoners of war to France 4

21. Lord Wellington to Lord Castlereagh, signifying his readiness to serve the Prince Regent and Government in any situation he may be thought fit for . 4

21. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Clancarty, requesting him to apply to the Dutch Government for the release of Baron Malouet, a prisoner of war, then at Utrecht . 4

21. Lord Melville to Lord Castlereagh, relative to the release of French prisoners of war, and adverting to the entry of Louis XVIII. into London, and his further intended movements, with enclosure: . . 4

Statement of the number of Prisoners of war in Britain and abroad 4

22. Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh, referring to the declaration of the garrisons of towns in the Netherlands still occupied by the French, in favour of Louis XVIII., and the intention of the Prince of Orange to visit Paris 4

22. Sir Thomas Graham to Lord Castlereagh, communicating military intelligence . . . 4

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April 23. Lord William Bentinck to Lord Castlereagh, notifying his intention of forming a Provisional Government at Genoa, and Prince Borghese's refusal to consent to the armistice concluded by Bellegarde .

23. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool, referring to the proposed invitation to the Emperor of Austria from the Prince Regent . . . . .

23. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool, transmitting the Convention, and again adverting to the proposed visit of the Emperor of Austria and King of Prussia to England . . . . .

23. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Bathurst, transmitting the Convention signed with Talleyrand for a suspension of hostilities . . . . .

23. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Bathurst, relative to stores sent to Holland for the Prussian army . .

24. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Bathurst, transmitting papers, and copy of an instruction sent to Sir Thomas Graham, with reference to the execution of the Convention .

24. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Clancarty, transmitting copy of the Convention, and instructing him to suggest to the Prince of Orange the expediency of immediate arrangements for occupying such ceded places as belonged to Holland in 1792 . . .

24. Note for Lord Liverpool and Mr. Vansittart, on procuring all supplies of specie abroad through one Agent 4

24. Lord Castlereagh to Sir Thomas Graham, relative to the occupation of fortresses on the side of Holland and the Low Countries, and to other military arrangements, and informing him of Sir J. Hope being taken prisoner, and of the departure of Bonaparte for Elba 4

24. Lord Castlereagh to Sir Thomas Graham, notifying the appointment of Count Kunigl to receive possession of fortresses in Brabant, in the name of the Allied Sovereigns 4

24. Lord Castlereagh to Lord William Bentinck, forwarding copy of the Convention for suspension of hostilities; informing him of the armistice concluded by Welling-

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ton with Soult and Suchet, and of the sortie from Bayonne, in which Sir J. Hope was taken prisoner .

April 25. Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh, referring to the misconduct of officials in the Belgic provinces, and to the oppression of the Swedes and the Prince Royal; notifying the surrender of Deventer, and the Convention concluded with the French Commandant of Maestricht, with enclosures: . . . .

20. Mr. Johnson to Lord Clancarty, relative to the oppressive measures of Baron Horst and other affairs of the Netherlands . . . .

25. Mr. J. Fagel to Lord Clancarty, relative to the conduct of Baron Sack, and the armistice concluded by General Rosen with the French at Maestricht .

Abstract of a Convention for the Surrender of Deventer . . . . .

Convention concluded at Maestricht . .

26. Lord Castlereagh to Lord William Bentinck, forwarding despatch and letters inviting the King of Sardinia to return to his continental dominions . .

27. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool, transmitting an extract from a despatch from Count Zeppolin, the Minister of Wurtemberg . . . .

27. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool, notifying Lord Wellington's acceptance of the embassy at Paris, and adverting to Italian affairs . . .

27. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool, enclosing a letter from Sir Robert Wilson . . .

27. Lord Castlereagh to his Royal Highness the Prince Regent, recommending Lord Wellington's appointment to the embassy at Paris . . .

27. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Bathurst, signifying his welcome reception of Mr. Apsley Bathurst, and adverting to the conduct of the Prince Royal of Sweden and Murat . . . . . .

27. Lord Castlereagh to Mr. Augustus Foster, informing that he had recommended his appointment to the embassy to the Court of Denmark . .

27. Lord William Bentinck to Lord Castlereagh, suggesting the discontinuance of the Italian levy . .

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April 27. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Wellington, expressing his particular desire to see him in Paris . .

27. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Wellington, transmitting copy of a letter from Lord Bathurst, suggesting directions for the movement of cavalry and horse artillery . . . . . .

27. Memorial addressed by the General Council of the Department of the Dyle to the High Allied Sovereigns representing the hardships suffered by the people of that department . . . . .

27. Memorial from the Council General of the Department of the Dyle to Baron Vincent, Governor-General of Belgium, on the same subject as the preceding . . . . . .

28. Mr. Vansittart to Lord Castlereagh, relative to financial matters, and pecuniary arrangements abroad .

28. Lord Melville to Lord Castlereagh, concerning the liberation of prisoners of war, and adverting to the importance of our keeping the Saintes Islands in the West Indies . . . . . .

28. Mr. Edward Cooke to Lord Castlereagh, conveying hints in case of making a definitive treaty . .

28. Mr. Hamilton to Lord Castlereagh, communicating a suggestion of Lord Bathurst's for an additional Article to the preliminary Treaty, respecting prisoners of war . . . . . .

28. Sir Thomas Graham to Lord Castlereagh, relative to military matters . . . . . .

29. Sir J. C. Hippisley to Lord Castlereagh, communicating the assent of Rome to the qualified *Veto*, and to the *regium exequatur* on Papal Rescripts . .

29. Mr. Charles Long to Lord Castlereagh, congratulating him on the glorious events, in the success of which he had taken so important a part . . .

29. Mr. Edward Cooke to Lord Castlereagh, offering hints with respect to a definitive Treaty, and referring to American questions . . . .

29. Lord Castlereagh to Lord William Bentinck, enclosing copy of a despatch to General Campbell: .

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April 27. Lord Castlereagh to General Campbell, containing instructions respecting the cession of Corfu . 4

30. Rev. Dr. Poynter to Lord Castlereagh, transmitting a letter from M. Quarantotti, commissioning him to solicit the interference of the British Government in behalf of the Pope, in order to obtain restitution of the territories wrested from the Holy See . . 4

ADDENDA.

CONFERENCES AT CHATILLON.

Jan. 27. Memorandum by Sir Charles Stewart, representing the different sentiments and views of the leading persons among the Allies 4

Feb. 7. Minute of the Second Conference . . . 4

17. Minute of the Third Conference . . . 4

28. Minute of the Fourth Conference . . . 4

28. The Hon. Sir Charles Stewart to Mr. Cooke . . 4

March 10. Minute of the Fifth Conference . . . 4

13. Minute of the Sixth Conference . . . 4

13. The Hon. Sir Charles Stewart to Lord Castlereagh . 4

15. Minute of the Seventh Conference . . . 4

18. Minute of the Eighth Conference . . . 4

19. Continuation of the Eighth Conference . . 4

ERRATA.

VOL. IX.

Contents, page iii., line 9, for "Brislau," read *Breslau.*

Page 10, lines 2 and 3 from bottom, for "échequier," read *échiquier.*

Page 19, in the heading of Colonel Cooke's letter, for "Stuart," read *Stewart.*

Page 20, line 2, for "petite," read *petit.*

Page 61, line 8, for "loix," read *lois.*

Page 62, line 18 from bottom, for "criée," read *creée.*

Page 71, line 13, for "qui," read *que.*

Page 160, line 17, and page 258, line 5 from bottom, for "tenems," read *tenens.*

Page 196, line 13, for "cette," read *cet.*

Page 199, line 7, for "respect which," read *respect to which.*

Page 214, line 17, for "Minister," read *Ministers.*

Page 265, line 12, for "letter," read *lecture.*

Page 271, line 11, for "traitées," read *traités.*

Page 302, line 17 from bottom, for "agent," read *agents.*

Page 319, line 13 and 14 from bottom, for "le département," read *les départements.*

Page 323, line 3 from bottom, for "forms," read *form.*

Page 393, line 2 from bottom, for "Trignecourt," read *Flignicourt.*

Page 394, line 18, for "Tesmont," read *Lesmont.*

Page 397, line 11, and page 398, line 10 from bottom, for "Mailleret," read *Meilleraye.*

Page 398, line 12, for "discomforture," read *discomfiture;* line 6 from bottom, for "Treffau," read *Treffol.*

Page 399, line 14, for "Mouran," read *Monroux.*

Page 399, line 11 from bottom, and page 404, line 10, for "Jouairie," read *Jouarre.*

Page 401, line 1, for "usefully," read *equally.*

Page 404, line 2, for "Cuencey," read *Quincy.*

Page 435, lines 6 and 7, for "misundertaking," read *misunderstanding.*

Page 446, line 16 from bottom, instead of "from that purpose," read *for that purpose.*

Page 450, line 1, for "Castlereagh," read *Liverpool.*

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES

OF

LORD CASTLEREAGH.

1813 CONTINUED.

ALLIANCE OF NATIONS AGAINST FRAI
CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY; EXPULSION OF THE FRENC THE EMPIRE.

The Hon. Sir Charles Stewart to Lord Castlereag.

Draft. Hanover, January 2

My Lord—The moment previous to my departu Kiel, Baron de Wetterstedt put into my hands the co dence that had taken place on the part of Genera Tavast, who had been sent to Copenhagen by H.R Prince Royal since the arrival of the former in Denm these papers are very interesting, and as they bring t of the negociations up to the time of my leaving the head-quarters, I think it worth while to forward co hence to your lordship, although perhaps Mr. Thornt also remit them.

The extreme alarm that the conduct of Austria in th ciation has created in the Prince Royal's mind will n be allayed, and I cannot help believing that no neg begun on a basis so evidently rotten as this appear long since to have been will ever be attended with fa results. The Austrian Minister seems to have supp

had the means of making both parties yield in part. Denmark giving Drontheim, was to be ensured as to the rest of Norway; and Sweden, receiving Drontheim, was to forego all future claims at a peace: however, the Prince Royal, backed by existing treaties, and the King of Denmark, determined to hold Norway to the last, are neither so easily inclined to yield, and I do not see any issue but a resumption of hostilities.

The war may probably then be carried on in Holstein until the Spring. It will employ a large army, even if the Prince Royal is contented with a defensive warfare. And I feel much surprise and alarm that his Royal Highness does not seem to be considering the magnitude of the enterprise in the manner that becomes a great military mind. He talks of the surrender of Glückstadt, the storming of Rendsborg, &c.; but the means he has produced against the former are really too trifling. He has even obliged the rocket brigade to fire their field rockets, which are completely useless, against the place. He has no efficient siege apparatus, and there is a great want of arrangement throughout his present undertakings. His état-major seems to be dispersed in every quarter.

General Adlercreutz is very ill in the rear; Baron Tavas is negociating at Copenhagen, and Count Löwenhjelm ha been sent to London. The duties have devolved on his Roy Highness's aid-de-camps, who are wholly inexperienced; a from all I witnessed when in Holstein, I cannot help er taining considerable anxiety for the result of his Royal F ness's campaign. The corps of Walmoden is not fit fo field, and since my arrival at this place I have had so representation about it, that I have written another let the Prince Royal, proposing its coming at least to the le of the Elbe, to be placed before Haarburg, relieving Count Strogonow's.

However I might have been desirous to take so measure as to insist positively on the repose so nec these troops, had I proceeded to greater extremities,

doubt the Prince Royal would have availed himself of such a stress on my part to declare Great Britain was deserting him, as well as Austria deceiving him, and he might at once have turned round. I hope, therefore, your lordship will think I have done as much as I could, under the present critical aspect of affairs.

The differences have been so great between the Prince Royal and General Walmoden, that I am afraid they will never go on smoothly. The latter is not of a contented disposition, and the former is by no means an easy character to act with. But to find a remedy at such a crisis is not so easy. Great decisions must be made by the great Allied Powers at head-quarters. To soften differences and to make the machine go on as well as we are able, notwithstanding all the impediments that arise, must be the duty of all employed as myself. I have cautioned General Walmoden, whom I met here, against encouraging the Duke of Cambridge to augment the difficulties in his own mind with which he has to contend. I do not diminish them; they are undoubtedly great. Still, his Royal Highness's great attention, experience, and ability, will very shortly overcome them. Time is all that is required, and to keep his Royal Highness up to the mark. The counsels of either General Walmoden or Decken are not very inspiring; and if I might venture to make a suggestion, it would be that the duke should be armed with *the feeling* that he ought to take more responsibility on himself; and with this I am persuaded business would go on much better, as his Royal Highness is more able than those who surround him.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The Hon. Sir Charles Stewart to Mr. Edward Cooke.

Berlin, April 22, 1813.

Dear Cooke—Since closing my private letters to Castlereagh, I hear from Mr. Jackson, who has been out this evening, that he has seen Hatzfeldt, who is just returned from his mission to Paris. He was sent there, as you will remember, to explain

D'Yorck's capitulation. The account he gives is that Bonaparte will certainly join his army. He does not want for men, and he has got great supplies of horses for his cavalry. But the miserable deficiency he will experience is in the formed material; every thing is new levy, conscript, and indisciplined. The general meeting of officers of state, marshals, &c., at Paris, Hatzfeldt describes, as you have already heard; every one giving his opinion, and Talleyrand alone advising treaty for peace, with the Rhine, Alps, and Pyrenees, as their boundaries. Bonaparte would not hear of any territory incorporated with the French Empire being given up. Count Stadion is to arrive at Dresden in a day or two: this looks well. There is no doubt entertained here of a great (and if great it must be decisive) action in the course of a few days. I do not hear the King of Saxony has taken a decided part.

Tell Bunbury I can procure all the best maps here that are in existence. I will send him a list, next time I write, with the prices, and he had better mark what he wants.

Colonel Cooke leaves this for Stralsund, to meet the Prince Royal on his landing to-morrow.

Ever yours, &c., CHARLES STEWART.

The Hon. Sir Charles Stewart to Lord Castlereagh.

Hamborough, April 28, 1813.

My dear Castlereagh—Being much hurried yesterday, I unable to write to you by the despatches. I now send a lines by post, although we have no news here this mo I could not obtain a farthing of money here, yesterday holiday; so was forced to delay my departure till to-da I hope now to be off in an hour.

The news I gave Cooke, in my private letter of ye as coming from Vienna, was written by Gentz[1] to

[1] Gentz, one of the most eminent political writers of his t native of Silesia; entered at an early age into the civil service which he exchanged for that of Austria, where he proved a

Tettenborn. You know, I dare say, much better than I do, what great influence the former has with Metternich, and what good authority he is. I omitted inadvertently yesterday to mention from whom General Tettenborn's information came.

I hear the Prince of Orange is expected to land with the Prince Royal: the former was not at all pleased with what passed between him and the King of Prussia before he left him; and it is owing to this circumstance that he has attached himself to the Prince Royal.

I am uneasy about our northern friends, Swedes and Danes, and much apprehend that you will have more difficulties to contend with than I think Cooke apprehended. The Danes offered their services here to Tettenborn at a critical moment, when it was believed that Davoust was advancing again on Hamburgh, and when much alarm prevailed. But he gave no encouragement, nor will he let a soldier into the town, which he is putting in a state of defence, without the Emperor's positive orders.

Believe me ever yours, CHARLES STEWART.

Lord Castlereagh to Sir Charles Stewart.

St. James's Square, May 4, 1813.

My dear Charles — I write a few lines by Hope, whose departure has been delayed by contrary winds, although they will probably not reach you as quick as by a more direct conveyance. The state of affairs on the Elbe will not permit us for the present to risk any despatches of importance by that route; and I hope none from your side may fall into the

assistant to Prince Metternich. A decided enemy to the revolutionary principles of France, Gentz wrote the manifestoes issued by Prussia in 1809 and 1813. He attended at the Congress of Vienna, the negociations at Paris in 1814 and 1815, and at all the subsequent Congresses, in the capacity of chief secretary, and drew up the Protocols. He died in 1832, very poor, and, alas! is not remembered as his great talent, and especially in the composition of State papers and despatch writing, deserve.

enemy's hands, as we must be aware how great an object it would be either to the Danes or French at this moment to lay hold of an English courier.

The Prussian Treaty with Sweden is highly satisfactory, as giving a uniformity to the principles of the alliance at a moment when Dolgorueki had thrown us into a momentary embarrassment.

I hope the Convention of Breslau will be amicably explained: my letters to Lord Cathcart will have put you into possession of my views on that question. Count Münster and the Hanoverians appear to me to have taken an exaggerated alarm upon its meaning; assuming that the revenues and territories of all the German States (for example, Saxony, Bavaria, &c.) that might join the Allies, must necessarily still remain under the administration of the Central Council; the revenues, by Article IV., being the property of Russia, Prussia, and Hanover, and not of the sovereign of the particular State. This is a construction too unjust, impolitic, and absurd, to be credible; and I yesterday received a note from Hambro', which proves I was right; for, whilst the Council does take upon itself, and necessarily, to prescribe the rate of duties which shall, for the present, be collected on imports into the Elbe, placing them on the same footing as those in the Baltic ports, the produce of the duties so to be collected is expressly declared to belong to the local Government.

Baron Ompteda's and Count Münster's construction appeared to me to be too unwise to be credible. At a moment when the policy is to encourage converts, provided you believe them sincere in embracing your cause, to announce to them that they could only come in upon the principle of a *temporary* surrender of their authority, subjects, and resources, would be to consolidate Germany against the Allies, and not against the French. At the same time, to admit that hostile States have any claim to change sides *when* it suits their convenience, is to set *up a right* by such change at once to repossess them

of their country and authority, is equally absurd the other way. They can only be allowed to come in upon terms to be regulated with regard to the conduct, circumstances, and presumed politics of each State. The terms ought, however, to be so liberal as to encourage all the States to unite against France, who can be made useful, and preserving to the greater powers an ascendency in this temporary Diet or Council. The considerable Powers, if they unite cordially, ought not to be in fact excluded from a share in this Council, or to be set aside in the internal administration of their own territories; although it may be indispensable that this Council should exercise a summary and unlimited authority, a species of martial law, over all States, to give uniformity and system to their exertions in the common cause. I understand the object is to create a substitute, with powers adequate to the exigency of the moment, for the Diet of the Empire, which cannot regularly exist until there is an Emperor declared, and which body in its ancient power and constitution was much too slow and feeble for the present crisis. I trust the sound principles of action are too obvious to be mistaken. We must trust to liberality, wisdom, and, above all, energy, in their application, and there must be as little jealousy as possible tolerated whilst all depends upon common exertion.

You may show this to Lord Cathcart, with my former letters: it will sufficiently explain my general ideas; their application must be decided on the spot. I have decided to send Thornton as our minister, without delay, to the Council. Baron Bremer is to be the Hanoverian.

In haste, my dearest Charles, ever yours,

CASTLEREAGH.

Ébauche d'une Convention Séparée.

In Sir Charles Stewart's private and secret letter of May 17, 1813.

La disparition et la rareté progressive du numéraire metallique, entrainant des difficultés et des pertes considérables dans

la remise des subsides que sa Majesté Britannique désire fournir à ses Alliés continentaux, pour la poursuite de la lutte présente, il est convenu entre les trois hautes Puissances contractantes, que conformément à l'article du Traité de ce jour, elles émettront de concert un papier fédératif, exclusivement applicable au dépens de la guerre, et remboursable en espèce métallique aux termes et conditions ci-après stipulés.

Article premier. Le papier fédératif, sera signé par trois commissaires des trois hautes Puissances contractantes autorisés à en émettre pour 1,500,000 thalers Prussiens par mois, et jusqu'à la concurrence de 30 millions de thalers sur le pied de 21 florins par marc d'argent fin.

Article deuxième. Les deux tiers de la somme ainsi émise chaque mois seront remis à fur et mesure au Gouvernement Russe, pour le service de son armée et l'autre tiers au Cabinet Prussien pour le service de la sienne.

Article troisième. Sa Majesté le Roi des royaumes unis de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, prend à sa charge, le remboursement de trois sixièmes de la somme émise; Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, le remboursement de deux sixièmes; et sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse d'un sixième. Sa Majesté Britannique se charge cependant envers les porteurs du papier fédératif d'une garantie solidaire et générale pour conférer à ce papier le crédit entier, dont jouissent les créanciers sur la Grande Bretagne. De leur côte LL. MM. reconnoissent expressément que cette garantie ni les libère d'aucune manière de l'éngagement de rembourser leurs quoteparts de la manière et aux termes fixés par la présente Convention.

Article quatrième. Le papier fédératif sera émis par mi lions thalers séparément classés, et numérotés, d'après la da de leur émission et chaque million sera divisé en séries s divisés en un nombre fixe de numéros, de manière que cha billet émis portant en tête l'indication du million dont fait partie et celle de la série à laquelle il appartient a que son numéro dans cette série, ce nouveau billet puisse

foi de la somme déjà émise lorsqu'il sera ajouté à la calculation.

Article cinquième. Si les commissaires jugent utile au crédit du papier fédératif d'en retirer le plus possible de la circulation à mesure qu'il y entrera, ils sont autorisés à ouvrir à cet effet un ou plusieurs bureaux en différentes villes de commerce, où les porteurs du dit papier pourroient l'échanger contre des obligations portant un intérêt d'un demi par cent par mois. Cet intérêt commencera à courir du premier jour du mois qui suivra celui où le dépôt aura été fait; p.e. le porteur dépose le 20 Juin l'intérêt daté dès le 1r Juillet suivant. Ces obligations énonceront le No. du billet auquel elles auront été substitués, et elles seront remboursables lorsque ce numéro sera sorti par le tirage, d'après les stipulations de l'Article VIII. Les sommes requises pour le payement de ces intérêts seront fournis par les hautes parties contractantes dans la proportion de leur quote-part.

Article sixième. Le remboursement du papier fédératif s'effectuera dans la proportion d'un million de thalers par mois, à dater du mois qui suivra les ratifications de la paix générale et devra être ainsi achevé en autant de mois qu'il y aura eu des millions émis.

Article septième. A dater du mois qui suivra les ratifications de la paix, le papier fédératif qui n'aura pas été échangé contre des obligations jouira également de l'intérêt de ½ par cent par mois payable à l'époque du remboursement du capital, tant des billets qui auront été déposés et enrégistrés, que ceux qui ne l'auront pas été.

Article huitième. Pour déterminer les séries que chaque Puissance aura à acquitter dans les proportions stipulées des comissaires respectifs; ils prendront immédiatement, et publiquement, après les ratifications de la paix par un tirage par la voie du sort, c. à. d. qu'on composera 30 numéros. Le premier tirage de 5,000,000 thalers sera pour la part de la Prusse; le second de 10,000,000 pour celle de la Russie; le troi-

sième de 15,000,000 pour celle de la Grande Bretagne. Les séries ainsi determinées pour la quotepart de chaque Puissance, reste à fixer l'ordre dans lequel se fera le remboursement. Pour cet effet, sa Majesté Britannique consent à commencer ce remboursement en payant mois par mois, et à raison d'un million de thalers par mois, la première moitié des millions émis dont les numéros seront sortis de la roue. On procédera de même à fixer par la voye du sort l'ordre dans lequel le remboursement successif des millions restans dans la roue, écheoiera mois par mois à la charge de la Russie, et de la Prusse: si l'on a émis 30,000,000 de thalers, le payement de 15,000,000 acquittables par ces deux dernières Puissances ne commencera à écheoir pour elles, qu'après les mois fixés pour l'expiration du dernier payement mensual de la Grande Bretagne, et à dater duquel la liquidation du papier fédératif se poursuivra mois par mois et toujours à raison d'un million par mois sera achevé dans 30 mois. Chacune des Puissances contractantes se charge de payer les intérêts attachés aux billets l'article 7me, à dater du mois qui suivra les ratifications paix, prenant à sa charge l'intérêt prescrit attaché à des billets déposés dont le sort lui aura assigné le remboursement. Les obligations données en échange seront payées l'époque où l'auroit été chaque billet qu'elles remplacent.

Article neuvième. Le remboursement du capital, ainsi les payements des intérêts, auront lieu à la fois dans la les villes d'Allemagne désignées à cet effet par le comm à l'époque du tirage et pourra s'effectuer au choix des Puissances respectives, ou en argent courant de Prusse du titre et valeur fixés en 1764, ou en argent courant de la ville remboursement aura lieu, ou enfin, soit en piastres d'E soit en argent fin, selon la valeur de l'argent courant d

Article dixième. Les porteurs du papier fédératif a faculté de l'échanger en Angleterre contre des billets quier, et en Russie contre des assignations de banboursables les premièrs six mois, et les derniers 18

la ratification de la paix générale. Cet échange s'effectuera à Londres à raison d'un livre sterl. par six écus, et à St. Petersbourg selon le rapport entre le rouble d'argent et l'écu de Prusse qui à été établi officiellement.

The Hon. Sir Charles Stewart to Lord Castlereagh.

Head-quarters, Würzen, May 18, 1813.

My dearest Castlereagh — Mr. Rouse Boughton having arrived with despatches from Constantinople and Vienna, on his way to England, I avail myself of the opportunity of sending duplicates of my last communications. I have little to add to them, although there never was a crisis more interesting, or probably more replete with important events. As to military affairs, two great armies have now been three days in presence of each other. The Allies determined to meet the attack in the position they have chosen; having weighed all the consequences likely to result from a retreat even to a more favourable one at Görlitz, together with the advantages they have here. I think they have decided wisely, *if they can allure the enemy to take the bull by the horns;* for every retrograde march, in the present position of affairs, prejudices public opinions, and the soldiers have begun to lose their *morale;* and I cannot conceive, from what I have seen of a Russian army, that they can support a retreat in the immediate presence of the enemy pursuing vigorously, with order, or without great loss. I admit the commencement of their campaign may be urged against this doctrine, but I can only argue from what I see.

The ground that has been chosen is open and adapted for cavalry in the centre; on our left flank, we have a range of mountains, similar to those that flanked us on the left at Talavera. Some strong batteries have added to the security of this part of the position. It then extends through some villages which are strongly entrenched, and through the plain

to three commanding hills on the right, which rise abrup
and form strong points; but the ground again beyond is o
intersected by roads in all directions, and I can see no imp
ment to the enemy moving round us here, if their column
infantry can cope against our masses of cavalry in the plai

Reports of their movements are contradictory and va
Yesterday I heard, from an intelligent prisoner, that Bu
parte was in person in the camp opposite Bautzen, that Be
harnois' corps, Marmont's, and troops of the Rhine Confed
tion, were with him, and that he meditated an immed
attack. To-day, from the reports of one of our reconnoitr
parties, they do not imagine that more than 30,000 men
immediately opposite in our front. This calm, however, is
forerunner of some great event; and, before you receive t
the destinies of many may be decided. I am not satisfied w
the interior of things in the Russian army. The Emp
should do one thing or another—either command or l
entirely out of the way. As it is, both his Imperial Maj
and the King mar and confound the arrangements, and t
visible. Wittgenstein, having failed in carrying thin
triumphantly as was expected when he assumed the com
has a strong party against him, being so junior an offi
others serving under him. Barclay de Tolly, who comm
at Borodino, and under whom Wittgenstein served,
yesterday, and is placed *en second*. This is a strong c
cabal is not surprising.

The Prussians are in good order under their Allies
Portuguese are in the Peninsula with us, and the Ki
be compared to our Portuguese Marshal, who attend
great Star, which puts the whole in motion. Depre
from public and private misfortune, the King liv
secluded with his *aide-de-camps* and staff; and Hard
I have already told you, is in the hands of Stein a
rode, and remains with the Bureaux now at Görli
Stadion's arrival, these Ministers have been har

forming new notes, in which the terms of pacification and mediation are laid down. Lord Cathcart being, I conclude, *au fait* at all that is going on, and having the intention of writing to you fully, it is better for me, not knowing anything officially, not to enter into any detail imperfectly. Lord Cathcart seems confident of Austria; and accounts from Vienna, after the battle of Lützen, (knowing the retreat of the Allies) make no difference.

Stadion, in the interview I had with him, talked of Prince Schwarzenberg having very much expedited the preparations. Their two armies in Italy and Bohemia he estimated at 150,000 men. He regretted the necessity of the Allies having passed the Elbe; declared it his opinion they should now fight the enemy, and gave me the impression that he conceived that the more battles that were fought the better for Austria.

The 1st of June is the time fixed for the Austrians moving. Still the fate of the armies may be decided before that period. It is a curious game for a great nation to play—to procrastinate, I fear, by futile negociations, which, to judge from the past, will never avail, and thus lose the only opportunity ever afforded her of acting with effect. If her troops were to *débouch* now—and why should they not? for it is absurd to suppose a *large force* must not be ready—the French dare not advance. What policy but a deep game can keep her from acting instantaneously, if she really desires to be effectual? It is troops in the field that will procure peace, and not Stadion with the gout at our head-quarters, and Count Bubna in Buonaparte's camp. (I understand he arrived at Dresden on the 15th with a similar mission to Stadion's.) I may calculate all this erroneously, and those behind the curtain may know more. But it is so like the game Austria played before, it is difficult not to have doubts.

Our subsidiary Convention proceeds slowly. I send you, in a separate private letter, the substance of what has occurred since my last. I do not foresee that my ideas, as before detailed

to you, will not be borne out and warranted by the ultim
issue. I have the points with Prussia chiefly to fight mys
as Lord Cathcart thinks them less momentous; indeed, t
whole of this has been very dilatory, and I see no end to
but this is not my fault.

A report, received last night at the outposts from an offi
who was made prisoner, states that the main body of t
enemy has passed on routes that bear upon Cüstrin a
Frankfort.

May 19t

Lord Cathcart having delayed Mr. Rouse Boughton ena
me to add the intelligence of yesterday. The enemy h
moved on different routes towards the Oder. The corp
Regnier is at Lückau and Lübben. Buonaparte himself,
Victor, is stated to have marched on Berlin. If this in
gence is correct, and it came from the King of Prussia's *a*
camp, I do not comprehend our remaining long here.
should march to our right, and attempt something offensi
ensure our communications. The amount of our force in
tion is not more than 70,000 effectives; we have from 6
900 pieces of cannon.

The Russian and Prussian note contains, I hear, a go
of mummery. Hardenberg has not yet given it me: it
sent to Paris, and then to Buonaparte, and on its ret
Austrian declaration is to be issued. This, however, w
a fortnight or three weeks, and much may happen in the i
It is rumoured that General Sacken has had an acti
the Poles, and it would argue that that country is in
rection, and would join France.

Your news from the Lower Elbe you will have mor
from Mr. Cockburn, so I shall not touch upon it.

M

I am enabled, by the further detention of Mr. Bou
send you in an official letter the accounts of Barclay

success on the evening of yesterday. *Au reste*, we are in *statu quo*.

Another conference on our Convention took place yesterday evening. The points of contention that principally exist are—

1st. As to the force to be kept up by Russia and Prussia. The latter would accede to 100,000 men. The former wishes to confine her number to 150,000 men. I know not how her quota will be approximated in the discussions to 200,000. Lord Cathcart with every exertion will not get it up, I fear, to more than 170 or 180,000 men. Prussia will then only agree to be pledged to the half. They both wished to take the numbers of the Treaty of Kalish as their mark.

2nd. Our two millions are specified to be payable in London. They urge the payment on the Continent, and insist on knowing how and where they are to be paid, whether in *pièces sonnantes*, or in paper. We have no detailed instructions on this head. I instanced Sweden, and said I conceived the subsidy not taken in effects would be paid in a similar manner.

3rd. The differences I have already mentioned in my letter of the 17th on the federative paper. They press the *solidarità* and credit of the whole five millions to be taken by Great Britain, she having the separate guarantee of the other Powers for their quota: and this they say has been intimated by Count Lieven; "the returning the paper on our market against bills of Exchequer" they have given up.

4th. The Hanoverian objects. Hardenberg withdrew his first unofficial *projet* of a secret and separate article, and presented another, of which I enclose a copy (A). I strongly remonstrated, and urged against his having gone to a certain length, and that he now was retreating instead of advancing. He declared he had at first not consulted the King; having done so, he found him quite impracticable. I declared I must be so too. He then took back this article, and presented me No. 2 (B), and this is the shape in which it stands. Nessel-

rode says Russia has done all she can, nor do I believe it can be brought nearer our wishes.

Hardenberg pressed me again on a Treaty of Alliance, offensive and defensive, and said, if we have not been at war, the restitution of Prussian ships taken must take place; besides, other arrangements were necessary. To all I replied I had no authority; but anything he gave me in a formal shape I would transmit home.

I have gone into these details *privately*, and perhaps unnecessarily, indeed before any joint mode of communication and representation with Lord Cathcart has been fixed on. But they will mark out the course of proceedings, and enable you the earlier to send your ideas on points that may not ultimately be carried through as we wish; and, if I have touched in any degree on any part of the Russian arrangements with which I have no concern, it has arisen entirely unintentionally, and merely to give you, *privately*, as much information as possible.

I hope my having foreseen and written very early from Dresden on all the chief difficulties we are now coping with will furnish instructions from home so much the sooner.

Ever, my dearest Castlereagh,

Yours most affectionately,

CHARLES STEWART, Lieut.-General.

[Enclosure A.]

Article Séparé et Secret.

Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie ayant dans ses transactions avec la Prusse mis expressement en réserve les droits de la maison de Brunswic-Lunebourg sur le Hanovre, s'y engage encore d'une manière plus positive par le présent article secret. Il promet en outre de s'employer efficacement au moment de la paix, de procurer en Allemagne à la dite maison une acquisition territoriale d'une population de 250 à 300 mille âmes.

[Enclosure B.]

Article Séparé et Secret.

La sureté et l'indépendance de la Prusse ne pouvant être solidement établies qu'en lui rendant la force réelle qu'elle avoit avant la guerre de 1806, Sa Majesté le roi des Royaumes unis de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande s'engage par le présent Article séparé et secret à ne pas poser les armes, aussi long tems que la Prusse ne sera point réconstituée dans des proportions statistiques, géographiques, et financières, conformes à ce qu'elles étoient avant l'époque précitée. Sa Majesté contribuera à l'aggrandissement de la Prusse si les succès des armées alliées le permettent, et dans tous les arrangemens il sera conservé entre les différentes Provinces qui doivent rentrer sous la domination Prussienne, l'ensemble et l'arrondissement nécessaires pour constituer un corps d'état indépendant. Par contre Sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse qui dans ses transactions avec la Russie, a déjà mis expressément en réserve les droits de la maison de Brunswic-Lunebourg sur le Hanovre, s'engage à coopérer de toutes ses forces à faire restituer à cette auguste maison ses États héréditaires, et à lui procurer également un aggrandissement convenable par une acquisition territoriale, dans laquelle, s'il est possible, et sous la condition expresse que la Prusse en soit dédommagée autre part, l'ancien évêché de Hildesheim entrera, et qui dans tous les cas ne sera pas moindre que d'une population de 250 à 300 mille âmes. On consultera à l'égard des arrangemens à prendre l'intérêt des deux hautes parties contractantes et surtout celui qu'elles ont d'établir une union parfaite et stable entr'elles pour leur commune défense.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Cathcart.

Foreign Office, May 20, 1813.

My Lord—Upon the conclusion of the Treaty of Stockholm, the Prince Regent thought proper to address a letter to the Prince Royal of Sweden, copy of which is enclosed, also copies

of one from myself, with the Prince Royal's reply. I send this correspondence for your lordship's information, in case you should have occasion to refer to it.

Lieutenant-Colonel Cooke to General the Hon. Sir C. Stewart.

Stralsund, May 21, 1813.

My dear General—General Hope has desired that I would make known to you his arrival, as well as the extreme pressure of business which prevents his entering for the present into a full detail of the objects of his mission. He begs, however, to refer you, in the present state of haste in which he has been obliged to conclude his despatches, to Lord Cathcart, who will be most fully instructed upon all those heads which he would naturally have otherwise communicated to you.

He further desires that I will state for your information the measures which, in the present state of events, he has deemed it advisable to adopt with reference to the completing the equipment of the Mecklenburg cavalry and infantry, under the command of Count Walmoden.

In the first place, the *immediate* wants of Walmoden have been remedied by an order in which Lyon was directed to give up the following articles:—

500 muskets;
160,000 rounds and ball;
10,000 flints;
750 } rounds of ball and grape for six-pounders,
250 }
with a full quantity of implements and port-fire fuses, and matches for eight guns.

And for the completion of the Mecklenburg troops, the Prince Royal of Sweden has agreed to abandon such quantities as ma be required for that purpose, out of the stores for the 12,0(men of the German Legion landed here.

The General desires me to remark that no further aid c

be granted, in his opinion, from the stores actually destined for this Legion, until we can learn the amount of the stores coming from England by which they may be replaced; neither would he have taken upon himself to break in upon General Lyon's stores, but for the urgent representation of General Walmoden.

I add herewith five letters which Lord Castlereagh directed him to forward; he will communicate with you fully, and wishes for the present that I should not be removed.

I believe the General's *aid-de-camp*, Captain Brown, will deliver this, and receive any orders that you may deliver upon his return.

Ever, my dear General, HENRY COOKE.

I have given Mr. Addington money to carry him on. I beg that you will forward me an order for such money as I may want, either upon General Hope or Mr. Thornton.

Colonel Cooke to the Hon. Sir Charles Stuart.

Stralsund, May 22, 1813.

My dear General—Some Swedish troops have moved towards Hamburgh, with a view of creating a diversion. The Mecklenburgh troops under Walmoden, cavalry as well as infantry, having been organized and sufficiently instructed to act in the field, have made several applications for swords, pistols, and firelocks.

General Hope, considering the immediate necessity of enabling Walmoden to bring them into play, has prevailed upon the Prince Royal to give up such cavalry appointments out of the 12,000 stand of arms for infantry and cavalry as may be sufficient to cover immediate wants. He has also desired that I will order Lyon to give up 500 muskets, and sufficient shot and grape for eight six-pounders British, acting in the field, as well as 260,000 ball cartridge. This is to answer the immediate demand of Walmoden's troops, who are actually engaged,

and in great fear of failure in their ammunition. He (Walmoden) is desirous of having a *petite depôt* formed within a few days of his general line of operations.

Lyon will collect the whole of his goods at Wismar, after perils and marches as useless as ridiculous: he has fortunately saved his treasure, 7,000 guineas, out of Hamburgh, which Mr. Parish had in charge. I am now quite adrift, and under new hands. General Hope brings me a letter from Lord Castlereagh, in which he requests that I will consider myself at General Hope's disposal, until he shall return to England. I do not complain at this, but it is not what I expected, and I had calculated upon serving only under you: however, Hope is a most perfect gentleman, and an amiable man; and, provided you wish it, I will remain, or when you think I can be of service to you, am I to consider myself belonging to you, and consequently correspond confidentially and officially? Am I to consider my original instructions as *still in force*, as far as concerns my intercourse with you, always obeying Hope? I should conceive in the affirmative.

I am very desirous of hearing from you. The Duke of Cumberland left us yesterday: he says that he will await the arrival of the Emperor's instructions at Strelitz; but I rather suspect that he will go on to Berlin, as I know two of his *aides-de-camp* are already gone.

Mr. Thornton, whom I have never been able to enter into any conversation with, lives at the Island of Rugen, and comes over in the day. His child has got the hooping-cough, and his wife an overflowing of milk. I therefore calculate upon very little means of communicating with him: *au reste*, he is mild, amiable, and good-natured, and I really like him.

Pozzo di Borgo is charming. You will see him ere you get this letter. I wish you all joy of the Duke's arrival: for he seems very much attached to you, and will therefore sacrifice some few hours of the day to your society. Since four o'clock yesterday morning I have not had a single moment to myself.

He has, however, done good by his manners and conduct towards the Prince Royal, who appears highly satisfied with him.

In haste, my dear General, ever yours most sincerely,

HENRY COOKE.

The Hon. Sir Charles Stewart to Lord Castlereagh.

Imperial Head-quarters, Schweidnitz, May 31, 1813.

My dear Castlereagh—Our operations have been conducted counting with implicit faith upon Austria: we have fallen back concentred, and have committed ourselves to a narrow strip of country, where existence for 120,000 horses and an army becomes very doubtful. We have abandoned Breslau, the direct communication with Kàlish, and have thus given Poland over to Bonaparte's influence, and all for Austria; and still she does not declare. Bonaparte's force, still manœuvring on us on our right, forces us back. He is playing with us with armistice and negociations at the same time, and there is no head here that is able to cope with his subtlety and military proceedings. This is a true picture. We made a show here, but we retreat again to Strehlen and Neisse to-night. An offensive movement on Bonaparte's flank in the plains with all our force, when we consider our superior cavalry, might possibly arrest him in his march on Breslau, and *I* certainly should attempt it. But if, as is asserted by those who counsel the movements, Bonaparte has his two corps, of 60,000 men each, disposable for separate or connected operations; and if, while we were engaging one upon Liegnitz, another from Breslau might press in upon us, or *vice versâ*, and if the risk for our numbers is too great, an armistice is our only alternative. Reasoning, however, on a more favourable view of things, believing Bonaparte will always make more of his measure than we will, conceiving Bülow operating in the rear might produce panic while we attacked the flank, guarding as much as possible the line by Czenstochau, I confess I should be for making a

demonstration, at least, of the offensive. If it is true we are not more than 60,000 men, the attempt might be desperate. Nevertheless, if we do not act boldly now, all will be lost. You will find fault with me, very likely, when I say in confidence I am by no means pleased with the manner things are going on, both in the councils and in the field. Lord C. I hope will give you satisfaction. But he cannot get through business as you do, depend upon this. I refer you *au reste* to all I have scribbled to Cooke.

Ever yours most affectionately,

C. S.

My King is very much out of sorts.

The Hon. Sir Charles Stewart to Lord Castlereagh.

Imperial Head-quarters, Reichenbach, June 6, 1813.

My dear Castlereagh—The news we send home is not the best, and, from what I see, I fear political treachery and the machinations that are in the wind more than any evils from Bonaparte's myrmidons. We must keep a sharp look-out, especially since our refusal of Austrian mediation. We are not considered (from all I see going on) in the Cabinet.

The accounts from Hamborough and Stralsund are bad. I fear the Swedes will go, and Bonaparte gets 20,000 Danes in the North. However, we shall trim him yet, if we can confine him to fair fighting.

The Prince Royal has not been managed as he should have been by Russia, and if the Emperor does not lower his tone, Bernadotte will yet seize Finland. The disorder in the Russian army is great; Prussians are infinitely better. They have everywhere greatly distinguished themselves, and will do much more in a little time. You cannot send them too much ammunition and arms. Russia rides the bear over them, but they are obedient and patient, and I will pledge my faith for theirs although the Germans will not burn *their Moscow*, and l waste their country, still they will be true; and Prussia

not be the first power that will withdraw from English alliance. I trust Parliament will be up before the bright hopes in England are the least overclouded. At all events, Wellington must send you a victory to bruit forth with the armistice.

I cannot help thinking the great personages of the drama here will meet, and Metternich will attempt some *family* alliances to aid the object of peace. If things turn to a Congress, and if you acquiesce in sending a negociator, pray select a very able man. Depend upon it, he will be required. I fear military diplomatists will not be quite satisfactory to you. Mr. Disbrowe says he is going to Vienna. You will want a devilish clever fellow there, and I am afraid he is too inexperienced. I have seen enough in a little time of the windings and turnings of diplomatic chicane to fear. I do your business very imperfectly, and therefore I may be allowed to express my doubts of others.

Now, one word as to my little establishment. Bidwell has been a treasure to me, and I should be unjust if I did not assure you how highly satisfied I am with his exertions. However, as John James has distinguished himself much, and is improving rapidly in experience, I should be glad he should be appointed private secretary under such allowance as is usual. If this took place, I think I could soon spare Bidwell; but I should be glad the order for his return came from you, as anything of this nature from me would appear as if I did not appreciate his services. As Mr. Addington has also joined me, and as there are many amateurs here all requiring open house, I could dispense with Bidwell, useful as he is. Jackson has been at Breslau, in the rear. I have sent for him now here, and shall leave him, if I go to Stralsund; if not, I shall probably send him to Breslau, to pick up all he can.

God bless you! I have time for no more by this opportunity.

Ever yours most affectionately,

CHARLES STEWART.

General Dumouriez to

Samedy, 12 Juin.

Monsieur et cher ami—Voicy une letttre que j'ay reçue du Col. Rapatel; elle est de vielle date, et la face des affaires est changée depuis dans la partie où il guerroye sous le brave Général Dornberg, qui doit en ce moment être réuni avec les Suédois ainsi que le Comte de Valmoden, le Duc de Brunswick les débris de la légion Anséatique, et les insurgés de la basse Saxe. Je crois même que le corps du blocus de Magdebourg, commandé par le Comte de Woronzow, doit avoir pris la même route; se trouvant coupé de la grande armée Russe depuis ses retraites successives jusqu'en Silésie.

Le Prince de la Couronne de Suède, par la jonction de tous ses corps, quand il aura rassemblé tous ses Suédois en Poméranie, se trouvera à la tête d'une armée respectable, surtout s'il est joint par un corps de Russes, qui, d'après les Gazettes, lui arrive sur 300 transports. J'en doute, et cela me parait un peu tard. Mais je doute qu'il puisse porter cette armée sur l'Elbe, laissant derrière luy une armée Danoise, qui pourrait, avec le corps de Davoust, non seulement l'inquiéter par sa droite dans le Lauenbourg, mais en passant la Trave près Lübeck, lui couper sa retraite sur Stralsund, s'il était poussé par un corps considérable, que Buonaparte ne manquerait pas d'envoyer sur le bas Elbe contre luy, s'il lui voyait faire un mouvement en avant. Cela est d'autant plus probable que certainement, en marchant sur la Sprée, après l'affaire de Würschen, il doit avoir poussé au moins une division sur Stetin, pour le délivrer, et fermer toute communication entr les Suédois et les Russes, d'autant plus que les derniers, dirigeant leur retraite sur Schweidnitz, s'éloigne[nt] encor la Baltique et du bas-Oder. Ainsi, je crains de ce côté inaction forçée, à moins que Bernadotte n'employe ses fo contre le Dannemark, qui serait une épisode qui n'aurait a rapport à l'objet principal, et dont on aurait à se repen

jour, comme je pourrais le prouver facilement, si je voulais m'engager dans une discussion politique et militaire à cet égard.

Certainement les affaires de nos Alliés vont très mal, et si on continue les plans qui ont amené, pendant cette campagne, la crise actuelle, je les regarde comme désespérées, la Prusse anéantie, et les Russes chassés même de la Pologne, avant la fin de l'année.

Hé bien, je regarde les affaires de Buonaparte comme plus désespérées que celles de la Coalition, si on ne perd pas de tems, et si on veut prendre, dans le moment même, le parti de tirer sur le champ l'armée Suédoise de la Poméranie, pendant qu'on a tous les transports nécessaires, et l'envoyer en Hollande, ou en Normandie, où il n'y à ni troupes ni soupçon de danger. Il y a bien longtems que cette idée sublime occupe toute mon attention. Malgré son apparence de témérité, elle est plus prudente, plus simple, et moins dangereuse, que tout ce qu'on peut luy substituer; et son exécution est simple et facile. Oh, pour le coup, elle couvrirait de gloire notre Cabinet, et changerait toute la face de la guerre, en arrêtant le progrès du tyran, en délivrant l'Allemagne, qu'il serait forcé d'évacuer, pour accourir, peutêtre trop tard, avec une armée épuisée et mécontente, à la défense du cœur de ses États, contre un ennemi maître de la mer, et par conséquent de sa retraite, si elle devenait nécessaire. Communiquez ce plan à vos Collègues; il est digne de leur attention: mais, soit qu'on l'adopte, ou qu'on le rejette, il n'y a pas un instant à perdre.

Je ne suis pas de l'opinion de Rapatel sur l'efficacité de Moreau pour changer le sort de la France. Il a de grands talents, mais il est épicurien, très attaché à sa femme et à son enfant. Il a consenti à les envoyer en France, et ce sont des ôtages qui arrêteront ses mouvements et sa bonne volonté, si elle existe.

Quant aux Bourbons, il y a beaucoup à dire pour et contre. Ils ne peuvent rentrer que par un mouvement spontané de

la nation, et en ce cas le mouvement général l'emportera sur les préjugés pour et contre.

13 Juin, 1813.

Monsieur et cher ami—Je vous avais expédié ma lettre avec l'incluse du Col. Rapatel, lorsque j'ai reçu celle que je vous envoye du Duc d'Orléans à son ami le Duc de Kent. Je la trouve si importante que je vous prie de la communiquer à vos collègues, ainsi que ma lettre d'hier.

Plus les affaires du nord de l'Allemagne prennent une tournure fâcheuse, plus, à ce qu'il me semble, notre Gouvernement doit redoubler d'efforts pour changer la face de la guerre, en employant tous ses moyens et partout à la fois.

J'ay toujours regardé une descente partielle en Italie comme un coup décisif, facile, et sans inconvénient. Le danger et la dépense sont médiocres. Son importance, même en cas que le succès ne fût pas complet, est incontestable. A la vérité, on a diminué les facilités de l'exécution de ce plan, par l'envoi qu'on a fait de l'armée Anglo-Sicilienne à Alicant, où elle est peu utile. Mais comme, d'après cette lettre du Prince, et certainement d'après les rapports de Lord W[illiam] B[entinck] l'esprit public est assez mûr, et le dégarnissement de troupes Françaises en Italie est assez sensible pour profiter du moment avec les moyens qu'on a, qui, malgré leur médiocrité, sont suffisants pour une première tentative, qui doit être de former un établissement naval et militaire à Orbitello, en avant de la presqu'île de Porto-Ercole. Cet établissement n'exige que trois ou quatre bataillons Anglo-Siciliens. En huit jours il peuvent rendre cette position imprénable, d'où, en répandan en Toscane et dans l'Etat Ecclésiastique 50,000 armes et de proclamations, on produira facilement une insurrection to autour de soy, et on aura un pied stable en Italie. Il ne f pas 8 jours pour se bien retrancher; et il faut plus de te Murat pour se disposer à attaquer cette garnison, qui d'ail n'a rien à craindre, ayant ses transports à portée et la

libre, soit pour recevoir des secours, soit pour être retirée, si sa présence ne produit pas une insurrection assez considérable pour être soutenue.

Une fois cette tête de pont établie, on aura le tems d'y renvoyer ou l'armée d'Alicant, ou des troupes d'icy même. L'effet de cette diversion inquiétera Buonaparte en répandant la désertion dans ses troupes Italiennes, tant en Allemagne que dans la Peninsule: elle sera utile surtout à Lord Wellington. Son effet sera considérable aussi en faveur des coalisés. Si sous peu de jours Mr. Lamb peut partir avec plein pouvoir pour Lord W[illiam] B[entinck] de suivre ses plans, surtout si on peut envoyer quelques transports, ou d'icy, ou de Lisbonne, ou de Cadiz, ou même d'Alicant, le plan est infallible en Juillet, et d'avance, en l'annonçant aux puissances coalisées on leur rendra leur énergie, si elle est diminuée par leurs revers, et on rompra toutes les mesures de médiation et de pacification qui leur sont présentées comme une amorce pour les paralyser, ou les desservir, et qui seraient leur perte absolue, si elles produisaient une armistice, dont Buonaparte profiterait pour avancer ses places d'armes et ses magazins, se faire renforcer par tous les membres de la Confédération du Rhin, à qui cette faiblesse des Alliés donnerait une nouvelle force, et dicter ensuite ses loix, ou conquérir avec de plus grands moyens.

Si, en même tems que cette diversion s'opérerait en Italie et que la campagne se ferait avec vigueur en Espagne, on adoptait le plan que j'ay proposé hier (qui n'est pas de moy, mais de Scipion l'Africain), si on transportait subitement, et d'une manière inattendue, l'armée Suédoise sur les côtes de Hollande ou de Normandie, le théâtre de la guerre se trouverait entièrement changé ainsi que ses chances; l'Allemagne serait délivrée presque sans coup férir; et la France se trouverait ou menacée ou attaquée sur toute sa frontière orientale, depuis les bouches du Rhin jusqu'à la Seine. La diversion en Italie prendrait encore plus de consistence; l'Espagne serait nécessairement évacuée. Notre armée dans la Peninsule serait réduite de

moitie; et ce qui reviendrait *at home* serait disponible pour partout où on aurait besoin.

Ce plan sublime, en opérant le salut de l'Europe, la rentrée des Français dans leurs limites naturelles, et la chûte du tyran, qui, soit par la guerre telle qu'elle est conduite, soit par la paix telle qu'elle peut être faite au milieu de ses victoires, augmente sa force et sa soif de conquêtes et de déstruction—ce plan procurerait le bien de notre patrie, et une gloire aussi immortelle que juste à notre Gouvernement. Il répondrait à toutes les attaques que le Cabinet va éprouver de ses détracteurs sur le traité de la Suède, qui est très attaquable, si son subside est dépensé sans une utilité qui balance sa cherté. Certainement ce sera le cas, si cette armée reste nulle en Allemagne, où elle ne peut rien changer aux circonstances, et ne peut que fournir des victimes de plus, surtout vû l'éloignement continué des armées Russo-Prussiennes, et l'interruption absolue de toute communication entr'elles et l'armée Suédoise.

Ce plan est simple, facile, et grand—Lord Caselreagh a souvent fait l'éloge public de ma sagacité, nommément en 1805. Hé bien, je lui réponds sur mon expérience de la réussite, si on se détermine sur le champ, et si on exécute la descente en Hollande ou en France d'icy au 15 de Juillet. Mandez moi, non vos secrets ministériels, mais ce que vous en pensez, et rendez justice à mon zèle ardent.

The Hon. Sir Charles Stewart to Lord Castlereagh.

Reichenbach, June 19, 1813, midnigh

I think, my dear friend, your table will be pretty covered with despatches by this conveyance; but, unles give me some free agency and a messenger or two to be und control, you will have all your news two or three week than you ought to have. Lord C[athcart] takes two consider a despatch, and two to write one, and he neve to think till other people have done. Now this may s

the wisest results, but certainly not the most expeditious details. If I were to send a despatch unknown to him, and he were to discover it, there would be an end to our harmony.

I hope you will get us through our Treaties; it is best to show *something* done, even under doubtful circumstances. Had we finished as we ought, and as I would easily have accomplished a month since, we should have been able throughout to play a higher game, and the armistice might have been more combated.

I read Lord C. my despatch. He objected to my statements of Russian disinclination to numbers, but he could not controvert them, or make me alter them. He also said he should give his detail, as he is not quite satisfied. I have worked of late to forward their measures by myself. It will, I hope, however, all be right. I suppose you will say, as heretofore, that my views are gloomy.

God be with you!

Write to me, and don't abuse me, for *your* cuts go deep.

Ever yours,

CHARLES STEWART.

The Hon. Sir Charles Stewart to Lord Castlereagh.

Berlin, June 28, 1813.

My dear Castlereagh—I have your note of the 11th. I am sorry to be so much in the dark. But believe me it is not for want of exertion. I see you have not my originals and Cathcart's from Colberg; this may prove to you, as well as other circumstances, that, if I had free action, I should be of more use to you in sending early intelligence. You may reckon with certainty on my accounts of numbers. I think it best policy to tell you the truth. Our weakness in force is our only excuse for the armistice. Lord C. is desirous of being as agreeable as possible to the Emperor of Russia. This, in the long run, will be seen. As long as you employ me, I will do

my duty conscientiously. The results will always prove where I am in error.

I send you a publication of *Stein's* as to the new state of things for Germany. I think you may like to get it translated and published in England.

In haste, ever most affectionately yours,

CHARLES STEWART.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Cathcart.

Draft. Foreign Office, July 6, 1813.

My dear Lord—After my public despatch of yesterday was signed, Captain Charles arrived with the treaties and letters to the 17th inclusive. In the present conjuncture, I deem it of so much importance that your lordship and Sir Charles Stewart should be in possession of the sentiments of the Government upon the great outline of our policy, that I do not detain the messenger, and shall reserve what relates to your last communications to accompany the ratifications by another courier.

Not having yet had time to bring the subject regularly under the consideration of my colleagues, I can only now state that your lordship's and Sir Charles Stewart's conduct in concluding the treaties at the period they were signed is fully approved. I must leave to your joint discretion what use it may be advisable to make of the instruction herewith sent: much must depend upon the circumstances of the moment. If negociatio is not at an end, and hostilities renewed (which if determined in the spirit of concert and exertion, and especially with Austr would, I am satisfied, prove the wisest as well as the sa policy for Europe in the long run), you must guard agai Continental peace being made to our exclusion. Impractical on our part might hazard this, notwithstanding our tre which might not have the force to resist the menace b French and Austrian hostility; for this purpose, our r

to treat with our Allies must be avowed, that they may have no reproach to make against us. The four points on which we must separately insist as *sine quâ nons* must be distinctly put forward, nor can they complain of any one of these; they were notorious from the first both to Russia and Prussia; and, in good faith and fairness, all their assurances as well as their engagements not to make a separate peace must have been made in full contemplation that we had no possible option as to the points in question. With respect to others, which, in truth, involve the whole question of Continental policy, we must contend for as much as the Allies can be brought to stand to with firmness and spirit. But it is in vain to suppose that we can inspire the determination, if it does not exist. We may animate by our counsels as well as by our example, but we must avoid the appearance of idly pressing them against the grain. Such a line might weaken our influence, and would incur the responsibility of whatever disunion or failure followed.

The great practical question is a renewal of hostilities or a prolongation of armistice. When our Allies know what is indispensable on our part, and have made up their minds on what is essential to themselves, they must then consider what is the prospect of France agreeing to these demands, and, if agreed to, of observing her engagements. If the accomplishment of a reasonably solid peace, through negociation, is not clear, *hesitation* in recurring to hostilities will damp and disunite the confederacy, and the resources of the Allies will be wasted in inactivity; better in that case try the fate of war for the remainder of the campaign, and let future policy be governed by the result.

The recent successes in Spain have put *us* on strong ground. We can now with honour evince a disposition to concur with our Continental Allies in negociations; having done so, we shall act our own part with more effect, if fortune or our friends should forsake us. Lord Wellington's successes may now give

us the title to treat for our Allies, the Spaniards, with the possession of the Peninsula on our side; to hazard such an advantage by showing a reluctance to negociate, whilst Russia and Prussia are negociating under the Austrian mediation, could not be borne out as a line of separate policy. The risk of treating with France is great, but the risk of losing our Continental Allies and the confidence of our own nation is greater. We must preserve our own faith inviolate to Spain, Portugal, Sicily, and Sweden. We must maintain our most important conquests, employing others to improve the general arrangements on points which are not likely to be carried by other means; and with respect to the Continent, we must sustain and animate those Powers through whose exertions we can alone hope to improve it, taking care, in aiming at too much, not to destroy our future means of connexion and resistance.

As I shall have occasion to write to your lordship again in a few days, I shall now confine myself to this outline, leaving it to your lordship and my brother to regulate your conduct as may appear to you most for our honour and interest. I have sent to Sir C. Stewart copies of my public and private letter of this date, with directions to regulate his language in concert with your lordship.

Believe me, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

PS. Your lordship can alone judge what extent of confidence as to our views it may be advisable to make to Austria. My last despatch will have enabled you to open a direct commun cation, and I hope *to improve it.*

I have confined the claim in my public despatch to t restoration of Hanover, properly so called. The *arrondi ment* must rest upon the understanding with Russia Prussia.

Lord Castlereagh to the Hon. Sir Charles Stewart.

Draft. Foreign Office, July 14, 1813.

My dearest Charles—To save time, I must again send you my letters to Cathcart as your guide. As this will probably find you at Stralsund, I beg you will put Thornton in possession of my views, that he may make such confidential communications from the British Government to the Prince Royal as he may think right. You will be able, I trust, from him to disprove your ciphered anecdotes. I believe it is the same story we had from Hamburg long since. The person alluded to is *Seigneul.* Ask Mr. Thornton about him. Thornton shall receive by the next messenger copies of the mediation instruction.

I shall send by the same conveyance an instruction to you, approving of D'Ivernois' plan for a separate paper to be issued on our own credit to the extent of two and a half millions, limiting the monthly instalments to one million of thalers for both Powers. Vansittart and I wish to suggest for consideration whether it might be more advisable, after you and Lord C. have settled details with R[ussia] and P[russia] as far as you can, to send D'Ivernois to England with your instructions. The Convention might be finally signed here by Lieven—Jacobi, and myself, and Sir Fr[ancis D'Ivernois] will get the notes, &c., executed here, ready to be handed over monthly to the respective Powers.

The Prince is very well satisfied with your Hanoverian arrangements, as are his Royal Highness and his Ministers with your general conduct: so you must continue to work hard and endure all details.

I enclose copy of a letter to the Duke of Cumberland, also one for Münster: you must try to reconcile the Sovereigns at headquarters, to let him witness as a volunteer what is going on. He cannot have a command, and, to guard against jealousy, it is better he should not be with the Prince Royal. I think

you had better apprise the Duke confidentially of Lowenhjelm's language. It will put him on his guard.

We have nothing later than the 26th from Wellington, when he had invested Pampeluna. Murray writes that the approach of Suchet with 20,000 men induced him to re-embark for Tarragona, leaving part of his battery train. I hope we shall soon send you good news from Spain.

I am, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Cathcart.

Draft. Foreign Office, July 14, 1813.

My dear Lord—The enclosed letters will explain themselves; and I have to beg that you will manage as well as you can for the Duke. Command is, I conceive, out of the question. To see service as a volunteer is all that can be looked to; and, as there might be some risk of the Duke being entangled in some *tracasserie*, if he shall attach himself to the northern corps, in which Hanover and Walmoden would make an additional difficulty, I wish you and my brother could facilitate his being permitted to witness the Russian and Prussian operations in preference. Your lordship perhaps has heard Lowenhjelm's language, which obviously referred to the Duke, and, if listened to, might do harm. CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Cathcart.

St. James's Square, July 14, 1813.

My dear Lord—I cannot omit again impressing upon yor lordship the importance of awakening the Emperor's mind the necessity, for his own interests as well as ours, of perem torily excluding from the general negociations every mariti question. If he does not, he will risk a misunderstanding tween those Powers on whose union the safety of Europe rests. Great Britain may be driven out of a Congress, bu

out of her maritime rights, and, if the Continental Powers know their own interests, they will not hazard this.

It is of great importance to strip any negociation between America and us even of the *appearance* of foreign intervention. The Emperor, if he knows anything of England, must be convinced that no Government dare surrender the right of search for enemy's property, or British subjects: that the only question is, whether it can be so regulated by municipal laws, and regulations, as to the mode of conducting the search, and accounting for the person so withdrawn from the ship searched, as to guard against abuse, so far as this may be found practicable: there is every disposition to meet the question fairly, but the mere fact of an arrangement being made through the intervention of a third Power would probably decide the nation against it. You must, therefore, press London; and, if that cannot be managed, you will consider Gottenburgh as a *sine quâ non*. Any place near the Russian Court, or the seat of other negociations, would give to our refusal of the mediation the air of a shabby pretence.

CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Cathcart.

Draft. Foreign Office, July 14, 1813.

My dear Lord—It may be proper I should mention to your lordship that I have read over to Count Lieven my instructions to you relative to the Austrian mediation, and our views as to peace, also that which relates to America. Knowing this fact, and that the Count writes to his Court by the present courier, your lordship will regulate your communications accordingly.

I see no objection to your allowing the Emperor to peruse *in extenso* my public despatches on these subjects, with such remarks as your lordship may think fit to accompany them.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Cathcart.

Draft. Foreign Office, July 14, 1813.

My dear Lord—I send by the present messenger authority to accept the Austrian mediation, if the state of affairs should continue, in the judgment of our Allies, to render it expedient. I consider the official letter before addressed to Count Metternich as a sufficient authority to accredit your lordship for this purpose, coupled with the subsequent instructions, explanatory of our views with respect to a general pacification. In the present stage of the discussions, it is impossible to give full powers to treat and to conclude. We must know more of the basis on which the Continental Powers are prepared to negociate before we can finally instruct a Minister to act for us. At present, I conceive more is not required than that some accredited person should be prepared to enter into explanations on the part of the British Government, in like manner as Count Nesselrode and the Chancellor Hardenberg have hitherto done on the part of their respective Courts.

Your lordship will feel the importance of ascertaining clearly the Continental basis before we can say a word as to particular cessions; beyond the mere admission of the principle, we cannot advance till this is known. I trust that such will not be the case; but we are justified in supposing it *possible*, *at least* that the basis agreed to by the Continental Powers under the Austrian mediation might be so defective as to afford no temptation to Great Britain to make a sacrifice of *any* of her conquests for the purpose of giving effect to such an arrangement. We must, therefore, know the nature of the object aimed at before we can judge what it becomes us to do; and this course is the most likely to render our support useful to our Allies. You must make the Emperor feel that we cannot advance money for armistices, and that it is, therefore, of more importance to bring matters to a short issue.

Baron Jacobi expressed a wish that the acceptance of the

Austrian mediation should be notified by Wessenberg. This I have declined, considering it of moment to leave to our Allies the discretion as to the mode of bringing this forward; besides, without the explanatory despatches, the fact of acceptance could lead to no proceeding, and these, even in cipher, I should be sorry to expose to a passage through France. This reasoning has convinced the Baron that his suggestion was not well considered.

Believe me, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Cathcart.

Draft. Foreign Office, July 28, 1813.

My dear Lord—The messenger with your despatches to the 8th inclusive arrived yesterday. I hope Lord Wellington's progress and victory will have animated the councils at Trachenberg, and induced Austria to take a more decisive tone. Of all the Powers, Austria will be the first sacrifice of an inadequate arrangement; and if, with the present means assembled against France, she cannot erect an adequate barrier for her own preservation, she ought never to have emerged from her servile relations to Buonaparte; but I can add nothing to what I have already said on this subject.

Lord Wellington writes in great spirits: he is consolidating his position in the Pyrenees, and will be regulated by the course of the great Powers on the Continent in his future operations. Both Clausel and Suchet are pointing homewards.

Your lordship has already been informed that my brother's report of the battle of Bautzen was published in the Gazette, having been received some days before your lordship's account of that event reached England.

I hope you have obtained copies of the papers the substance of which is given in your No. 67. I am very glad you have sent Sir R. Wilson on an inspection to the rear. With every proper respect and confidence in our Allies, we must see with our own eyes, and not be too scrupulous in checking numbers. CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to the Hon. Frederick Lamb.

Foreign Office, August 6, 1813.

Sir—I enclose to you a letter from his Royal Highness the Prince Regent to the Emperor of Austria, accrediting you to his Imperial Majesty, as his Majesty's Minister Plenipotentiary, in the event of the absence of the Earl of Aberdeen from the Court of Vienna, in which case you will present the letter in the form usually practised on similar occasions. I also enclose to you a copy, and am, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

His Royal Highness the Prince Regent to the Emperor of Austria.

Sir, my Brother—Having judged it expedient under the present circumstances to confer the rank of Minister Plenipotentiary on our trusty and well-beloved the Honourable Frederick Lamb, our Secretary of Embassy to the Court of your Imperial Majesty, during the occasional absence of our right trusty and right well-beloved cousin the Earl of Aberdeen, Knight of the Most Ancient and Most Noble Order of the Thistle, I request that your Imperial Majesty will give entire credence to all that the said Minister Plenipotentiary shall communicate to you on our part, more especially when he shall represent to your Imperial Majesty the assurances of my sincere esteem and affection for your person, and my ardent desire to cement more and more the union and good understanding which so happily subsist between the two Crowns.

I am, in the name and on the behalf of his Majesty,

Sir, my Brother,

Your Imperial Majesty's good Brother,

GEORGE P. R.

Given at the Palace of Carlton House, August 6, 1813.

Lord Castlereagh to the Hon. Sir Charles Stewart.

Copy. Foreign Office, August 7, 1813.

My dear Charles—As soon as Lord Aberdeen takes charge of the King's affairs in Austria, you will either withdraw or transfer to him any agents you may have stationed there.

I have great doubts as to Mr. Horne being suited to that destination: his resentments against Count Metternich seem to disqualify him for any temperate inquiry in matters which concern him. Mr. Addington will no longer be required in that quarter, and as Mr. Thornton is without any civil assistant, and as his duties are of sufficient importance to warrant my attaching a suitable person to him to perform the duties of a Secretary of Legation, with the usual emoluments, if this destination should be acceptable to Mr. Addington, I beg you will direct him to join Mr. Thornton without delay.

Believe me, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

PS. I shall apprise Mr. Thornton of my intentions of attaching Mr. Addington to his mission whilst he remains on the Continent, and you will communicate with him upon this subject.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Cathcart.

Copy. Cray Farm, August 7, 1813.

My dear Lord—We have just received your account of the Trachenberg Conferences, which, with the letter from the Emperor of Austria to the Crown Prince, renders the whole of that proceeding a most important and, I trust, auspicious incident in the Continental drama. The *dénouement* of the plot is yet a matter of anxiety. I trust, however, the impulse which has been given will not yield to nominal concessions.

I should hope, if the Austrian terms were not opened by Metternich at Dresden, that the Emperor is yet free to insist upon an arrangement more consonant to the general interests. The events in Spain not only justify, but require his Imperial Majesty, as a mediator, to alter his terms. He must see how

fatal it would be to all, were he to separate his cause from that of the other Powers. Neutrality must exhaust his resources as much as war; and, if Buonaparte should triumph over the others, his own fate is sealed. My despatches of the 6th and 14th of July must have arrived in full time to enable your lordship to bring our claims forward. It is impossible that Russia and Prussia can hesitate in standing by the four points that we have made *sine quâ non*. I can as little conceive that Austria, assuming the task of mediating *a general peace*, can reject demands so just and moderate in themselves. This will in itself so largely extend the preliminary base, as materially to diminish the chance of Buonaparte yielding. Besides, if he could bring himself to stoop so low, the Allies would, of course, not take this upon trust, upon a mere paper engagement. They must, in common sense, before they sacrifice the whole season for acting, require some substantial securities, such as the retreat of the French armies, and the restoration of the Prussian fortresses. Here will be a new stumblingblock. I can hardly conceive it possible that the Conferences at Prague can, under present circumstances, end in peace, if the Allies are true to themselves and to each other. Buonaparte has had a severe lesson; but, whilst he has such a force under arms, he will not *submit* to any arrangement which even Count Metternich could have the face to sign his name to, as providing "on solid principles for the repose of Europe."

Lord Aberdeen leaves town to-day for Yarmouth, and will lose no time in joining your lordship. I have acquainted Baron Wessenberg in general terms of his being charged with a mission to the Emperor.

Our latest news from Lord Wellington is of the 19th ult. His left was then besieging St. Sebastian. He had blockaded Pampeluna, chiefly with Spaniards. He was giving his army rest, which they much wanted after their fatigues; and waitin for Lord William Bentinck's bringing up the right. Whe last heard from, he was at Valencia, following Suchet, who w

retreating. Clausel had retired by Jaen. Before Lord W. forms his future plans, he must know what is to happen in Germany; his whole policy must be governed upon that of the Allies. He writes in great spirits, and the Continental Powers may rely upon his doing his best for them. Fatal would it be for them, and for the world, if they could for a moment think of seeking their safety in what is called a Continental peace. We have done wonders in the Peninsula; but don't let the experiment be tried of a single combat again in that quarter. We *may* sink before the undivided power of France: and if we do, Germany, and even Russia, will soon resume their fetters. We are protected against this evil by the obligations of good faith; but we are also protected against it by the plainest dictates of common interest. We have now the bull close pinioned between us, and if either of us let go our hold till we render him harmless, we shall deserve to suffer for it.

Believe me, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

The Hon. Sir Charles Stewart to Sir Francis D'Ivernois.

Reichenbach, August 12, 1813.

Sir—In consequence of a communication which I have received from his Majesty's principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, I have the honour to acquaint you that the British Government are desirous that you should proceed to England, for the purpose of arranging and bringing into action the plan of the paper money, on which you have already thrown so much light in the communications that have taken place between us. I have communicated on the subject of your departure with Lord Cathcart, who entirely approves of the same, although his lordship has not received, as yet, the formal instruction which I have reason to believe from Lord Castlereagh he will receive by the next courier. My object is, as much as possible, in this interesting moment, to forward with rapidity every measure connected so largely with the public interests as the financial measure in question.

At a Conference last night, between the Russian and Prussian Ministers, Lord C., and myself, the principle was agreed on that England is to issue, on her own credit alone, two millions and a half instead of the five millions as a federative concern which was first in agitation.

An *ébauche* of a Convention has been drawn up by Russia, the principle founded on the plan which you first originated; and it was read last night. M. le General Pozzo di Borgo will send you this *projet*. Besides this, it is the intention of the Prussian Government to send M. de Niebuhr to England on their part to assist in the details of the arrangement. Your own plan, as originally laid before me, and the knowledge you have of all the ideas on this subject, here render any instructions wholly unnecessary. The principle agreed to here, all further details can be settled much better in England, and the Convention signed there.

Sir Henry Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh.

Cadiz, August 19, 1813.

My dear Lord—I hope to be able to send by the next packet the information which your lordship requires in your private letter of the 22nd of July. I am much inclined to think that it will be advisable to support the interests of the Princess of Brazil, upon certain conditions, which I shall submit to your Lordship's consideration in my report upon the present state of Spain.

Nothing can be worse than the state of affairs at Cadiz. It is thought that the new Cortes will not comply with the late decrees for their assembling here; and that they will not assemble at Madrid of their own authority. I own I am of a different opinion. Such a step would require more energy and decision than I believe is to be found in the country. It is to be expected likewise that all the Deputies of the new Cor who are of the same way of thinking with the Liberales v readily assemble at Cadiz, where they are certain of the s

port of the people. If, however, in spite of the late decrees, the new Cortes should assemble at Madrid, and should appoint a new Government, which I conclude would be their first step, I shall feel considerable difficulty in deciding upon the line which it would be right for me to take, but should of course avoid taking any decided step without instructions from your lordship.

I understand that the Regency are satisfied with Lord Wellington's last letter of the 7th of August, and that this business will be settled in a manner satisfactory to him. No answer has as yet been returned to my note, which, I am persuaded, has produced a good effect, although I am told that I am to expect an angry reply.

I know not how far your lordship may be disposed to approve the appointment of M. Pizarro; he certainly possesses talents, and, if I am to trust to his assurances, he will not give any trouble; indeed, he appears to me to consider it to be his interest to conform himself entirely to the wishes of the British Government.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

H. WELLESLEY.

Mr. Edward Thornton to Lord Castlereagh.

Belitz, August 30, 1813.

My Lord—Although I might have regarded myself as authorized, by your lordship's letters of the latter part of last year, to have gone to a much greater extent on the subject of money than I have done in my despatch No. 98, of this day's date, yet I was unwilling, after so long an interval has passed, and under circumstances so very different from what they then were, to go farther even for this service, which appears to me most essential, without your lordship's special consent. Yet I am not sure that, in the long run, it may not appear right to your lordship to renew to me this authority according to circumstances.

I found the other day that the P. R. had engaged himself towards[1] the French commander of Breslau, if he will deliver up that fortress, to pay him one hundred thousand Hamburgh dollars. I am quite sure that it is utterly out of his own power to do this; and he may perhaps find the means of acquitting himself of this engagement, with the assistance of Prussia. That, however, is not probable; and his own power of doing it diminishes every day, in proportion as other daily engagements in the course of his command, and such indeed as are the natural consequences of that command, press upon all his means.

Your lordship will easily comprehend what I mean, but I do not wish to speak plainer, even writing by a special messenger in these times; and I have not time to put all which I have to say in cipher. I will endeavour to find a moment of more leisure. I have the honour of being, &c.,

EDWARD THORNTON.

Lord William Bentinck to Lord Castlereagh.

Tarragona, August 31, 1813.

My dear Lord—You will see, by my despatch to Lord Bathurst, that I find myself compelled, by the accounts I have received from Lord Montgomerie of the state of affairs in Sicily, to relinquish the command on the eastern coast of Spain, and to return to Sicily. When I accepted the joint situations of Commander of the Forces in the Mediterranean and Minister in Sicily, I never imagined that the duties of the one would have been incompatible with those of the other. But so they have hitherto proved. From one day to the other, I have been constantly in the hope of being able to leave Sicily but I am now convinced that such is the weakness of the Hereditary Prince, and such will be the incapacity of any set

[1] The remainder of this sentence is in cipher, the explanation of which is given on a separate paper that accompanies the letter, headed by a remark in pencil, "Evidently a mistake of the ciphers."

men who may be placed at the head of the Government; such also the silly, the interested, and depraved character of the people, it will be impossible for the British Political Authority ever to absent himself from Sicily.

It is quite otherwise in Spain and in Sicily. In the former, there seems the greatest jealousy of British interference; but in the latter, both prince and people desire the protection and direction of the British authority, and are satisfied they cannot go on without it.

If this opinion of the necessity of the constant residence of a British Minister in Sicily be correct, I hope your lordship will allow me to ask to be relieved of my political charge. I prefer and I wish to follow my profession. I should be happy to retain the military command separately in the Mediterranean; or, if it is thought necessary to unite both appointments in one person, I should then anxiously desire to give up both; and my humble prayer would be to be appointed a Lieutenant-General on the Staff of the Portugal army. But, as a military man, I feel that I am losing both the right and fitness for military command in remaining in a civil situation, when such active military service is going on, and when the greater part of the army which I myself command is employed in it. Excuse my troubling you so much at length about myself. I remain, &c.,

W. BENTINCK.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Cathcart.

Draft. Foreign Office, September 1, 1813.

My dear Lord—Your letters of the 12th were most acceptable. However sanguine you had taught us to be on the issue, we were nevertheless deeply anxious.

I approve entirely of your holding your hand on the mediation, when my despatch reached: the authority to do so was given *en prévoyance* of the case, as the acceptance was acceded by Great Britain to the formal request of the Allies.

I wish you to ascertain clearly whether any and what basis of alliance between the three great Powers has been laid at Prague—I should be glad to know *how and when* your lordship was first informed of the interview with Murat. I have the greatest confidence and admiration of the Emperor; but I do not like his concealing anything which is in progress from your lordship, of which there has been a striking instance recently, although I am sure from no bad motive. When it can be done without unnecessarily retarding business, if the sentiments of the British Cabinet cannot be consulted, the opinion of their Minister on the spot should be taken previous to decision. Engagements of secrecy against us are of bad precedent, and must not be. I advert to this the rather because I believe both the treaties with Prussia were signed before your lordship saw them.

As the fact of our being prepared to accept the Austrian mediation is now known to all the Allies, I presume your lordship did not attempt to conceal it from Austria when at Prague. I am not aware of any objection to a full disclosure in that quarter. Our line was friendly and respectful to that Court, and I am sure Metternich will not complain that your lordship saved him from the embarrassments of the disclosure at the eve of the rupture.

I rather expect Bonaparte, notwithstanding the resumption of hostilities, will have sent a *contre-projet* to Austria, if possible to embarrass. Metternich seems to have outmanœuvred him. It was said a certain not very popular Minister in Russia saved his country by tempting the enemy to speculate upon his weakness and his influence: perhaps a speculation of the same nature may have produced another false calculation—would that it may lead to as signal a result!

Our latest news of Lord Wellington is to the 19th—the armies quiet—the attack on St. Sebastians about to be renewed with augmented means. Till both Pampeluna and St. Sebastians fall, the army must act on the defensive.

The news from Prague was telegraphed to a vessel at Plymouth in readiness, which instantly sailed with a fair wind. It was received in London on the 26th, and has reached Lord Wellington by this time. The *Moniteur* is yet dumb both as to the defeat of Soult and the rupture.

CASTLEREAGH.

Mr. Edward Thornton to Lord Castlereagh.

Rödighe, Saxony, September 5, 1813.

My Lord—I ought in justice to General Moreau, the intelligence of whose wounds has excited the greatest possible sensation here, and has been received with the sincerest grief, to mention to your lordship, in confidence, that he was averse from the movement of the combined army upon Dresden, as he himself has declared in a letter which he wrote to the Prince Royal—I cannot say whether before or after this lamentable event, for I have not seen the letter. The Prince Royal has, however, received a letter from him since, as I conclude; for the letter which I take the liberty of putting under this cover, addressed to Mrs. or Mr. Jackson, is written by General Moreau himself since his wounds, and contains a letter for Madame Moreau. I trust your lordship will, on such an occasion, forgive me for requesting that it may be carefully forwarded. Baron de Wetterstedt gave it to me to-day.

I trust your lordship is satisfied with what has been hitherto done by the Crown Prince, considering all the difficulties he has had to contend with. With Magdeburg, Wittenberg, and Torgau, fortresses on the Elbe, against him; with Stettin, Cüstrin, and Glogau, on his left flank, Davoust on his right flank; as well as the garrison of Magdeburg under Gerard, and an army almost equal to his own, on his front, he has been enabled to save Berlin, and to defeat all the projects of the enemy on this side of the Elbe, with a loss, on his own part, of little more than two or three thousand men; while that of the enemy has been at the least five times as great. I

entertain confident hopes that, on the other side of the Elbe, he will act a still more conspicuous part.

I beg your lordship to believe me to be, &c.,

EDWARD THORNTON.

PS. I understand Vandamme was the mortal enemy of Moreau: it is some consolation that he is in the power of the Allies. E. T.

Brück, September 7, 1813, 8 A.M.

2nd PS. I detained the messenger till this morning, for the purpose of giving your lordship the result of yesterday's engagement; but I think it not advisable to keep him longer for further details, as the other intelligence of which he is the bearer is of the greatest interest. I learn from a Saxon Commissary, who is brought a prisoner here, that the great combined army has again advanced from Bohemia, and that Chemnitz, Nossen, and Wilsdruck, are again occupied by them.

I beg to mention to your lordship that I have authorized the agent who is employed about the affair of Cüstrin to extend the term up to the end of this month. It appears that the vigilance has been so strict since the end of the armistice, as to put it out of the power of the persons employed to get a communication with those within, though they entertained hopes of being successful; and the Prince Royal, to whom I spoke on the subject, conjured me earnestly to continue to cultivate every possible chance of success, which would be of the utmost moment to the general cause. E. T.

Mr. Edward Thornton to Lord Castlereagh.

Jüterbock, September 8, 1813.

My Lord—I cannot allow myself to conceal an instant from your lordship what has been observed to me on my arrival here, and what I must communicate to your lordship on the information of others, though it will place me most strictly on my guard for the purpose of acquiring some from my own

observation. As I lay this before your lordship solely in the most entire confidence, I have no scruple of naming my authority, trusting that it will not be allowed to go further.

On my arriving here this morning, the first person I spoke to was General Pozzo di Borgo, who desired to talk to me alone, and who then gave me to understand that, in the operations of the day before yesterday, he thought he had discovered an extreme repugnance in the Prince Royal to give a decided character to the events of the day, and, in fact, to terminate the campaign on this side by the total defeat and destruction of the hostile army, which he (General Pozzo di Borgo) declared to have been completely in the power of the Prince.

He said that the march itself of the Swedish army was not conducted with the celerity which it might have been done with, and which the urgent and pressing demands of General Bülow for support absolutely required; but that, when the Russian and Swedish armies arrived on the ground, there was so much hesitation in giving the orders to advance, so much doubt and change of ideas, so much moving of the person of the Prince Royal from one place to another, without any apparent fixed plan, that the attack on the enemy was delayed for three or four precious hours, which would have been more than sufficient to ensure their destruction, while the Prussians were sustaining the shock alone, though with very great losses.

I have myself thought I observed, as well in the affair of Gross-Beeren, of the 23rd ult., as in other movements of the armies since, a sort of repugnance to expose the Swedish army to any great check or serious loss; and this, I think, may be in a certain degree accounted for, perhaps even excused, by the peculiar situation of the Prince Royal, as well as of the Swedish troops, although it may be carried too far; but I observed to General Pozzo di Borgo that there was a great distinction between a desire to spare the Swedes, and a desire to spare the French; and I asked him what was his opinion

upon this point. He answered to me that he thought there was something of both these sentiments which actuated the conduct of the Prince; but he gave it unequivocally as his opinion, that the repugnance to decide, and, in fact, to finish the contest the day before yesterday, actually did exist, whichever of the two motives might be predominant; and he cited to me the opinion of all the general officers almost to the same extent, and in the same way.

I have not yet talked with any of them—General Vincent, Baron Krusemark, General Suchtelen, or even Baron Adlercreutz—upon this delicate subject, not easily finding an opportunity to-day, and indeed wishing rather to hear, if possible, the spontaneous observations of these officers, than to commence the conversation by remarks which must necessarily indicate an informant, as I could not in my place have the means of personal observation. But I shall leave no efforts unexerted to come to the bottom of the subject, and I then certainly shall try to open myself upon it to the Prince Royal directly, or through the medium of Baron de Wetterstedt.

When I first entertained the suspicion of a desire to spare the Swedes, I took care to mention the idea to one or two persons, who would repeat it to the Prince; because I am quite sure, from what I see of the ardour of the Swedish officers and soldiers, that he will gain as little with them by this repugnance, as he would with the Allies by a similar forbearance towards the French. The former are extremely mortified at having no share, as is hitherto the case, in the military events of these days; and I could see that very plainly to-day in Baron Adlercreutz, who declared to General Pozzo di Borgo, in my hearing, that if the Swedes and Russians had acted, or had acted in time, the whole French army must have been destroyed. General Pozzo di Borgo has already written confidentially to the Emperor, as have General Baron Vincent and Baron Krusemark, to their respective sovereigns, so that

it is still more necessary to make your lordship acquainted with these suspicions.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

E. THORNTON.

Lord Castlereagh to Mr. Edward Thornton.

Foreign Office, September 24, 1813.

Dear Sir—I need hardly say that your private letter gave me much pain, for, whether founded or not, the impression which prevails with respect to the Prince Royal's recent conduct is in itself a calamity, and a great diminution of his Royal Highness's essential means of rendering great public services. You have acted very properly in not withholding from me a knowledge of this circumstance. I shall not, however, till I hear further, impart the communication, except to Lord Liverpool.

You will be aware of the extreme importance of secrecy upon this subject; for it is one of those cases in which, if a decisive step is not called for, every endeavour should be used, whilst due vigilance is observed, to bury the impression in oblivion.

I am glad to observe a corps of Swedish troops have since been placed under Bülow's command: this is a judicious measure in itself, and calculated to remove the most innocent of the two imputations; and I think it is this point upon which the Prince may most safely be made to feel that comments *have been* made. The charge of any supposed tenderness to the enemy implies so much, that it cannot be hazarded whilst he is to be supported; and I yet must indulge a hope that this impression may have been effaced by his Royal Highness's demeanour in the subsequent operations.

I deemed it advisable to-day, in congratulating Mr. Rehausen on the victory, to express my regret that the Swedes should not have been more prominent; and I took the liberty, as feeling deeply interested in the personal glory and character of the Prince, to mention to him that, the Prussians having happened more than once to have the whole thrown upon them,

even in presence of the Swedish troops, I felt it my duty to intimate to him that this had occasioned comments, and that he would do well to apprise the Prince Royal confidentially of it.

In approving of the step you have taken towards myself, I cannot in fairness blame your military colleagues for not concealing it from their respective Courts: I wish, however, the secret was not in so many hands. I have always lamented the Prince Royal's intercourse with Paris, as giving a double aspect to his politics. I have supported him from a belief, founded on his conduct throughout the Russian war, that he was sincere, and from a conviction that the best means of making him so was to uphold him against those who distrusted him. His hostility to Buonaparte cannot be doubted upon any ordinary rule of conduct. His weak side, I should fear, is a desire to make a party in France and in the French army. If an explosion can safely be avoided, it is of the last importance it should not be hazarded at such a moment. The effect would be most injurious to the cause. His name and talents as an officer, his successes, his Swedes even, are of the greatest importance. He must be stimulated to renewed exertions, and made to feel that he has lost in point of impression by not exposing his own troops more.

I don't know that I can add more on this most delicate and important subject, than to desire that you will be vigilant without betraying distrust, and, if possible, preserve to his Royal Highness the means of being useful. At the same time, till all reasonable doubt on this head is allayed, I trust the military combinations may not materially augment his command.

I am, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

Mr. Edward Thornton to Lord Castlereagh.

Zerbst, September 26, 1813.

My Lord—Since the departure of the messenger from Jüterbock, on the 8th of this month, I have had none till this time

to whom I could give my letters, with perfect confidence of their reaching your lordship's hands in safety. Immediately after the departure of that messenger, I was at pains to discover from Baron de Krusemark and from Baron de Vincent what opinion they entertained of the events of the 6th; how far there was a real delay in the support of the Prussian troops by the Swedish and Russian, which had the effect of saving great part of the French army; and whether they could penetrate the motive of this conduct to be any desire of saving the French army, or of sparing the Swedish troops. On the latter of these motives, I must observe that, if it existed, it is very ill advised and ill-judged on the part of the Crown Prince; as the major part of the Swedish officers and troops—Baron Adlercreutz himself particularly—are furious at having been kept out of action, in a manner which almost reflects disgrace on them: for it has so happened that they have not been yet fairly in fire since the commencement of hostilities.

I found Baron Krusemark and Baron Vincent perfectly *d'accord* as to the fact of the delay of bringing the Swedish and Russian troops into action, and of the effect of that delay, which, consuming to the Allies two or three hours' more daylight, saved, in the same degree, the more complete rout and capture of the enemy's army. The former, however, on my putting the point to him, could not, he said, bring himself to believe that this conduct arose from any other motive than that of an extreme caution and prudence on the part of the Prince Royal, though he feels, in common with all the Prussians, that they have been exposed to the whole brunt of these battles. Baron Vincent, I rather think, entertains more suspicions of the Prince Royal, and feels more in the same way with General Pozzo di Borgo; but he himself is extremely cautious and measured, and would not be easily induced to hazard himself much on a point which depends so much on opinion.

If I were to form a judgment from the tenour of my own

observations, made after the departure of my letters to your lordship, and in part before, I certainly should be inclined to ascribe this conduct of the Prince, in a very considerable degree, to the motive assigned to him by General Pozzo di Borgo, and to believe that a reluctance to push the French troops to extremity, and to exterminate them when occasion offered, did really form a part of the system of the Prince in the views which he may have towards France (for views he certainly has). On my first seeing the Prince Royal at Jüterbock, after the battle, there certainly appeared a consciousness about him of having done something for which he could not give a satisfactory explanation; and this is evident from the tone of eulogium taken in the bulletin towards the Prussians, as a sort of amendment for his conduct.

A day or two after the departure of the messenger, being alone with him, and talking incidentally over the events of the battle, he observed some French prisoners in the street, wounded, and in waggons, whom the Swedish soldiers were helping into the house. "C'est inconcevable," he exclaimed to me, "que la tendresse avec laquelle le soldat Suédois soigne les prisonniers Français! Quel *instinct!*" He then checked himself, as if he had said too much, and your Lordship will, I think, be of that opinion; for the word was an extraordinary one to be used and to me.

In the course of the same morning, other persons being present, he said he would show me a letter which he was going to write to the Maréchal Ney, for my opinion of it, and which he thought might have a good effect. It appears that an aide-de-camp of this General, named Clouet, had been made prisoner in the battle of Dennewitz; and the Prince Royal thought this a good occasion to address a letter to Ney, mentioning the capture of his aide-de-camp, and promising every attention to him which the merit of belonging to so distinguished a captain could entitle him to. The last paragraph of the letter was to the following effect—that, for twenty years past, they had been

ravaging Europe with continual wars; that it was time for the world to have repose; and whether it was not possible, with the aid of such men as himself, to procure it.

On a common occasion, I should have paid little attention to this letter, and should have regarded it as having no more than the avowed object of exciting a sentiment of discontent against the war in a person of so much influence as Ney, and perhaps of gaining a partisan. But my suspicions were excited by all that had been intimated to me, and I was not very willing, at any rate, to countenance an intercourse which might extend much further than to its ostensible object. I therefore expressed myself against the sending of this letter, observing that, as the turn of the last paragraph might be construed into a sort of pacific overture, I thought it would be much better that any such overture should only be made in concert with the other Allied Powers. He answered this observation with a good deal of vivacity; uttered the word *suspicions*; said he would not send it; but that I did not know the French marshals and the French military, and he did; and the letter was calculated to have a good effect on them. I did not deny that, but persisted in the first observation I had made.

The letter was not then sent; and at Coswig, a few days after, he gave orders, in my hearing, that it should be sent by a trumpet to the other bank of the Elbe, and to the nearest *French* quarters; but I am not certain that it was ever sent. The letter, I have since learned, was shown to the other gentlemen whom I have had so frequent occasion to mention, and who approved of this intercourse as little as myself; but they did not think it right to make any observations upon it to the Crown Prince.

The evening on which this conversation passed at Jüterbock, the French aide-de-camp of the Prince, M. Camps, whom I have much more reason to regard as not attached to the cause for which he is fighting, was sent to Berlin—a circumstance which excited new suspicions. But, with all the means

of inquiry I have been able to set on foot, I cannot find whether he had an interview with the aide-de-camp of Ney.

As I have learned, however, since, and from good authority, it should seem that the attempts made upon this man, of whatever kind they were, have not met with a very courteous reception. The money which M. Camps sent him was received without an acknowledgment; and I learn from a good quarter that, the Prince Royal having offered him his liberty upon his parole, this offer was received with an impertinent remark, that he did not thank him for it, as he expected very soon to be released by the arrival of his companions in arms at Berlin. It is added to me, from the same authority, that the Prince was so much offended with this impertinence, that he ordered the aide-de-camp to be sent as a prisoner into Russia.

I should not have troubled your lordship with all this narrative, if it did not tend to show that the Prince Royal has certainly some views towards France, and beyond Sweden, in what he is doing. I never doubted that he had certain views of personal ambition, which, if they even went so far as to the place of Bonaparte itself, could not but even be turned into account, provided his mode of attaining them did not influence unfavourably his conduct while acting with us. If he can aid Europe to unthrone its present oppressor, he will do a great service; but it is very material that, in the pursuit of his own views, he should not be allowed to endanger the failure of ours: such as would be the act of sparing a French army in his power, lest he should render himself unpopular in France. Whether this is really his system, I have as yet no further ground for supposing; but it must be counteracted by every possible means.

The other gentlemen, Military Commissioners here, wish to regard the delays which have hindered and which still hinder the passage of the Elbe, as some indication of the same unwillingness to proceed directly against the French; but I can hardly see this in the same point of view. Your lordship will

have the accounts of the state of the Grand Army in Bohemia much better than I can, and may perhaps learn the reason of an inactivity which, if not interrupted by an attack of the enemy, has continued through this whole month; but to me it appears that this inactivity, so dishonourable to such an army, which allows itself literally to be besieged in the mountain passes of Bohemia by detachments from the French army, is sufficient ground for the inactivity of this army, which could not, in common military prudence, throw itself on the other side of the Elbe, without the possession of a single strong point on its banks, unless it was sure of being supported in its movements by the operations of the Bohemian army. This state of things has been the cause of the *Mémoire*, which has been sent with my despatches of this date, and in which, I think, your lordship will agree with me that the question is very fairly put.

Your lordship will see, by the orders of the day which I transmit, a transposition of a part of the force blockading Magdeburg, in order to join it to the corps of Count Wallmoden, for the purpose of attacking Marshal Davoust and eventually the Danes. This division of force towards objects which may be regarded as the peculiar views of the Prince Royal and of Swedish interests is cited as a proof of the wish of the Prince to draw off from the general cause towards the accomplishment of his own views, and perhaps it is so: but why do the Allied Sovereigns, by their own inactivity, force him into the same state, and invite an active and restless spirit to seize the occasion of pursuing his own advantages? He would not, perhaps, though the object is of great importance, if the movements of the Grand Army gave him scope for combination of plans and co-operation in their execution.

The question of these orders gave occasion to a scene, the day before yesterday, of a most violent kind, as I learn; for my illness has prevented me, for eight or ten days past, from assisting at these discussions. General Pozzo di Borgo, it appears, was the day before yesterday preparing, in concert

with the other Military Commissioners, to put some questions to the Prince on the subject of these detachments, and perhaps to make some remonstrance against them; when the Prince, suspecting that there was a settled plan to counteract him, or offended that his views against the Danish troops should be penetrated, flew into a most violent passion, and allowed himself to speak of himself and of the Allied Sovereigns in a tone and language which, as it was represented to me, I have never yet witnessed, and which disgusted every one present. As his vivacity cooled, he went into the other extreme, to counteract the effect, of which he is the first to see the bad consequences. Yesterday and to-day, he has been, as I learn, indisposed; and Baron de Wetterstedt, in speaking to General Pozzo di Borgo, ascribed his illness to the chagrin of that conversation. Nobody has spoken to me on this subject but the latter, to whom it was principally addressed, but who received it with the utmost calmness and *sang-froid*. He is extremely mortified at it, however; though I trust he will not experience any repetition of such scenes.

On the other hand, my lord, I can assure your lordship that the Prince Royal has a hard game to play with the commanders and troops of the different nations, particularly the Prussians, under his orders; and I do not wonder that he is quick in expressing his mortification. It is with the utmost difficulty, and by dint of repeated positive orders, that General Bülow has at last undertaken the siege of Wittenberg, almost in spite of himself, and after repeated remonstrances against it, and proposals of other plans in the place of it. A day or two ago, Count Tauenzien informed the Prince Royal that he had been invited by General Blücher to join his troops to his, for the purpose of making an attack on the enemy at Grossenhayn; and that, in consequence, he should march with fifteen thousand men for that purpose. But, as this movement would leave a great point in his line open, he desired General Bülow to detach the division of General Borstel to close it up, which

the former promised to do. Your lordship will hardly imagine that I am speaking of three Prussian Generals under the orders of the Prince Royal, (I do not include General Blücher) nd that all these movements are contemplated and ordered, without the smallest reference to the Commander-in-Chief, or any view to his plan of operations.

The Prince Royal wrote, I understand, with great propriety, and even delicacy, to Count Tauenzien on this conduct; and I am now given to understand, by way of extenuation, that Count Tauenzien is not under the orders of the Prince Royal, but has only been directed to act with the army under the command of the Prince Royal—an extenuation which shifts the blame from the shoulders of the General to that of the Sovereign: for nothing can be more manifestly ruinous than such a state of insubordination and disobedience. General Bülow is avowedly, however, under the orders of the Prince Royal, and yet he acts in the same manner.

I beg your lordship to have the goodness to pardon this long detail, which brings me nearly up to the present day; and your lordship is, I trust, persuaded of the constant zeal and watchfulness which I shall exert, on any circumstances which may excite suspicion. I ought to add, that the death of General Moreau has, in this particular, been a great misfortune; for it has removed from before the eyes of the Prince a check on his projects, and a formidable rival to them. I have positive proof that Moreau would have acquiesced in, and perhaps have promoted, the restoration of the Bourbons, as thinking it the only medium of restoring tranquillity to France. I will not say so much of the Prince Royal, though I would willingly believe that events would lead him at last to that point.

I beg your lordship to be assured of the perfect respect with which I have the honour to be, &c.,

EDWD. THORNTON.

Count de Hardenberg to Count de Münster.

Prague, le 12 Octobre, 1813.

Pour mettre sous les yeux de votre Excellence les idées du Comte de Metternich rélativement à l'arrangement futur des affaires de l'Allemagne, il m'est beaucoup plus facile de faire mention des différens plans discutés jusqu'ici, et qu'il n'approuve pas, parcequ'à son avis, ils ne remplissent pas le but que leurs auteurs ont en vue, que de détailler le plan positif que le Comte Metternich voudroit leur substituer.

Un obstacle presque insurmontable pour tous ceux qui voudroient rendre à l'Allemagne son ancienne constitution, ou en créer une plus forte sur les débris de celle-là est le défaut d'un chef qui pourroit se charger du pouvoir exécutif—l'Empereur de l'Autriche, bien que celui des Souverains Allemands qui seroit le plus qualifié à se charger de ce poste eminent, le refusant décidément—et quoique le Comte de Metternich met encore quelque fois en avant que si, dans la suite des tems, les Princes Allemands, sentant eux-mêmes la nécessité de s'assujettir à des lois positives, vouloient librement charger l'Empereur d'Autriche de la suprématie et de l'exécution de ces lois, il pourroit alors peut-être prendre un parti, pour lequel, sous les circonstances actuelles, il avoit le plus grand éloignement, je n'en suis pas moins convaincu que si aussi dès à présent le vœu des Princes d'Allemagne que l'Empereur d'Autriche reprenne la Couronne Impériale d'Allemagne se manifestoit librement et unanimement, que le Comte Metternich conseilleroit pourtant à l'Empereur de la décliner. Les raisons de cet éloignement de l'Empereur de se charger de la dignité Impériale d'Allemagne sont faciles à concevoir ; il prévoit des obstacles et des jalousies, dès l'introduction de la question, et des difficultés non interrompues dans l'exécution des fonctions dont il se seroit chargé.

Quant aux obstacles du premier genre, le Comte Metternich ne nie pas que même la Cour de Berlin a manifesté son acquiescement à ce que l'Empereur d'Autriche remonte sur le

trône impérial d'Allemagne, mais il n'ignore pas non plus l'idée toujours encore accuellie par un parti en Prusse, et que l'Autriche rejette décidément, d'une division de pouvoir par Sud et Nord, et craint ainsi, peut-être avec raison, voir renaître les anciennes jalousies de la Prusse contre l'Autriche, écartées depuis que la rivalité de domination sur l'Allemagne a cessé.

Quant au reste de l'Allemagne, le Comte Metternich craint qu'en voulant par des loix positives restreindre à présent la souveraineté dont ses Princes ont au moins cru jouir sous la protection de la France, et ce ci est le cas surtout dans le Sud de l'Allemagne, on n'en feroit que des amis secrets de la France, toujours prêts à secouer le joug, si on vouloit et pouvoit même de force leur en imposer un dans ce moment, plus pésant, à leur avis, que celui dont on leur offre de les affranchir. Il n'est pas douteux que la protection de la France pésoit essentiellement plus sur eux que ne le feroient des lois justes et la suprématie d'un Empereur constitutionnel : mais toujours ils se croyoient et ils étoient effectivement souverains chez eux, et ceci adoucissoit le joug que leur imposoit Napoléon ; ils cédoient avec résignation à une force majeure à laquelle rien ne résistoit, dans l'espoir que cet état des choses ne pouvoit durer, et qu'alors ils rentreroient dans l'exercice non restreint de la souveraineté acquise sous la protection de la France ; et le Comte Metternich est convaincu que plutôt que de voir crouler cet échafaudage ambitieux, qui leur a couté tant de sacrifices, tant au physique qu'au moral, les dits Princes préféreroient de courir encore une fois toutes les chances possibles en commun avec le fondateur de leur souveraineté.

L'exemple récent de la Bavière est venu fort à propos pour appuyer la thèse du Comte Metternich. Si on n'avoit pas garanti à la Cour de Munich sa souveraineté et toutes les dimensions de son territoire, elle n'auroit pas hésité à faire marcher contre l'Autriche les 40,000 hommes, qui maintenant combattent pour les Alliés. Mais ce n'est pas seulement sur la question même du rétablissement de la dignité impériale en Allemagne que le Comte

Metternich prévoit des difficultés ; il en prévoit de plus grandes encore dans l'exercice de ses fonctions. Plus l'autorité de l'Empereur devroit être grande pour le mettre en état de tenir les rènes du Gouvernement, avec la force et l'énergie nécessaire, plus on s'y opposerait dès l'organisation de la constitution ; et si aussi cette opposition étoit momentanément vaincue par la force ou par la majorité, l'on ne s'occuperoit avec plus de sollicitude dans la suite à entraver la marche de la constitution.

Le Comte de Metternich ne balance pas à convenir que Napoléon a fait servir la Confédération du Rhin à l'exécution de ses plans ambitieux, mais il nie qu'il s'ensuive qu'un Empereur trouveroit les mêmes ressources dans une Confédération constitutionnelle. Bonaparte lorsqu'il créa la Confédération du Rhin étoit déjà précédé par le prestige de son invincibilité, et les Princes se soumirent en partie par crainte, en partie entrainés par l'appas des avantages et d'agrandissements que l'appui de la France leur promettoit encore dans l'avenir. Cette Confédération criée par les révolutions ne doit aussi sa durée qu'à la progression de ces révolutions : elle n'a été jamais basée sur des lois positives, et n'a été maintenue que par la verge de fer qui menaçoit le récalcitrant : mais l'Empereur d'Autriche ne se croit ni la force qu'a pu déployer la France, ce qui déjà encourageroit l'opposition, ni n'a la volonté de l'employer comme l'a fait Bonaparte. Il ne se croit pas en état de résister seul à la France—comment se chargeroit-il d'une tâche qui l'exposeroit à chaque moment, de rentrer en lice avec la France, forte de l'appui de tout ce qu'il y auroit de mécontens en Allemagne ?—et ce mécontentement il le croit une suite infaillible de toute restriction de souveraineté que l'on voudroit imposer forcément aux Princes Allemands.

Le Comte Metternich méconnoit aucunement le vague dans lequel, sans lois positives et sans un chef pour les surveiller, et sans pouvoir y substituer quelque autre arrangement, resteroit l'union de l'Allemagne contre un ennemi commun : il ne se fait pas illusion non plus sur ce que les Princes foibles pourroient

être tentés de chercher, dans de certains cas, un appui même étranger; mais il ne trouve pas le remède contre ce mal dans une constitution, qui comme il croit l'avoir prouvé, causeroit des scissions dès son origine, et du mécontentement dans sa marche, sans que le pouvoir exécutif ait la force de la réprimer, si non par ces mêmes moyens dont on voudroit éviter l'usage trop fréquent, par la voye des armes. Quant au poid qui péseroit peut-être sur les malheureux sujets de tant de petits Princes, jaloux de l'exercice illimité de leurs droits de souveraineté, le Comte Metternich n'y est pas insensible; mais, une fois admis que la reconstruction d'une constitution Germanique auroit d'un autre coté des difficultés insurmontables, ou tout au moins de plus grands inconvénients, il ne voit d'autre remède à ce mal que celui inhérent à toute espèce de tyrannie, et qui seul lui met un frein dans d'autres Gouvernemens déspotiques —la crainte d'une opposition ouverte contre la volonté d'un Souverain qui ne gouverne pas avec justice et équité. L'argument tiré de ce qu'il faut présenter un état d'amelioration et non d'esclavage à une nation qu'on veut appeller à briser ses chaines ne peut faire grande effet sur le Ministre d'une Cour qui s'allarme de l'idée seule de vouloir mettre au jeu le peuple et mettre à l'écart les Gouvernements. C'est d'après ce principe aussi que la Cour de Vienne s'applique principalement dans toutes ses transactions à gagner les Gouvernements, et de n'agir que par ceux-ci sur les peuples. Le Résumé de l'opinion du Comte Metternich est ainsi:

Que l'introduction d'une constitution fondée sur des lois positives en Allemagne, et le rétablissement d'un Empereur muni d'un pouvoir suffisant pour l'exercice de ses fonctions, trouveroit près de plusieurs des Princes prépondérants de l'Allemagne une opposition plus ou moins grande en raison du plus ou moins de restriction que l'on voudroit mettre à l'exercice des droits dont ils jouissent actuellement.

Que si, aussi, l'on voudroit introduire par la force des armes cette nouvelle constitution, l'on rejetteroit le parti de l'opposi-

tion ouvertement dans les bras de la France; ou qu'au moins on le lui rattacheroit secrétement.

Que le rétablissement de la dignité Impériale dans une des maisons prépondérantes de l'Allemagne feroit renaître toutes les anciennes jalousies qui, par le passé, ont désunies l'Allemagne.

Que la séparation du Sud et du Nord de l'Allemagne sous deux Chefs différents amèneroit bien plutôt encore ce résultat et produiroit une scission totale.

Que par le rétablissement d'une constitution, si aussi elle pouvoit avoir lieu, l'on n'évitéroit aucun des maux auxquels l'on voudroit obvier, puisque, pour faire exécuter les lois, il faudroit toujours, en dernier résultat, avoir recours aux armes contre les transgresseurs, qui, de leur côté, chercheroient comme autrefois, l'appui d'un autre de leurs puissants Co-Etats, ou même d'une Puissance étrangère. Si donc, d'après l'opinion du Comte de Metternich toute constitution tendante à réconstruire l'Allemagne n'écarteroit pas les maux que l'on voudroit éviter, et ne produiroit pas l'union qui seroit nécessaire à son repos interne, et pour la rendre indépendante des Puissances étrangères—et le Comte Metternich est si convaincu de cette vérité, qu'il se fait fort de prouver que tout projet de constitution qu'on présentera péchera par-là; et comme, d'autre côté, il sent parfaitement l'inconvenient qu'il y auroit de laisser l'Allemagne absolument dans le vague, et les Princes du 3me, et 4me ordre exposés et peutêtre même inclinés à se livrer à toutes les petites intrigues diplomatiques au détriment de la cause générale de l'Allemagne, le Comte Metternich croit que le seul moyen d'éviter ce dernier inconvénient, et en même tems obtenir les grands résultats que l'on attend vainement d'une constitution, sans s'exposer aux dangers qui en seroient infailliblement la suite, que le seul, ou, au moins, le meilleur rémède à tout ceci ne se trouveroit que dans un système très étendu de traités et d'alliances entre les Princes Allemands, par lesquels chaque Prince Souverain prendroit avec les autres Princes individuellement et par-là généralement avec tous, les

engagements nécessaires de ne pas entrer avec des Puissances étrangères dans des liaisons dirigées contre l'Allemagne; de se garantir réciproquement leurs Etats, et leur souveraineté; de faire cause commune contre toute aggression étrangère, et, de même, contre toute aggression hostile d'un Prince Allemand dans l'intérieur de l'Allemagne.

Le Comte Metternich sent bien que pareilles alliances ne seroient pas indissolubles, mais il croit qu'une fois que les Princes prépondérants de l'Allemagne auroient pris l'initiative pour un engagement pareil, les Princes moins puissants s'empresseroient, pour leur propre sureté d'accéder à cette confédération, et que, comme alors tous seroient obligés par leurs traités de s'unir contre celui ou ceux qui vouloient les violer, cette confédération assureroit la tranquillité externe et interne de l'Allemagne, au moins aussi surement que des lois positives également sujettes, comme l'expérience du passé l'avoit prouvé à être transgressées ou éludées, et n'offrant, dans ce cas également d'autre moyen de coercition, en dernier résultat, que la force, avec la seule différence que, dans le cas d'une constitution, l'emploi de la force serait prévu et ordonné par la loi, et que dans les traités il serait déterminé par le *casus fœderis*, puisque du reste la loi et les traités sont également obligatoires pour ceux qui veulent s'y soumettre, mais aussi également sujets à être transgresseés par ceux qui s'y refusent et se croyent la force de pouvoir résister.

Dans tout ceci, comme je l'ai déjà observé, l'on n'a, il est vrai, eu aucun égard à l'administration interne des pays soumis à l'avenir à la volonté libre et souveraine du Prince appellé à les gouverner, ni ainsi au sort plus ou moins heureux des sujets; mais l'Autriche ne se croit pas obligée, ni Elle ni ses anciens Co-Etats, à se charger d'une pareille intervention (qui en outre ne pourroit s'exercer avec effet que sur les petits Etats) au risque de s'exposer aux bien plus grands inconvénients qui résulteroient de l'introduction d'une nouvelle constitution Germanique. Je sais, au reste, que pour parer à

l'inconvénient qu'il y a toujours à avoir dans une confédération de trop petits Etats, qui ne peuvent pas utiliser leurs moyens pour le bien général, la Cour de Vienne, n'auroit aucune objection à ce que l'on médiatisat les Princes appartenants à cette catégorie.

Après avoir ainsi rendu un compte aussi exact qu'il m'a été possible après deux conférences que j'ai eues sur cet objet avec le Comte de Metternich, de ses idées sur l'arrangement futur des affaires de l'Allemagne, et sans me permettre aucun jugement sur ce plan que le Comte Metternich au reste avoue lui-même ne peut pas être tout-à-fait mûr, je dois ajouter encore quelques observations générales qui ne laissent pas que de mériter quelque attention, lorsqu'il s'agit d'opter entre les différentes formes d'organisation à donner à l'avenir à l'Allemagne.

Les projets du Baron de Stein, et son idée favorite de diviser le Nord et le Sud de l'Allemagne, sont connus à Votre Excellence, ainsi que la tendance que la Cour de Berlin a eu de tout tems d'amener, au moins de fait, cette séparation. Jusqu'ici l'éloignement décidé que l'Empereur de l'Autriche a manifesté de reprendre la couronne d'Allemagne, et plus encore, d'acquiescer à un pareil partage d'autorité, a empêché que le Baron de Stein et les fauteurs de son système mettent ces idées publiquement en avant ; mais depuis que les armées Prussiennes ont joué un rôle aussi glorieux et brillant, et qui certainement leur fait le plus grand honneur dans la guerre de la délivrance de l'Europe, l'on commence à mettre en avant avec moins de retenue des certains droits qu'avoit acquis par-là la Prusse à partager l'Empire d'Allemagne avec l'Autriche, et même à prendre sa place, dans le cas que celle-ci persisteroit à la décliner. Jamais l'Autriche ne consentira ni à l'un ni à l'autre de ces plans ; mais voyant qu'elle ne pourroit pas, sans se brouiller avec la Prusse, s'y opposer ouvertement, si une fois la question qu'il faut une constitution et un chef à l'Empire d'Allemagne étoit décidée, il n'est peut-être pas tout-à-fait impolitique d'écarter dès le commencement cette première ques-

tion, pour ne pas être forcé dans la suite d'aborder la seconde sur la forme de Gouvernement à donner à l'Allemagne—questions qui positivement réveilleroient toutes les anciennes passions, qui, en désunissant les forces de cet Empire, ont peut-être le plus contribué à sa destruction.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.,

HARDENBERG.

Mr. Edward Thornton to Lord Castlereagh.

Leipsick, October 22, 1813.

My Lord—In the discussion which I had with the Prince Royal yesterday upon the subject of money, and which was carried on with a sort of bitterness which I had not seen in him, at least towards me, he adverted suddenly, and *par parenthèse*, to the letter which had been written to him from Halle, and which I had signed, with the other gentlemen. "Et vous," said he, "vous, qui n'êtes pas militaire, vous me donnez de conseils militaires!"—which proved, by the by, that Wetterstedt had not spoken to him at all, or, at least, in the sense I had desired him.

I answered, that I never presumed to give him military counsels; that I appealed to Baron de Wetterstedt (then present) whether I had not informed him in Halle that I had myself proposed the letter ("Vous aviez bien tort," interrupted he), had copied it with my own hand, had signed it the first, expressly because I wished to take away every possible suspicion of its being a military advice; that I regarded the subject in a great political light, and it was a duty I owed to my sovereign not to let such a critical moment escape. He said, that if he had not been actuated by *égards* for the persons and for the sovereigns whom they represented, he should have done right to send back the letter unopened, and that, on a second occasion of the kind, he would do so.

I observed to his Royal Highness that fortunately such occasions seldom occurred, and might never occur again; but

that, if it were possible, the same sentiment which actuated me then, would urge me to take the same responsibility upon myself again, whatever might be the consequence.—"Dans ce cas là," answered the Prince, "je vous renverrois de mon quartier-général." — I replied, that I should be immediately prepared to quit it, as soon as I should receive the orders of my sovereign. He recurred again to the *military counsel* which I had given; and, on my affirming again the contrary, asserting that it was a request which we had made to him to move forward, *une prière*, he suddenly cooled and said, if that were the case, there was not another word to be said about it; let it be forgotten, &c. I had often seen these starts of violence and passion towards others, to a degree of outrage, but nothing of the kind had been addressed to myself, except, as I once informed your lordship, in an interview at Jüterbock on the subject of his letter to Marshal Ney.

While I am upon this subject, I must beg to inform your lordship that I have spoken both with Baron d'Adlercreutz, and with Baron de Wetterstedt, on the subject of Sir Charles Stewart's conversations with the Prince Royal, at Zylbitz, and of his conduct upon other occasions; and both of them expressed the warmest approbation, admiration, and even gratitude, for his conduct, ascribing much, if not most of all, the good that has happened to it alone, and particularly with regard to the reputation of the Prince Royal himself and of the Swedes, who (Baron d'Adlercreutz observed to me) were dishonoured by the line of conduct which was pursuing, and who were furious at the manner in which they were treated. I have seen and conversed with other Swedes of observation and of distinction, all of whom are unanimous in the same admiration of the zeal and good conduct of Sir Charles Stewart, and of the happy effects of it.

The Prince Royal has had, however, the skill to turn the Emperor of Russia to his opinion (apparently, at least, though I am persuaded not really), and Pozzo di Borgo has been re-

tained near the person of the Prince, at his own request, indeed, unless, as I understand, General Suchtelen were removed. The latter is not the case, but I am given to understand that he has received proper hints to be more careful of the advice he may give. General Vincent and Baron Krusemark remain with the Prince, who, however, complained to Count Metternich on the same subject. All of them, however, are convinced that the conduct of these gentlemen has had the best effect in promoting the present result; and it is fearful to think what might have been the event, if the Prince Royal, meeting with no opposition, had carried the opinion of passing to the other shore of the Elbe. I collect from those very near him that this was much nearer the case than we imagined.

I trust now that the prosecution of the objects of the campaign may be securely relied on; for they tend, in a great degree, to the same points to which the personal interests of the Prince Royal and of Sweden lead: but we must be always upon our guard, and, on the approach of the army into the country of Hanover (the direction which it will probably take at length), everything ought to be prepared for the Government of the Electorate being established, and put into immediate operation. There are other reasons, of which your lordship is no doubt aware, why it would be most proper and expedient that his Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge should be prepared to come to the Continent to assume the immediate government of the Electorate, if that be the intention of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent. I should be sorry to see any interference on any side with the internal affairs of the Electorate; and perhaps it may be apprehended a little, though, I think, not very seriously, on the side of the Prince Royal, as well as on *another side*.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

EDWARD THORNTON.

PS. I ought to have mentioned to your lordship in a public letter, and in reference to your despatch, No. 52, that the

Prince Royal is furnished by the King of Sweden with ample authority to conclude treaties and to grant full powers for signing: so that, if your lordship should think proper to send me full powers, I could be immediately prepared to sign, after Lords Cathcart and Aberdeen and Sir Charles Stewart have done so; or, theirs being signed, I trust your lordship would not disavow me, if I were to sign with Sweden, *sub spe rati*, the same instrument.—E. T.

Mr. Edward Thornton to Lord Castlereagh.

Göttingen, November 1, 1813.

My Lord—Baron de Wetterstedt received, with the mail of the 12th of October, at Heiligenstadt, a despatch from M. de Rehausen, transmitting a copy of a letter addressed by Count Münster to his Serene Highness the Duke of Brunswick, in answer to some questions which the Duke had put to him on the subject of the administration of the duchy, when it should be recovered from the enemy.

Baron de Wetterstedt allowed me to read it and to show it to Sir Charles Stewart; and, although it is probable that your lordship may have learnt from Count Münster himself the substance of the ideas which he communicated to the Duke of Brunswick, I think it right to put your lordship confidentially in possession of this paper.

Your lordship will observe, from the disposition of the troops, which, I presume, Sir Charles Stewart will transmit, that a corps of Russians (those under Count Strogonow), to the amount of 5 or 6,000 men, will be sent to take possession of Brunswick; it is necessary that some force should be sent there, to prevent the possibility of an insult from Magdeburg.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

EDWARD THORNTON.

[Enclosure.]

Traduction d'une Lettre adressée à S.A.S. le Duc de Bronswic par son Excellence M. le Comte de Münster.

26 Septembre, 1813.

Votre Altesse Sérénissime a désiré que je lui soumisse mon opinion sur le contenu des papiers qui m'ont été communiqués rélativement à l'occupation et à l'organisation future du pays de Bronswic.

Je ne saurois mieux témoigner à V. A. Sérénissime ma reconnoissance de la confiance dont elle m'a honoré qu'en lui indiquant avec toute la sincérité possible, les principes qui dans ce moment-ci me semblent devoir être suivis.

D'après ce qui j'ai communiqué confidentiellement à V. A. S. avant son départ pour l'Allemagne, il paroit que les Puissances Alliées n'ont nullement adopté le principe qu'un Prince dépossédé par l'ennemi rentreroit dans ses droits perdues aussitôt que l'ennemi seroit chassé sans la cooperation du Prince. En conséquence de ces vues, on avoit fait des conventions qui paroissent rendre douteux la restitution future des Etats de Bronswic. C'est par les efforts que j'ai faits par ordre du Prince Régent, que le danger a été éloigné.

Mais pour ce qui regarde l'administration des pays repris, il existe entre les Puissances Alliées des conventions d'après lesquelles, à l'exception de la Prusse et de l'Electorat de Bronswic-Lunebourg, le Nord de l'Allemagne doit être partagé en 6 districts, dont chacun aura deux Gouverneurs, un civil et l'autre militaire, qui, sous un conseil d'administration, dirigeront les autorités locales. A cette qualité Mr. Alopeus, comme on le sait a été envoyé dans le Mecklenbourg, il y a déjà long-tems.

Il n'y a rien d'étonnant en soi-même dans cette mesure. La marche des affaires qui concernent la délivrance de l'Allemagne en général seroit trop embrouillée, et trop dépourvue d'ensemble, si ces affaires étoient partagées entre tant d'autorités locales. De telles autorités isolées et conditionnelles

n'existoient même pas, lorsqu'autrefois l'Empereur et la Diète, conjointement avec les tribunaux de l'Empire, avoient une jurisdiction à exercer. Aujourd'hui une autorité semblable à celle-là ne peut pas être établie que par le conseil d'administration. C'est pourquoi je ne comprends pas comment le duché de Bronswic pourroit se soustraire à l'influence des grands cercles administratifs.

Il est vraisemblable que ces questions seront modifiées par le changement de système de l'Autriche. J'ai fait faire, en conséquence, des demandes par nos Envoyés; et j'attends à cet égard des renseignemens, dont je me reserve de communiquer le contenu très humblement à V. A. Sérénissime.

Je sais par le Baron de Gagern que l'Electeur de Hesse a conclu avec la Russie et la Prusse un traité séparé, qui concerne ses anciens Etats. Les articles de ce traité ne me sont pas exactement connus; mais il faut que les pleins pouvoirs donnés par son Altesse Electorale soient fondés là-dessus.

Pour les formes, je dois très humblement observer à V. A. S. qu'il sera absolument nécessaire qu'elle présente, tant aux Puissances Alliées qu'au Prince Régent, une déclaration du Prince Auguste, frère ainé de V. A. S., par laquelle ce Prince renonce à ses droits de premier né; parceque celle de 1806 pourroit être regardée comme faite dans des circonstances trop différentes de celles d'aujourd'hui, et parceque on ignore si les conventions faites alors ont été en tout réciproquement remplies, et si elles sont valables maintenant. Après ces remarques générales, mais en même tems importantes, je vais répondre à la question qui m'a été faite sur la propriété des résolutions adoptées.

Pour les affaires civiles, il me paroit que l'administration ne devoit pas être confiée exclusivement aux Etats Provinciaux, mais que quelques Conseillers Electoraux devoient être adjoints à la Régence Provisoire, où ils devoient avoir la préséance. Le but des Etats ne peut être que de favoriser les

intentions du Gouvernement, tant qu'elles sont en conformité avec les lois existantes.

En Hanovre, on devoit adopter le principe de faire rentrer au service tous les employés qui ont perdu leurs places par l'usurpation de l'ennemi, et auxquels on n'a rien à reprocher en particulier, avec quelque modification toutefois pour les tribunaux de justice et les places de recette. Il me semble très dangereux de laisser en place les employés qui ont été nommés par l'ennemi. Le peuple n'auroit pas de confiance dans le nouvel ordre de choses, et l'ennemi auroit des espions surs.

Quant à l'organisation militaire, soit pour le nombre, soit pour la repartition des troupes de ligne et de la milice, je pense que tout cela est réglé par le Conseil d'Administration, à raison de la population et des moyens de finance. Les Commandans des troupes ont apparemment aussi des ordres éventuels sur l'organisation militaire en Bronswic, comme l'a eu Tettenborn en Hanovre.

A la demande de Votre Altesse Sérénissime sur mon départ pour l'Allemagne, j'ai l'honneur de répondre que je compte demander au Prince Régent les plein pouvoirs nécessaires pour ce but, aussitôt que la plus grande partie de l'Electorat sera délivrée. Je ne peux rien dire sur ce qu'on pourra juger à propos de faire à l'égard de nos troupes, après l'occupation du pays, le commandement en chef étant confié au Prince Royal de Suéde.

Lord Castlereagh to the Earl of Aberdeen.[1]

Copy. Foreign Office, November 13, 1813.

My dear Aberdeen—Your despatches from Frankfort of the 8th and 9th, with their accompanying private explanations, arrived by the Weser before those of an earlier date on the same subject were received. This was fortunate, else we

[1] Ambassador to the Court of Austria.

should have felt some alarm at the notion of Louis being thought of for the Government of Holland.

I trust we may also feel assured, from the last accounts, that Metternich has no idea of a suspension of hostilities pending negociations, even should a basis be agreed upon. Either of these expedients is deprecated here in the strongest manner. The former is now happily out of the question, by the act of the Dutch nation, to which we are parties; and the offer made by France in August to negociate, without a suspension of arms, renders it easy to decline a proposition which would protract discussion, till the armies of France were again prepared to take the field.

You will not be surprised to learn, after such a tide of success, that this nation is likely to view with disfavour any peace which does not confine France strictly within her ancient limits. Indeed, peace with Buonaparte on any terms will be far from popular, distrusting, as the people naturally do, his submitting to his destiny for any length of time; but you will perceive that these opinions have not turned us from our course. We still are ready to encounter, with our Allies, the hazards of peace, if peace can be made on the basis proposed, satisfactorily executed; and we are not inclined to go out of our way to interfere in the internal government of France, however much we might desire to see it placed in more pacific hands. But I am satisfied we must not encourage our Allies to patch up an imperfect arrangement. If they will do so, we must submit; but it should appear, in that case, to be their own act, and not ours.

I am aware that the internal difficulties of the confederacy are great, but, once dispersed, to reassemble it will be impossible. We must, therefore, labour to render it effectual to its purpose now: and your last reports encourage me to hope that such will be the result. The revolution in Holland is in itself a new feature in the war, and the fall of Dresden a great accession of strength.

I must particularly entreat you to keep your attention upon Antwerp. The destruction of that arsenal is essential to our safety. To leave it in the hands of France is little short of imposing upon Great Britain the charge of a perpetual war establishment. After all we have done for the Continent this war, they owe it to us and to themselves to extinguish this fruitful source of danger to both. Press this as a primary object of their operations; and, in order to render the value of the fleet, if taken or destroyed, more available for their present expenses, we shall be ready to pay them immediately in credit bills, which they can now realize as advantageously on the Continent as a bill upon the Treasury.

I hope my correspondence has latterly satisfied you that we do justice to your exertions and to the conduct of your Court. When we write, we both naturally take our tone from the circumstances, not as then existing, but as known to us. Thus, when I was fretting about the Elbe, and the apprehended indecision of Austria, the Allies were laying the solid foundation of all their subsequent glory; and Metternich was performing miracles, both in negociations and in his armaments. You may assure him I shall not fail him in the long run, however I may complain when I am not satisfied the wheel is moving. There is no preference in any quarter which ought to give him umbrage, but some management which may keep the Russians more cordially at his back. He has behaved in the most loyal manner to us since we became friends, and he shall see, in our arrangements for the ensuing campaign, that we do him justice.

As to yourself, my dear Aberdeen, I can only assure you that your letter was the first intimation I had of the position of your name in the full powers. I never read a line in that most learned document, which, I believe, is generally composed by Rolleston; and you will believe I could not have any wish to deprive you of your personal rank.

Yours ever, my dear Aberdeen, most sincerely,

CASTLEREAGH.

Your correspondence gives great satisfaction, and your numerous private letters are the best proofs of your zeal in executing my wishes.

I forgot to answer your query about Holland—indeed, my Circular Memorandum must have done it long since. The line of the Waal would reduce Holland to nothing, strip it of all its best defences, and leave Antwerp in the enemy's hands. You must, my dear Aberdeen, use all your influence with Metternich to deliver us from this annoyance. We don't wish to impose any dishonourable condition upon France, which limiting the number of her ships would be; but she must not be left in possession of this point. Consider this as the object essential beyond all others for you to push, so far as concerns British interests.

I wish further to urge the great importance, so far as it can be done, without interfering with the plan of campaign, of securing the early possession of the territories essential to our peace. The enemy against whom we contend will always be more willing, in negociation, to cede what has been acquired than to give up any thing he holds.

Mr. Edward Thornton to Lord Castlereagh.

Hanover, November 16, 1813.

My Lord—Your lordship will learn, by the messenger of Sir Charles Stewart, who goes to-day, as well as by the messenger Daniels, who set off for England, by the way of Bremen, last night, the measures which have been in contemplation, on the part of the Prince Royal, to endeavour to gain Hamburg, and the separation of the French army from that of the Danes, even at the expense of allowing Davoust, with his really French troops, to return into France under a capitulation.

Sir Charles Stewart expressed yesterday to the Prince Royal his unfavourable opinion of this measure, in which opinion I felt it my duty to acquiesce, at least to give no opposition to it; because it is of much more consequence that his Ma-

jesty's servants should appear, on all occasions, united in opinion towards a foreign sovereign. But I have expressed to Sir Charles my frank opinion on this subject to-day, having found from him that the Prince Royal had given orders to Count Wallmoden to endeavour to bring about such a capitulation, and that he (Sir Charles) had addressed a letter to the Prince to dissuade him in the strongest terms from pursuing this measure; and I beg your lordship will permit me to do the same thing to yourself.

Sir Charles thinks that a convention of this kind will be regarded by every class of persons in England as ignominious as that of Cintra was considered at the time it occurred; that the corps of Davoust, thus released, will form the *noyau* of an army of a hundred thousand conscripts, doing thus immense injury to the Allies and the allied army; that, on the other hand, the quarrel and separation of the Danes from Davoust and the French cause are events highly probable; that, in this case, Davoust must be lost, and the saving of him and his troops by a capitulation will reflect eternal dishonour on the Prince Royal and his army, while it will have a pernicious effect on the Allies.

I am most ready to own that the transaction will shed no lustre on the military reputation of the Prince, more especially as it must have the appearance of a sort of connivance with the French, or a desire to spare them; while it lets them loose upon the Allies, and is in reality an injury there. I should be equally ready to acquiesce in the same reasoning, if I regarded the quarrel and separation of the Danish Government from France as events probable or to be hoped for, while any French troops remain in the country. In that case, the situation of Davoust would be hopeless, and it would be almost treason to release him from it. But I must own to your lordship that I do not see the question of Denmark in quite so fair a point of view. That which, in my opinion, would be almost hopeless, while Davoust has his retreat upon Holstein,

and his influence over the Danes immediate, would become a great probability, were he removed ; and I leave your lordship to judge what mischief might be done by the Danes and French united for the next five months, when the Baltic and North Sea are, for the most part, impracticable to ships of war, and when an army of 50 or 60,000 men in the fortress of the Eyder and the strong country of Holstein can be brought to act perhaps in conjunction with the garrisons of Hamburg and Magdeburg. The advantage of gaining immediately the first of these towns, the prospect which it holds out of bringing up the Elbe the means of reducing the other, are considerations of the highest moment. I will only add, that General Vincent, no mean military authority, and, as an Austrian Minister, certainly as much interested as any one that Davoust's corps should not be let loose upon the allied army in the south, has given his opinion in writing to Prince Metternich that the advantages are such as would be cheaply purchased by the capitulation in question.

I do not mention these things to your lordship with any intention of making use of this opinion to the Crown Prince. I mean, as I have already assured Sir Charles Stewart, to keep within the line of his opinion.

I have the honour to be, &c., EDWARD THORNTON.

Copie d'une Dépêche de Mr. Schultzenheim à M. de Rehausen.

Lunebourg, 28 Novembre, 1813.

Msgr. le Prince Royal reçut avant hier un courier de Mr. de Wetterstedt, apportant les dépêches intéressantes dont vous trouverez ci-joint les copies. S. A. R. a été extrèmement satisfaite de leur contenu, et c'est par son ordre que je vous invite, Monsieur, de le communiquer confidentiellement au Ministère Britannique. Vous aurez la bonté de saisir cette occasion pour observer à Lord Castlereagh qu'au moment où S. A. R. allait se décider d'attaquer Hambourg, l'intérêt qu'avait la Grande

Bretagne à la réussite de cette expédition ajouta un grand poids dans la balance. La Hollande, au sort de laquelle la Grande Bretagne ne peut pas être étrangère va être délivrée par la gauche de l'armée du Nord de l'Allemagne.

Msgr. le Prince Royal a reçu le bordereau des dépenses pour le compte de l'armée, et c'est avec une peine infinie que S. A. R. a vu que la dépense surpasse la recette de près de 3 millions de Rxd. Le Prince Royal en a parlé à M. Thornton, et vous aurez la bonté de porter cette circonstance à la connaissance du Ministère Britannique, comme une nouvelle preuve de la justice de nos demandes.

Mr. Robert Ker Porter[1] *to H.R.H. the Duke of Clarence.*

Weymouth Street, November 28, 1813.

Sir — From the condescension and kindness your Royal Highness has honoured me with, I take the liberty of expressing how much I feel grateful for that interest you take in my welfare. Allow me to state, therefore, more particularly the object of my present and most anxious wishes.

From the desolated and consequently deranged state of a great part of the Princess's property in Russia, owing to the late horrors of the common enemy, together with the very disadvantageous exchange, we shall be obliged to return to the North of Europe, until our affairs will enable us finally to

[1] Son of a military officer who left a family in very low circumstances, and brother of the two ladies of that name, who acquired considerable distinction by their works of fiction; as he also did by his performances as a painter, particularly by his panoramic pictures of the Storming of Seringapatam, the Siege of Acre, and the Battle of Agincourt. Being invited to Petersburg by the Emperor Alexander, he was appointed historical painter to his Imperial Majesty, who conferred on him the Order of St. Joachim, and employed him in decorating the hall of the Admiralty in that capital. While there, he married a Russian lady of rank and fortune (the Princess mentioned in the following letter). He was the author of several literary works, among which were, "Narrative of the late Campaign in Russia, in 1812," and "Travels in Persia."

settle in England. Thus situated, I am very desirous to make myself in some way useful to my country, as well as exert myself in some honourable employment during our stay; and I am certain that, from being so peculiarly situated in that Empire, I may have it greatly in my power.

My object, then, your Royal Highness, is, if possible, to be attached to our mission at the Imperial Court; requesting neither emolument nor remuneration; neither to be a tax on the British Government, nor on his Majesty's Ambassador; but merely *attaché à l'ambassade*, for which honour I would most gladly dedicate my time and the utmost of my abilities. Should, sir, your goodness procure for me what I am so desirous of obtaining, I should wish to join my Lord Cathcart as soon as I could. His lordship, I believe, is very well disposed to serve me, having more than once honoured me with his confidence when at St. Petersburg.

Permit me again to express my gratitude for the condescension you have allowed me. I have the honour to be, with the highest respect, your Royal Highness's most obedient and dutiful Servant, ROBERT K. PORTER.

Mem[oir on] Continental Politics.[1]

A Londres, en Novembre, 1813.

L'histoire des guerres démontre que la France doit principalement ses conquêtes aux arrangements avantageux pour l'offensive comme pour la défensive du système militaire de ses frontières. Dans le cas où les succès des Alliés arracheroient à la France toutes ses conquêtes depuis la Révolution, cette Puissance auroit bientôt réparé ses pertes et se retrouveroit en état d'attaquer de nouveau l'Allemagne, avec des chances d'autant plus favorables que les deux Puissances, l'Autriche et la Prusse, des quelles la conservation de cet empire dépend, sont épuisées, et ont besoin de plus de temps pour se refaire.

[1] Such is the indorsement on the Paper, without signature.

En suivant jusqu'à son origine la guerre de la Révolution, l'on reconnôitra aisément les causes de ses malheurs, à ce que—

1°. La Hollande n'avoit pas suffisamment l'attitude et la consistance d'une Puissance continentale;

2°. Que l'Empire Germanique manquoit d'organisation militaire pour la guerre contre la France; ses Princes avoient de troupes, à la vérité, mais par des vues particulières, et nullement pour un but commun;

3°. Que l'Autriche et la Prusse, dans une guerre contre la France, éloigneroient trop leurs troupes de leurs magazins, pour les soutenir convenablement;

4°. Que la jalousie entre ces deux Puissances retenoit surtout la Prusse d'employer ses forces à l'avantage de l'Autriche.

Il faut donc, pour assurer dorénavant l'existence de l'Allemagne, parer à tous les inconvénients dangereux énoncés ci-dessus.

Quel tableau présenteroit la France, passant de cet état d'unité de Gouvernement à un démembrement de son territoire en plusieurs Etats indépendants, rasant ses places frontières, négligeant son organisation militaire et abandonnant sa conservation à l'espoir d'un secours étranger, venant d'Espagne ou d'Italie!

Avant la guerre de la Révolution, il eut été impossible d'introduire en Allemagne un système fédératif qui se fut rapproché de l'unité de pouvoir, et au moins d'imposer à tous ses Princes l'obligation de se soumettre à un plan commun, et de prendre des arrangements en conséquence. Il ne l'est peut-être plus aujourd'hui, après l'expérience des malheurs que l'imprévoyance attire sur soi-même, après qu'à l'aide de troupes étrangères on est parvenu à chasser les François de l'Allemagne, et à réinstaller les Princes dans leur souverainetés de proposer l'adoption d'un système fédératif, dans le double but de la conservation de la patrie, et d'opposer une barrière à l'esprit de conquête de la France.

Moins il y aura d'Etats confédérés, et plus le système fédé-

ratif approchera de l'unité et augmentera de force. La sureté de l'Allemagne exige l'existence d'un Etat intermédiaire entre la France et le bas Rhin, assez puissant pour empêcher les armes Françaises de s'établir sur les bords de ce fleuve, entre Mayence et l'Yssel. Les Pays Bas Autrichiens, et le territoire situé entre l'ancienne frontière de la France, la Meuse, la Moselle, et le Rhin, réunis à la Hollande, pourroient former un Etat, qui serviroit de poste avancé contre la France, comme l'étoit jadis le Piémont et la Savoye pour l'Italie.

La frontière de Dunkerque à Thionville est celle à laquelle les rois de France ont donné le plus de soins, et où il y a le plus de moyens d'attaque de rassembler. La prudence exige d'opposer à la force le moins de foiblesse possible.

La Hollande, devenue puissance continentale n'a pas en elle-même, malgré sa nouvelle étendue de quoi opposer suffisamment de résistance à la France. Elle ne peut même avec cet agrandissement, assurer son existence qu'en défendant ses places fortes assez long temps pour attendre l'arrivée d'un secours étranger.

La démolition de places fortes de barrière a privé les Pays Bas entre l'Océan et la Meuse de tout appui, et il en couteroit beaucoup de les rétablir. Luxembourg seul assure quelque protection contre la France: tant que cette forteresse appartiendra à un Etat voisin de la Hollande, l'indépendance de cette Puissance sera toujours menacée. Cet Etat, voisin et limitrophe de la France dépendroit entièrement d'elle. C'est ainsi que Louis XIV. a préparé dans les places le long du Bas Rhin ses conquêtes en 1672. Si la conservation de la Hollande doit dépendre de secours étrangers, il n'est pas suffisant que les Princes ses voisins entretiennent des troupes selon leur convenance particulière: mais il faut établir dans son voisinage un système militaire qui oblige les Princes d'Allemagne à placer leurs troupes le plus promptement possible sur pied de guerre. Il ne faut plus que, comme autrefois, au moment des opérations, l'on perd de son temps en discussions sur la mode

de conduire la guerre, sur la nomination du Général en Chef, et sur la formation des magazins de munitions, d'armes, et de vivres. Toute négligence à cet égard n'auroit d'autre résultat que d'amener encore la perte de la Hollande et l'asservissement de l'Allemagne.

La France, engagée sur la Lorraine, l'Alsace, et l'Italie, ne pourra guères disposer de plus de 200,000 hommes entre la mer et la Moselle. La Hollande, avec 60,000 hommes sur pied, auroit besoin d'une armée auxiliaire de 140,000 hommes, que les Souverains du Nord de l'Allemagne devroient s'engager à fournir. Cette armée auxiliaire devroit avoir son Etat Major, établi dans quelque grande ville, telle que Hambourg, Brême, ou Hanovre. Il devroit être composé d'un Ministre de la guerre, d'un Intendant-général, d'un général d'artillerie, d'un général du génie, et des officiers et adjoints nécessaires. Il auroit la direction de l'administration militaire et de tous les préparatifs pour la guerre, dans les endroits choisis pour cela.

Le Weser et la Fulde semblent la meilleure ligne pour l'établissement des arsenaux pour l'armée du Nord de l'Allemagne. Les arsenaux devroient être établis à fraix communs, et successivement fournis du nécessaire.

Tous les Souverains du Nord de l'Allemagne s'engagent de se soumettre pour ce qui regarde les arrangements militaires au plan proposé, d'après les circonstances, par l'Etat Major. Le lieu de son séjour sera aussi celui d'une école d'artillerie et de génie. Les Princes de la Confédération choisiront les membres de cet Etat Major, et resteront en rapport avec eux. Ils auront annuellement, chacun à son tour, l'inspection des travaux assignés par l'Etat Major et sur toute l'administration militaire.

Si la Hollande peut-être considérée comme le boulevard du Nord de l'Allemagne, il en seroit le même du pays situé entre la Moselle, la Sare, et le Rhin, depuis Germersheim à Coblentz, relativement au Sud de l'Allemagne. L'on pouvoit d'après les mêmes principes, former pour cette partie méridionale, et la défense de la rive droite du Rhin depuis Philipsbourg jusqu'à

la frontière de la Suisse, une armée du Sud, également avec 140,000 hommes avec son Etat Major, siégeant à Francfort sur Maine, ou ailleurs, et des écoles d'artillerie et du génie.

L'Allemagne septentrionale couverte par Dusseldorf, Wesel, Juliers, Luxembourg, n'auroit pour le moment besoin d'aucune nouvelle place. Il, n'en est pas ainsi de l'Allemagne méridionale. Son armée se trouveroit toujours obligée d'agir en deux corps d'armée séparés. Le plus considérable se placera entre la Moselle, le Sare, et le Rhin; l'autre sur la droite de ce fleuve, entre Philipsbourg et Bâle. Pour faciliter les opérations du premier de ces corps il semble indispensable de réconstruire Philipsbourg, de bâtir une forteresse à la Moselle, d'établir des forts sur le Hundsrück, pour assurer les communications entre la Moselle et le Rhin à la Glain, et sur les Vosges. Mayence pourroit servir de place d'armes à ce système de places fortes, Kehl et Fribourg reconstruit suffiroient pour appuyer les opérations du second corps: on y ajouteroit quelques forts dans les gorges de la Forêt Noire, au Necker, et au Danube. Tous les Princes de l'Allemagne devroient se réunir pour le rétablissement de ces forteresses, qui garantiroient l'indépendance de cet Empire.

Il est indispensable pour la justesse de combinaisons des deux armées du nord et du sud de l'Allemagne, que leurs états-majors respectifs soient en rapport continuel, là où leurs succès ou leurs revers auront tant d'influence sur chacune d'elles en particulier.

Les princes Allemands de la confédération pourroient être, les grands-ducs de Hanovre, de Holstein-Oldenbourg, Hesse-Cassel, Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, Bade, Hesse-Darmstadt et de Nassau, les Rois de Prusse, de Saxe, Bavière, Wurtemberg, et l'Empereur d'Autriche. Dans la supposition que ce dernier Souverain reçut en hérédité dans sa famille la Couronne Impériale, l'on a jugé la dignité de Grand-Duc plus convenable que celle d'Électeurs. Les Grand-Ducs et les Rois appartiendroient, selon leurs anciennes ou nouvelles possessions, à l'une des deux

divisions de l'Allemagne sous la direction suprème de l'Autriche ou de la Prusse. Les Souverains moins considérables se rangeroient à leurs voisins plus puissants qu'eux, fournissant, dans une juste proportion, leur contingent, auquel les Rois et les Grands-Ducs seroient également obligés.

Sans entrer dans tous les détails de subdivision des Provinces, et soit qu'elles soient des objets d'échange, d'indemnité ou d'agrandissement, il suffit de remarquer ici, que chacune de ces fédérations pourra, sans effort, y compris les puissances dirigeantes, porter son armée à 140,000 hommes, et il seroit à souhaiter que les Grands-Ducs fussent placés de manière à fournir de 8 à 10,000 hommes ; les Rois de 15 à 25,000 ; tandis que la Prusse en donneroit 60,000, et l'Autriche 80,000.

Hambourg, Lübeck, Brème, et Francfort, peut-être Augsbourg, pourroient redevenir des Villes très Impériales, s'attachant, pour les objets purement militaires à leurs voisins.

Il faut pour la sureté de l'Allemagne que l'Autriche et la Prusse mettroient de côté toute jalousie.

Il peut être désagréable à la dernière de ces puissances que la Lusace appartienne à l'Autriche. Que la Saxe la cède à la Prusse, moyennant que l'Autriche renonce à son droit de suzeraineté sur cette province. La Saxe peut être dédommagée ailleurs.

La puissance de la France sera paralysée et l'on ne verra plus le spectacle honteux d'Allemands combattans contre des Allemands, du moment où l'établissement d'un système militaire contre la France et la réunion intime de la Prusse et de l'Autriche garantiront l'indépendance et la sureté de l'Allemagne. Elle est toutefois encore menacée tant que l'Italie appartient à la France. C'est à l'Autriche à y reprendre son ancienne influence et sa position précédente, et de tâcher d'y établir un système fédératif à l'instar de celui proposé pour l'Allemagne.

Il pourroit être composé du Roi de Naples et des Deux Siciles, du Pape, du Grand-Duc de Toscane, et de l'Empereur

d'Autriche, et aurait un Etat-major pour la gestion des affaires militaires, qui devroit communiquer avec celui des armées d'Allemagne.

La nouvelle constitution Germanique seroit garantie par l'Autriche, l'Angleterre, et la Prusse.

L'Empereur d'Autriche reprenant son titre d'Empereur d'Allemagne, a le droit, du consentement de l'Angleterre et des Grands-Ducs, et des Rois de la confédération, de déclarer la guerre et de mettre l'Allemagne sous les armes.

L'on devra songer à donner une constitution à ce nouvel état fédératif, à établir une diète et à en fixer les attributions.

La liberté du commerce préviendra qu'il n'éprouve des entraves par l'établissement des douanes arbitraires.

Il n'a pas été question de la Suède ni du Danemark, parceque ces Puissances n'appartiennent pas au système fédératif de l'Allemagne; rien n'est plus aisé que de les laisser y prendre part si elles le désirent, ce qui sans doute contribueroit au repos et à l'indépendance de l'Europe.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

The Hague,[1] December 1, 1813.

My dear Lord—I have little to add to what you will find in my regular and private despatches of this date. The principal matter is that, with the exception of a degree of enthusiasm such as I never before witnessed, and which was certainly never surpassed, we have literally nothing with which to defend ourselves in case of attack, or even of a predatory excursion.

Gorcum, you will see, is the point at which a considerable force of the enemy is assembling, with what view I am not

[1] After the battle of Leipzig, the Dutch Provinces, like all the German States, rose to assert their independence; the Stadtholder, who arrived at the Hague in November, was proclaimed Sovereign Prince of the Dutch Netherlands; and Lord Clancarty was appointed his Britannic Majesty's representative at his Court.

enabled to say; and between the Hague and Gorcum there is literally nothing to prevent the French from making a free and unimpeded march into this place whenever they please; and Rotterdam, as being nearer to them, is still more exposed. Although this is the fact, I do not think there is any very considerable apprehension to be entertained of its being put to practical proof.

A matter, however, of very serious moment gives me some uneasiness: in the present state of the winds, it is impossible to say how long it may be before the arrival of the troops and of the arms; for the last week, the wind has been as foul as possible, and the hardness of the present frost leads me to suppose that a change is not likely soon to take place. If, however, during the continuance of this wind, the troop-ships should be enabled to work over, their landing would be easy; but, if the wind should become fair for their voyage, and blow even moderately hard from the westward, and that it is in contemplation to land them in North Holland, I know not how, with a lee shore and strong surf, this will be practicable. Whatever succours you may hereafter intend for this country, at least during the winter months, I should strenuously recommend that they should be embarked on board of ships-of-war, in which case they will be enabled to work over, as we have done under the disadvantage of a foul wind, and will be easily landed; while otherwise they may be detained for an indefinite period, as the troops and arms now are, or, if the wind should come on shore, the difficulties of landing will be extreme.

You will find in this packet a letter addressed from his Serene Highness to his Royal Highness the Prince Regent: properly, I ought to send a copy of this herewith. His Serene Highness has, however, apologized for not sending it for the moment, from the difficulty he is in of procuring a confidential person to make out the copy, but has assured me that it should be transmitted to me for your information without delay, as

soon as the present press upon him will enable him to have it made out.

Adieu!—the cold is intense, and my fingers are almost frozen. Yours most affectionately,

CLANCARTY.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

The Hague, December 2, 1813, 7 o'clock, Thursday morning.

My dear Lord—In the night, the Jason, with the arms, has made the coast. Major-General Taylor is on board, and the arms will be landed in the course of the day, if possible. This is a great relief.

The Prince has received rumours in the night, and seems to attach some credit to them, that the Briel has declared in his favour; this would also be a great point. He has sent an officer to see; and, if he reports the fact to be so, I shall think it of sufficient consequence to despatch a courier express to make it known. This will open a communication with England, and enable General Sir Thomas Graham to make his dispositions accordingly.

Yours, my dear lord, most sincerely and affectionately,

CLANCARTY.

A gentleman has just arrived, who has brought the official confirmation of the Briel having risen. The inhabitants are in possession of the town—Orange boven!

Sir Henry Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh.

Cadiz, December 4, 1813.

My dear Lord—I have not much to say in addition to my despatches of the 30th ult. At my last interview with M. de la Serna, he told me that he had read to the Regency a despatch from the Spanish Ambassador in London, in which he gave an account of a conversation which he had had with your lordship, in which you expressed the extreme dissatisfaction of the British Government with the conduct of the Regency, with respect to Lord Wellington's command.

Count Fernan Nunez did not conceal his apprehensions of the consequences which a perseverance in the same line of conduct would produce both in England and on the Continent; but, so far was this letter from producing any effect upon the Regency, that they instructed M. de la Serna to direct Count Fernan Nunez to signify to your lordship that the conditions under which Lord Wellington held the command were derogatory to the dignity of the nation, and deprived the Government of all power, and that it was absolutely necessary to put an end to them.

M. de la Serna told me that no consideration should induce him to send these instructions to the Spanish Ambassador, and he informed me that he had requested permission to resign the office of Minister of State, upon the plea that his other employment required his undivided attention—his real motive being to free himself from all connexion with a Government which had so much to answer for, and which would be ignominiously dismissed upon its arrival at Madrid.

I have heard to-day that his resignation has been accepted, and that he has been succeeded by Don Jose Luzendo, Secretary to the Council of State. This is the sixth appointment to the foreign department which has taken place within these four months.

I propose to set out for Madrid as soon as I can complete my preparations for the journey; but the demand for mules is so great, in consequence of the removal of the Regency and the Cortes, that it is very difficult to procure any. I shall certainly, however, reach Madrid before the Regency.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

H. WELLESLEY.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Aberdeen.

Draft. Foreign Office, December 7, 1813.

My dear Aberdeen—You know how acutely we feel upon all political subjects, when our feelings have been long excited

by animating events; but that, at all times, a maritime question touches us to the quick. I cannot conceal from you the uneasiness of the Government upon the perusal of St. Aignan's Minute: and most certainly such a document, if published by the enemy, without any counter-document on our part, would excite unpleasant impressions in this country. It is, therefore, deemed indispensable to record our sentiments in a producible shape, and I lose no time in instructing you accordingly.

I apprehend, after presenting your note to Metternich, your course will be to transmit a copy to Lord Cathcart, for the information of the Russian Government. You will assure the Allies that we act not from the smallest sensation of distrust, but from the necessity imposed upon us of always keeping our case in a shape which, if produced to Parliament, would justify our vigilance and correctness, as not having left the enemy a cavil as to our real intentions.

We shall feel much anxiety till an allied force, adequate not only to its protection, but to assume the offensive towards Antwerp, is assembled in Holland. We consider it of great importance that the Allies should countenance the Prince of Orange as early as possible. Pray encourage the Austrian Government to send a Minister to the Hague. With their support and our arms, we may soon hope to have a respectable force established in that most important quarter. If Charles has left you again, impress the same idea upon Prussia.

I have not time to write more.

Yours, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Mr. Edward Thornton to Lord Castlereagh.

Lübeck, December 7, 1813.

My Lord—The Prince Royal, whom I saw to-day, mentioned to me, for the purpose of communicating it to your lordship, his intention to demolish the works which the French erected about Travemunde, the port of this town, and which were certainly intended for the sole purpose of shutting the naviga-

tion of the river to the English. But there is another fort on the edge of the sea, which may be used for the protection of fleets lying in the Bay of Lübeck, on which he desired me to consult your lordship, whether it should be destroyed or not, as it might be useful to protect such vessels, being unarmed, from the attacks of Danish privateers. I ventured to give my own opinion that they had better be all of them destroyed, because, in effect, they are all of them directed against us; and, although they might be of a momentary use in defending against privateers, they were principally objects of annoyance to the English ships of war. I did not say all this to the Prince; but, if your lordship coincides in this opinion, it will be very easy to desire his Royal Highness to complete the demolition of these works *in toto*.

I learnt, a few days ago, from the Prince Royal, that it is the intention of the Allied Sovereigns to dethrone the King of Saxony, and to place the Duke of Saxe-Weimar in his place. This, I presume, cannot be new to your lordship, yet I am unwilling to omit mentioning it, because it appears the commencement of a system, which will possibly disunite Germany, possibly excite civil discontents, if not civil war, and which would certainly render the return of Bonaparte into Germany, if ever he should regain strength, much less difficult, and (what is worse) less odious.

The Prince observed on this occasion that, if the King of Saxony were to be dethroned, the King of Denmark hardly deserved to escape; and I remarked to him that I was persuaded it was not the wish of the Prince Regent's Government that either of them should be dethroned; the re-establishment of the former system, with as little innovation as circumstances would admit of, being, in my opinion, the only mode of settling the tranquillity of Europe on a permanent basis.

By an article of a Bremen newspaper, it appears that that town is regarded as within the administration of the Central Department, that is, of M. de Stein, who has named the

Consul of Prussia as the agent for the Department. The Prince Royal has declared that it shall not be so with regard to Lübeck, or to Hamburgh, if we have the good fortune to recover it; and he has instructed M. de Wetterstedt to make a strong representation to the Emperor at Frankfort on the impropriety of putting on the footing of conquered countries the three Hanseatic towns, which have done and which have suffered so much for the common cause. Your lordship has already seen the transaction in regard to the Elsfleth toll, contrary to the positive stipulations of the peace of Luneville; and I have no doubt, if M. de Stein is suffered to rule in these towns, that a revenue will be raised upon them by a tax upon commerce, which will fall almost entirely on that of England.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

EDWARD THORNTON.

PS. There is a report to-day renewed of the surrender of Dantzick. The head-quarters go to Segeberg to-morrow.

E. T.

4 P.M. I open my letter to inform your lordship of the certain account of the surrender of Dantzick, which Count Kalckreuth has this instant received.—E. T.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Aberdeen.

Draft. Foreign Office, December 10, 1813.

My dear Aberdeen—I have, in conformity to your desire, given directions to the Admiralty that the frigate which carries the Duke of Cambridge (now at sea) to the Weser, should await your arrival. I yet hope that my numerous letters will have tranquillized your mind upon the necessity of personal explanations. I think there is nothing that could result from our conversations that could compensate for your absence at so important a moment from your post; and, although I never considered you the least pledged beyond the principle of a temporary mission, I should have much wished to have fore-

seen the period of your return, so as to have judged to what hands I should confide our interests at so leading a court, even for the shortest period of time.

The lateness of the hour, and the little probability of this finding you at head-quarters, render it unnecessary for me to add anything to my official letter.

I give great credit to Metternich for his answer to your Note. It is *loyal and gentlemanlike;* and I beg you will tell him that I respect him for it. His answer to the Duke of Bassano I cannot equally admire in point of discretion. I think it is a very awkward document, as connected with St. Aignan's Minute, in the hands of our opponents. CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Cathcart to Lord Castlereagh.

Frankfort-on-the-Maine, December 12, 1813.

My dear Lord—Among the other subjects which the Emperor talked over last night were the papers I had left in his Imperial Majesty's hands relating to the state of the negociation in Persia and to the dispute with the Porte. In the former I had made an extract from Sir Gore Ouseley's despatch, and in the latter I had given Mr. Liston's answer to the Reis Effendi, together with his principal observations.

In regard to Persia, the Emperor will not make any pledge of restitution of conquest, but wishes to let the negociation take its course till it is concluded, apprehending that the only restitution which would be satisfactory to Persia would be such as would endanger the tranquillity or the security of the Georgian provinces.

In regard to the question with the Turks, as to Asiatic possessions to be restored, his Imperial Majesty considers that he has at least as much to complain of as the Porte can pretend to, supposing the article in question to admit of the interpretation given by the Porte to be correct, which he is not disposed to admit, and urges the hardships to their inhabitants, who are Greeks, and not Mahometans.

In regard to Turkish menaces, it will become necessary to reinforce the corps on that frontier, which will be done without prejudice to other operations, and which his Imperial Majesty considers as the most effectual and certain mode of preventing an attack.

He has, however, very highly praised the good sense and policy of Mr. Liston's answer, and has promised to reconsider the whole of that subject, with a view, if possible, to give satisfaction to the Turks, without engaging in more difficulties; and therefore I have made no *despatch* on these subjects, reserving them for the result of the renewed conversation.

The Russian reserve has marched this morning from hence: the cavalry moved two days ago. The Emperor transfers his head-quarters this day to Darmstadt, where great preparations are made for his reception; and he will continue to march with the troops to Carlsruhe, and thence probably to Fribourg.

The departure from hence so soon after seeing the Emperor last night prevents me from adding more, as I expect to set out with his Imperial Majesty in a few minutes.

I have the honour to remain, &c., CATHCART.

The Emperor seems perfectly well disposed to the Orange Republic, and to *Antwerp*, &c. I think Nesselrode knows nothing of the cause of the delay of communicating with the American mission; that it was an intrigue of the Chancellor's, if it is one; and that, during the operations of war, the Emperor had lost the clue to it, so that something has been unanswered. If it is not cleared up, I will write another Note, and send a copy to Walpole. Metternich seems to have satisfied Sir Charles on many subjects since my last.

Switzerland wishes to keep her neutrality. The Emperor desires not to force her territory. But she is told that if she does not join the Allies, she must not expect protection at a peace; and it is thought probable she will join the Allies, first partially, then generally.

Lord Aberdeen to Lord Castlereagh.

Frankfort, December 12, 1813.

My dear Castlereagh—Although I have written very lately, I cannot leave Frankfort without giving you the latest intelligence, above all, as it relates to Switzerland, at present an object of the highest importance. When we arrive at Freybourg, we shall soon know, with tolerable certainty, what we are to expect. I entertain hopes which, I believe, are well founded. It is most likely that the cantons will separate. The Grisons, the little cantons, and Berne, will probably declare for us. I wish I had some instructions relative to Switzerland.

Last night, a person came to me, sent by the Avoyer of Berne, to inquire the views and wishes of the English Government. I assisted the objects of the Allies as much as I could, without committing myself; and I did not discourage that which is the grand object of the canton of Berne—a return to the ancient constitution of the confederacy. At the same time, I cautioned him against supposing that the Allies would adopt this course, if it should be possible to obtain unanimity by preserving things more nearly in their present state. They appear to think that England might do a good deal by her influence.

At the desire of the Austrian Government, I had proposed that Wilson should go into Switzerland, with very precise instructions and no money, to join Lebzeltern. But Cathcart did not approve of this. He likewise objects to putting Wilson off his staff, without a more official document than your private letter to me. I enclose a Note from W. to me on the subject, and I sincerely hope to have speedily done with this affair.

Cathcart will have written to you the report of a conversation with the Emperor on the subject of peace. I do not think he quite understands the drift of the Emperor's observations: I doubt if he meant anything more than the previous arrange-

ments of the great European powers as proposed, but with which C. was imperfectly acquainted. The great object of them all, as I learn from Metternich, is to *simplify* the proceeding. The course proposed by the Emperor, as it is understood by C., would be too strong. He asked my opinion. I cannot think it justifiable to our Allies, or consistent with the principles so repeatedly declared by the British Government, to sign preliminaries of peace and leave their interests to be settled by a definitive arrangement. But I am pretty sure he is mistaken. When I see Metternich again, which will not be before I get to Freybourg, I shall ascertain precisely what this means.

We are in some little fear about Holland, not having heard for three days. If the Prince Royal will but move in force, it is safe; and Krusemark writes that the Prince declares he will be on the Rhine on the 25th. I am anxious to hear from you, and to know your views and intentions. I have repeatedly mentioned to you my intention of returning in the event of the negociation going off, or of my having nothing to do with it. I would do a great deal to be of service to you, and, in this case, there would be nothing sufficiently important to detain me. I have an additional reason for returning, if I am not bound to stay, in the bad health of Lady Maria, whom I wish to see very much.

I did not know what to do about the St. Etienne. They are quite determined that I should have it; and, as Lord Cathcart and Stewart have got the civil orders of St. Andrew and the Black Eagle, which are never bestowed for military service, they are resolved, after the first affair at which I am present, to give the same testimony. In fact, they have taken the thing up warmly as against my colleagues. Long before I knew that the rule was against a Minister accepting a foreign order, I had determined to decline it, thinking that it would always be a recommendation at home. They probably had heard of my intention, which produced the interference of the

Emperor. However it ends, I fear that I shall lose the credit of a voluntary refusal.

Believe me most sincerely yours, ABERDEEN.

PS. It is said that Ney has entered Basle; but the news is not confirmed, nor do I believe it.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

The Hague, December 13, 1813.

My dear Lord—By the breaking up the head-quarters at Frankfort, and return of Charles to Hanover, you will see that we have blundered your despatches to him after all. We have acted, however, for the best; all our intelligence led us to expect that both Lysle and Camino would still catch him at Frankfort.

I have sent you all that I have strength and power to send in my public despatches, except a map of Holland by Krazenoff, in six sheets: it was intended that there should have been twelve; but the map was so perfect that Buonaparte had the plates seized, with as many copies as he could find, and prohibited the progress of the work.

What with the correspondence with two Admirals, four Generals, British and Allied, and four foreign Ministers, and your lordship, I am kept so well employed that I have scarcely time to sleep and eat. God bless you!

Yours most affectionately, CLANCARTY.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

The Hague, December 14, 1813.

My dear Lord—I take a large sheet, meaning to write a large letter.

In the first place, let me beseech you to hurry off Graham[1] to us, in any manner, without delay. Bergen-op-Zoom and Antwerp are, as you may perceive by my despatches, actually

[1] General Sir Thomas Graham (Lord Lynedoch).

at our feet, but we have as yet no means of acquiring them. Whether they will continue unsupported by reinforcements, should we lose the present opportunity, it is impossible to tell. No doubt, every practicable exertion will be made by the French to save these places. Hitherto, they have had no means wherewith to reinforce them.

I am next to beseech you to tranquillize Charles's mind by a private letter. In my opinion, his views upon the late subjects of controversy are correct: if he has erred, I have the misfortune to err with him. Surely you never could have seen that Minute of M. de St. Aginan, at the time you acceded to the basis. I know not in what shape the basis reached you: the heads of it do not seem to me to have ever been committed to writing, except in that Minute.

Upon the maritime question—on the concealment from Sweden, I cannot help agreeing with Charles: the latter, Aberdeen says in his last despatch, (which he sent here under a flying seal for my perusal) has been satisfactorily explained. I hope it has been so; but, as to the first, it still, in my view, stands in a very awkward position. Aberdeen tells you that, in a conversation with Nesselrode, this Minister expressed himself as wishing nothing better than to wave the discussion of it altogether: but is this the tone to be adopted by us upon such a vital question, not only to ours, but to the interests of all Europe? Your views upon this subject, I understood to be, that the points relating to navigation were so clear, so fixed, and so established by the law of nations, as not to admit of discussion, and therefore that Great Britain would not suffer them to be discussed. This appears to me to be the proper tone for England to take, and I cannot but admire at the coldness with which this matter seems to affect the Allies, and the desire expressed by Nesselrode to wave the subject.

After all that has passed in Europe for the last twenty years, one would have hoped that Russia and the other Allies would have been cured from their attachment to the principles of the

armed neutrality. Had these principles been acquiesced in by Great Britain as a general regulation, at the time they were so pressed, particularly by Russia, Holland, Prussia, and Austria, what would have become of all those very powers in their later contests with France? Had they been adopted, the whole world would have been placed at the feet of Buonaparte: the commerce of France, and consequently her resources, would have remained entire, as far as her commerce was concerned, increased rather than diminished by war. And there is nothing in my mind more clear than that to the vigorous opposition of Great Britain to the views of the Empress Catherine and others of the Allies, in this respect, the world is now indebted for the chances which still present themselves for its salvation. Are your Ambassadors at Frankfort properly impressed with this great truth? and have they urged it home in argument? I hope so—and yet it is strange that it should have had no greater effect than eliciting from Nesselrode a cold avowal that he wished nothing better than to wave the discussion of the subject. *Timeo, multum timeo.* It seems also somewhat strange that Aberdeen should not be certain whether so material a point as this should have formed part of the instructions read to him *in extenso* from Prince Metternich to the Baron Wessenberg.

With respect to the declaration of the Allies, I differ both with Charles and Aberdeen, inasmuch as I think that the substance, style, and manner, of it are well calculated to make an impression upon the people of France; but how Aberdeen can say that, though feeble, the Declaration is unobjectionable and exempt from blame, is to me incomprehensible. What can be more objectionable, or a greater object of blame, than that the Allies should, in the very outset of a negociation, gratuitously pledge themselves to the admission of a greater portion of territory to France than she ever enjoyed under her kings?

Charles sent me all his despatches and his private letter to you, all under flying seal: with respect to the first, General

Pfühl is here, having accompanied us from England; and, I must own, his talents seem to me very much overrated at this Court.

I have no apprehension of any embarrassment arising respecting the command in this quarter: it will be long before the Prince of Orange can have an army sufficiently qualified for the field, and even if he had, (which it is my endeavour to forward as much as possible) he will probably, for a long time, be so occupied in the details of his new Government, as to render it little likely that he should head them in person. It is true that the Crown Prince, according to his letter to General Bülow, which was forwarded to you in a former public despatch, may be expected hereafter. I think it, however, improbable, from a letter received from his Royal Highness by the Prince of Orange to-day, (and of which, with an abstract with the Note enclosing it, a copy goes herewith) that his arrival will soon take place, or that, when it shall, he will be likely to meddle with Graham, who will probably take his orders for England.

The Russians have not created dislike in this country: except from Rotterdam, I have heard of no complaints of them, and there the only complaint exhibited was that the officers' table was too expensive.

Upon Charles's private letter I have no remark to make, but to deprecate an ill-weighed suggestion of his respecting myself: happily, he has, in the very next paragraph, recommended a much more eligible course. It is easy to see that the Prince of Orange would much rather that the Pays Bas Autrichien should be annexed to his domains, than that a third power should be interposed between him and France. His ambition seems to get the better of his judgment in this respect. The annexation would be very unpopular at Amsterdam, whose ruin would be its inevitable consequence, from the great natural advantages possessed by Antwerp as a commercial entrepôt; and this may, in some degree, account for

the reluctance at first displayed by him to an establishment for his family at Amsterdam, and occasional residence there.

I heard a history yesterday, from the mouth of one of the principal gentlemen of the place, who was present at it, of the evacuation of Breda by the enemy. The day was foggy; fifteen Cossacks presented themselves before one of the gates; this was immediately magnified into 800 Cossacks; the gate was hastily closed. The same fifteen Cossacks, without delay, presented themselves at another of the gates: all were then shut, and all was confusion among the French within. It was said by them, and universally believed, that the town was *cernée par ces gueux de Cossacks:* all things were immediately packed, and put in motion by the French from the town, by the gate of Antwerp. The other gates were then opened, and the fifteen Cossacks admitted and well received by the inhabitants. This is the summary of the gentleman's story; which, I think, may at once entertain and serve to show you the state of terror with which the French who occupy the remaining parts of the Dutch territory are impressed.

In Aberdeen's private letter to me, he mentions having sent a Mr. Johnson, as an emissary, to stir up the Dutch and Flemings to revolt, and that this person would wait on me, to take my directions. He has accordingly been here to-day, and showed me a letter from Aberdeen, authorizing him to draw for £25,000 sterling; and said that a person from Antwerp would wait upon me, to acquaint me with the state of that place, and other parts of Brabant and Flanders. I told this gentleman, as is most true, that I conceived that things were going on extremely well without the expenditure of a single shilling; that we had accounts from all parts of these countries; that we knew the disposition of the inhabitants to be sufficiently ripe for revolt; and that troops were only required to cover the insurrection, which were immediately expected; and that I thought more harm than good might be expected to result from our tampering with them; that I should, however, have

great pleasure in receiving the person he mentioned, whenever he should arrive, and hear what he had to say; but that I scarcely thought anything, under present circumstances, would authorize the expenditure of a single shilling. He replied that it was too late to save all the £25,000, for that £15,000 had actually been drawn or paid at Frankfort; but that £10,000 remained with him, Mr. Johnson, to wait my directions, and that he thought this pledged for the purpose he was directed to pursue. I shall take great care, however, that the remainder, if subject to my directions, shall not be wantonly employed.

Upon asking the Prince of Orange, yesterday, whether he had received the answer from Admiral Verheul, he apologized for not having acquainted me with it, and told me it was as unfavourable as could have been framed; but that he was still certain that this Admiral only required a sufficient force to be sent before the Helder, to afford him an excuse for surrendering.

We are still without a house, still at a miserable inn. Under the assurances of M. de Vanderduyn that he would procure a person to hire out furniture at a reasonable rate, I was induced to take a house for a year, at 1,800 florins. His upholsterer has, since my agreement for this house, arrived from Amsterdam, and has the modesty to ask for the furniture no less than 19,200 florins per annum, which would make the annual rent of the house furnished 21,000, or something above £2,200 per annum at the present rate of exchange. I have, therefore, been obliged to speak to M. de Vanderduyn on the wretchedness of our situation, and he is to speak to the Prince to-morrow upon the subject of our accommodation.

Yours most affectionately, CLANCARTY.

PS. The remainder of the Guards, consisting of 320 men, have arrived at Scheveling this evening, having left Harwich yesterday! This gives me hopes of Graham's arrival in the course of to-morrow. Heaven send it!

Lord Aberdeen to Lord Castlereagh.

Freyburg, December 19, 1813.

My dear Castlereagh—The Swiss affair is most happily decided. The question has been so managed, that the Emperor of Russia has been compelled to approve of the operation. Metternich has shown infinite ability in the whole of this business, and we owe everything that may happen in Switzerland to him alone. He has had difficulties to contend with beyond belief. The Emperor of Russia declared that he should consider the entrance into Switzerland as a declaration of war against himself; yet Metternich was always determined to do it, but to bring matters gradually to that point, when they should no longer leave the option as to the conduct to be pursued. The canton of Berne, Zurich, and all the little cantons, are enthusiastic in the cause. I trust no difficulty will be experienced in any part. I think you must highly approve of what has been done.

With respect to the operation as a military movement, I know there is a great difference of opinion. So far as I can form a judgment, it is incomparably the best plan for a vigorous attack of the French power, and I have always been of this opinion. You are to understand, however, that it is not as an insulated and limited measure that we establish ourselves on the frontier of France, but as affording us the only means of acting on a great scale in future, and striking a decisive blow at the very existence of Bonaparte.

We are persuaded that the only road to Paris is from this quarter, and I hope you do not think me too sanguine or bold, if, after all that has been said, I venture to talk of Paris. It appears to me that, if we once enter France, it would be ridiculous to play for anything but the highest stake. If we hold together, I do not see how he can oppose us with effect, and I confidently hope that the attempt will be pursued with all the energy and vigour which it demands. We shall give the people

an opportunity of showing what their real feeling is. I believe in Alsace and Franche Comté we may expect them to be friendly.

I shall be very anxious to know what you think of the affair of Denmark. A prospect is at last afforded of getting out of the difficulty; but, at any rate, Austria is pledged, and I collect from Nesselrode that the Emperor of Russia is entirely of the same opinion with the Austrian Government on the whole of this question. I know this is a matter in which you take the most lively interest, and which is full of difficulty. The only advice which I have to give on the subject is to have a little patience; to give the Austrian Government a chance of extricating us from these difficulties by exercising the freedom which it still possesses. They may be disposed, perhaps rather too much, to undervalue the Prince Royal. My language has always been to put him and his concerns in the best light, although it has not always been easy. Above all, I have always insisted on the nature of our engagements with him. On this part of the subject, Metternich has always referred me to Russia; but I never fail to return to the charge. On the whole, I do not think he means to act unfairly, but perhaps we should do well to profit by this opportunity, to assist him as much as possible in bringing this most thorny question to a favourable result. Some confidence here would be well placed. It will be hard if Russia, who may be considered as the principal concerned, should be perfectly contented, and that means should not be found to satisfy us.

You may consider the affair of Murat as settled. The fellow knows his importance, and wishes to make the most of it. He will probably vapour a good deal; but the Queen, who rules everything, has sent to Metternich to say that he will at last act on their terms. It will probably end in Austria agreeing to his having a change of frontier on the Papal territory just enough to satisfy his vanity, and enable him to show something to his people. I did not feel it particularly incumbent on me

to protest against anything of this kind, because I thought that a question of frontier for the Pope was more an Austrian affair than belonging to any one else, when once it was decided that he should be re-established in Rome. I doubt much if it will be possible, with the claims of Sicily, Sardinia, and Austria herself in the north of Italy, to restore to him the three Legations; but something adequate should be done.

On the whole, I send you a good day's work. You will, therefore, bear to hear me for a few moments on the subject of the general Treaty, which is certainly not so pleasant, but the situation of which I wish you to understand fully, so far as I am concerned.

I must first inform you that it is my own fault, if fault it be, if you have not a declaration, on the part of Austria, expressing an entire readiness to sign the Treaty *here*, with the modifications which we might think ourselves authorized to make. The situation of affairs has lately been such between Austria and Russia, and the decided difference existing between them led so easily to the increase of ill will, that I took on myself to decline it. I conceived that I alone was personally concerned; that a declaration from Austria, so far from influencing Russia, *might* have a contrary effect, and certainly would produce irritation. I therefore declined having my own justification perfect, for the purpose of exercising that duty which I believe to be more important than all others—that of preventing anything like a separation of interests in these powers; and I trusted to make out the case to you the best way I could. When Metternich and Nesselrode were together, I tried every means of argument and exhortation with them, but now I find how the matter is situated. Metternich has confessed to me that he had promised more than he was able to perform; not more than he was warranted in promising. He said that, with all his influence, still he was not the master, and that, after having given him reason for what he told me, the Emperor had changed. It is only to-night that he again offered me the

declaration; and, when he understood the motives of my refusal, he was very sensible of my consideration. In fact, he has had a most difficult game to play, and you know the Emperor of Russia well enough to be aware of it.

On the subject of this Treaty, I believe him to be sincere, and can see no reason to doubt it. I may venture to say that Stewart, with more excellent qualities than I can enumerate, is rather too suspicious, and sees every thing in too unfavourable a light. I think Metternich sees the interests of his country, and is wise enough to see that they coincide with ours. I only want to bring you to this opinion. If he saw Austrian interests different from ours, I dare say he would pursue them. However, I have said quite enough about him, and will plague you no longer.

Believe me ever most sincerely yours, ABERDEEN.

PS. Schwarzenberg, from Basle, goes direct to Berne, where he will arrive on the 26th. He will send 20,000 men to Lausanne, &c. Other troops will cross the Rhine at Schaffhausen, and, uniting with Schwarzenberg's column, proceed into Franche Comté. If the enemy is in force at Besançon, he will attack them if they stand, and besiege the place, if advisable. Wrede besieges Huningen. The Russians support Wrede, and look to Befort. If Bonaparte assembles, which is possible, in great force, at Strasburg, we must look to our communications; but the great thing is to find him *in mass* any where, so as to bring him to action.

Lord Aberdeen to Lord Castlereagh.

Extract. Freyburg, December 19, 1813.

Dear Castlereagh—There has been a new difficulty about Horne. He set out for Bavaria, and wrote to me when he arrived at Bayreuth. I desired him to fix his residence at Ratisbon, Augsburg, or Nuremberg; as I understood that his connexions were in Bavaria, and that, if any where, he had the

means of being useful there. But it appears the Bavarian Government are as determined not to have him as the Austrian, and he has been directed to quit the country. He is now at Stuttgard. The fact is, that he was formerly a *monk* in Bavaria; so that it cannot be supposed he will be well viewed in a Catholic country, after he has turned Protestant, married, and, as they say, adopted very *philosophical* notions on these subjects. If they determine not to receive him, it is certainly a point which I shall not feel it in the least incumbent on me to press. In this case, rather than send the man home, I shall send him into Saxony, where there is no Government to object, and where there is a good deal doing which I should be glad to know .....

I must mention one man, of whose value, I think, you are scarcely aware—Johnson. He is one of the most right-headed, sensible men I ever met with; he is really a person of rare merit, universally liked and esteemed. I have heard more good of him from all quarters than you can imagine. I have sent him, as I told you, to manage the business of the Low Countries, and I wish I could quarter him and employ him every where. It is a real satisfaction to have to deal with so safe a person, so trustworthy in every respect.

Yours, ever most sincerely, ABERDEEN.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Aberdeen.

Draft. St. James's Square, December 22, 1813.

My dear Aberdeen—The march of events is so rapid, the points at issue so important, and the impossibility of keeping pace, by instructions from home, with the necessity for them abroad, is such, as to require, were it practicable, that the Government itself should repair to head-quarters. As it is, they have thought it right that I should, during the recess, proceed there, to make such arrangements as the existing circumstances may require on the spot. You may, therefore,

expect me early in the month; and I trust we may be enabled to decide on Pozzo's budget more satisfactorily, when the discussions can be conducted under a full knowledge of the existing state of affairs. I shall, therefore, go no further with him or with the other foreign Ministers here, than to ascertain all the points on which they deem it expedient that I should obtain the sentiments of the Government before my departure, for my final decision when we meet.

It gives me the greatest pleasure to observe that a little political controversy has made no change in yours and Charles's mutual confidence. If I could have foreseen the great questions that were impending, I should certainly have thrown the three Ministers that were at head-quarters into a species of commission, and have required them to consider and decide upon subjects of general policy in their collective capacity, transacting the inferior details in their distinct capacities. What has been wanting was a central authority. The differences have been fewer than might have been apprehended: but where there are several independent authorities, there must be doubts as to the sentiments of the Government. Whilst I state the evil, and advert to what might have been in a great degree the remedy, I must say that, upon the whole, the Government has been most ably served, and I beg you will be assured we do ample justice to you all.

I shall not, in all probability, get away from hence before the 28th; and I shall stop possibly a day at the Hague, where I shall leave Lady C. Robinson is to be of my party to head-quarters, and we expect you to give us a hearty welcome.

I have just received your note through Denmark. Bombelles gives Wessenberg no details, and asks for a suspension of hostilities, without telling us any thing of the proposed arrangement. He does not even mention whether there is an armistice with the Allies or not. I hope we shall soon be relieved from our suspense. Till we are better informed, especially as to the latter fact, I do not see the possibility of taking any

step, unless it be to authorize Thornton to notify a naval armistice on our part, as contingent upon one by land.

The letter alluded to in Bombelles' instructions from the Prince Royal to the Emperor, confining his views to Drontheim, has never been seen by me. As far as we are informed, his compromise was, Drontheim *now*, and the rest of Norway at a peace, or the indemnities to which Denmark was to be entitled.

As we are to meet so soon, I shall only add, that I have not executed your commission with respect to sending Lord A. your despatches: unless he was to read all, he could hardly follow the subject fairly; and, with all my personal confidence in him, I do not feel myself entitled to this species of communication.

CASTLEREAGH.

The Hon. Sir Charles Stewart to Lord Castlereagh.

December 23, 1813.

My dearest Castlereagh—The messenger Walsh, who has been to the Prince Royal's head-quarters after me, is just arrived, as Meates is setting off. I have, therefore, no time, without delaying Meates, which is not worth while, to write on many points relating to these communications, which I should have received long since. I send a few hasty lines on the subject you opened to me from Lord B. in a separate letter. The remark at the end of Lord Bathurst's note was not a *small cordial* to me just now. *Au reste*, I'll send off again in a day or two.

Thornton has written to me from Kiel, and so has Cooke. I send both their private letters, though not meant for your eye. I think that Thornton does not see sufficiently strongly that the Prince Royal, by his miserable skirmishes in Denmark (notwithstanding they cut a figure in bulletins), and his negociations and armistices, &c., that he paralyzes a corps of 80,000 men, and advances not an inch to the great game in

view. I shall be very determined with him, and get categorical answers. But it is wonderful how he imposes on people who are around him.

Cooke's narration is too black, and rather high coloured, I know, to your taste—however, it is as well to see all lights. I hope to get the Hanoverians corps and Walmoden here: after all that's happened, I shall demand this peremptorily. The Danes are really playing a ridiculous game, and what a little mind Charles Jean has!

Adieu! Yours, C. S.

Lord Aberdeen to Lord Castlereagh.

Freiburg, December 24, 1813.

My dear Castlereagh — I am sorry to inform you of the loss of one of our new friends. The King of Wirtemberg has written to Bonaparte to say that the alliance has been forced on him, and that he looks forward to the time when he may be able to assist him with effect. The channel of his correspondence has been discovered; and, as it is through Switzerland, Schwarzenberg has taken measures to procure fresh proofs of his treachery. The cause of this conduct is to be found in his hatred of Bavaria. He can never forgive Austria for granting more favourable terms to the King of Bavaria than to himself. He even made a show of not ratifying the Treaty, which his Minister, Count Zeppelin, had concluded; and, since the return of Zeppelin to Stuttgard, he treats him with the greatest indignity.

I am sure you will think that the Austrian Government did right in making a distinction in favour of Bavaria, which came forward so early, and the accession of which was so important to the common cause.

The King is abhorred in the country, and I should not be the least surprised if measures were taken to place the government of the State, at least for the present, in other hands. The Prince Royal has given the Austrian Government to

understand that, whatever is done, he shall perform his duty at the head of the army; but that he does not wish to be placed at the head of the Government.

A circumstance which occurred when the King received the intelligence of the battle of Hanau, and, as it was then believed, of Wrede's death, excited universal indignation. The King was at supper with a party, of a description of which you may probably have heard. The most savage joy was displayed, and the health of Napoleon repeatedly drunk.

I leave you to judge if we can leave our rear exposed in the bold movement which we have now undertaken. We must be assured of the state of Wirtemberg, as, in the case of disaster, treachery might be fatal. Of course, an *éclat*, if possible, will be avoided; but it is not only necessary to secure ourselves, but to deprive Bonaparte of the hope that others of our own friends may be in the same situation.

I have thought it right to give you this information: of course it is at present confidential.

Ever most sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN.

Lord Aberdeen to Lord Castlereagh.

Freiburg, December 24, 1813.

My dear Castlereagh—The Swiss movement goes on perfectly well: Bubna ought to be at Berne by this time, and there are troops in the neighbourhood of Befort. The remonstrance of Watteville on the entrance of the Austrians was concerted. Schwarzenburg was to be at Basle himself today; and I believe we shall go in two or three days to Rheinfelden.

The Emperor of Russia is come here, and has had many discussions with Metternich on the subject of Swiss neutrality: he has been compelled to admit that it was necessary to avail ourselves of the disposition of the people; but he still adheres to his former opinions as to the principle of the measure. This

Metternich has very wisely abandoned to him, as they are agreed about their conduct, and trust no more embarrassment will arise from this affair. Lebzeltern writes from Zurich that the public spirit is daily becoming more enthusiastic. The offers of raising troops for the service of England are more frequent, but all these I have invariably discouraged, and, indeed, refused.

I should tell you that Lebzeltern mentions a report from Paris, on good authority, that Bonaparte is treating with Ferdinand VII. He is to be restored to Spain, on condition of the English being excluded from that country and its ports. Other conditions are mentioned. Metternich, when he showed me Lebzeltern's letter, told me that Bonaparte had frequently said to him that he should never have any difficulty in arranging the affairs of Spain; for, whenever the war went against him, he could make any terms with Ferdinand he chose, and turn him into the country, to the injury of the English influence. Whatever foundation there may be for the report, it is as well that you should know it.

I had a very long conversation with the Emperor, yesterday morning; being, as usual, quite alone with him, he talked with great freedom: he is more decided than ever as to the necessity of perseverance, and puts little trust in the fair promises of Bonaparte. So long as he lives, there can be no security—he repeated it two or three times. We had just received the news of the capture of Zara, at which the English frigates, and especially Captain Cadogan, had greatly assisted. He spoke with a degree of warmth and feeling about the English, which I have rarely witnessed. He said, "They are my friends, and the friends of my family—I always like to see their faces. Among many things which have made me unhappy of late years, I have felt the absence of the English." It is a feeling he has cherished from the beginning of his reign; whenever he sees an Englishman, he thinks he sees a friend. All this is of little consequence, but it is as

well to write it, because, whatever may be thought of the Minister, falsehood and deceit are perfectly unknown to the Emperor.

I hope you will be satisfied with Metternich's treatment of the maritime question. The sentiments of Nesselrode are not less favourable; but I fear the Emperor has some little tincture remaining of the prejudices instilled into him by Romanzow, which may make him hesitate.—I dined with the Emperor Alexander to-day; and, as I sat by him at dinner, he talked a great deal about his going to England. He did it so seriously, that there must be something in it. He seemed to think that he had been invited by the Prince, in consequence of a letter which he had received from Mr. Grange. If you wish to have him, I do not think there would be any difficulty.

I hope we have brought the business of the Prince Royal to something like a conclusion. He has not been acting very wisely of late with a view to his own interests. Making the protection of Holland subservient to his immediate objects is sufficiently odious, whatever may be his provocation. Nesselrode is quite furious; and I assure you that you would very much admire my exertions to tranquillize him and Metternich on the subject of the proceedings of the Prince Royal. But, in fact, I see that we have no choice, and must act accordingly. Nesselrode is an excellent person, most zealous in the good cause, but a little alarmed at the symptoms of dissolution. These are less formidable at present than they were lately; but, in your warlike speculations, you will do well to take them into account.

I should tell you, in case you hear of a very absurd letter from Bombelles to Walmoden, that Metternich has entirely disavowed the whole proceeding. B. had not only no instructions of this kind, but has acted entirely contrary to the wishes of Metternich. No time has been lost in giving this explanation to the Prince Royal.

In a letter before leaving Frankfort, I mentioned the report

of a conversation which Cathcart had with the Emperor Alexander on the subject of peace. I told you that I thought he was mistaken, and that he imagined a preliminary understanding between the leading powers, before going to a Congress, was, in fact, the formal conclusion of a treaty. I find that I was right in this supposition: no such proposal has yet been thought of.

The information from France all seems to agree in stating the consternation which prevails as very great. General Winzingerode, who is the Minister from Wirtemberg, has received a letter from his father at Paris, which describes it in strong terms. It appears by it that Bonaparte is determined to wait for some time, and act entirely on the defensive, improving his means, and ready to take advantage of any mistake committed by the Allies. But, with such a combination of force, if it can at all be brought to bear, we may do a great deal before he is prepared for us. It has been determined to send a few hundred Cossacks across the country to Lord Wellington.

Believe me ever most sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN.

PS. The Emperor has just told me that he wishes to give the small cross of Maria Theresa to Captain Cadogan, and the cross of St. Leopold to Captain Blake, for their services at Zara. He wishes also to give some gold and silver medals to those who served in the batteries, and contributed so essentially to take the place.

Instructions to Lord Castlereagh, on his Mission to the Allied Sovereigns.

George, P.R.

Instructions for our right trusty and well-beloved Councillor Robert Stewart, (commonly called Viscount Castlereagh) one of his Majesty's principal Secretaries of State, and Member of the Parliament of his Majesty's United Kingdom, whom We

have appointed his Majesty's Plenipotentiary to the Courts allied to his Majesty upon the Continent of Europe.

Given at the Palace of Carlton House, the 27th day of December, 1813, in the fifty-fourth year of his Majesty's reign.

We, taking into consideration the urgent importance of the existing crisis, which requires, on many occasions, a more full and immediate decision on our part than can be effected under the inevitable delay attending a direct communication between the Powers of the Continent and this Government; and the objects under discussion being of a magnitude far beyond the limits of the discretionary decision of the ordinary diplomatic representatives; and We, having, therefore, determined to employ on a special and temporary mission on the Continent one of our confidential Servants and principal Secretaries of State, fully informed of our views, and invested with full powers to negociate and engage, in his Majesty's name, for the establishment of such arrangements as may most effectually unite all the Powers of the Continent at this crisis, so generally important to the interests, security, and independence of the whole, in common views for the vigorous prosecution of the war, and also may enable him to negociate and conclude, on behalf of his Majesty, conventions or treaties for the restoration of peace:

We have thought proper to confide to you this most important service; and We hereby signify to you our pleasure, in his Majesty's name, that you should repair, in the first instance, to the head-quarters of the grand allied army, where it is understood the three Allied Sovereigns, his Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Austria, his Imperial Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, and his Majesty the King of Prussia, are assembled, to whom you will deliver the Credentials with which you will be furnished to them respectively.

After possessing yourself in the fullest manner of all the

information which can be supplied by his Majesty's Amba sadors, or other Ministers, you will propose to enter into co ference with such Minister or Ministers of the said Sovereig as may be appointed for that purpose, upon the great objec of your mission: and you will be furnished with full powe to enable you to enter into any treaty or engagement with a or any of the Allied Powers, or with any other Powers, furtherance of the like views.

You will receive, previously to your departure, and afte wards, from time to time, additional instructions, which wi be conveyed to you by our command, under the signature one of his Majesty's principal Secretaries of State, to whon in your absence, We shall entrust the duties of your depar ment.

His Majesty's accredited Ministers on the Continent, whatever rank or description, will receive our commands t transmit punctually to you accounts of every thing materi which may pass at their respective Courts, and to pay in plicit attention to the directions which they shall recei from you, continuing, whilst on the Continent, to act in t capacity of his Majesty's principal Secretary of State f Foreign Affairs.

And, in order to enable you more fully to execute the co mission with which you are charged, We do hereby author and empower you to take with you as assistant in the exe tion of this especial service, with the rank of Minister Pl potentiary, our right trusty and well-beloved the Honoura Frederick Robinson, a member of his Majesty's most hono able Privy Council, whom We have thought proper to in with full powers for holding conferences, and concluding s engagements or treaties with his Majesty's Allies, or an them, in case of your illness or otherwise, according to directions he shall receive from you, in conformity to instructions with which you are or shall be furnished.

Mr. W. Hamilton to Lord Castlereagh.

Foreign Office, December 29, 1813.

My dear Lord—It is possible this may still find you at Harwich; and, in that case, you will have the pleasure of conveying to the Continent the abstract of Lord Wellington's account of his victories from the 10th to the 13th.

Colonel Hill, who brought the despatches, did not leave St. Jean de Luz till the 17th, when nothing of importance had occurred since the 14th.

We have no other despatches or news from any quarter with which you are not acquainted.

Your obedient servant,

W. HAMILTON.

Mr. Edward Thornton to Lord Castlereagh.

Kiel, December 29, 1813.

My Lord—I avail myself in haste of Sir Charles Stewart's return to the Imperial head-quarters, where he hopes to find your lordship arrived, to offer to your lordship my sincere congratulations on the step which you have determined to take, and which, I promise myself, will settle every thing on its proper basis, and make the whole machine move forward once more with unity as well as energy.

Though not, perhaps, the first, yet certainly a most important object which your lordship's presence will attain is that of restoring to the affairs of Sweden that course which the politics of M. de Metternich have turned them from, and have occasioned almost the whole delay, which it was pretended he was desirous of saving. If I were to say more, and to assert that this conduct of the Austrian Cabinet, which has entangled with it new doubts and suspicions with regard to Russia and Prussia, is calculated to ruin the whole cause, as far as it depends upon Sweden and upon the Crown Prince to support it, I should not place before your lordship's eyes

too strong a picture of what I am apprehensive may happen, if a speedy remedy is not applied to it by the frank support of these powers to the system of Sweden, as stipulated by treaty, and even by the adherence of Austria to that system.

I put under this cover a duplicate of the last despatch which I had the honour of addressing to your lordship: from the times the others were written, subsequent to my number 144, and from the periods they must have reached the Hague at, and most probably England, I think all the rest must have already passed through your lordship's hands. Among these, I reckon my private letter of the 17th December, in which I had the good fortune to anticipate and to suggest the very circumstance which his Majesty's Government adopted two or three days after that date, of sending a Cabinet Minister to the Continent to the Imperial head-quarters.

Your lordship will see, from the despatches of Baron de Tawast, arrived at Copenhagen, (of which Sir Charles Stewart is to have copies) the state of the question at that capital. If M. de Rosenkrantz is to be believed—and in part Count de Bombelles' assertion confirms what he says—the instructions of this latter were not only shown to the Emperor of Russia and to the King of Prussia, but these sovereigns made alterations in them conformable to their own view. This assertion has had a most pernicious effect even on the mind of M. de Wetterstedt, who already talks of the possibility of being obliged to retire, with the Swedish troops, to Stralsund, if they are to be thus abandoned by the Allies: and I can assure your lordship that there are many Swedish Councillors who would readily advise this step. If it is attempted at the Imperial head-quarters (as I learn from Sir Charles Stewart has been thought of) to force the Prince Royal from hence, or to oblige him to yield to the conditions of the Austrian mediation by the threat or by the act of withdrawing the allied troops, I declare to your lordship my solemn belief that it will be done: and the consequences of that step would be much more per-

nicious than the numbers of the Swedish troops withdrawn would lead to imagine.

I declared to M. de Wetterstedt to-day, as it was my duty to do, and as I am persuaded your lordship would authorize me to say, that, if it were possible for the Allied Sovereigns to act in that manner, and to oblige the Swedes, no longer strong enough to face the Danes, to retire to Stralsund, and wait the season for the return to Sweden, his Majesty's Government would still keep their good faith, would furnish the stipulated subsidy till the season arrived, and *in* Sweden would aid with their maritime force in obtaining the conquest of Norway. I said this, my lord (which I likewise believe, too), because I see that the Prince Royal and all the Swedes about him are only supported by their opinion of the unalterable good faith of England, who is, in fact, the only power upon whose influence and fidelity they can have any reliance.

It was with much pain, therefore, that I felt myself obliged, in conformity to your lordship's despatch, No. 78, of the 21st of this month, to make even an allusion to the troops in the British pay, as if they could not be spared for the purpose of being diverted to other services, while the great interests are to be neglected or sacrificed. I might, in strictness and in exact conformity to your lordship's instructions, (the corps of Winzingerode being now marched) have suppressed the mention of this despatch; but I was not unwilling to give a stimulus to the Prince Royal on a subject on which we are all so much alive, and, in making the communication, I wished to ascribe it (as is the case certainly) to the extreme anxiety and sensibility of the English Government in every thing relating to Holland. But, with all I could do, I could not prevent it from being very severely felt by the Prince Royal; and I had to sustain a scene, in some degree resembling that at Leipsick, though incomparably less violent. I conjure your lordship not to suffer yourself to be led away by the opinions which you will find at the head-quarters, and to trust to my utmost

exertions, in as far as I know the Prince Royal, and have most studied his character, to bring him, with all the force which he can bring from this country, to bear upon the points the most interesting to his Majesty's Government and to Europe.

I am convinced, however, my lord, that nothing is to be hoped for until after the 4th or 5th of next month, when we shall have most certainly the return of the Comte de Bombelles from Copenhagen. The thing is not quite to be despaired of, until after that event shall have decided that Denmark will not yield; and, if there is a prospect of the signature of preliminary articles of peace with Sweden, I can venture to assure you that the negociation of that with England shall not stop the march of the troops towards Holland, nor the departure of the Prince Royal himself. It will be very easy for a Danish negociator to follow the head-quarters.

It is my intention to send duplicates of all my letters to England by other messengers to your lordship, as long as you may continue at the Imperial head-quarters.

When once our faces are turned towards the Rhine, as I trust they will be ere long, I shall then have to address your lordship upon subjects of a more delicate nature and of vast moment, if I see my way clear, as I am endeavouring to do. At that time, I should wish most earnestly to have a personal conversation with your lordship, which might be easily managed by my falling into your route on your way back from the Imperial head-quarters. I flatter myself that the course of events and the direction of this army's march will make this project one of easy attainment.

I have the honour to be, &c., EDWARD THORNTON.

Kiel, December 30, 1813.

I saw the Prince Royal alone this morning; and, after speaking upon the expectations he had of obtaining Glückstadt, and upon the subject of the despatches he had just received

from M. de Bildt relative to the affairs of Denmark, he began to talk to me upon the subject of France.

He said he was anxious to know what were the sentiments of the English Government upon it, that he might conform himself, as much as possible, to them. If it was their wish to preserve the present dynasty, he ought to know it, that he might concert with England the means of limiting its power, and confining it within such bounds as would preserve the liberties and independence of Europe. If, on the other hand, it was their real opinion that no security could be given, either during the life of the man, or during the continuance of his dynasty, either for the permanent peace of the Continent or of Great Britain, he was ready, always, however, to be understood, with the concurrence and co-operation of the French nation, to act with Great Britain in restoring that form of government and constitution which the former should desire, and Great Britain would consent to. "Enfin," said he, "en un mot, comme en mille, je veux être l'intermédiaire de la nation Française envers l'Europe, pour lui donner le souverain qu'elle choisira, soit Paul, soit Pierre, où quelqu'autre—en assurant à mon fils la succession à la couronne de la Suède ; et c'est là, il me semble, le plus beau rôle que je puisse jouer."

He gave me to understand that he meant by this the re-establishment of the house of Bourbon, if that was the wish of Great Britain ; and he urged me to procure without delay the sentiments and decision of the British Government upon it. I answered him that, for my own part, without having any instructions from my Government upon this point, I could assure him, and I would take it upon my own responsibility to do so, that we did not wish to see the dynasty of Bonaparte established in France. I thought I could equally venture to assure him that we wished to see the re-establishment of the Bourbons ; not by attempting to force it upon the French nation, but by encouraging in every way their return to this way of thinking, and to this cause.

He bade me observe, and he gave me to understand, that I might communicate it to Lord Castlereagh; that he possessed positive and direct proof that the house of Austria—Austria as well as Prince Metternich—desired the continuation of Napoleon's dynasty, and had no wish for the restoration of the Bourbons; and that consequently we must not look to them for assistance or co-operation, or entertain the idea of any communication with them to this effect. I answered him that I was somewhat aware of this, at least had always thought there was some ground to suspect it; that it was for this reason the intervention of the Prince Royal and the declaration of the will of the French nation were essential features in the restoration of the Royal House; because Austria could have nothing to oppose to this expression of this will, while an attempt to bring Austria into this opinion, or to force it upon her, might have the effect of dissolving the Alliance, and of throwing her into a separate peace and into the arms of Bonaparte. He agreed with me in this opinion, and in the necessity of the most perfect secrecy being observed, until the period should arrive by the declaration of the sentiments of the French people.

He observed, upon the mode and conditions of the restoration of the Bourbons, that, if there were any wish entertained of disturbing the possessors of the national domains (which had been spread by subdivisions through a great part of the nation) of attacking religious opinions and the freedom of religion already established, or of persecuting those who had taken part in the Revolution, he could not consent to give his assistance, because he was sure that a conduct like this would, after the restoration of the Bourbons, be attended with the same consequences as took place in England, in the century before the last, after the restoration of the Stuarts; that is, that the increasing discontents, and the attack on the security and property of the subject, would end, as they did there, in the expulsion of the Royal House, and in the establishment of another

dynasty. The Prince talked of the establishment of two Houses, on the model of the British constitution, as he had talked to me before; but all these matters must necessarily be the subject of after consideration, when the project comes nearer maturity. E. T.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool.

Harwich, December 30, 12 o'clock [1813.]

My dear Liverpool—I have received yours and Lord Bathurst's letters. Wellington's movement seems to have reached its natural limits as a first operation. The entrenched camp, I presume, is too closely connected with the works of the place to be carried, unconnected with the regular attack of Bayonne, and the crossing the Adour will require previous arrangements before it can be attempted. The result, upon the whole, as far as it goes, is satisfactory. I only lament that the wear and tear is to fall upon the British and the Portuguese, and that the Spaniards cannot be brought forward.

I have read with great interest Lord W.'s private letter, and shall keep the subject to which it refers constantly in view. As matters *now* stand, I think *we* cannot be too careful not to adopt any equivocal proceeding, which might render our position, both with the Allies and those in France who might be induced to show themselves, most embarrassing. If *they* move of themselves, we are fully entitled to take advantage of that, as of any other incident in war: but, if we lend ourselves to the measures that are to excite it, it will be considered as a trick on our part to get rid of the negociation, and those French who may be committed will, right or wrong, conceive themselves entitled to our protection. Should France reject the Allied terms, we are then all free to do what we like; but, having gone the length with our Allies to accept a basis on which we have declared that we are ready to negociate, I think our line ought to be an unembarrassed one till the question of negociation is disposed of.

As soon as I arrive at head-quarters, I will converse with our Allies upon the view Lord W. opens, and apprize you of their sentiments. I think we cannot assume that the view Metternich took of the question, when referred to him two months since, remains the same under the pending negociations. I have myself so humble an opinion of the effect of a French Prince showing himself in France, without arms and money, wherewith to levy troops, that I cannot feel disposed to risk much, especially in the peculiar situation in which we now stand, to try its effect upon the enemy. I am inclined to believe, when they talk of the effect to be expected, from a Bourbon showing himself, they mean a Bourbon with arms and money. Of the latter, I apprehend we have none to spare—not enough evidently to bring the Spaniards forward.

Upon the whole, my impressions are against any step, which should, even in appearance, mix our system with that of the Bourbons, whilst we are embarked in discussions for peace, and ignorant how our Allies would relish such a step at the present moment; and in this view I doubt the prudence even of a declaration as to the armistice by sea and land: 1st, because it would be considered an invitation to a rising; and, 2ndly, because I doubt its efficacy even to that object; as those who reason at all cannot doubt that, were the Bourbons restored, hostilities would immediately cease. We ought always to recollect that we are suspected of having *une arrière-pensée* on the question of peace, and that we should act with the more caution.

I have written very hastily my first impressions upon your letter. They are intended for Bathurst, for whom I have no letter, as well as for yourself. From the early part of Lord Wellington's letter, I think his impressions are the same as my own; that, with all the objections to such a peace, if Buonaparte will give you your own terms, you ought not to risk yourselves and the confederacy in the labyrinth of counter-revolution. If he will not, you may then run greater risks

but even then I should wish to see more evident proofs of active disposition to throw off B.'s yoke, before I encouraged an effort.

That some fermentation exists I have no doubt; that it may increase in proportion as France is pressed is probable; but if it really prevails to an extent that renders resistance feasible, I am persuaded it will explode, without waiting for a Bourbon to give it birth.

Yours ever, my dear L., in haste,

C.

I will write further on this subject from head-quarters.

No wind, and some fog.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Bathurst.

Copy. Harwich, December 30, 3 P.M. [1813].

Dear Lord B.—Just embarking to make our second attempt. Thank you very much for your most interesting private letter from W., which will be of great use to me at head-quarters. It will dispel the idea of a national resistance to an invasion directed to force a peace, and will give the Allies confidence in opposing themselves to Buonaparte and *his army*. I have written a few hasty ideas to Liverpool. *We* must take care not to make a *pot-pourri* by adopting half measures. I am confident any step that might call our good faith in the course we are pursuing into question would weaken our ground abroad and at home, and essentially impair our influence with the Allies, in pressing the necessity of adequate terms of peace.

If we are not prepared to give his adherents arms and pay, a French Prince at W.'s head-quarters would have but little power to create any thing. We know by what has happened in Holland how helpless good dispositions are in themselves, even with a Prince on the spot, and protected by an army.

Yours ever, in haste, C.

Lord Aberdeen to Lord Castlereagh.

Freiburg, December 31, 1813.

My dear Castlereagh—I hope the affair of Denmark is already arranged. Considering Metternich's indignation, he has acted moderately and wisely. He has been completely taken in by the Emperor Alexander and Löwenhjelm—the Emperor having engaged him to make his first overture, and correcting the instructions of Bombelles with his own hand, Löwenhjelm pretended to have powers to approve of every thing. When Denmark had agreed and committed herself, he then said that the letter of the Prince Royal to the Emperor of Austria was written during other times, and was not applicable to the present state of things.

I never saw Metternich really furious before; and this is all I fear. The affairs of Denmark and Sweden are of minor importance, when the question is the possibility of a coolness existing between these two great Powers. I trust Metternich will be wise enough to avert it.

Another circumstance, which has produced a bad effect here, and *might* have produced a fatal one in Switzerland, is the knowledge which all the disaffected and French party in Switzerland have of the Emperor of Russia's desire to respect their neutrality. They make the most of this; but fortunately the well-disposed are so numerous as to render it of less consequence. At the same time, it is felt by the Austrian Government; and the Emperor of Russia, on his side, will never perfectly forgive Metternich for having put him in the wrong with respect to the Swiss operation. All this is worth your most serious consideration.

Believe me to be, dear Castlereagh,

Most sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN.

Lord Aberdeen to Lord Castlereagh.

Freiburg, December 31, 1813.

Dear Castlereagh—I must give you an account of a circumstance which has recently occurred, and which cannot produce good humour among the parties concerned.

The Emperor Alexander, having seen how well the troops have been received in Switzerland, has given up any opposition, in a military point of view. As the Austrian Government do not wish to interfere in the internal arrangements of the Swiss cantons, it was determined that they should be entirely left to themselves. The Government of Berne, which, from the first, has shown the most decided friendship, has perhaps been a little precipitate in their proclamation, in which mention is made of the Pays de Vaud. At the same time, all their differences, and this among the rest, were to be left for the decision of a general Diet, which is speedily to assemble.

The other day, a letter was intercepted from the Emperor Alexander to the Governess of one of his sisters in the Pays de Vaud, in which he desires her not to be under any apprehension; for, come what may, he is determined that the Pays de Vaud shall never return to its ancient Government, and he will take care to secure them. If you have any information at all about Switzerland, you must certainly know that the Pays de Vaud is perhaps the only Frenchified part of the whole country. Bubna has found the public spirit there much better than he expected; but it is still infinitely the worst part of all Switzerland.

What makes this affair of the letter more unpleasant is, that it was found on a *French spy*, together with other papers relative to the condition, &c., of the Austrian army in Switzerland. Schwarzenberg ordered the man to be shot, and sent the letter to Metternich, who transmitted it immediately to the Emperor, with a request that he would in future make a better choice of a bearer.

There is nothing of much importance in all this; but you must be aware that it will contribute to increase any disagreeable feelings which may already exist.

Believe me, dear Castlereagh,

Very sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN.

Lord Aberdeen to Lord Castlereagh.

Freiburg, December 31, 1813.

My dear Castlereagh—Will you have the goodness to communicate with Clancarty on the subject of Johnson's expedition to the Low Countries, as the distance at which I am makes it very inconvenient? The whole of this was undertaken before the revolution in Holland; but, when that event happened, I only thought the endeavour still more desirable. I gave Johnson a letter to Clancarty, and placed him entirely at his disposal; as I thought he would be much better able to direct the whole affair.

At the time of Johnson's arrival, things wore so favourable an aspect, that Clancarty thought the whole proceeding unnecessary, and that we should obtain possession of the Netherlands without the expence of a shilling. Unfortunately, this appearance is now very much changed, and it is probable that Clancarty may also have changed his opinion. Most certainly, with a view to prevent hostile operations on the part of the French against Holland, nothing could be more important than a general rising of the people, as proposed, in the district of Chimai and that neighbourhood. I have again requested Clancarty to take the management of the whole affair; but, if he continues to decline it, at least to give Johnson every assistance in his power.

Yours ever sincerely, ABERDEEN.

General Balascheff to H.R.H. the Duke of Clarence.

Au Quartier Général Imperial,
Frybourg, le 31 Décembre, 1813.

Monseigneur—J'ai fidèlement rempli les ordres de Votre Altesse Royale, et me suis acquitté de la commission, qu'il vous a plu, Monseigneur, de me charger auprès de l'Empereur mon Maître. En apprenant que l'intention de Votre Altesse Royale étoit de venir sur le Continent, et d'avoir son agrément pour lui rendre visite à son quartier général, Elle m'a répondue qu'Elle se fera un très sensible plaisir de Vous voir chez Elle, et d'avoir l'occasion de témoigner combien Elle sait vous apprécier.

Veuillez, Monseigneur, me permettre de profiter de cette occasion et Vous présenter mes très humbles remerciments pour votre accueil gracieux pendant tout mon séjour à Londres, comme aussi d'agréer les sentiments de la plus haute considération, et du profond respect avec lesquels j'ai l'honneur d'être, &c.

A. BALASCHEFF.

1814.

ENTRY OF THE ALLIES INTO FRANCE; CONFERENCES OF CHATILLON; DOWNFALL OF NAPOLEON, AND RESTORATION OF THE BOURBONS; GENERAL PEACE; CONGRESS OF VIENNA.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool.

No. 2. Erebus, at anchor in the Rowling Grounds, 2 P.M., December 31 [1813].

My dear Liverpool—I have just received your despatches by Courvoisier. I feel all their importance, and I am conscious that many views of this most delicate and important question may present themselves to the Cabinet, which may not strike me, looking at the subject here; but I still am strongly impressed with a persuasion that, whilst the possibility of an effort in France on any useful scale is yet only a matter of speculation, any step of *éclat* would be premature, and ought to be avoided, till the question has been considered at head-quarters, and a decision taken in coincidence with the intentions, political and military, of the Allies.

In considering the two demands Monsieur is likely to bring forward, I admit that, to refuse, or rather to oppose, the latter appears harsh, consistent with the principle on which we have hitherto, I think, properly acted, of not being an obstacle to the Bourbons playing their own game, at their own risk, and in their own way; and, if the question was, whether a French Prince, going to a part of the coast of France where the British army was not operating, should or should not be seen safe by a British frigate, I should entertain no doubt upon the propriety

of affording his person such a security; but we should deceive ourselves if we supposed that he could go to the scene of Lord W[ellington]'s operations, without being practically, and in the face of France as well of Europe, mixed up in a common system with us: although no actual *engagement* should exist between him and the British Government, the support he might receive (if given at all) would be given in a confident reliance upon our protection. We could not expect him to discourage such an impression; and were Lord W[ellington] to do so by a fair and open declaration of the fact that he had no authority, either from his own Government or from the Allies, to countenance the cause of the Bourbons, is there not reason to fear that the rising disposition in favour of the ancient family might be checked rather than promoted by one of the Princes of that House presenting himself thus unsupported, and, as it were, disavowed, in the rear of our army.

It appears to me that, on this occasion, as on many former, the Bourbons are desirous of taking a step prematurely. Lord W[ellington], you seem to infer, wishes one of the family to come, but I apprehend only upon the supposition that, when there, he may be permitted to co-operate with him. If we are not ripe for this, Lord W[ellington]'s task will be a most embarrassing one. Supposing the disposition to move true to the extent stated on the side of Bayonne, unless it pervades the interior, and the Allies countenance it, on their side, it is more likely to lead to embarrassment than to success. It appears to me that matters have not yet sufficiently developed themselves to make an experiment prudent on a small scale, and in a quarter where we are everything, more especially if we are unprepared to give it direct support. I should doubt the discretion of Monsieur hazarding such a failure as a matter of impression. If one of the family goes, and nothing arises out of it, their cause is essentially prejudiced; and what can a Bourbon, without arms, money, or the avowed support of the Allies, hope to effect by his personal presence, in a

country hating their Government but still dreading its resentment.

Nothing can be more satisfactory than the course Lord W[ellington] is pursuing to ascertain the temper of France, and he cannot follow up the inquiry too actively; but we must distinguish between the good-will with which he is received and a disposition to bear arms against the existing ruler. His army relieves the people of France for the time from all the evils of their own system: no conscription—no taxes—no requisitions —ready money for all supplies—and kind treatment. We must not wonder at the popularity of such a *régime;* but it is another question whether the people will or can rise in sufficient force to accomplish any great purpose. Of this Lord W[ellington] seems to deem the evidence yet received to furnish but inadequate proofs. They appear to me altogether insufficient to found any proceeding upon, which might, even in appearance, commit us, *without a combined arrangement with our Allies;* and that, as a French Prince cannot be there for any useful purpose, without our being committed more or less, my opinion leans strongly to the truth of the proposition stated by Lord W[ellington], that things are not yet ripe for a Prince to show himself; and, if it is inexpedient that he should be there, it is a question of too great magnitude for us to hesitate in opposing it (at least, till we can consult our Allies) in the most decisive manner. In the mean time, they may pursue their own measures in preparing the interior.

I have written these few ideas very hastily. I trust Lord B[athurst] will encourage Lord W[ellington] to follow up this subject with diligence, and I should wish to receive every possible information upon it. Much may depend upon my being kept acquainted with the real state of the interior. Pray suggest that a communication in cipher, through France, might, under possible circumstances, be of the last importance; and you may rely upon it that I shall not fail to give this great question my anxious and best attention.

We slept on board last night, but our prospects are yet very discouraging.

In haste, ever yours,

CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Bathurst.

Erebus, January 1 [1814], off Harwich.

Dear Lord Bathurst—Lord Wellington's communications are calculated to produce so much impression at head-quarters, that I hope you will encourage him to be as communicative as possible, and I wish he would sound his Notables how far they would *incline*, and under what conditions, to take up arms. When Lord Wellington says he has never been better, if so well, received in Spain, we must recollect that he has never indulged any part of Spain in the same degree. In Spain, taxes continued to be levied, requisitions to prevail, for which the Spanish army paid little or nothing. In France, I apprehend, so far as it is under the dominion of the Allied troops, no imposition of any description takes place. It is, perhaps, the only spot in Europe completely free to enjoy the entire of their income, paying to the State nothing. We must not, therefore, be too much elated by our reception, or infer from this they are prepared to risk all against their own detested Government.

Let me know how you go on with your Militia transfers. In short, send me what you think may be of use.

Yours ever faithfully, CASTLEREAGH.

Lord William Bentinck to Lord Castlereagh.

Naples, January 2, 1814.

My dear Lord—I arrived here the night before last, to conclude an armistice with Murat. I found that Mr. Graham had already made one, and I approve his having done so. Your lordship, however, will have received from Lord Aberdeen the paper agreed upon between the Duke de Gallo

and Mr. Graham, and Mr. Graham's explanation of the circumstances and reasons which guided his conduct.

There appears to be, on the part of Count Neipperg, as well as of Sir Robert Wilson, a conviction that Lord Aberdeen had transferred to me a full power to make a treaty of peace with Murat, or that I had received such power direct from the British Government. Mr. Graham was completely persuaded that the letter I lately received from the Earl of Aberdeen contained such authority. You will have seen, by my letter to the Earl of Aberdeen, sent by my aid-de-camp, Captain Foljambe, my understanding of the orders of the British Government, as well as my doubts upon Lord Aberdeen's letter of the 12th December, received the 18th January, and the only letter I have received from Lord Aberdeen.

The Neapolitan Government are most anxious to make peace with Great Britain, and in the mean time to hold out to their subjects and to their army the probability of its early conclusion. For this reason, Mr. Graham was most urgently pressed to introduce the second article, which declares that Ministers Plenipotentiary will be immediately named; and his entire conviction, after his conversation with Sir Robert Wilson, of such being the intention of the British Government, induced him not to object to the wishes of the Duke de Gallo, and to the urgent entreaties to the same purport of the Count de Neipperg. It was impossible for me to confirm this article, and so I yesterday declared to the Duke de Gallo and the Count de Neipperg. I expressed my readiness to make an armistice, and to agree to a Convention or plan of co-operation, but further I had no authority. They then pressed me to introduce, under various forms of words, an article bearing the same inference, but I have resisted the introduction of any matter extraneous to the precise objects of my negociation, or exceeding the powers which I conceive myself to possess. It is equally necessary that I should not commit in any manner the British Government, as also that I should not appear to

the King and hereditary Prince of Sicily to be doing more in favour of Murat and against their interests than I have told them I was authorized to do.

The armistice will be made in the course of to-day, and will be transmitted to your lordship to-morrow by Mr. Graham.

I remain, my dear Lord, very sincerely yours,

W. BENTINCK.

Sir J. C. Hippisley to Lord Castlereagh.

Stoneaston House, January 4, 1814.

My dear Lord—As I can well appreciate the value of your time, I will endeavour to make the best atonement in my power for my intrusion by making it as short as possible. The object is to call to your lordship's recollection the situation of many of our fellow-subjects who, in the event of an adjustment with France, have a fair claim to urge their pretensions, from the sacred faith which ourselves have ever maintained towards those in hostility to us who had deposits *in our public funds.*

Though I am somewhat selfish in my statement, I could name a family of great respectability, who lost three-fourths of their income (I mean a British subject, and a most loyal one) from the conduct of the French Government respecting the *old rentes viagères*, and speak only of *creditors before* the war.

When Lord Cornwallis went to treat with the French Government, memorials were addressed to him, and I apprehend he had instructions on this head. I will say no more, and I trust your lordship will forgive me for saying thus much. I am aware the moment cannot be *ripe* for such statements, yet I was unwilling to lose the opportunity.

I beg to congratulate your lordship on the happy change on the Continent; and with my ardent prayers for the successful termination of the conflict, I have the honour to be, my dear Lord, ever faithfully yours, J. C. HIPPISLEY.

Dr. Dromgoole and Co. seem busy in their works of *suicide* at the Colonial Board.

Lord Castlereagh to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

Helvoet, January 5, 1814.

My Lords—I have the honour to acquaint your lordships that, at the earnest application of Admiral Kickhart and of the Commandant of Helvoet, representing the extreme want of gunpowder, and the absolute necessity of endeavouring to procure a supply, for the defence of the important post of Breda, I have communicated with Captain Forbes, of His Majesty's ship Erebus, and with Captain King, of his Majesty's ship Jason, upon the subject, and have taken upon myself to authorize those officers to issue to the said Admiral and Commandant such quantities of powder as the necessary services of their respective ships may permit; and I trust that your lordships will, under the particular circumstances of this case, approve of the conduct of these officers in complying, at my desire, with this requisition.

I have, &c. CASTLEREAGH.

Mr. Edward Cooke to Lord Castlereagh.

Foreign Office, January 5, 1814.

My dear Lord—I pity your oscillations in calms and fogs; ever up and down, and never forwards, is sad work. I will do my best about Charles's house.

I hope you have instructions for every day in the year. I think St. Aignan's propositions as old as the Flood; for to-day we hear of the settlements with the Swiss and Murat, which seem at once to give the Allies not only Italy but France, which make Charles Jean's excursions to Jütland of no consequence. I send you Charles's letters with their enclosures, which are agreeable enough.

Seriously, one cannot but be persuaded that, if the Swiss and Murat co-operate, the Allies have the ball at their foot, and that they can dictate peace as they please.

It is this circumstance which makes your lordship's situation

so responsible; for, be assured, that the general, I may say universal, principle is—no peace with Bonaparte!—or, if with him, such a peace as will put his malice and abilities into such a state of depression and weakness as to make us equally secure as if we replaced the Bourbons. By what I can find, this sentiment is really national.

The argument will be—the Allies had the power to give a real, secure peace: if they do not make such a peace, either England's negociators will not have done their duty, but have been duped by the Allies or falsely estimated our interests; and the Allies will have acted insincerely towards England.

There has been a Cabinet to-day on the information sent by Lord Wellington, and I know not its result. It must, of course, act with reference to your lordship.

I write merely to say what I am persuaded will be the universal impression, when the public hears of the alliance with Switzerland, the passage of the Allies into France, and the arrangement with Murat. These will be known next mail from Lord Sligo and others who write from the armies, and those who feed the Stock Exchange. We have papers yet of late date from Paris.

I rejoice to find from Lamb's letter that the spirit of the Austrians and the Hungarians is so high. I hope it rings in M.'s ears. I think the Allies will rejoice to see Wellington's regulations for the Custom Houses of Navarre.

What delight you must have felt on reading the despatches! We were doubly delighted here that you were fortunate enough to fall in with them. It is wonderful how much the passage of the Rhine has shortened its course: some say it loses its name at Basle; all are ready to swear that it loses it upon the Moselle's junction.

I say nothing upon general points; but I must venture a few detached ideas.

Bonaparte ought to be obliged, as a proof of his sincerity and repentance, to liberate the Spanish family and the Pope

previous to any treaty. Such an *amende honorable* ought to be preliminary to any base. The perfidy of those transactions ought to be marked.

The Russians, &c. ought to demand the restitution of pillaged trophies and curiosities.

You ought to make him pay for the support of his prisoners, and retain a gage or hostage for the payment.

I hope you will curtail the Pope's temporal dominions: an ecclesiastico-civil potentate is a monster. A civil State ought to be supported by civil means: his is supported by ecclesiastic means. His Ministers are not laymen, but cardinals and nuncios. He should be made to enter into a concordat with all Powers; and no Power ought to receive from the Pope, as long as he is to be a temporal Power, any Minister who is not temporal. All correspondence between the Pope and other Sovereigns should be through lay hands.

I doubt not you will impress upon the Allies the state France will be in, if the basis be drawn out into a peace.

You will recollect that last year the Consolidated Fund was deficient near £3,000,000. The present quarter is very good, and it is hoped there may be some surplus this year; and you will see by the papers sent what will be our loss by restitution of conquests.

If it were possible to break up the present system of France! —the more I look at it the more terrible does it appear: the despotism is so perfectly organized and concentred for the purposes of internal order and submission, revenue and military force so easily and rapidly managed and directed, and its instruments so animated, so ingenious, so versatile, so adventurous, so brave, that it appears to me there never existed in the world so formidable a political machine.

I own, notwithstanding the declaration as to maritime right, I should prefer a substantive article, recognising the Law of Nations as it was before the French Revolution.

I think the Crown Prince forgets that, whilst he was in

alliance with Denmark, he made a treaty to take half of her dominions, upon condition that, if she would then join with him and his Allies, he would try to indemnify her: and yet, after such a measure, he loads Denmark with indignities. We basely submitted to this policy, but surely we never thought Denmark acted perfidiously or dishonourably in not yielding to it. The moral is with Denmark—we submitted to a wrong *merely* in the hope of saving Europe. His propositions and those stated by Lord Aberdeen seem nearly the same: so I hope all things will be settled; but I fear he never will act fairly on the side of Holland, unless he can make a new game for himself. After the payment he gets, surely he ought not to embarrass and dictate everything, with only 20,000 Swedes, who are always kept out of fire.

I lament to find that, from an *interception*, General Gneisenau is in low spirits. He says his Sovereign, on account of some freedom in his conduct and honest advice, will not be reconciled to him: so, seeing no prospect in the service on a peace, he means to retire on his little means, and write a history of late events. I wish you could reconcile the King of Prussia to him, or get him into the Hanoverian service. He is a great man, and would be a treasure. Pray talk to Münster about him.

I believe you did not see Thornton's last despatches: he will send them to you in duplicate; but possibly not the private letter, which is therefore sent. I cannot understand his reason for not writing fully in cipher, if he thinks it necessary.

Ever most truly and obediently,
Your lordship's servant,
E. COOKE.

Memorandum relative to the Note of St. Aignan, referred to in the letter.

It is perfectly plain that St. Aignan's Note means nothing less than the extension of the French territory to the Rhine. What are the words?—

"Les Puissances coalisées étoient unanimement d'accord sur la *puissance* et la *prépondérance* que la France doit conserver dans son intégrité, et en se renfermant dans ses limites naturelles, qui sont les Alpes, le Rhin, et les Pyrénées."

It is not that the *territory* of France ought to extend to those boundaries, but merely its power and preponderance. The arrangement to be made for France is that, however she may be able to influence any small Power within the Rhine, her influence ought to be so reduced as to prevent her extending that influence and preponderance beyond it. If this were not the true meaning, why was not the word territory expressly used?

The Earl of Aberdeen to Lord Castlereagh.

Freiburg, January 5, 1814.

My dear Castlereagh—I am really most happy in the determination which you have adopted of coming to head-quarters. You will see and know more in eight-and-forty hours than we could impart to you by the despatches of many weeks. Your coming has given very general satisfaction. The Austrians are delighted, and Nesselrode appears equally glad. I hope Stewart may come with you, and then we shall soon settle all our discussions. It is quite impossible that any difference of opinion should diminish the cordiality with which I have always acted with him.

We are going on very well: but I shall be very happy to see you give some tone to the proceedings in Switzerland. I have had a deputation to-day from the canton of Soleure. All the proprietors and respectable persons desire the restoration of the ancient Government; but the persons actually in power, of the Jacobin party, having a knowledge that the Emperor of Russia is inclined to protect them, refuse to quit their offices without a wish expressed in writing from the Allied Powers. The principle of not interfering with their internal arrangements prevents this, as well as the employment of a military

force; and therefore this unfortunate difference of opinion among ourselves reduces them to the necessity of kindling a civil war, or, at least, of perpetuating a violent ferment in the country. I could at present only adhere to the system which had been adopted, expressing, at the same time, individually a wish for the removal of French influence, before the real independence of Switzerland could be established or acknowledged. I declined giving any official opinion or advice on the part of Great Britain; as any such, at the present moment, would be contrary to the system in which Austria has acquiesced.

Rose is here, and will proceed to Munich immediately. The good offices of England will be required in an arrangement about the Tyrol, which is rendered absolutely necessary. It was perfectly understood by the Bavarian Government that the Tyrol, the Vorarlberg, &c., were to be restored to Austria at a peace, in lieu of other possessions of equal value, to be ceded to Bavaria. This arrangement, which many circumstances contributed to render necessary at the time, the inhabitants cannot understand. The Austrian Government has done everything to tranquillize them, but without any permanent effect. The people have risen repeatedly, and declared that, if Austria will not have them, they will declare for France, and that anything is better than the Bavarian Government. The tranquillity of the Tyrol is so important at this moment, being the great communication with Italy, independently of the addition of 20,000 troops, and the happiness of the whole country, that something is absolutely necessary. Metternich has proposed to take possession of the Government immediately, assigning to Bavaria as a security a portion of the grand duchy of Frankfort. It is to be hoped this proposal will be agreed to.

From Murat we have the best intelligence. His accession appears certain, which gives us Bellegarde and a fine army of from seventy to eighty thousand men. I hope Neipperg will have concluded this affair, and that we may have the treaty before you arrive.

I trust you will be here soon. Our motions are not quite certain, but at present it seems to be the intention that we should go to Basle on the 10th. The Austrians would be well pleased to stay a little longer here, to see how things are decided; and your presence may possibly determine them. But the Emperor of Russia wants to move, and it is impossible to let him be long out of sight, especially in the present state of Switzerland.

I have secured you a quarter here, in case you should arrive before our departure, and I shall take care to secure one for you at Basle. For the rest, I hope you will share such comforts as I can give you and as a campaigning life can afford. But you must not expect a great deal. A hearty welcome, and the most sincere pleasure at seeing you, you shall certainly find. I am delighted to find Robinson is to accompany you.

Believe me ever most sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN.

PS. This letter will be delivered to you by my brother; he has only been able to remain ten days with me, as he is afraid that Clancarty may want him. I am very sorry for his departure, as I find his assistance so valuable; but I dare not venture to detain him longer.

Lord Aberdeen to Lord Castlereagh.

Freiburg, January 6, 1814.

My dear Castlereagh—As I hope to see you so soon, I shall not enter into the subjects to which I have alluded in my despatch. Although there is much to say, and much that is most important, in a word, with relation to the enemy, our situation is as good as possible—among ourselves it is quite the reverse. Everything which has been so long smothered is now bursting forth. Your presence is absolutely providential. If you come without partiality and prejudice, as I make no doubt you do, in spite of all the pains taken to prevent it, you will be able to perform everything; and no words are

sufficient to express the service you will render. I am most anxious that you should come.

We go to Basle on the 10th. The Austrian quartermaster is already there, and will secure you as good a quarter as can be had.

Ever most sincerely, ABERDEEN.

PS. I have just seen a Moniteur, containing the answer of Bonaparte to the Senate. His speech is most remarkable and pacific throughout. He names the provinces of France by their ancient appellations—Normandy, Picardy, &c. He concludes by talking of the necessity of peace, and adds, "Il n'est plus question de recouvrir les conquêtes que nous avons faites."

Perhaps you have seen this, as well as a long report of M. de Fontanes' to the Senate, also in a very pacific tone; if not, you shall have them when you arrive. Does the naming of the provinces look like royal France? Schwarzenberg, in his letter to Metternich, says it puts him in mind of a speech which Talleyrand made to him before leaving Paris: "A présent, c'est le moment pour l'Empereur de devenir Roi de France."

Lord Cathcart to Lord Castlereagh.

Fribourg in Brisgau, January 6, 1814.

My dear Lord—I hope this may meet you well advanced upon your journey, and I hasten to assure you of the great joy and delight with which I learned your intention by your private letter of the 22d. I lost no time in reporting and explaining it to the Emperor, who received a courier at the same time from Count Lieven.

You will see by my despatch the direction of the armies, which have crossed the Rhine with little opposition, and that the enemy's preparation is not in any state of forwardness. The Moniteurs of the 28th and 30th contain most extra-

ordinary documents. It is evident that Bonaparte finds hin self obliged to disavow any purpose of recovering the conquest which have been wrested from him, and to labour to convinc the people that he is the fittest person to repel the invasion, t prevent the ruin of the country, and to bring about a peac provided proper means and confidence are given to him. Th most remarkable thing is that he names the points invaded b their former names—Alsace, Franche Comté, &c., and intro duces Normandy, Champagne, &c. He repeats that he ha had the moderation to accept the terms which the coalesce Powers in their exultation offered to him; but attributes th successes on which that exultation is founded to the fortune war, and more to the intrigues and address of Ministers wh debauched his allies, than to the number of troops which hi more powerful antagonists *vomited* from their own territorie He talks of France as if it was a coalition, and says the onl prospect of the enemy, who could not have thought of in vading France if they had any moderation, was to excit disunion, and particularly to separate the people from thei Sovereign.

The Emperor Alexander goes from hence to-morrow, an will be at Basle the 13th. Count Nesselrode remains to morrow, and the Emperor of Austria a day or two longer.

You probably have received the last alternatives propose by Sweden to Norway by other channels: I, however, enclos the edition we have at this court, for comparison. Princ Metternich has refused to interfere farther. I received th copy from Count Nesselrode; but the Swedish Minister, wh lately made me so many communications, has not named thes in their present form, nor the disposition to cede Pomerania.

You probably have directions to people at Frankfort; bu if it can be of any use, I take the liberty of naming Mr. Bel rends, a merchant on the Quay, near the bridge over th Maine, No. 27, Letter A. He has a brother in London. was quartered in his house, and found him the civilest an

most useful man I ever met with: he can get you money to any amount, repairs for your carriage, and anything you may want, and would be proud to lodge you. He also can put you in the way of good Hock, if you wish to commission any. A house is marked for you in this town, and another will be marked and reserved at Basle. Mine here is near the Emperor of Austria, and within a few doors of Lord Aberdeen.

Ever, my dear Lord, most sincerely yours,

CATHCART.

Lord Castlereagh to H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge.

Hague, January 7, 1814.

Sir—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Royal Highness's despatch of the [blank] with its enclosures, and have lost no time in forwarding the same to England, with the necessary directions to have the details thereof fully considered, and a decision will be transmitted without delay to your Royal Highness.

I have the honour to transmit to your Royal Highness two letters which I was charged, on leaving London, to convey to your Royal Highness—a commission which I lament I am not able to fulfil in person, being under the necessity of proceeding without loss of time to the head-quarters of the allied armies.

I am, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Edward Thornton, Esq.

Hague, January 7, 1814.

Sir—Finding, on my arrival here yesterday, your Messenger Smith, I have deemed it expedient to order him to proceed to the North, with my despatch of the 24th ult., duplicate of which I have directed also to be forwarded to you at Frankfort.

I am induced to adopt this arrangement upon the supposition that my despatch of the 21st December, desiring you to

meet me at Frankfort on or before the 7th instant, may not have been received in time to enable you to comply with that request, and that circumstances may have since induced you to delay for a few days your journey to head-quarters.

I propose setting off from hence to-morrow by way of Frankfort for head-quarters; and feel it necessary to direct, in the present state of affairs, that you should lose no time in repairing thither, in order that I may signify to you, on the spot, the Prince Regent's pleasure for the future direction of your conduct in the mission with which you are charged.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Mr. William Hamilton to Lord Castlereagh.

Foreign Office, January 7, 1814.

My dear Lord—I have little to add to the papers of which, public and private, Mr. Jackson will be the bearer. The enclosed packet contains the draft of a despatch sent to Thornton respecting Hambro', the copy of a note from Castelcicala, and a memorandum from the Treasury of the commercial and real value of the conquered Colonies.

I heartily wish you joy on the daily improvement which is taking place in the affairs of the Continent, even from the time you left us; and there really appears some chance that you are gone to seal the downfall of French revolutions, and the restoration of old times.

You of course know of Löwenhjelm's journey to England. He is to see Lord Liverpool to-morrow, the 8th. M. de Rehausen says he has no letter of any kind; his sole commission being to explain verbally the reasons of the Prince Royal's late movements, in consequence of the alleged coolness of the Allies in supporting his pretensions, and to ask for more extended powers and instructions to Thornton.

The enclosed Note from Castelcicala is exactly in conformity to the Report he has made to his Government of the correspondence which grew out of St. Aignan's commission.

The Sardinian is very anxious that we should raise and pay Piedmontese regiments, for the service of the King, his master. An offer has been made to raise a few regiments for our own service, to be made over to his, in case of his restoration, on the principle of the Orange levies.

Believe me, my dear Lord, &c.,

W. HAMILTON.

Nothing from South since you left us.

Lord William Bentinck to Lord Castlereagh.

Florence, January 7, 1814.

My dear Lord—I have to acknowledge the receipt of your "private and secret" letter of the 18th December. Sir John Dalrymple has not yet sent me the conditions under which the Genoese have been transferred to the King of Sardinia, but I expect them immediately. If I might venture to give an opinion, I would earnestly recommend that the British troops and authorities should be withdrawn from Genoa. They are unnecessary to the establishment of the King of Sardinia's authority; and they only appear in the odious light of the supporters of a most odious measure, and most odious administration. There will probably be some private quarrels and assassinations on the first coming of the Piedmontese, which the police of the town can suppress; and from which it is desirable that our people should be kept clear.

I had, in contemplation of the early transfer of Genoa, provided, in communication with Count Vallaise, for the garrison of Genoa, without, in the first instance, introducing Piedmontese troops, which would have produced very bad consequences. I had called in an additional regiment of the Italian Levy from Nice, which, with the one already in Genoa, added to the Genoese troops, would have been and is a sufficient garrison. The people, being accustomed to the Italian Levy, would not have observed the change. The 14th Regiment is the only British regiment at Genoa: it is in very high order,

and would be disposable for any service. It might be also a favourable moment for the transfer of the Italian Levy to the King of Sardinia's service, and for getting rid of this expense.

I remain, my dear Lord, very faithfully yours,

W. BENTINCK.

Lord Cathcart to Lord Castlereagh.

Fribourg in Brisgau, January 8, 1814.

My dear Lord—I have announced to Lord Aberdeen and Sir Charles Stewart my intention of sending a messenger to Frankfort with despatches; to go from thence to St. Petersburgh by Mr. Disbrowe, who is at the former place waiting for them; and they will probably write to you. I have not, however, told to either that my real business is to convey this letter as speedily as possible into your own hands, because it is to contain a most confidential message to *you* from the Emperor Alexander.

His Imperial Majesty left this place yesterday, to go to Schafhausen, where his sister, the Grand-duchess Catherine, is, for a few days, having the intention to cross the Rhine on the 1st of January, old style, as he did the Niemen on the 1st of last year: and he will be at Basle in the evening of the 1st-13th of January, 1814, and not before that time, unless any extraordinary incident takes place. The Emperor of Austria will travel so as to be at Basle probably on the 12th; and the King of Prussia will either do the same, or meet the Emperor Alexander and come with him. As the distance is not above nine or ten German miles, it may be done in one day. Prince Metternich will probably not go before the 12th, and Count Nesselrode talks of going on the 9th or 10th. I propose to go, with my own horses, to-morrow evening.

The Emperor Alexander, before his departure, desired to see me; and, after mentioning the satisfaction he had felt in the confidence which was reposed in him by the Prince Regent and his Government, and particularly in expressions to that effect

which had been read in several of your Lordship's despatches, asked me with some solemnity whether the same confidence still subsisted in regard to him, and whether he was considered as engaged in this great cause, with as little bias to self-interest, at least as any other Power. I answered that I was certain the same confidence existed, and the same admiration of the principles upon which his Imperial Majesty had acted, and which had conducted him thus far.

"If so," said the Emperor, "I will engage you to ask Lord Castlereagh to see me, before he sees any Minister, either of *mine* or of any other Power on the business which brings him here. We all mean and wish to accomplish the same object; but shades of difference may arise in regard to means, and we claim, as the Power with which Great Britain has acted throughout all this business, to deliver our sentiments confidentially to the British Cabinet Minister first."

He expressed great satisfaction in your appointment. He said that he would not ask me to propose this to you in my own name, as he did not wish to lead me into any negociation separate from Lord Aberdeen or Sir Charles; but that I should deliver *his* message confidentially from himself to your lordship, and I have delivered it accordingly.

His Imperial Majesty was aware that this would not be easy, if you were to arrive at head-quarters before his return, and therefore thought you might oblige him by *not* arriving before him. I have stated this in detail, that you may fully understand what is meant. The moment I have your leave after you arrive, I will acquaint the Emperor, and your reception will be without any sort of form.

Your Lordship's decision to come is the most fortunate event that can be conceived, and has given to all of us the greatest joy. Had it not been for the message I have delivered, I would have joined the rest in entreating you to come on with as little delay as possible, in reference to the fatigue of such roads and inns as you will find. I have mentioned the

brothers Behrends, at Frankfort, as persons who would be proud to be useful to you in any way of business or otherwise. Their house is on the Quay, near the Bridge. The proprietor of the house would give you an apartment.

Darmstadt is an excellent place to stop at, with a good theatre and opera. Heidelberg has good inns. Baden is worth seeing, particularly the *souterrains* of the Secret Tribunal. Carlsruhe; Rastadt, where General Wittgenstein is, but where the inn is not so good; Offenburg, where I have sent to desire a quarter to be prepared for you; and this place, where there is a quarter ready.

I hear Bubna is marching in the direction of Lyons, Marshal Prince Schwarzenberg at Montbeillard, General Wrede at Colmar, the Prince Royal of Wurtemberg before N. Breysach, Wittgenstein before Kehl, having the forts Vauban and Abran, with the means of crossing the Rhine. Marshal Blücher has brought a considerable corps between Turkheim and Creutznach on the Nahe, and is marching on Metz, patrolling to Nancy. Coblentz is occupied, Mayence blocked on the left bank by General Langeron—40 officers, 1000 privates, and 15 cannon, said to be taken in the last named affair. The French Guards removed to Paris, except detachment, sent towards the Scheldt, 3 or 4,000. Some assembly of troops at Metz, say 12,000, a week ago.

Ever, my dear Lord, sincerely and faithfully yours,

CATHCART.

Lord Castlereagh to H.R.H. the Prince Regent.

Sir—In obedience to your Royal Highness's orders, I lost no time, upon my arrival at the Hague, in soliciting a private audience of the Prince of Orange, for the purpose of executing your Royal Highness's commands, on the subject of the intended alliance between the illustrious family of Brunswick and the house of Orange.

I found the Prince of Orange had already expressed, through his ambassador in London, his grateful sense of the overture with respect to the succession which your Royal Highness directed me to make through that channel previous to my departure. The Prince desired I might assure your Royal Highness that he received this suggestion as a fresh proof of liberality and kindness towards himself and his family; that your Royal Highness had, in this proposition, evinced so much consideration towards the feelings and national sentiments of his people, that he was persuaded so distinguished a mark of forbearance and delicacy on the part of your Royal Highness could not fail, if possible, to bind the Dutch nation more closely for ever to Great Britain.

With respect to the explanations on this most interesting subject which I have been charged to make, on the part of your Royal Highness, to the Allied Sovereigns assembled at head-quarters, his Royal Highness gave me full authority on his part to assure their Majesties that every thing which had been proposed by your Royal Highness had met with his warmest concurrence.

His Royal Highness felt the importance that a frank but confidential communication on this subject should precede at head-quarters any discussion of the general interests; and that, with this precaution, the more public and formal avowal of the intended marriage might be advantageously delayed, till the period when the arrangement might be prepared in its details for the consideration of Parliament.

I avail myself of this occasion of humbly submitting to your Royal Highness that I propose, whilst on the Continent, with your Royal Highness's approbation, to address whatever I may have *officially* to lay before your Royal Highness to one of his Majesty's principal Secretaries of State; that I shall, for the better execution of the service with which I am entrusted, endeavour to restrict my personal correspondence as much as possible, leaving to the respective Ministers, as heretofore, to

report for your Royal Highness's information events in progress; and that I propose, as Lord Liverpool has charged himself with the superintendence of the department of Foreign Affairs during my absence, to address to his Lordship such confidential observations as may appear to me necessary for the information of your Royal Highness and your confidential servants.

I am, Sir, with the utmost deference and attachment,

Your Royal Highness's dutiful and obedient servant,

CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool.

Hague, 8th January, [1814].

My Lord—Having reported to the Prince Regent the substance of my interview with the Prince of Orange, on the subject of the intended marriage, I deem it necessary to observe that I have requested M. Hogendorp to confer with Lord Clancarty, and to furnish your Lordship with such information from hence as may bring the execution of the measure in its details, more especially with respect to the succession, under your consideration.

My attention was called to this by an observation of that Minister as to the expediency of making provision for the separation of the two Crowns in the Act which would shortly be proposed for regulating the succession to the Crown of Holland under the new constitution.

As you receive the most ample and correct information from Lord Clancarty on all matters concerning the interior of this country, it is unnecessary for me to trouble you with any detailed remarks. As far as general observation has enabled me to form a judgment during my short stay, it has afforded me satisfaction to observe the extent to which public confidence has been restored in their political and military security. The military organization of the country appears to proceed with as much rapidity as can reasonably be expected from a Dutch

Government so recently constituted; and it is gratifying to observe the good-will which prevails among all classes, and the cordial attachment that pervades the people to their new Sovereign, whose indefatigable zeal and diligence in discharge of his public duties, since his return, have made the deepest impression in His Royal Highness's favour not only upon his Ministers, but upon the public in general.

I had both yesterday and this forenoon much conversation with the Prince of Orange, and also with his Minister for Foreign Affairs. I found, on the subject of the Netherlands, a very strong desire to profit by the prevailing wish of a large proportion of the people to place themselves under the protection of the house of Orange: and I think it was not impossible that his Royal Highness might have been embarked in some measure to the extent of undertaking a temporary administration, if invited.

Upon representing the extreme delicacy of such a step, and the conflict to which it might give rise with the system of administration constituted by the Allies for the temporary administration of territories recovered from the enemy, his Royal Highness very willingly consented to wave any such intention for the present, and will not assume the administration, as a matter of course, of any other territories than such as constituted a part of Holland in 1792. I have promised, as soon as I arrive at head-quarters, to have the system of administration to be acted upon in the Netherlands, as the Allied armies advance, considered and decided on; and his Royal Highness has instructed his Minister at head-quarters, M. de Spaen, to take no step except in concert with me, or at my suggestion. I gave his Royal Highness an assurance that, if I should find that it was proposed to extend the central administration to those provinces, and to the other territories formerly belonging to Germany, on the left bank of the Rhine, I should employ the Prince Regent's good offices to have his Royal Highness's representative, as Sovereign of Holland, admitted to sit near

the Committee of Ministers at head-quarters, to whom the ultimate control in this administration is confided, and in which Committee both Great Britain and Hanover are at present represented.

In the course of conversation, the Prince expressed great anxiety as to the disjointed state in which the military command on the side of Holland at present existed, and which rendered combined movements difficult, if not impracticable. Apprizing his Royal Highness of the delicacy of this question, I fully admitted the necessity of providing an adequate remedy, without loss of time, for so obvious and serious an evil: and I assured him that I shall not fail to apply my earliest attention to it, on my arrival at head-quarters.

I afterwards found, from M. de Hogendorp, that his Royal Highness would receive with great satisfaction from the Allies an invitation to assume the command in person; his Royal Highness conceiving that the Prince Royal of Sweden, after his operations in the North were terminated, might direct his movements to the Middle Rhine. I only observed, upon this suggestion, that it had not occurred to myself, nor, as I believe, to my colleagues, that his Royal Highness had formed any desire for active command, and that I could form no judgment what might be the prevailing sentiments at head-quarters upon any part of this most important question.

With respect to the steady perseverance with which Great Britain continued to pursue the object of securing an adequate military barrier for Holland, the Prince of Orange expressed his warmest thanks. His Royal Highness did not seem aware that the Court of Vienna had any views whatever on the side of the Low Countries, and very candidly admitted that much of the desire of connexion with Holland might arise from the persuasion existing in the country to the contrary. I cannot say that his Royal Highness's eagerness to see the Netherlands united under his authority is in the smallest degree relaxed; but upon this, as upon all other points, he is very reasonable,

has the most unbounded confidence in Great Britain, and admits that it is both just and prudent that the lieutenants of the Emperor of Austria should be attended to with respect to a country, to which his Imperial Majesty has such strong pretensions, if asserted on his own behalf.

I had an opportunity of opening to his Royal Highness the prevailing sentiments entertained with respect to the Dutch colonies. I had the satisfaction of finding that, without specifying any sum, the nature of the arrangement intended with respect to the Cape is likely to prove very satisfactory; and the idea of obtaining a barrier, without funds to render it effectual to its purpose, has long been an object of anxiety. I begged that this explanation might be considered personal and not official; that I was extremely glad to find that the ideas thrown out were acceptable, and that his Royal Highness admitted that the views which had been taken of that question were not only liberal, as contingent upon Holland being adequately secured against France, but that they were just and reasonable, with a view to our own security, if we should fail in accomplishing this object. This was fully acquiesced in; and his Royal Highness understands that Great Britain remains master of this question, to execute her own liberal purpose towards Holland in her own way and at her own discretion.

Their existing commercial relations with the colonies were touched upon. The sequestrations on Dutch property, principally, I believe, at Surinam, I ventured to assure his Royal Highness would be removed without delay; with respect to a direct commercial intercourse with those colonies, whilst in our possession, that it was a more difficult question; and that, with every desire to act kindly and liberally towards Holland, it would be difficult to adopt any measure now which should have a tendency to pronounce upon the ultimate fate of these possessions. I believe a permission to *bonâ fide* Dutch proprietors to import, under license, their actual property in Dutch

or British vessels direct to Holland, instead of circuitously through Great Britain, would satisfy them; and to this, with a view to the difficulty before stated, I see no great objection. I have desired the necessary information may be transmitted for your consideration.

A portion of the arms sent over having been diverted to other services, I ventured to assure his Royal Highness that the Prince Regent would progressively arm and clothe, as a first outfit, both his regular army and landwehr, each description of force being taken at 30,000.

M. Hogendorp apprized me generally of the measures in progress with a view to their future Government. They expect to be prepared to assemble the Notables, or States-General, in the course of February. They propose to give the complete sovereignty and executive authority to the Prince, the legislative power to be in the States-General and the Sovereign —the former to be elected by the Provincial States, but to be altogether independent of them, and to constitute a national representation, to which the servants of the Crown, as well as all other ranks, may be indiscriminately chosen: their duration to be for three years, but members may be re-chosen. He mentioned to me that, such was the prevailing confidence in the Prince of Orange, that the nation would probably, by its Notables, defer to him the nomination to the first assembly, leaving the members at the end of the first period of three years to be elected by the Provinces—the motive to which arrangement would be a desire to avoid election disputes at the outset, and a wish to see the power placed in persons decidedly attached to the existing Government.

My immediate departure precludes my troubling you by the present occasion with any further observations.

I am, my Lord, with great truth and regard,

Your faithful servant,

CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Aberdeen.

Hague, January 8, 1814.

My dear Aberdeen—After being eight days at sea, we arrived here on the 6th, and shall proceed on this evening towards head-quarters. I have intercepted three of your messengers, and have your letters to the 2nd inclusive.

As we are to meet so soon, I shall say nothing upon business. With respect to yourself, after the strong wish you have expressed with regard to your return, I do not feel myself entitled to urge you either to delay or abandon your purpose. I feel very grateful for the kind consideration you have shown to my convenience recently, and also with respect to the future: being now, although only for a limited period, on the spot, the public interests at the Court to which you are immediately accredited can the less be exposed to embarrassment from passing, for the present, into Mr. Lamb's hands; and although I should have felt great personal satisfaction from an uninterrupted intercourse with you whilst at head-quarters, this is not a consideration which ought to interfere with your own views.

As to the future, and especially the question of negociation, I have as yet formed no opinion on it. My principle has hitherto been and still is not to take any decision as to the mode in which the discussions on the part of Great Britain, in any Congress to be held, shall be conducted, until the period shall actually arrive, considering all determinations formed by anticipation, and independent of the circumstances of the moment, to be pregnant with inconvenience; nor can I as yet foresee whether the late overture is likely to break off upon preliminary matter, to be suspended by the events of the campaign, or to lead to actual negociation.

I have thought it right to say thus much before we meet, in order that you may be enabled the better to decide upon your own arrangements; and, hoping very shortly to shake you by the hand, I shall, till then, my dear Aberdeen, post-

pone the various points on which I should wish to converse with you.

I have written to Charles, to beg him to meet me on the road, with full instructions for my guidance. If he should by any accident be absent, I am sure you will kindly charge yourself with this task. F. Robinson and Planta travel with me. Ward and Montague follow.

Yours ever, my dear Aberdeen, very sincerely,

CASTLEREAGH.

I am very happy to hear of Esterhazy's nomination. Pray hurry him, and, in the mean time, an official notification of his appointment.

Lord Aberdeen to Lord Castlereagh.

Freiburg, January 9, 1814.

My dear Castlereagh—I hope you will come on as soon as it may be convenient, for you are much wanted, and most impatiently expected. I am happy to say that Stewart arrived here yesterday, quite well. He has left the Prince Royal in tolerably good humour; but he will not, I fear, long continue so, when he learns that his Minister refused a more advantageous proposal from Austria to Denmark than that which he determined at last to make himself. Löwenhjelm was with Stewart and me when I taxed him with this: he said it was not his fault; that he had followed his orders; and if they who gave them did not know their own mind, he could not help it. Bildt, the Swedish Minister at the Austrian Court, is now imploring Metternich to come forward again, but he will not. I trust Denmark is in such a state that she must yield, and thus settle the whole question.

With respect to the mission of Bombelles, I considered it as a *démarche* purely Austrian, which they were at liberty to make, and which I could not prevent. I gave no approbation to the instructions, but limited myself to a correction of a passage, which said that, in the event of an arrangement, peace

would be made with England, and *the fleet restored.* I erased this, and put in, "*sur des bases liberales.*" The attempt was made with the approbation and at the solicitation of the Emperor of Russia and King of Prussia; but, though I wished him success, I always told Metternich that I had no power to act.

I wish you were here. I have a great deal to tell you, too important almost to be written, however confidentially, and which must materially influence all your views. I have put Stewart in possession of these facts, and have had much conversation with him. Our difference of opinion at Frankfort, which would not have existed but for his absence, has had no effect on the entire confidence with which I always act with him. Not being very well, I have left to him and to Cathcart the task of giving you the military news of the day: they will do it much better.

You will be glad to hear that Metternich and Stadion are on the best possible terms, and live a great deal together. I very frequently make a fourth with them and Nesselrode, whom I think you will like. He is not quite clever enough for his Emperor, but is an excellent person. Farewell, for the present. I am German enough to be now going to smoke a pipe with Stadion.

Yours ever sincerely, ABERDEEN.

Stewart has informed me of the marriages of your sisters, which have taken place so as to afford you satisfaction. I hope it is not necessary for me to assure you of the pleasure which this has given me, or of the sincere interest which I take in their happiness.

Mr. William Hamilton to Lord Castlereagh.

Foreign Office, January 12, 1814.

My dear Lord—We have little to tell you from this quarter —nothing of importance from America or the Peninsula. Lord

Bathurst does not write to you to-day, though you will find a letter from him of yesterday's date.

Count Lieven has notified the conclusion of a peace between Russia and Persia, on the 24th October, which has made Lord Buckinghamshire very happy.

Fernan Nuñez says Caulaincourt is gone to meet you at Manheim. I trust you will give him the go-by, as they say.

I enclose a letter from the Wirtemburg Minister, which you will already have answered in person, and also one from Lord Bathurst to Lord Wellington on the opening of French ports.

Mr. Smith, who was at Cagliari, died on his passage thither from Palermo. Lord Oxford writes the particulars of his death, and asks for his appointment to the Sardinian Court. Am I to urge Hill to go out again directly; or will you name any one else for the place, as chargé des affaires during his absence?—Smith's death is a real loss. A-Court will go out shortly, as Lord William Bentinck's *locum tenems*, in his eventual absence.—Mr. Fagel is going to Holland, the end of this week. His brother William is appointed Secretary of Embassy.—We are going on with the necessary forms to enable the military honours and Orders to be gazetted.

Our last advices from Sir H. Wellesley are of the 28th of December. The British garrisons have been ordered by Lord Wellington to leave Cadiz and Carthagena. General Ballasteros had returned to Cadiz. Sir H. Wellesley left that place on the 21st for Madrid.

Yours faithfully,

WILLIAM HAMILTON.

Lord Castlereagh to Edward Thornton, Esq.

Mühlheim, January 13, 1814.

Sir—I have met a messenger at this place on his way to the North, and received by him, from Sir Charles Stewart, at Basle, your despatches, Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6.

I have only a moment to instruct you *not* to conclude

or countenance any pecuniary arrangement, without express authority for so doing, with the Court of Copenhagen for the employment of Danish troops, the arrangements of his Majesty's Government not admitting, under present circumstances, of an additional charge of this description. You have, in other respects, correctly conceived the nature and extent of your instructions as to the terms of peace you are authorized to conclude with Denmark.

I have not time, by this courier, to advert to your reasoning upon the arrangements taken by the Prince Royal with General Hope and yourself; I only deem it necessary at present to state that I do not consider your inferences to be warranted by the transaction referred to.

With respect to any measures of a political tendency, affecting the interior of France, I feel it necessary, from a despatch lately received from you, to caution you against taking any step, or giving countenance to any project, without express authority from me, on a subject of such extreme delicacy and importance.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Mr. William Hamilton to Lord Castlereagh.

Foreign Office, January 14, 1814.

My dear Lord—We are still without any further news from Lord Wellington than when you heard last. Bunbury went off last night. Enclosed are copies of Sir H. Wellesley's last despatches.

The whole French party here are in the highest spirits on the late successes, and every one seems overjoyed that their old friend Blücher is again in activity. They augur very well from his determined movement across the Rhine.—Sir C. Stewart's despatches from Frankfort will be gazetted to-morrow, unless we get a more detailed account from him in the next four and twenty hours.

Will your Lordship remember to send Sir Gore Ouseley leave of absence? Peace being now made between Russia and Persia, Morier will do the business alone; and Sir Gore is sure he will die, if he is obliged to live any longer in that climate.

Your, &c., W. HAMILTON.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

The Hague, January 14, 1814. Friday.

My dear Lord—I avail myself of Mr. Jackson's departure for head-quarters, to furnish you with the little which has passed in this part of the world, since you were here in person.

Mr. Jackson arrived late last night, and sets out immediately: he left Harriette and my family at Harwich, who, I fear, are not likely soon to arrive with this wind.

The draft of my Despatch No. 16 will put you into possession of my conversation with M. Van Hogendorp, upon the commercial objects of this country desired from Great Britain —my interview with whom was fixed before your departure hence for Sunday last, and accordingly took place on that day.

My other despatches of Wednesday last are of no consequence: the one transmitted Charles's to me on the Orange levies; the other related to the measures taken for the apprehension of one Blanchard, suspected of forgery; and the third conveyed Admiral Young's and Sir Thomas Graham's opinions upon the proposal of a Dr. Kastelnoot for the surrender of Nieuport; both of which are unfavourable to the measure.

With my own, I also forwarded to England, by Wednesday night's mail, a despatch to Lord Bathurst from Sir T. Graham, who sent me a copy thereof and of its enclosure: copies of these papers I send you, and do so the more willingly, because the note of his conversation with General Bülow marks a readiness in Sir Thomas to act in co-operation with him, which does our General honour.

We are not yet made acquainted with the details of this business, which was actually commenced on the 11th, but the accompanying copy of a report from M. D'Yoog, resident for the Prince of Orange with Bülow's corps, shows that, though not to the full extent crowned with the advantages which it was hoped might have resulted from the attack, in the main it has been successful.

The Prince of Orange furnishes me with the following information, derived from a person who left Antwerp the day before yesterday—that orders had been issued there to destroy the ships and magazines, should the Allies approach in force; that the garrison consisted of 14,000 men, most of them conscripts, and in a bad state of discipline—the public authorities were trying rigorous measures to re-establish it.

I send you, as a last enclosure, Admiral Young's letter to me, received last night, giving an account of an affair in South Beveland. It is impossible to speak too highly of the zeal which Admiral Young has evinced for the public service in this quarter, ever since our arrival in Holland, which has also been followed up by the active exertions of every officer of his fleet with whom we have had to do.

Lady Castlereagh is quite well, and to my great comfort established in this house.

Yours, my dear Lord, most affectionately,

CLANCARTY.

[Enclosure.]

M. de Hogendorp to Lord Clancarty.

La Haye, 14 Janvier, 1814.

My Lord—Je suis chargé par son Altesse Royale de transmettre à votre Excellence un mémoire succinct, qui se rapporte à un point de nos conversations, qui assurément n'a pas échappé à votre souvenir.

Les dernières lettres que nous venons de recevoir du Baron de Spaen, et de l'Amiral Kinkel, écrites au grand quartier général de Frybourg, le 5 de ce mois, confirment les bonnes

dispositions toujours croissantes, s'il est possible, des hauts Alliés, et surtout de l'Autriche. Je me flatte réellement, my lord, que l'Europe entière partage l'opinion de la Grande Bretagne sur la nécessité de nous rendre assez fort pour resister aux vues ambitieuses de la France, qu'elle a manifestées depuis trois siècles, et qui, de nos jours avoient été couronné d'un plein succès.

Il se repand en ce moment des bruits favorables sur l'invasion du Brabant par les braves troupes Angloises et Prussiennes. Si j'apprends la nouvelle authentique avant de fermer celle-ci, je ne manquerai pas de l'insérer.

J'ai l'honneur d'être avec la plus haute consideration, &c.,

CHARLES DE HOGENDORP.

Lord Cathcart to Lord Castlereagh.

Basle, January 14, 1814.

My dear Lord—Sir Charles Stewart has sent to acquaint me that he is going to despatch a messenger, and I therefore write a few lines in haste, though I have not had time to collect any certain reports of the state of the armies at a distance.

Two houses are prepared for your lordship here—one in the Russian division of the quarters, near the Emperor Alexander, and close to Count Nesselrode and me; the other near Sir Charles and Aberdeen, at the farther end of the Austrian quarter. It will be for you to choose; but, at all events, I trust you will make your first visit to the Emperor Alexander. His Imperial Majesty is very impatient to move on to his troops; but he will wait a day or two here, in hopes of your arrival; and the Ministers are very anxious to persuade him to remain, because they are near together and commodiously lodged, but it paralyzes military movement, which goes on slowly without the Emperor, and which, as matters stand, probably would assist negociation.

I have in a despatch of this date enclosed a copy of a letter

which the Emperor Alexander has desired may be written to the Duke of Vicence, to bring him from Luneville to Chatillon; and a place in the heart of France for negociation is certainly better than one on the frontier. As yet I hear of no great assembly of troops, and a gentleman arrived here this day from Paris saw none.

Ever, my dear Lord, sincerely and faithfully yours,

CATHCART.

I hear that the Emperor has got the Report of the capitulation of Dantzig, *the garrison to be prisoners of war*. But, at this short notice, I cannot get at the official Report in time to put it into a despatch.

Lord Aberdeen to Lord Castlereagh.

Basle, January 14, 1814.

My dear Castlereagh—As Stewart sends a messenger to-night, I write principally to repeat my desire for your arrival. You are much wanted, and I hope will be in time to do much good. Notwithstanding the brilliancy of our situation respecting the enemy, much evil is preparing, and perhaps may burst forth very soon. I advise you by all means to hasten as much as may be convenient.

The Emperor of Russia had determined to go to-morrow morning, but they have persuaded him to stay a little longer; however, he will certainly go in a day or two. The Emperor of Austria and Metternich have determined at all events to wait your arrival here. What the King does I know not. In the mean time, the Emperor of Russia wishes absolutely to negociate in France, and has therefore desired Metternich to write to Caulaincourt, and to beg him to go to Dijon, which is the place fixed on.

In the mean time, the armies advance on all sides. Bubna is at Lyons by this time, Schwarzenberg not far from Langres, and Blücher about Metz. Wrede has had an affair with Victor, near Strasburg, not very important, but advantageous.

The master of the house in which I lodge arrived this morning from Paris, which he left on the 7th. He says the universal cry is for peace; that the *Declaration* of the Allies is everywhere, and has produced the most astonishing effects. In his road from Paris he saw no troops. It was said that the Emperor intended to go on the 8th or 9th to the neighbourhood of Chalons, and that a force was collecting thereabouts.

I have only to-day seen the letter of Bombelles to Wessenberg, with W[essenberg]'s answer. I wish you had sent me copies, as he mentions me so much and in so absurd a manner. I have represented it to Metternich, who is ready also to explain the affair. I will delay until your arrival my explanation of the whole transaction, so far as I had any knowledge of it. I am most happy, however, to learn that it is likely to be terminated immediately in the most favourable manner.

I have already told you that, in my opinion, Denmark would never hold out, after being deprived of all hopes of assistance from the good offices of Austria. Löwenhjelm told Stewart and me to-day that the Danish negociator had arrived at the head-quarters of the Prince Royal, with full powers to negociate on the most satisfactory basis, and that, before this time, he conceived that the affair was perfectly concluded. I am heartily rejoiced at this circumstance.

I have just heard that Nugent has had a brilliant affair at Forli. He is advancing towards Bologna. Murat was expected at Rimini on the 1st of this month: he had given orders to his troops to act in a friendly manner towards the Austrians and English wherever they met them. Neipperg had arrived at Rimini, but nothing has yet been received from him. There is an insurrection in the mountainous district of Tuscany in full activity, which co-operates with Nugent. Bellegarde was to receive his reinforcements on the 7th of this month, and would move forward immediately.

Affairs in Switzerland go on tolerably: it is a wonder they should go on at all, with the unfortunate difference which

exists. All the Jacobin and French party loudly proclaim the Emperor Alexander as their Protector. This gives them a courage which they would otherwise never have possessed. I trust, however, everything will end well. I think I told you that the Grisons had restored their ancient Government without difficulty or resistance.

The affairs of the Tyrol improve, but the question is still encumbered with difficulties. The Austrians have at last adopted a wise course in the Italian Tyrol, and generally in Italy, viz., to displace the French magistrates, and abolish certain odious taxes forthwith, in contradiction to their system of taking only military possession of the conquered countries until a peace. But the people did not understand this method of proceeding, and found them to go farther.

Believe me ever most sincerely,

ABERDEEN.

Mr. Edward Thornton to Lord Liverpool.

Kiel, January 15, 1814.

My Lord—As I cannot but flatter myself that his Royal Highness the Prince Regent will deign to receive with approbation the efforts which I have employed to bring about the peace with Denmark, as well for Sweden as for Great Britain, I trust likewise that your lordship will forgive me, if I once more put forward my humble pretensions to some gracious mark of distinction from his Royal Highness on this occasion, and that this distinction may be the one for which I have hitherto been so unfortunate as not to succeed in my application.

I take the liberty of entreating your lordship's influence on this occasion, and I shall do the same personally with Lord Castlereagh, to whom I shall proceed at the utmost in a couple or three days from this time; because, when I made a former application to his lordship, he laid some stress on your repugnance to increase the number of Knights of the Bath. I trust

that this repugnance will yield to an occasion which is not likely often to recur, and of which there cannot be many examples in the whole circle of foreign Ministers.

It has been insinuated to me that possibly his Majesty's Ministers may wish to confine the distinction of the Red Ribbon either to military men or to other professions, only when they are exercised by men of noble birth. I mention this because I have heard the insinuation; but I find a difficulty in imagining that the road to honour can be barred to any person who has not closed it against himself; or that any one can be, or ought to be, permitted to have some merits in a career from the distinctions of which he is to be excluded, when they might be the reward of his merits. It would be peculiarly hard upon me, and upon any person circumstanced as I am, who, having no hopes of riches in the career in which he is engaged, or perhaps despising them, finds himself excluded from the only distinctions which can give a reward to his labours—I mean personal ones: for, without riches, I feel, for my own part, that an hereditary distinction might become a charge.

I can declare to your lordship most truly that, from the first hour in which I entered into this line, honour and personal distinction have been the only motives of interest which have prevailed with me; and it would be peculiarly hard if I should be disabled from giving distinction to my name, because I have had the misfortune to be born with one not already marked by such distinctions. It is not, if your lordship will allow me to say so, the compact on which an Englishman enters into the service of the State, which, I am sure, would suffer, were it to be the case.

Hoping for your lordship's favourable representation of my humble request to his Royal Highness the Prince Regent, I have the honour to be, with the greatest respect, &c.,

EDWARD THORNTON.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Cathcart.

Frankfort, January 15, 1814.

My dear Lord—The journey from the Hague to this place, by Münster and Cassel, from the badness of the roads, has occupied six days, with only one night in bed. I propose to resume my route to-morrow morning, and shall not sleep more than one night on the road to Basle. You can therefore calculate the period of my arrival.

I beg you will say everything suitable on my part to his Imperial Majesty in reply to the gracious intimation with which you have been charged. You may confirm all the assurances you gave, and add that there is nothing I should *so much* desire as to receive the earliest and most unreserved sentiments of his Imperial Majesty from his own mouth.

I apprehend my duty will be to notify my arrival to the Ministers of the three Powers at the same time, and that it must depend on them at what time I am to see them *officially;* but I shall of course be *at any moment* at the Emperor's orders, from the instant I get out of my carriage.

I shall not say more, as we shall soon meet.

Believe me, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Cathcart to Lord Castlereagh.

Basle, January 16, Sunday, 1814.

My dear Lord—The messenger Williams brought me your lordship's letter of the 8th this morning early. The Emperor had already made every arrangement to proceed this day, to overtake the army; and his Imperial Majesty's head-quarters will be to-night at Delle, to-morrow at Montbeillard, and the 19th at farthest at Vesoul, at which place I think it possible you may, if you think proper, overtake him.—Pozzo is not yet arrived.

The Emperor has charged me to express to you his regret

that he cannot await your lordship's arrival here; and that there are important considerations which oblige him to go away from the conversation which he was so anxious to have with you on your arrival. His Imperial Majesty, however, trusts that you will bear in mind the principles which dictated the request I have by various messengers stated on his part concerning your first audience.

He is aware that you cannot now avoid going into business with the Ministers you will find here; but he requests that you will leave a place in the opinions you may be led to form, and particularly in any communication of them you might be disposed to make, for the results of the conversation his Imperial Majesty hopes to have with you, at an early day, on several most important topics.

The first of these is that of negociation. The general sentiments of his Imperial Majesty are to avoid incurring the charge of neglecting to make peace when a favourable opportunity presents itself; but to avoid precipitation and to weigh well the question whether more should not previously be done by arms.

Secondly, to treat for peace *pure et simple*, proposing boundaries, and reducing the question to a categorical answer—Yes or No—and avoiding mixing in this negociation those questions which belong to the Allies among themselves, towards ensuring the proper balance of power, and securities for the duration of peace.

On this latter subject, his Imperial Majesty is equally desirous that you should reserve yourself for a conversation with him. And you will find the Emperor equally impressed with a notion of the importance of postponing for the present all complicated questions on this subject.

I know the principal topics have been named to you—Saxony forms the principal feature, and the greatest nicety may be required to adjust that question between Austria and Prussia. I do not know that any difference of opinion has broke out, but everybody wishes to canvass you. What is very singular,

Chancellor Hardenberg came to the Emperor within these few days, and reported that Prince Metternich had spontaneously declared to him that he, Prince Metternich, abounded in the same sentiments on the expediency of giving a frontier to Prussia in Saxony. I cannot undertake to say that the frontier was named; but I think to the Elster and Bohemia.

Coupled with other things, the Emperor is a little inclined to think that the Chancellor has either mistaken the Prince, or that there might be an intention of sounding his Excellency.

I see the Emperor looks to a great alliance between England, Russia, Austria, and Prussia, giving to each sufficient means, and prescribing the line of joint operation, in case of the future aggression of France.

Russia renounces all idea of extension to the Vistula, in favour of Prussia, but will look to the demolition of the duchy and to the acquisition of so much thereof as may be necessary for her purpose.

It is conceived that whatever is done for the King of Saxony must be on the side of Italy. His Imperial Majesty will talk to you of his readiness to support the King, and the interests of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent in Hanover.

There is a strong report that Bonaparte has left Paris, and that he has come to the Marne, I cannot say how far, which adds to the Emperor's impatience to be with the army, and to see that sufficient attention is paid to its concentration.

Your lordship will recollect that, in consequence of one of your private letters, I moved the Emperor to send a mission to the Prince of Orange, which his Imperial Majesty promised, and authorized me to say so. I have since reminded Count Nesselrode of it, and I have the pleasure to say that I learned from him this morning that it is arranged, and that the nomination will be declared at the first halting-place.

I leave the messenger Basset to deliver this letter into your lordship's hands, and I will be much obliged to you to send him to me, with the news of your arrival and your commands.

I go this evening to Delle, and, trusting to your forgiveness for the haste in which this is written, having passed the whole morning at the Emperor's, I have the honour to remain, my dear lord, very faithfully yours,

CATHCART.

Lord Wellington to Lord Bathurst.

St. Jean de Luz, January 16, 1814.

My dear Lord—I send by this occasion the Treaty concluded with King Ferdinand, and other Papers on that subject contained in despatches from my Brother.

Napoleon will certainly endeavour to avail himself of this Treaty in the general arrangement, if there should be such a one, in which certainly the confinement of Ferdinand may be considered as a conclusive article. But it will be necessary that the Allies should be prepared to protect Spain against the demands contained particularly in the 9th and the 13th Articles, relating to the partisans of King Joseph and to the provision for King Charles. The Spanish Government will be at the feet of Napoleon, if he is allowed to interfere in favour of his partisans in Spain. The finances cannot bear the provision made for King Charles; and this is equally a point upon which no foreign influence can be admitted.

I have written to my Brother, to urge the Spanish Government to declare themselves positively on all the parts of the Treaty to which they object, in order that the Allies may be prepared to support them in what is reasonable.

Ever, my dear Lord, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Hon. Sir Charles Stewart to Lord Castlereagh.

Basle, January 17, 1814.

My Lord—The details from all the advanced corps continue to be of the most encouraging description.

Marshal Blücher has taken near 3,000 prisoners and 25

cannon since his passage of the Rhine. His last reports are from St. Avrol, of the 10th November. Detachments of his corps occupy Treves, and in a few days Luxembourg will be invested.

Marshal Marmont has been under the necessity of making the most rapid forced marches to prevent the Silesian army getting in his rear by the Vosges Mountains. In his retreat, he has broken down all the bridges over the Saone; but Marshal Blücher is pursuing him. The accounts of the confusion and disorder in France are universal. The assembling of the conscripts is very slow; those that are brought together want arms and all equipments. There seems now nothing more certain than that the Allied Armies can march to Paris when they will. Two-thirds of the old French soldiers that recrossed the Rhine are either dead or gone into the hospitals. All the general officers and men of experience declare no resistance can be made. Your lordship will have, from the advance of the armies, more detailed information than I can give. Prince Schwarzenberg was still at Vesoul the 15th. The enemy were collecting at Langres, and the Prince Marshal was preparing to attack them if they remained there, which I should doubt. He had made his dispositions for this purpose, and his forces may amount to about 165,000 men; the line he occupies is, however, a very extended one. If the enemy had force to take advantage of it in any one point with collected means, the main Russian army under General Barclay de Tolly will be ready to support Prince Schwarzenberg's offensive movement. General Witgenstein's corps occupy the country between General Barclay de Tolly and Marshal Blücher, and the Russian and Prussian reserves, together with his Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia, have left this place to march on Vesoul. The French garrison that retired into Besançon amount to 8,000 men. Befort is still bombarded, and General Schöffer commands the forces which it engages. General Bubna's last reports were from Bourg en Bresse, having left detachments at Geneva and Fort l'Ecluse, which was taken

and occupied. The Simplon and St. Bernard are all occupied. The Prince of Wirtemberg had advanced from Espinole; the enemy retiring, after their defeat by General de Roy, towards Charmes, and the Prince of Hesse Homburg from Dole. General Platow's Cossacks are heard of in every quarter.

I enclose your lordship two proclamations issued by Field Marshal Prince Schwarzenberg.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CHARLES STEWART.

Mr. Edward Thornton to Lord Castlereagh.

Kiel, January 17, 1814.

My Lord—Mr. Addington set off with the Treaty only last night, and the Messenger Smith will deliver to your lordship the copies of the Treaty and of my despatches by Mr. Addington. The despatch No. 8 in duplicate, announcing the Treaty, will, I trust, have been delivered to your lordship by General Suchtelen's courier, Mr. Bodisco.

It is my intention to set off, if possible, in the course of to-morrow; and as soon as I shall get into the good roads of Germany, which only begin on the other side of Hanover, I shall proceed with all the diligence in my power. I trust that the happy termination of the difficulties, and the ameliorated aspect of affairs in Holland, will remove every subject of discontent against the Prince Royal, who, I will venture to assure your lordship, will proceed now with the prosecution of the common views with more rapidity than ever; and I entreat your lordship not to allow any appearance of that discontent to remain, which could only tend to render him unhappy and uneasy, and possibly might do some harm to our future objects.

M. de Wetterstedt received by the same conveyance which brought me your lordship's despatch from the Hague a despatch in cipher from M. de Rehausen, detailing your last conversations with him, with the menaces of withdrawing the subsidies, and with other topics, which, if they had arrived

earlier, and had been, as they then must have been, communicated to the Prince Royal, would have gone nearly to have ruined the whole cause. He has, of his own movement, seconded by my earnest desire, suppressed it to the Prince Royal, for it reached us on the day of the signature of the Treaty of Peace, and was not deciphered till the following day.

M. de Wetterstedt thought, and I beg your lordship to forgive me for mentioning this, that he saw in the subject of this despatch the effect of Pozzo di Borgo's mission, and of the insinuations which he made against the Prince Royal. I trust this was not the case; but I know the man, and, notwithstanding his good qualities, he is not an Italian, I may say a Corsican, for nothing. He is implacable and revengeful, and I am sure he never will pardon the Emperor's recall of him from the head-quarters of the North army, and the influence of the Crown Prince, which was the cause of it. I am persuaded, from what I know of him, that he could not have been a day in England without venting to your lordship part of the opinions which this circumstance has inspired him with. I conjure your lordship not to allow these insinuations to have more than their *just* weight, and of this quality they possess very little. When I have the honour of seeing your lordship, I can say much more.

I shall have to-day, and to-morrow also, a long and confidential conversation with the Prince Royal. Be assured, my lord, that his most earnest wish is *not* to make peace with Bonaparte, but with the legitimate Sovereigns of France, restored by the wishes of the people of France, and supported by the Allies.

I should, therefore, most earnestly deprecate anything like armistice—like relaxation of hostilities during negociation—if possible, almost any negociation with Bonaparte, which gives him a sort of legitimate character, of which he ought to be deprived.

In order to reconcile the feelings which must prevail in the

Cabinet of Vienna towards Bonaparte, or at least his race, it is indispensable that France should declare herself, and that can only be done by an impulse from this side.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

EDWARD THORNTON.

Lord Aberdeen to Lord Castlereagh.

Basle, January 17, 1814.

My dear Castlereagh—I am obliged to you for your letter of the 8th, which I received this morning. I will postpone all observation till we meet, which, I trust, will be very soon. I shall now only say that, the instant I heard of *your* intention to come here, my plans necessarily changed There could be no real objection to my remaining, whatever was the work in which you were engaged, and I felt that it was quite impossible that any one should be of so much use to you as myself, in those transactions with which I have had anything to do.

The Emperor of Russia left us yesterday morning, and, all things considered, under most extraordinary circumstances. He saw the King of Prussia before he set out, and made a very singular communication to him. I related it to Stewart last night; but I shall reserve it, with all that is connected with it, until we meet. If you are not fatigued, you will do well to hasten your journey; although the Emperor of Austria has declared that he will wait here for you at any rate, and has desired me to inform you.

Thank God, there appears to be a good prospect of a speedy settlement of the affairs of Denmark and Sweden. The state of these negociations had become so complicated that it was scarcely possible to understand it. A part of what has passed I shall be glad to explain.

The affairs of Switzerland give rise to much embarrassment. It is provoking that, with the best possible disposition in the great majority of the people, there should exist so strong a support for the French party.

Everything with the army goes on well. I send you a very good and clear despatch from Burghersh.

Stewart will give you the information you require, but I know of none necessary. You are lodged close to us both, and I will take care that your rooms are well aired. We have agreed to divide you; or, rather, you must give yourself up as a victim to us alternately. They say there is a very bad prospect in France for quarters, there being nothing but very small towns, or rather villages, in this part.

Meerfeldt and Esterhazy only wait your arrival to be introduced to you, and they will depart instantly—the latter certainly: the other will be regulated by you.

I have written a despatch, which I will, however, keep till you come, in which I think the affair of the Low Countries, so far as Austria is concerned, is satisfactorily managed. Difficulties had arisen, in consequence of the way in which the Dutch went to work. We had three at a time; and the Prince, being little accustomed to the conduct of business, had not managed matters adroitly. I fancy there will be now no more trouble. I have got from Metternich a formal renunciation of the claim of Austria, and a desire on her part that these countries should contribute to strengthen Holland.

Believe me ever most sincerely,

ABERDEEN.

Lord Castlereagh to Prince Metternich and Baron Hardenberg.

Basle, January 18, 1814, 5 P.M.

Lord Castlereagh presents his compliments to Prince Metternich—Chancellor Hardenberg—and, having received the Prince Regent's orders, as principal Secretary of State for the Foreign Department, to proceed to the Continent on his Majesty's especial affairs, Lord Castlereagh has the honour to notify his arrival to Prince Metternich, and will do himself the honour of paying his respects to his Excellency, at any hour to-morrow he may be pleased to appoint.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Cathcart.

Basle, January 18, 5 P.M.

My dear Lord—Finding at Freiberg from Mr. Gentz that there was yet a chance of finding the Emperor at this place, I pushed on, and arrived in fifty hours from Frankfort.

I regret that the audience, with which his Imperial Majesty intended to honour me, is thus delayed; but I shall endeavour to accelerate it as much as possible, and hope to get away from hence the day after to-morrow. Your lordship may assure his Imperial Majesty that I shall form no decisive opinion on any of the great questions now pending, without availing myself of his Imperial Majesty's enlightened views upon them severally; and I hope I do not presume too far in entreating his Imperial Majesty to keep his mind as open to what I may feel it my duty to submit on the part of Great Britain.

I trust the Emperor will be persuaded that my first object is to cement an alliance which has led to results so auspicious to the world, and to preserve to Europe, in the firmest bonds of union, that great confederacy which has saved it from destruction.

Yours ever, my dear lord, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Cathcart.

Basle, January 20, 1814.

My dear Lord—I find I cannot well move from hence before Saturday. I wish to make myself independent in my movements by getting horses, &c.; and I yet wish to hear a little more, now I am here, before I join you.

I have been presented to the Sovereigns here, and I have conversed with their respective Ministers at considerable length. I have to all desired to be understood as forming no decisive opinion myself on any subject, much less as declaring any on the part of my Government, till I have paid my duty to the

Emperor of Russia, and informed myself of all his Imperial Majesty's sentiments, if I may be permitted to do so, from his own mouth.

For the moment, my dear lord, I believe it is unnecessary to add more. I am too impatient, *for many reasons*, to join you speedily to waste unnecessarily a moment here.

Yours, my dear lord, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Burghersh.

Basle, January 21, 1814.

My Lord—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your lordship's two despatches of the [blank]. In that of [blank] I observe that your lordship has detailed the substance of a communication, entirely of a political nature, made by Prince Schwarzenberg to you upon the subject of the restoration of the Bourbon family to the throne of France. As the instructions you have received from me relate simply to points of military detail, I have to request that, whenever information of a political nature reaches you, with which you think it advisable that I should be made acquainted, you will in future transmit it, through the medium of a private letter, to the Earl of Aberdeen, his Majesty's Ambassador at the Court of Vienna, instead of making it the subject of a public despatch to me.

You acted perfectly right in taking care that whatever passed between the Count Vincent and yourself should be considered as unofficial; but I am persuaded that you will easily comprehend how essential it is for the due execution of the public service that you should avoid as much as possible the appearance of being interested with any political character, and that all persons with whom circumstances may accidentally lead you to communicate upon such subjects should be most distinctly made to understand that your functions are entirely military; and I should wish, except under the most pressing circum-

stances, that your lordship should altogether decline being addressed upon political topics.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Burghersh.

Basle, January 22, 1814.

My Lord—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your lordship's different despatches containing the details of the recent military events, and I have particular pleasure in being authorized to signify to you his Royal Highness the Prince Regent's approbation of the very clear and satisfactory manner in which you have narrated such military operations as have taken place since your lordship has been attached to the army under the command of Prince Schwarzenberg.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to the Earl of Aberdeen.

Basle, January 22, 1814.

My Lord—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your lordship's letter of the 18th instant, marked separate, enclosing a copy of a letter addressed by Prince Metternich to Major-General Sir Robert Wilson, containing an offer, on the part of his Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty to confer upon that officer the Order of Maria Theresa.

I have great satisfaction in acquainting your lordship that his Royal Highness the Prince Regent has been graciously pleased to signify that he approves of Sir Robert Wilson's accepting the honour proposed to be conferred upon him, as a mark of the sense which his Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Austria entertains of the nature of the services which he has rendered in the late important events.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Bathurst.

No. 1. Basle, January 22, 1814.

My Lord—I have the honour to acquaint your lordship, for the information of the Prince Regent, that I arrived at this place, in execution of his Royal Highness's instructions, on the 18th instant, and lost no time in presenting to the Emperor of Austria and to the King of Prussia the letters of credence with which his Royal Highness honoured me. I received from both their Majesties the most gratifying assurances of their persevering adherence to the interests of the Alliance, of their attachment to the Prince Regent, and of their grateful sense of the support they had received from Great Britain.

I took this occasion of announcing to both Monarchs, on the part of the Prince Regent, the auspicious marriage which was about to take place in his Royal Highness's illustrious family, together with the intended regulation of the succession to the Crown of Great Britain and Sovereignty of Holland. It is impossible too highly to paint the satisfaction both Monarchs expressed at this happy event, and the manner in which it was intended to be carried into execution.

Having had an opportunity of entering generally with the Ministers of Austria and Prussia upon the present state of affairs, and not deeming it consistent with the Prince Regent's intentions that I should deliver any opinion on his Royal Highness's part, till I have had an opportunity of presenting my letters of credence to the Emperor of Russia, and of possessing myself fully of his Imperial Majesty's sentiments, I propose to set out to-night for the head-quarters of his Imperial Majesty, which I shall probably find at Langres.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Bathurst.

Basle, January 22, 1814.

My Lord—I enclose a document which Prince Metternich has communicated to me; that it was circulated at Chaumont, there can be no doubt; but, as the enemy are driven to all devices (having forged a proclamation in the Emperor of Austria's name) to keep the interior quiet, it may have no foundation whatever; though it is more probable it is connected with some device of Bonaparte to separate himself from the Spanish question, and to save himself from the mortification of having Ferdinand reclaimed by the Allies; and it may also be done with a view of keeping Paris down, and of covering Soult's retreat.

I put this construction upon the transaction, as I cannot for a moment doubt the decision of Spain upon any such base intrigue.

I thought it right to communicate this paper to M. Pizarro, the Spanish Minister here. He had learnt from Spanish officers who had lately escaped from France, that Napoleon had lately sent for two of Ferdinand's Spanish attendants, and that he had despatched one of these persons to Ferdinand, and the other to Spain, with some propositions. M. Pizarro has written a very proper despatch to his Government on this subject, and feels confident that they will honourably sustain the character and interests of the Spanish nation at this crisis.

Prince Metternich informs me that Napoleon's language to him always was that he could settle the Spanish question any day as best suited him with Ferdinand. His Highness, however, is not disposed to give much credence either to the language he then held, or to the present statement.

I have to request your lordship will take the necessary measures for directing his Majesty's Ambassador at the Court of Madrid to counteract any schemes the enemy may hope to

accomplish through engagements or promises extorted from Ferdinand, while a prisoner. All acts, by the laws of Spain, done under such restraint, must be considered wholly null and void.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Bathurst.

Basle, January 22, 1814.

My Lord—Having received from Prince Metternich an official communication that the Emperor of Austria has concluded a treaty with the person exercising the Government of Naples, of which your lordship will receive a copy enclosed, I have instructed Lord William Bentinck to the effect contained in the despatch herewith sent, which I trust the Prince Regent will approve, under the circumstances of the case, and the importance of accumulating every possible exertion at this great crisis against the common enemy.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Clancarty.

Basle, January 22, 1814.

My Lord—I have the honour to acquaint you that information has been received this day that the head-quarters of the Grand Army have been advanced from Langres to Chaumont, and that those of Marshal Blücher have been established at Nancy. This rapid progress of the allied forces, coupled with that which, I have no doubt, has by this time been made on the side of Holland and Flanders, induces me to suggest to your lordship the expediency of directing all messengers whom you may have occasion to despatch to me to endeavour to reach the head-quarters of the Grand Army by the shortest route, without making so great a *detour* as would be the case if they proceeded, in the first instance, to this place. They will, of course, endeavour to obtain on their way the best information

they can as to the situation of the head-quarters, and the security of the roads by which they may have to pass: but it is of considerable importance that my communications with the Hague should be as expeditious as possible; and I request your lordship will have the goodness to furnish them with such instructions as may seem best calculated for the purpose.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury.

Basle, January 22, 1814.

My Lords—I have the honour to inform your lordships that, in consequence of the earnest representations of M. Pizarro, Spanish Minister at the Court of Berlin, of the destitute condition in which several Spanish officers have reached this place, having escaped from prison in France, and of his total inability to supply them with any means of proceeding to their native country, I have thought it right to furnish M. Pizarro with the sum of £250 for this service, and have accordingly this day drawn upon your lordships a bill in triplicate for that sum, in favour of M. T. Marian Fourcart, of this place, which I request your lordships will direct to be paid when due.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord William Bentinck.

Basle, January 22, 1814.

My Lord—The Emperor of Austria having entered into engagements with the person now exercising the Government of Naples, by the tenour of which engagements it is agreed that a corps of Neapolitan troops, not less than 30,000 men, shall immediately join the Austrian army of Italy, for the purpose of acting offensively against the common enemy, I am to signify to your lordship the Prince Regent's pleasure that,

so soon as you receive from his Imperial Majesty's Minister at Naples, the Count Neipperg, a copy of this treaty, your lordship do immediately, upon the faith of that instrument, suspend hostilities against the Government of Naples, on the part of Great Britain; and I am also to direct that you will take measures for prevailing upon his Sicilian Majesty to do the same.

I shall, as soon as I arrive at the head-quarters at Chaumont, procure from the Earl of Aberdeen the correspondence which has passed upon this subject between the Courts of Vienna and St. James's, and furnish your lordship with the instructions necessary for the direction of your conduct upon this important subject. The treaty actually signed having been returned by Prince Metternich to Count Neipperg, to have some alteration made in its details, I enclose a copy of the treaty as it is proposed to be amended, in order that your lordship may see that the Act, as executed, is substantially conformable to the intentions of the Austrian Government, as notified to me.

You will signify to his Britannic Majesty's officers by sea and land, as far as circumstances will permit, the armistice, should it be concluded, for the direction of their conduct.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool.

Basle, January 22, 1814.

My dear Liverpool—I have had, during the two last days, several hours' conversation with the three most leading Ministers here—I mean Metternich, Stadion, and Hardenberg; but it is too soon to judge of them before I come to closer quarters with them upon the points of difficulty: I have every reason, however, so far to be satisfied, and they seem to feel my arrival as a valuable facility.

I have had a very full confidential communication with

Metternich on the Bourbon question: he is highly conciliated by the line we have taken, and the forbearance with which we have used the discretion given to us by his Government through Aberdeen. I am confident that I should have great additional influence over his mind on any practical question connected with this subject that may occur, from the manner in which we have conducted ourselves upon it. My opinion is that, if we meet this event in our progress as a French measure, Austria will not embarrass it from any family considerations, and the less so from the dread she feels of Bernadotte's elevation; but she will not speculate upon it, or commit herself upon either loose or partial grounds. She will desire always to see the public act, and to frame her decision with reference to its nature and extent, and the state in which the Allied interests at the moment stand in the war. Metternich seems strongly impressed with the feeling that, to take our terms high against France, we must not encumber ourselves with anything that can bear the appearance of an initiative on such a question on the part of the Allies. I have always strongly felt this as applied to our own interests, and that we cannot press *our* demands to the utmost, if we are at the same time *mixed* in a question which, as far as relates to the existing Government of France, supersedes all terms. He also thinks, for the interest of the Bourbons themselves, that it is a question of doubtful policy, to say the least, whether they would not lose more than gain from showing themselves, in the first instance, in the camp of any of the Allied Sovereigns, and, above all, in the British camp. He seems to dread that great question being ineffectually stirred, and anxious that the Allies should not be encumbered with it, or responsible for it. In other respects, I should not despair of his concurring with the other Allied Powers in turning any public effort the French nation may make in this sense to a good account; and I am sure my means of giving his mind such a direction will be in proportion to the delicacy we may observe in not precipitating any act on our own part

which might compromise the Allied counsels prematurely in so vital a question. It is painful and not fair that the Bourbons should have their hands tied, whilst Bernadotte's are free; but why should they not pursue their views in some quarter which does not locally and in appearance mix them with us? I shall write more precisely on this subject from head-quarters. I think it material to say thus much now, and the rather as we are endangered not a little in our internal counsels by the number of great State problems that are at the same moment cast upon us.

I have not adverted to it in my general letter, but much controversy between Austria and Russia still prevails on the interior affairs of Switzerland. The Emperor, influenced by Laharpe, countenances the popular party: Austria is favourable to the ancient order of things, all happily hostile to France. Metternich has the merit of getting over the obstacle of the neutrality. It is desirable these *tracasseries* should transpire as little as possible, at least through the Government of England, and especially the Emperor's *égarements* about Bernadotte, which I hope to dissipate.

Ever, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Prince Metternich.

Basle, January 22, 1814.

The undersigned has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Prince Metternich's letter of the 21st instant, announcing the appointment of Count Meerveldt as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary from his Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Austria to the Court of London. He begs to assure Prince Metternich of his persuasion, that no appointment could have been more satisfactory to his Royal Highness the Prince Regent; and the undersigned is convinced that, though Count Meerveldt is not yet furnished with the credentials in the usual form, he will nevertheless experience

at the Court of London that respect to which the nature of his mission, as well as his personal character, so justly entitle him.

The undersigned, trusting that the credentials for Count Meerveldt, in the usual form, will be forwarded to his Excellency from Vienna, has the honour to renew to his Highness Prince Metternich the assurances of his high consideration. CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

The Hague, January 23, 1814.

My dear Lord—My public despatch of yesterday, the only one sent to England since I last wrote, merely relates to the mission of a Major De Warren, who states himself to have been employed for the recovery of some masts, the produce of Hanover, by the British Government, and in no sort relates to any matter of consequence sufficient to trouble you with.

The accompanying copy of my private letter to Lord Liverpool is scarcely more worthy of your perusal: I send it, however, as it puts you in possession of all we know or hear at this place.

Mr. Addington arrived last night with the treaty between Great Britain and Denmark; with the terms Mr. Thornton, who, immediately after the signature, set out for the grand head-quarters, will have acquainted you. Mr. Addington was again despatched by me from Scheveling to England at eleven o'clock last night; and, as the wind is quite fair, will probably reach Harwich in the course of this day.

Gordon arrived here the night before last, and Mr. Temple last night from England, with his Excellency Greffier Fagel. Hamilton writes me word that the French Princes (which he does not designate) may be expected here immediately; and I understand from Sir Robert Porter, who left England the day before yesterday, on his way to the Grand Army, that a packet is prepared at Harwich, to convey them here. I suppose I

may show them the civil hospitality of occasional invitation to my table, and shall do so, unless I hear to the contrary.

General Gore, with his brigade, is marching upon Lingen, with a view of proceeding forward, to form his junction with Sir Thomas Graham. Our army in this quarter has its head-quarters at Oudenbrock, its advance at Rosendael and Steenbergen. That of General Bülow is at Breda. There has been no movement in either since the 14th, the particulars of which I sent you by the last messenger.

I have written to Liverpool privately to notify the arrival at no distant period of the Duke of Saxe-Weimar, with 9,000 men, who would possibly be in a very unequipped state, and have forwarded the private letters of the Duke addressed to the Prince of Orange, noticing his various wants, in order that Government may decide whether some of these may not be supplied from England, rather than leave 9,000 men in an inefficient state in this quarter. To-day I hear that the Duke is arrived at Arnheim, his troops at Zwoll. Adieu.

Yours most affectionately, CLANCARTY.

[Enclosure.]

Lord Clancarty to Lord Liverpool.

Hague, January 22, 1814.

My dear Lord—There has been no arrival of any courier here, since I last had the pleasure of addressing you; consequently, I have no matter of any interest officially to detail, and but little indeed of current rumours privately to acquaint you with, except those that may probably have reached you through some other channel.

No messenger having reached the Hague from Thornton, confirmatory of the intelligence from Bremen, transmitted to you in my last private letter, I am led to fear that that intelligence was premature; though, perhaps, as the wind was at N.E., and I know he was in want of messengers, Thornton may have expedited his official despatch *viâ* Heligoland, or

direct from Glückstadt, without having been able to send a duplicate by the Hague.

I fear they have not been going on here quite so well as could have been wished in the financial department; left without a shilling, as was the Treasury, upon the arrival of the Prince of Orange here, and with the interest growing due upon their reduced debt, one of the first objects of the Government was to provide the means of paying this interest, in order thereby to restore public confidence. To enable them to do this, a loan was opened for a limited time (I believe six weeks), with a power in the Government to close it prior to the expiration of the period. From this source Government expected to derive 8,000,000 florins, which would be sufficient to set them at their ease, in the payment of the instalment of interest, and enable them to go on till the machinery of the new Government could be reconstructed. In the mean time, the *droits réunis* and several other obnoxious taxes imposed by the French were abolished, while their main system of taxation was continued till further order.

Unfortunately, the loan has turned out by no means so productive as was expected. To what extent it has failed I have not yet been able to ascertain; but, from all I can gather, it should seem that the failure has been nearly complete. Thus circumstanced, the Government was necessarily led to turn to some other source, and unhappily has been led to readopt some of those taxes which were imposed by the French and particularly obnoxious to the people: among others especially a tax on mills. This has created some discontent; and, though not manifested by any act of violence, has sufficiently shown itself to give some uneasiness; and I should think it probable that the tax will be revoked. Should this be the case, the necessity will be to be lamented, as evincing at once the rashness and feebleness of Government. In all other prospects, there appears no diminution of the good-will of the people towards the present and their hatred of the French Government.

Mr. Gordon returned last night from the head-quarters of the Grand Army. He assures me that Aix-la-Chapelle is in the hands of the Allies, probably of part of the force of Winzingerode, a part of whose troops passed the Rhine on the 14th. He also brings a rumour of an action fought with considerable loss by Marshal Blücher, about the 15th inst. near Metz, in which the French were defeated.

Lest you should not have received any accounts later than Stewart's letter of the 9th inst., which gave the positions of Marshal Blücher's forces to the 5th, I send you the accompanying translate from the Dutch Government Gazette of this morning, of a paper purporting to be the 12th Bulletin of the Silesian army.

A M. Martigny, a native of Holland, and one of the members of the late Corps Legislatif at Paris, has just effected his escape thence. I have not yet been enabled to see him, but understand he reports that considerable discontent prevails all through France, and especially that about Lille the people are in a state of insurrection; that the cause of the prorogation of the Legislative Body on the 30th December was that an address and report of the state of the country had been voted, the latter entering very freely into political matter, with the object of enforcing the necessity of immediate peace; that the presenting of this document had been proposed and carried under circumstances of considerable disorder; that the printing presses were set to work, but that these were soon taken possession of by the Government, the progress of the work stopped, the doors of the Hall of Assembly closed, and locked during the night, and the decree issued for their prorogation. I do not vouch for the credit of this person; his account, however, seems not unlikely.

Mr. Addington is just arrived with the treaty of peace between Great Britain and Denmark, and a copy of that between Sweden and the same power. These were both signed in the night between the 14th and 15th, and bear the former date.

CLANCARTY.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Liverpool.

Hague, January 26, 1814.

My dear Lord—Resuming the subject of the state of finances here from my last private letter, I yesterday evening met Mr. Canneman, the finance Minister, at an assembly, and, conversing with him apart, he told me that they are in considerable difficulty; that they found an arrear of fourteen months' interest upon their reduced debt; that the loan had not been so productive as they had hoped. Upon asking him the amount of their failure in this respect, he surprised me by saying that they had actually subscribed to the amount of £200,000 sterling, which would exceed the fourth of the sum they had expected. He went on to state the necessity of their making every effort to secure public credit by the payment of their arrear of interest; but that though the ordinary taxes came in as well as they could have hoped, yet that these were insufficient to the exertions they were making, although fully adequate to the ordinary expenditure of their Government; and that, unless the British Government should be inclined to support them in their pecuniary difficulties, he did not know how they could get through them.

I told him that he might naturally suppose I could have received no indication even of the sentiments of my Government, upon a subject which could only have originated by their disappointment concerning their loan; that, with respect to further subsidies, I should, however, conceive, speaking entirely from myself, that I had only to refer him to the course of exchange, to show the difficulty which must arise upon this subject; that I was not surprised at the failure of the loan here, and had told Mr. Vant, the treasurer, when he first mentioned to me this project, soon after the establishment of his Royal Highness's Government, that I thought that he ought not to be too sanguine upon it; as it was natural to conceive that those who possessed capitals in this country would be desirous

of taking advantage of the prospects of reopened commerce rather to vest their capitals in trade, where so great a return was to be expected, than to place them in the hands of Government at a minor interest.

He answered that this was the very course to which he attributed the failure of their loan; but soon after recurred to the subject of seeking aid from Great Britain, stating that he had not had it in contemplation to propose aid by way of subsidy, but that if Great Britain could be induced to lend her credit to co-operate with that of the Dutch Government by guaranteeing a loan to be made here for the service of the latter, he thought they still might accomplish the object they had had in view.

I replied that this would seem to me open to the same failure with the other, as the commercial capitalist would at least look forward to greater gains from commerce than the State would be inclined to afford: but that the operation he had in view might also affect the engagements to which Great Britain was already pledged with other Powers, and besides that I should like to know from him how he would be inclined, supposing a matter of this sort should be at all entertained, reciprocally to lend the credit of his Government, to co-operate with that of Great Britain in guaranteeing a loan to be raised here for the service of both States. To this he answered that he did not think it would be possible to raise a sum of money here adequate to the wants of both Governments; and he was going on further to explain himself, when we were interrupted.

Although this was perfectly a private discussion, I have thought it right to notice it, lest the subject should, as, in their present state of embarrassment, I do not think it improbable, be brought forward more seriously hereafter. The reason of my suggesting, by way of objection, rather than as a proposition, the reciprocal guarantee for the security of a loan, for the service of both Governments, was for the purpose of taking ground, should any proposition hereafter be made, and the matter be thought expedient, to provide, if possible, funds here

for the payment of our troops, without remittance from England, so as, in some degree, to operate in correction of the low course of exchange.

I send you herewith enclosed, a copy of a paper left here yesterday by M. Nyvelt, sub-Secretary of State in the Foreign Department. As this paper is unauthenticated by any signature, and was merely left at my house by M. de Nyvelt, without any note, I transmit it privately for your information, and in order that his Majesty's Government should be prepared, in the event of any formal demand being in future made upon the subject of it. With the facts I am totally unacquainted. Much will necessarily depend upon the terms of capitulation of the Danish islands. By the only article quoted, it should seem that all the property of enemies was to be given up; and if so, in strict right, there is no foundation for the demand: but how far Government may be inclined, under the present relations of Great Britain with the Dutch Government, to act favourably by the mortgagees of these plantations, and to be guided by the precedent cited to have taken place at the last peace, it is for your lordship's decision.

Upon the subject of public events I have nothing by this mail to communicate officially. The accompanying extract of a letter was communicated to me last night by the Prince of Orange. The writer is a M. Nyvelt, brother to the Secretary in the Foreign Department, and who acts as Commissary-General for his Royal Highness's troops at Breda. I believe the statement myself, and leave you to form your own judgment upon the credit to be attached to it. It was currently reported here yesterday and to-day that Liege had also risen and *chassé*d the French *employés*.

Wittenberg is confidently said to have been taken by assault on the 12th inst.; but, though I endeavoured ineffectually to trace the report to some authentic source, I see no other ground than my failure of success to discredit it.

Sydenham writes word that a large part of the troops of the

Crown Prince will be at Mühlheim, opposite Cologne, on the 12th of February.

It was rumoured here late this evening that Gorcum was on fire, and subsequently this rumour increased to the capture of the place by the Prussian force. Neither of these events would have appeared to me improbable, as it was in contemplation to have bombarded the place some two days since; but that I have received letters from Sir T. Graham, dated the day before yesterday, which are totally silent upon the subject; so that I fear the rumours are premature.

Yours, &c., CLANCARTY.

[Enclosure.]

Extrait d'une Lettre de Capelle.

Je me suis occupé de recueillir d'abord tous les détails de ce qui s'etoit passé à Gand. Voiçi les circonstances authentiques.

Le lendemain de l'attaque fait sur Anvers, le peuple s'attroupa, disant que les Anglois étoient à Anvers. On commença par briser les Aigles, et toutes les enseignes aux armes Françoises, soit droits réunis ou autres. Ils se rendirent ensuite chez le Receveur, qui leur donna l'argent qu'ils demandèrent, et qui fut partagé entre eux. Ils continuèrent toute la journée de chasser les droits réunis, les douaniers, enregistrements, domaines, et toutes les administrations de la ville; et l'on s'attendoit le lendemain à des scènes; mais divers habitans avoient reçu dans l'intervalle de leurs correspondants à Anvers la nouvelle inattendue de la retraite des armées alliées. Ils jugèrent alors qu'il étoit nécessaire d'arrêter ce mouvement, mais la chose n'étoit pas facile.

Ils prétendirent qu'aucun François ne restoit à Gand. On fit donc une espèce de capitulation avec l'agrément du Préfet, dont les principaux articles étoient que toutes les administrations civiles Françoises quitteroient la Ville, et qu'on payeroit à tous les ouvriers sans ouvrage 2 francs par jour jusqu'au moment qu'on pourra leur en procurer. Cette promesse a été

exécutée, et les journaux et autres papiers de Gand sont déjà arrivés sans timbre ; et toutes les administrations ont emballé à la hâte et sont parties. Que faut-il qu'on ajoute pour prouver l'extrême faiblesse du pouvoir François dans la Belgique?

Au moment que j'écris je reçois la nouvelle que Bruxelles a suivi l'exemple de Gand ; que les administrations civiles en sont parties.

Je ne suis pas resté moins oisif de notre côté. J'ai fait acheter une grande partie d'avoine et de seigle jusques sous le canon d'Anvers pour approvisionner l'armée, sur le conseil de M. Browis. La plus grande partie auroit déjà été livrée, mais mon commissionaire, saisi d'une terreur panique étoit revenu sans convenir du jour de la livraison. Cette approvisionnement contribuera peut-être aux mouvemens militaires et j'y donnerai le plus grand soin.

Lord Castlereagh to Prince Metternich.

Langres, January 27, 1814.

The Undersigned has the honour to offer to Prince Metternich his acknowledgments for the copy of the Treaty, in the form in which it is proposed to stand, between his Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Austria and the person now exercising the Government of Naples.

However painful it must be to the Prince Regent that any arrangement should have been found necessary to the general interests which is calculated to oppose an obstacle to the resumption by his Sicilian Majesty of his ancient and hereditary dominions upon a general peace, yet the Undersigned has not hesitated to transmit to his Royal Highness's Minister at the Court of Palermo an instruction, of which a copy is enclosed, directing an immediate cessation of hostilities, upon the faith that a just and suitable arrangement will be effected as an indemnity to his Sicilian Majesty, for the great sacrifice which he is called upon to make for the general welfare.

The Undersigned deems it necessary to represent to Prince

Metternich the necessity of his being enabled to confer with the Court of Palermo on the proposed arrangement in favour of his Sicilian Majesty, before any discussion can be entered upon for terminating the war at present subsisting between his Britannic Majesty and the existing Government of Naples.

The Undersigned has the honour, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Prince Metternich, Count Nesselrode, Chancellor Hardenberg.

Head-quarters, Langres, January 27, 1814.

The Undersigned, his Britannic Majesty's principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, has the honour to call the Prince Metternich's [Count N.'s—Baron H.'s] attention to the enclosed official correspondence, which passed in London previously to his receiving the Prince Regent's commands to proceed to the Continent.

Lord Castlereagh requests to know whether any explanation of the nature therein referred to has yet been made to the French Government: if not, the Undersigned is prepared to concert with his Highness and the Ministers of the Allied Powers as to the manner in which this indispensable preliminary on the part of the British Government can best be carried into execution, previously to the commencement of any negociations.

The Undersigned has the honour, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to the Ministers of the Three Allied Powers.

Langres, January 27, 1814.

The Undersigned, his Britannic Majesty's principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, referring to the earnest desire expressed on the part of his Court that Holland may receive on the side of the Low Countries, at a general peace, a suitable accession to her military frontier and territorial resources, begs leave to submit, on the part of the Prince Regent, to the

favourable consideration of the Allied Sovereigns, the Prince of Orange's pretensions to be entrusted during the war with the military administration of a due proportion of the territories which may be recovered from the enemy, bordering upon the ancient Dutch frontier.

His Royal Highness is induced to make this request not only as important in point of resource to invigorate the exertions which the Prince of Orange is now making in the common cause, but as tending to connect his Royal Highness's Government in habits of intercourse with the people that may eventually be confided to his care, and who have recently manifested the strongest desire to place themselves under his protection.

His Royal Highness the Prince Regent will consider it as a gratifying mark of attention, should the Allied Sovereigns see no objection to receive a Minister from the Prince of Orange in the Central Committee for the administering during the war the territories recovered from the enemy.

CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Bathurst.

Langres, January 27, 1814.

My Lord—I have the honour to acquaint your lordship that, before my departure from Basle, Prince Metternich officially notified to me that his Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Austria had been pleased to appoint Count Meerveldt to be his Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Court of London, and that his Excellency would set off for his destination immediately, carrying with him a letter from his Imperial Majesty to his Royal Highness the Prince Regent, which, as the credentials in the usual form had not yet been received from Vienna, Prince Metternich hoped would, nevertheless, be sufficient to ensure his reception in London, in his ambassadorial capacity. His Highness added that the proper credentials would be forwarded to England without delay.

I ventured to assure Prince Metternich, in reply, that I was persuaded that no appointment could be more satisfactory to his Royal Highness the Prince Regent than that which had been notified to me, and that I had no doubt that, notwithstanding the momentary delay in regard to credentials in the usual form, Count Meerveldt would experience, upon his arrival in London, that respect which the importance of his mission, as well as his own personal character, would naturally entitle him: I expressed, however, a hope that the regular credentials would follow his Excellency as soon as possible.

I have the honour, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

The Hague, January 27, 1814.

My dear Lord—A mail having arrived last night and landed the Messenger Robinson at Scheveling, I lose no time in despatching him with its contents.

From hence I have little of interest to announce. My despatches sent yesterday to Government were two; neither of them worth the trouble of your reading. The first contained a Note from the Foreign Office here, requesting the return to this country of some forty-seven Dutch seamen serving in the Firza frigate, and who had previously been captured by us on board French ships, in which they had been obliged to serve by conscription. They are belonging to the village of Scheveling, and a list of their names has been forwarded with the despatch. The second sets forth the wants of this Government in arms, ammunition, &c., for the efficient equipment of their regular and militia force, and transmits a statement of these wants, with which I was furnished by the Government here.

By this it appears that their whole force, militia and regular, will amount to 55,400 men. The arms they acknowledge to have received amount to 38,000 stand; but of these so large a part have been distributed to the peasantry, &c., for the blockade

of the Helder, Naarden, Deventer, &c., that only about 17,000 stand remain applicable to the purposes of the force in progress of levying. Accompanied with some observations, I have transmitted a copy of this paper to Government for their consideration. Together with these, I wrote a private letter to Lord Liverpool, containing everything I was possessed of at all worthy of communication: a copy of this, with its enclosure, you will herewith receive.

It was intended that a combined movement of the Prussian and British force in the neighbourhood of Breda should have taken place in the direction of Antwerp on the 25th inst. The object of this was, if possible, to take the town, but, if not, to endeavour the destruction of the fleet, and, for this purpose, at Sir T. Graham's request, I procured an order for the despatch to his head-quarters of a M. Van Gorkum, who had recently made his escape from Antwerp, and was in possession of an excellent plan of the place, and of the most minute knowledge of all its defences. This person asserts that there will not be the slightest difficulty in burning the fleet without taking the town. Sir Thomas Graham, however, writes me word that this movement is postponed. The General's letters are dated the 24th and 25th from Oudenbock. In the first, he says that "General Bülow cannot be ready to move for a couple of days yet, and even then, owing to some intelligence concerning Marshal Macdonald's movements, it is uncertain whether the operation against Antwerp can be the first undertaken; however, we hope still there will be no material delay." In his second, he says, "General Bülow informs me to-day that the movement proposed for the 27th cannot take place, in consequence of reports of the advance of a part of the enemy's force, supposed to be Macdonald's, towards Oost and West Balle, but that he will acquaint me whenever he is ready. The Duke of Weimar is at Breda; his troops, amounting to 7,000, within three or four days' march."

I should rather think that, from his rank in the service, the

Duke of Saxe-Weimar supersedes Bülow in the command: if so, this is to be regretted, as the latter is an excellent officer, and perfectly acquainted with his ground. It has given me great pleasure to find that, ever since the matter respecting the garrisoning of Breda, Graham has shown every disposition most heartily to co-operate with the Prussian force, and I have no doubt will continue to do so. It will also afford you satisfaction to know that he and I are in the daily habit of the most friendly correspondence.

Wellesley's despatches were left under flying seal for my perusal. How thoroughly Napoleon marks his tottering state by thus endeavouring to catch at straws to save himself! I sincerely hope that your negociations may be so long delayed that his fall will be complete before their termination.

I find in the packet with Wellesley's despatch the copy of a private letter from Liverpool to me, the original of which, however, I have never received.

Yours, my dear lord, most affectionately,

CLANCARTY.

Lord Castlereagh to George Rose, Esq.

Langres, January 27, 1814.

Sir—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letters, Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4, and I shall have no hesitation in recommending to the approbation of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent the determination which you adopted, under the circumstances stated in your first despatches, of proceeding to Munich without delay; and his Royal Highness will, I am persuaded, observe with satisfaction the manner in which Count Montgelas received the letter which you were entrusted to convey to him from me.

I flatter myself that that Minister will see in the step which, under my instructions, you were authorized to take, the strongest proof of the desire of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent to return, without loss of time, to those relations of amity which

have formerly united the Courts of London and Munich. Whenever his Government shall send a person to England, provided with regular credentials as Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, he shall be received in that capacity, and you will be furnished with similar authority in the usual form. I think it, however, necessary to observe (and you will so state it to Count Montgelas) that a considerable time has now elapsed without the adoption of such a step on the part of Bavaria, and that any protracted delay cannot fail to make an unfavourable impression in England.

The events which have recently occurred in the Bavarian Tyrol are calculated to excite considerable interest; but it is satisfactory to find that the disturbances which have arisen in that quarter have been quelled without the intervention of a Bavarian armed force. Under the present circumstances of that affair, I do not think it necessary to give you any more specific instructions respecting it; but you will continue to furnish me with such information as you may be able to obtain of what is passing in those districts.

I have observed, with great regret, the opinion which you express with regard to the disposition and principles of Count Montgelas, and to the ascendency which he still retains over the mind of his Sovereign. It might have been hoped that the feeling which seems to pervade the rest of Germany at the present moment would readily have found a place in the councils of Bavaria, a country at least as much interested in the national independence of Germany as any other Power of more extended territory. You will not, however, fail to use your best endeavours to impress upon the mind of Count Montgelas that the future repose of Europe depends upon the steady co-operation of all those States who have so long suffered by its protracted interruption; and that his Royal Highness the Prince Regent has looked upon the accession of Bavaria to the common cause as no less honourable to its Government than useful to the great interests which are at stake.

In looking at the situation of Bavaria and the spirit which directs her councils, the principles and conduct of the Prince Royal are deserving of the highest praise; the share which his Royal Highness has had in forwarding the military means of his country, and animating the public spirit against the common enemy, cannot fail to inspire his Royal Highness the Prince Regent with the liveliest hope of the successful application of those resources which Bavaria possesses; and you will not fail to take a proper opportunity of expressing to the Prince Royal the sense which his Royal Highness entertains of the honourable and manly course which he has pursued. As it appears, however, by your despatch, No. 4, that his Royal Highness does not experience that support to which such conduct entitles him, you will, I am persuaded, feel the importance of making this communication in the way the least likely to produce any embarrassment by rendering his Royal Highness's exertions less useful to the public interests.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Prince Metternich.

Langres, January 29, 1814.

The Undersigned, in acknowledging the receipt of Prince Metternich's Note of the 28th instant, in reply to his of the 27th, respecting the maritime question, begs to express himself perfectly satisfied with the mode in which his Highness proposes to communicate to the French Secretary of State the fixed determination of the Allied Powers not to suffer that point to be mixed up in any negociation with the French Government. But the Undersigned feels himself compelled to advert to an expression in Count Metternich's note, which, if not properly understood, might lead to very considerable embarrassment. Lord Castlereagh alludes to the expression of "la Code Maritime d'Angleterre," which might be supposed to imply that Great Britain asserts certain rights peculiar to herself, and not founded upon the ascertained laws of nations.

To guard against misconception on so essential a point, the Undersigned deems it of the utmost importance that, in any communication to be made to the French Government upon this subject, the greatest care should be taken to place the question upon its true and only grounds, viz., the impossibility of revising, upon the present occasion, that system of maritime law which is common to all States, as sanctioned by the established law of nations, under the obligations of which, upon terms of perfect reciprocity, Great Britain has always considered herself implicitly bound to act, and which never has been made a subject of deliberation in any European Congress.

The Undersigned trusts that Prince Metternich will excuse his thus adverting to an expression, which, he persuades himself, was not intended to convey any meaning of which the British Government might feel itself entitled to complain.

The Undersigned, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Liverpool.

The Hague, January 29, 1814.

My dear Lord—You will see, by the accompanying private Note from M. Van Hogendorp, that the subject of the unsigned Memorial transmitted with my last will be brought immediately forward, and that a representation which accompanied the enclosed Note will also be brought before you. It appears to me, as far as I am able to form a judgment, that neither of the points solicited can be considered as matters of right. How far you may consider them as matter of favour will be for you to decide. There seems this distinction, however, between the two cases, viz., that, in the matter contained in the Memorial forwarded with my last private letter, the loss seems to have been incurred without any fault or misfeasance of the parties; whereas, in the present instance, a simulated flag and simulated papers, in fraud of our regulations, are the foundation upon which the request is made. Whether this ought to make any

distinction in your decision, when the points shall be brought more formally before you, you are better able to judge than I am. I am to-morrow to see M. Van Hogendorp upon these, and, as he sends me word, upon other matters, and shall then merely take them *ad referendum*.

The following intelligence has been transmitted to me from Rotterdam by a Mr. Johnson, sent here by Aberdeen, to communicate with some principal people of Brussels and its neighbourhood. The part scored under I do not think likely to be true; because we should probably have heard it, if correct, from some of the Prince of Orange's correspondents at Breda; especially as Mr. Johnson's informant writes from that place on the 26th, and D'Yoog's Report (sent with my public despatches) is dated from the same place on the 27th. The remainder of the intelligence is not improbable. "*Les avant postes de M. de Kleist ont poussé jusqu'à Namur.* Un officier de la marine Hollandaise, échappé de France, a traversé le Hainault depuis Tournay jusqu'à Halle, sans rencontrer un seul Français armé. A Bruxelles il n'y avait personne. A Louvain, la garnison n'excédait pas mille hommes: ce qui se trouvait à Malines n'allait guères jusqu'à 1,500: et 4,000 commandés par le Général Maison se portaient sur Anvers. Il y a eu des mouvements à Arras. Les forêts d'Artois sont remplis de conscrits réfractaires, qui ont constamment repoussé les detachemens envoyés contre eux."

I have requested Gordon, to whom Johnson's Note is addressed, to endeavour to open a communication with these *conscrits* for the purpose, if possible, of furnishing them with arms, &c. Mr. Johnson adds that there also do not seem to have been any disturbances at Bruxelles; that the insurrection of Arras extends to Lille; and that nothing was known at Rotterdam of the disturbances at Ghent.

There is a report here of a victory obtained by Blücher near Chalons sur Marne; it is, however, a mere report, at least at present unauthenticated by anything like official information. If true, such a victory would be invaluable.

Monsieur arrived here the night before last, as Comte de Ponthieu, and dined yesterday with his Royal Highness the Duke of Clarence, at his Royal Highness the Prince of Orange's. I had asked him to dine with me to-day, but he has proceeded on his journey towards Switzerland.

M. Fagel mentioned to me privately to-day that the Prince of Orange, in speaking to him of the projected marriage, seemed to think that it would be necessary that some instructions should be sent on his part to his Ambassador in London, for the purpose of making a formal demand. I begged M. Fagel to prevent this from being done, till the sentiments of the British Government should be taken upon this subject; that, no doubt, if the Prince Regent thought such a step necessary, he would have taken means to have it suggested to this Government; and that this matter had surely be better left entirely to his management. To this M. Fagel assented, and has since acquainted me that he has again conversed with the Prince of Orange on the point, and that his Royal Highness has assured him that he has no other thought than, in all things relating to this matter, to follow the wishes of the Prince Regent.

Your private letter to me of the 21st inst. has never reached me, and the only way in which I became acquainted with its existence has been by finding a paper purporting to be a copy of it in a despatch sent here from the Foreign Office, under a flying seal, addressed to Lord Castlereagh. As the subject of it is of much importance, you may probably think it necessary to make inquiry for it, and to have it forwarded.

Yours, &c., CLANCARTY.

[Enclosure.]

M. de Hogendorp to Lord Clancarty.

La Haye, le 28 Janvier, 1814.

M. de Hogendorp présente ses complimens à Monsieur le Comte de Clancarty, et prend la liberté de lui faire passer

une Notice sur quelques vaisseaux confisqués en le priant d'en prendre une lecture préalable, afin d'en faire le sujet d'une conversation ultérieure.

C'est dans le même dessein que M. de Hogendorp fait passer à son Excellence un autre Mémoire sur des négociations et des hypothèques dans les Iles Danoises. Par ce moyen il sera plus facile à M. Hogendorp de traiter ces matières avec son Excellence, lorsqu'elle voudra bien avoir la bonté de passer quelques instans chez lui.

M. de Hogendorp garde encore la chambre. Cependant il aura chez lui la Constitution à une heure à midi. Il a appointé M. de Düve. Au reste il est aujourd'hui ou demain aux service de son Excellence toutes les fois que la service de son Altesse Royale n'occupe pas impérieusement tous ses momens pour des objets d'une importance majeure.

Il regrette infiniment que son indisposition l'ait privé si long temps de la conversation de Monsieur l'Ambassadeur et de la connaissance de Miladi son épouse.

De son Excellence le très humble
et très obéissant Serviteur,
CHARLES DE HOGENDORP.

[Enclosure in M. de Hogendorp's Note.]

Statement respecting Dutch Vessels under the Prussian Flag laid under embargo in Spring, 1806.

Fifty or sixty Dutch vessels from Holland, and for the greatest part from Gröningen, under a simulated Prussian flag, arrived in London in the spring of 1806, with cargoes of oats, corn, and other stores, which were delivered there conformably to the orders of the masters.

These vessels were all laid under embargo by the English Government at the end of the month of March or the beginning of April in the same year, in consequence of the suspicion that the Prussian Government would choose the French side, and with permission nevertheless to the masters of the said ships to

return to their country, provided a sufficient security for the value of these ships were given. A certain part of these vessels, (fifteen or twenty in number) whereof the owners were known in England, and who could therefore get credit to give the said caution, availed themselves of it immediately, and sailed away; but the masters of the forty remaining, who were themselves the owners, for want of connexions in foreign countries, and whose knowledge of navigation was confined to that of the narrow seas, unable to obtain securities, were, in consequence, obliged to remain.

War with Prussia broke out, and eighteen or twenty of those ships were condemned and sold. Meanwhile, Prussia again changed her political system, and united herself to the cause of Great Britain. In consequence, the vessels not yet condemned were liberated from embargo, so that the captains remained in possession of them, and obtained leave to depart, while the securities for the first mentioned fifteen or twenty vessels were left free from suit or other proceedings.

The unfortunate situation of those owners, whose ships (eighteen or twenty in number) were condemned for want of giving security, is sufficiently obvious; whereas those who obtained proper securities, and those whose turn to have suits instituted against them would have come later, were released without difficulty or loss.

This misfortune falls upon men, inhabitants of Gröningen, whose constant traffic is with England, to which they carry stores and other produce from Holland, and who, by industry and economy from their youth, have become proprietors of these vessels, who are totally ruined by the loss of them, and whose numerous families are plunged into abject poverty. This kind of coasting trade with small vessels, worked by two, three, or four hands of the captain's family, was the support of almost a whole village: by their losses its existence is almost annihilated.

The assertion that these vessels were Prussian vessels, on account of their papers, and that the Prussian Government

ought to take this affair upon itself, cannot be made applicable to them. No; they were true Dutchmen by birth, and from ancient times inhabitants of the province of Gröningen, and who, as such, being comprehended in the unhappy war, could not go to England without a simulated flag, with which they have served England many years. These facts are as well known in England as they are here—that they were Dutch vessels with a simulated flag.

M. de Hogendorp to Lord Clancarty.

The Hague, January 29, 1814.

My Lord—The first lines I write with my sick hand are addressed to your lordship, in order to express to you my gratitude for the most agreeable communications you have given me just now. I shall immediately transmit all your papers to his Royal Highness; but meanwhile I expect his orders, I cannot bear to remain silent, nor to shut up in my heart my admiration for the loyal sentiments of the Prince Regent and his Ministers—I am not now speaking to the Ambassador, but to the Earl of Clancarty, who settled with me this business like a friend and a brother.

I have the honour to be, &c., HOGENDORP.

Lord Castlereagh to M. Gremoens (Berne).

Langres, January 29, 1814.

Sir—Your letter of the 15th of October last, addressed to the Prince Regent, has been received and laid before his Royal Highness.—I am commanded to convey to you and to those of your countrymen in whose name you addressed his Royal Highness, the expression of his Royal Highness's satisfaction at the patriotic sentiments contained in that communication, and I am charged to assure you that his Royal Highness will always take the warmest interest in everything that may contribute to the welfare, the happiness, and real independence, of the Swiss nation.

I have great pleasure in being the instrument of acquainting you with these sentiments on the part of the Prince Regent.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Count Zeppelin.

Langres, January 30, 1814.

The Undersigned, his Britannic Majesty's principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Count Zeppelin's letter of December 26, 1813, and to acquaint him that it was laid before the Prince Regent as soon as it arrived in England.

Lord Castlereagh has received his Royal Highness's commands to inform Count Zeppelin of the sincere satisfaction which his Royal Highness feels in returning to the ancient relations of amity with his Royal Highness the King of Wirtemberg, for whose person he cannot fail to entertain that regard which the recollection of former connexion, as well as the ties of blood which unite the two families, naturally excite.

The Undersigned is charged to assure Count Zeppelin that, whenever a person furnished with the regular credentials shall be despatched from the Court of Stutgard to that of London, he shall be received as the accredited Minister of his Royal Highness the King of Wirtemberg, and his Royal Highness will then be ready, on his part, to direct a person to proceed to Stutgard, duly authorized to act in a similar capacity.

Lord Castlereagh begs to offer to Count Zeppelin his congratulations upon the restoration of amity between their respective countries, and to assure him of his high consideration.

CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to H.R.H. the Prince Regent.

Langres, January 30, 1814.

Sir—As your Royal Highness commanded me to write to you, if anything occurred that was not of an official nature, I

take the liberty of stating that the Emperor of Russia, very early in my first audience, adverted to his wish to visit England, and to his satisfaction at the invitation he considered himself as having received from your Royal Highness. I assured his Imperial Majesty that it was a subject on which I had often heard your Royal Highness express the strongest solicitude, and that his Imperial Majesty might be assured of the warmest reception from your Royal Highness and the nation. I have not the smallest doubt, from the manner in which the Emperor touched the subject, that it is his determination to execute this purpose.

The Emperor then stated to me that the Archduchess Catherine had a very earnest desire also to see England, and his Imperial Majesty asked me if I saw any objection to her undertaking this excursion. I ventured to assure his Imperial Majesty that I was confident any branch of his family would experience from your Royal Highness the most cordial reception. The Emperor said he should speak to me again on this subject.

Count Münster arrived here yesterday. I think he is not looking well. He seems satisfied with his interview with the Chancellor Hardenberg on your Royal Highness's Hanoverian affairs.

I should have earlier stated to your Royal Highness that the Emperor of Russia received with expressions of strong interest the notification of the Princess Charlotte's marriage, and seemed fully to approve of the intended regulation of the succession.

Upon public affairs here I can add nothing worthy of your Royal Highness's notice, which I have not detailed to Lord Liverpool.

The head-quarters were moved from hence yesterday to Chaumont. The enemy are moving in considerable force on the side of Vitry and Bar-le-Duc. An intercepted letter from Berthier states Buonaparte to be with the army, which he says is both "belle et bonne;" and that they are moving upon the

enemy's communications. Prince Schwarzenberg is concentrating, and an affair is expected.

I saw the Russian cavalry of the guard defile through this town yesterday: it is impossible to say too much of their appearance. Indeed, the whole composition of the Russian Guards of all arms is at this moment the most splendid that can be imagined. They muster above 30,000 effectives. In addition to all his active armies on this side of the Russian frontier, his Imperial Majesty stated to me that Prince Labanoff's army of reserve on the Vistula was, at this moment, 110,000 strong, of which 19,000 was cavalry, and that he had 180,000 recruits in his depôts in progress of discipline. It is a most formidable military power.

I am, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool.

Langres, January 30, 1814.

My dear Liverpool—I have not many minutes to write to you with unreserve. I think our greatest danger at present is from the *chevalresque* tone in which the Emperor Alexander is disposed to push the war. He has a *personal* feeling about Paris, distinct from all political or military combinations. He seems to seek for the occasion of entering with his magnificent guards the enemy's capital, probably to display, in his clemency and forbearance, a contrast to that desolation to which his own was devoted. The idea that a rapid negociation might disappoint this hope added to his impatience. I hope that this is abated, and that we may not suffer from his precipitancy. Our decision of yesterday has calmed his temper, and given general satisfaction.

You may estimate some of the hazards to which affairs are exposed here, when one of the leading monarchs, in his first interview, told me that he had no confidence in his own Minister, and still less in that of his ally. There is much intrigue, and more fear of it. Russia distrusts Austria about

Saxony; and Austria dreads Russia about Poland, especially if she is mistress of the question after a peace. I have got some length with both the parties upon this subject, and I shall try to deliver them from their mutual alarms. Suspicion is the prevailing temper of the Emperor, and Metternich's character furnishes constant food for the *intriguants* to work upon. I shall write further without delay. Possibly you may hear from me by Calais. Unless France is condescending to an incredible degree, the discussions, if they proceed, cannot speedily end. The subject is extended. I am afraid pending negociations are likely to give an advantage to Jacobinical and military intriguers over the more honest sentiment of the nation. The people quiet everywhere, and good-humoured. They look to the invasion as favourable to peace. They spoke freely against Buonaparte to me on the journey; but I traced little disposition to an effort, and no apparent interest about the old family.

A letter from Berthier, dated the 27th from Vitry, (or St. Dizier) has been intercepted, which, says Buonaparte is advancing with "*une belle et bonne armée sur les derrières de l'ennemi.*" Blücher, by a dash in advance of our own line, has opened Nancy too much. The enclosed is from the Austrian Resident at his head-quarters. He is a true hero, but he may sometimes err. A retreat now would be very inconvenient. I am confident our advantages are solid with management; but we must not undervalue our difficulties, with a line of waggons rolling day and night in our rear, from Berlin, Bohemia, and Hungary, which a small corps of cavalry thrown round our flanks might at once arrest, if strength is thrown too rapidly in advance.

I thought the negociation might have been put upon a short issue. It is difficult in itself. Russia leans to delay. I have no notion Buonaparte would or could, as things yet stand, yield to the latest demand; and, if peace is impracticable, we should be better rid of our plenipotentiaries.

It is right you should know my channels about Bernadotte. They were Russian as well as Austrian; and could not take the alarm without some cause. The Emperor attacked Charles in a good-humoured manner as to my informants. Charles[1] admitted he was *one*, and that he had heard it from his own people. His Imperial Majesty expressed himself, *even* to him, that he did not consider the Bourbons as the most worthy. On the other hand, Noailles and the emigrants here say the Emperor *has* given them encouragement, promised them not to make peace, and only desired they might not hoist the white cockade within the Allied positions. The Emperor told me, on the contrary, that he had given them no encouragement; and, from the marked approbation he expressed of *your* having given them none, I must suppose that this is the fact. The enclosed extract will show you what Bernadotte's language is.

I have found nothing but good-humour and co-operation from our Minister here. I have determined to use them as a commission, and go myself to Chatillon to set them a-going. None of the Chiefs here appear, and I think it is better to be in reserve. I hope to incorporate them sufficiently whilst I stay, to make them more available than a new tool, too sharp or too blunt for our purpose. CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Bathurst.

Langres, January 30, 1814.

My Lord—I have the honour to transmit to your lordship, to be laid before his Royal Highness the Prince Regent, copies of a correspondence which has taken place upon the subject of the maritime question.

His Royal Highness will perceive thereby that the Allied Sovereigns adhere to the determination which they had previously declared of not permitting that question to be mixed up with any negociation which may take place.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

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[1] The present Marquess of Londonderry.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Cathcart and Sir Charles Stewart.

Langres, January 31, 1814.

My Lord—The Allied Sovereigns having agreed to open preliminary Conferences with the French Government at Chatillon, with a view of concluding, if possible, in conjunction with their Allies, a general peace upon just, solid, and honourable terms, and the Austrian, Russian, and Prussian Plenipotentiaries having received instructions to assemble there on the 3d of February next ensuing, I am to acquaint your lordship that the Prince Regent, acting in the name and on the behalf of his Majesty, has thought fit that Great Britain should be represented in the said Conferences by a Commission to be composed of the King's diplomatic servants, accredited to the three Allied Courts.

I am, therefore, commanded to signify to your lordship the Prince Regent's pleasure, after making a suitable explanation to his Imperial Majesty of the orders you have received, that your lordship do repair to Chatillon on the day above named, there to receive from me your full powers, and the necessary instructions for the direction of your conduct.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Cathcart.

Langres, January 31 [1814].

My dear Lord—When you receive an order from the Prince Regent, and know that the decision of your *own* Government is that the negociation should be conducted by the Ministers accredited to the respective Courts, and not by the Minister residing at any *one*, it is unnecessary for me to enter into arguments upon the propriety of this decision, or to learn from your lordship what the decision of OTHER Courts has been as to the conduct of their affairs.

I hope you will not suppose that I misunderstand the

military zeal which prompts the remonstrance on your part; but, as I cannot consider your diplomatic duties to be subservient to the military duty of reporting on the operations of the field, and as I know you will always discharge, with perfect good-humour and cordiality, any task not unbecoming your situation which is cast upon you, although less pleasant to your own feelings, I certainly cannot consider it consistent with my duty to supersede an arrangement made upon full deliberation, and of which I should have apprised your lordship when here, had not other subjects, accompanied by some doubts as to the propriety of acting in person, induced me to delay it. Having been engaged with the Ministers here all day, I have very reluctantly been obliged to detain your Cossack.

Many thanks for your obliging attention in providing a quarter for me at Chaumont. I shall take care of yours at Chatillon; I have determined to go there from hence direct. Pray send the enclosed order to Charles on the same subject I have addressed you. I rejoice to hear Blücher has given Buonaparte a *coup de patte*. Bülow and Graham have not been idle on the side of Antwerp.

In haste, my dear Lord, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Sir Charles Stewart.

Langres, January 31, [1814.]

My dearest Charles—I send you your orders for Chatillon. As I have no notion of diplomatists, more than soldiers, giving themselves orders or drawing their notions of what is right from the *wisdom* of other Governments than their own, I have returned Lord Cathcart a good-humoured critique upon his letter, and an official order to repair to Chatillon. You have both had fighting enough to satisfy reasonable appetites, and I cannot suffer either of you to forget, whilst I am in charge of the King's affairs, that you can have no *duties* or *preferences*

paramount to the discharge of your diplomatic functions, in such manner as your own Government thinks fit to direct.

Graham and Bülow have beat the enemy near Antwerp, and invested the place. The Saxons, I believe, are marching on Brussels. Hardenberg has not yet sent me the report.

I long to hear from you. Fix with Burghersh and all the scouts to send us their reports to Chatillon, from whence my messengers will convey them by Calais to England.

Your news last night was the first. Metternich carried your letter to *his Emperor*.

God bless you. C.

I shall go to Chatillon direct from hence. I send to-morrow about quarters, and shall take care of yours.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

The Hague, January 31, 1814.

My dear Lord.—The enclosures herewith sent will put you in possession of all the information I have to communicate respecting the proceedings of this mission since I last wrote. The first is a private note from M. Hogendorp, after receiving the notification I was desired to make of the despatch respecting the permission of the Dutch to trade with their former Colonies, a copy of which has been already sent you from the Foreign Office. I merely transmit the note, that you may see the manner in which this boon of our Government has been received here.

My last despatches were numbered 26 and 27. The draft of No. 26, with copies of its enclosures, the one notifying the capture of Bois-le-Duc, I send. By information since received, however, it appears that, instead of 50, 154 pieces of cannon were found in the citadel, and 60,000 lb of gunpowder. I do not send you the draft of No. 27; it related merely to a conversation with his Royal Highness the Prince of Orange, in which he notified to me his intention of accepting an invitation

of the inhabitants of Amsterdam to visit that town, and occasionally to reside some part of each year there; and acquainted your lordship, for the information of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent, with the arrival of the Duke of Clarence at the Hague. The third enclosure is my private letter to Lord Liverpool, dated the 29th, the same day with the despatches, and containing two enclosures respecting a solicited indulgence for the liberation of some Dutch vessels which had been seized in England as Prussian, but which had in fact gone with simulated papers. The fourth, which contains three enclosures, was written this morning, and is a private letter to Lord Liverpool, giving him an account of all the information which had reached me since the day before yesterday. Its enclosures are a copy of General Bülow's proclamation to the people of Belgium; the second is a report of D'Yoog's, of the 29th, from which you will perceive that Tirlemont is in possession of the Allies, and that there are good hopes that Louvain, and some that even Gorcum, will speedily be so, which is also fortified by a report of D'Yoog's of the 30th, also transmitted. I cannot but regret, and sincerely believe Sir Thomas Graham likewise regrets, that the movement of the Prussian and British force in combination upon Antwerp, intended to have taken place on the 25th, has been postponed. My private letter to Liverpool, forming the fourth enclosure, will acquaint you with the nature of the movement (as far as I am informed of it) now in operation; and, though I wish it, or any other movement in advance, had taken place before, I have little doubt that it will now be equally successful, and only regret the time which has been lost, and the greater difficulty the army will be put to on account of the rapid thaw, which must necessarily render the roads difficult.

God bless you! We are all well, and all extremely anxious to hear from you at Paris.

Yours most affectionately, CLANCARTY.

[Enclosure.]

Lord Clancarty to Lord Liverpool.

The Hague, January 31, 1814.

My dear Lord—The gale of wind which suddenly came on the night before last night, placed one of our packets, (the Lord Nelson) which was anchored off Scheveling, waiting for our despatches, in considerable danger: upon the weather, however, growing more moderate yesterday evening, she was enabled to put out to sea; but it was found impossible to embark our despatches.

I avail myself of this circumstance to send you what information has occurred since my last, either *viâ* Scheveling, if the Lord Nelson should again put in there, before the bearer of this should arrive there; or by Helvoet, should this not take place.

Mr. Gordon yesterday saw a person who has just arrived from the French frontier; he passed through Macdonald's army on the French side of Namur, which was retiring towards the old frontier. He states himself afterwards to have passed through Namur, where there were no French troops, much confusion, and expectation of those of the Allies, and several of the principal inhabitants leaving the place; and that, a few miles on this side, he met with several Cossack parties. He also states that the troops composing Macdonald's force do not exceed 4,000 men. Should this intelligence be correct, two observations on it arise: first, that the words scored under in my last seem to convey more of truth than, when they were written, I had conceived; and secondly, if Macdonald's force is reduced so low as represented, it is to be presumed that he has left large garrisons in the places occupied by the French in his rear.

Sir T. Graham writes me word from Oudenbosch, on the 28th, that General Bülow will probably begin his movement in two or three days hence; but that Sir Thomas Graham was still unapprised whether he would join the British, so as to

make an immediate attempt upon Antwerp; that this would probably depend upon the report of General Borstel, who was to advance on Lier; that if General Borstel should require support, Bülow would move up, for the purpose of aiding him to return on Antwerp, as soon as he should find himself enabled so to do; that, in the meantime, he, Sir Thomas Graham, should take a more advanced position towards Calmhout, and there wait till Bülow should be ready to act against Antwerp.

I send you herewith enclosed a copy of General Bülow's Address to the inhabitants of Belgium.

The Prince of Orange has sent me an extract of a letter from Breda, of the 28th. I should conceive the intelligence to proceed from M. de Nyvelt, whom I mentioned in my last. If true, and I see no reason to disbelieve it, it is most interesting.

"Il est arrivé aujourd'hui un officier du grand quartier, général de Bâsle, qui apporte la nouvelle certaine, que les Alliés sont entrés dans Langres, et que l'ennemi a abandonné cette position avec tant de précipitation qu'il a laissé au pouvoir des Alliés douze pièces de canon. Tout étoit également occupé par eux. Le Général Blücher étoit a Nancy. Le Major Helwig avec ses troupes légères est entré à St. Tron et à Herfeldt et menaçoit Louvain et Bruxelles."

Yours, &c., CLANCARTY.

The Honourable Sir Charles Stewart to Lord Castlereagh.

Chaumont, January 31, 1814.

My Lord—The enclosed Report, which I have the honour to transmit, will give your lordship a much more detailed and able account of Marshal Blücher's action than I was enabled yesterday to send.

On my joining the Marshal this morning at Grannes, I found him occupying a very advantageous position; his left on that village and the Aube river, and his right at Maison, which was occupied by the Prince Royal of Wirtemberg. The enemy

showed themselves with their right at Dieuville, their centre about Laroutière, and their left extending towards Saulain. In the middle of the day, they appeared to be collecting on their centre, and their first movements indicated an attempt on Trannes and Marshal Blücher's position. But later it became evident, by an advance of a considerable body of cavalry, and the filing of troops to their right, that they had another object, and the demonstration was made to cover it.

The country being unfavourable for ascertaining with precision their movements, and the reports of the patroles and light corps not having come in, I am only enabled to give your lordship my own opinion that Bonaparte is marching his forces back to Vitry or Troyes; the latter I think most probable.

By the intercepted letter from Berthier, sent in by General Yerbatoff, it appears evidently to have been the first plan to fall back upon the right of the Allies, where they were supposed to be weak, to get round their flank, and to act upon our communications and our rear. Another useful lesson received by Napoleon at Brienne added possibly to the report of General York's corps at St. Dizier, and Wittgenstein's moving from Joinville, evinced the certain failure of such a proceeding, if persevered in, as Bonaparte would to-day have found himself between three corps, and to-morrow the whole Allied army would be united in the environs of Brienne. I am inclined therefore to believe that Napoleon has wisely made use of yesterday and to-day to draw off his forces; as Mortier's corps, which was the only one detached from him in the action of the 20th, was stationed at Troyes, I consider it likely that he has united himself in that direction; and the opinion I have already given to your lordship of the improbability of Napoleon risking a general action, surrounded as he infallibly would have been, if he remained on his ground to-morrow, seems to be confirmed. The road from Brienne towards Troyes has been broken up, and the bridge at Lismont destroyed by General Yerbatoff's partisan corps; but I doubt if it will create delay.

Count Pahlen, with all his cavalry, made a movement from Blücher's position to-day, to the right, to join Count Wittgenstein: this probably operated to accelerate the enemy's withdrawing from their left. The corps of the Allied army are this night posted as follows: General Sacken's and a division of Count Langeron's, under Lanskoi, Otterfief, Yerbatoff, and the Prince Royal of Wirtemberg, in position near Trannes and Maison; Marshal Blücher having his head-quarters at Arsonville. I average the Marshal's force above stated at 35,000 men.

General Wrede, with the Bavarians, about 28,000, is arrived at Doulevent; General Giulay, about 18,000, is at Bar sur Aube; General Colloredo, with 21,000, on the road from Trannes towards Troyes; Count Wittgenstein at or near Vassy, stated at 15,000; General York at St. Dizier, 20,000; the reserves of Russian and Prussian grenadiers and guards, about 35,000 men. Thus, from 160 to 190,000 men might be concentrated on the enemy to-morrow. General Kleist's corps, not included, is arrived at St. Michel, and General Winzingerode is following.

I understand the whole of the force engaged on the 29th were of the Guards. Marshal Blücher averages his loss at not more than 7 or 800; the enemy's was very heavy. Your lordship will not fail to have remarked the immense superiority in number of the latter. Marshal Victor is said to have lost his arm. Napoleon encouraged his troops, and exposed his person considerably during the combat. Marshal Blücher's movement of his cavalry, which he led himself, is spoken of in the highest terms.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CHARLES STEWART.

Lord Bathurst to Lord Wellington.

Downing Street, February 1, 1814.

My dear Lord—I have received your letters of the 16th ult. Previous to Lord Castlereagh's departure, he assured the Spa-

nish ambassador that the Spanish interests would not be neglected, and that a communication would be made to him before anything definitive was arranged. The recognition of Ferdinand VII. is, your lordship knows, one of the Articles to be insisted upon in the basis of any Treaty. I entirely agree with you in thinking that the punishment or pardon of the adherents to Joseph must be the act of Ferdinand, at the head of his Government in Spain, not the subject of negociation with the Allies. It must be left also to the Spanish Government to decide whether any or what sum of money shall be allowed to Charles. It must be left to them to decide whether they will give him the allowance, with liberty to reside where he likes, or subject to any condition as to residence in a foreign country, or in his own. I will, however, forward a copy of your lordship's letter to Lord Castlereagh, to call his attention more particularly to this subject.

I am afraid that the Anti-jacobin party, by delaying to alter the Regency until the powers of the Cortes are verified, may lose a favourable opportunity, which they will not recover. For the sake of strengthening it, I should be much for joining with the party of the Princess of the Brazils, if it were not for the sound objection made by your brother that the time when Ferdinand may be expected to be restored by a general peace will probably not be much prolonged; and her assumption of power under these circumstances would be attended with much embarrassment.

I am, &c., BATHURST.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Clancarty.

Langres, February 1, 1814.

My Lord—I lost no time, upon my arrival at head-quarters, in calling the attention of the Allies to the situation of the departments bordering upon Holland; and, finding that the three Powers, on their advance into France, had made a sort of

re-partition of the country among themselves in military occupation, I thought I could not make a more advantageous proposition in favour of the Prince of Orange, than to claim that his Royal Highness, as Sovereign of the United Provinces, should have a suitable portion of the Netherlands, when occupied, assigned to him.

I confidentially consulted Baron de Stein, who is at the head of the Central Administration, on this subject. The Baron entered fully into my views; and I enclose a copy of a private Note from him, suggesting certain departments, which he conceived might form a suitable temporary occupation for his Royal Highness.

I have not yet received any official answer from the Allies; but, as their Ministers have, in conversation, acceded to the principle of my Note, I think you may safely encourage the Prince of Orange to instruct his Minister here to press his claims in this shape; and perhaps a communication had with Bülow on the spot might accelerate matters, as the supply of his army would be rendered the more certain, were the administration placed in the hands of permanent officers, under a military head.

With respect to political connexions, although no adjudication of new territory can take place till a peace, I see no reason why the Prince of Orange should not, by emissaries, or other means, quietly encourage the people of the Low Countries to look to him as their future Sovereign—as far as the Meuse, I think he is quite safe.

Prince Metternich and Count Nesselrode seemed to see no difficulty in M. de Spaen being received in the Central Committee.

You will consider Baron de Stein's communication as altogether confidential; but you are at liberty to state the whole to the Prince of Orange and his Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Sir Henry Parnell, Bart., to Lord Castlereagh.

Emo Park, Emo, February 1, 1814.

My dear Lord—I am sure you will not require any apology from me for writing to you, when you learn the object of my letter.

Being in Dublin last week, I met one of the best informed of the Catholics, who told me that the Bishops have had under their consideration the expediency of a Concordat with the Pope, for obtaining a strictly domestic nomination, and that they were willing to propose such a measure to him. As it appeared to me that their readiness to take such a step might be turned to great advantage, if communicated to you in an authentic manner, I called on Dr. Troy, and asked him if what I had heard was true. He informed me it was. I then proposed to him that I should renew my question to him by letter, in order that he might have an opportunity of stating, under his hand, in reply, what the Bishops were willing to agree to; telling him at the same time that I wished to send his answer to you. He acceded to my proposal, and approved fully of my writing to you. The letter which I now send you he wrote to me, in answer to mine. I agreed with him that what passed between us should not be communicated to any one on his part, and only to you on my part, and that I would particularly request you to consider my communication to you as private and confidential, to be made such use of as, in your discretion, might appear most serviceable to the Catholic cause.

I feel quite confident, from all that I have been able to find out in respect to this plan of a domestic nomination, that, if a negociation can by any means be set on foot with the Pope, there will be no difficulty in securing his consent to the proposed Concordat; and I should hope that such a measure would be quite satisfactory to the advocates of securities, as it will effectually provide against foreign influence.

If an arrangement of this kind can be made, the Catholic Board will at once approve of it. They have repeatedly declared they feel themselves bound not to meddle with any plan of security against foreign influence which shall be wholly ecclesiastical. Dr. Troy told me he felt no doubt of their implicit obedience to the Bishops. They begin, I think, at last to be sensible of the folly of their late conduct; and if Mr. Grattan will concede something to them in regard to the form and principle of framing the civil regulations of his Bill, I believe they will not do any more mischief.

Believe me yours most faithfully,

H. PARNELL.

[Enclosure in Sir H. Parnell's.]

The Rev. Dr. Troy to Sir Henry Parnell, Bart.

3, Cavendish Row, Rutland Square,
January 28, 1814.

My dear Sir—Your obliging letter of the 25th inst. is an additional proof of your patriotic endeavours to promote the happiness of Ireland, by removing the obstacles to the cordial union of all Irishmen.

Amongst these obstacles, a principal one is that, in the appointment of Catholic Bishops in Ireland, a foreign influence hostile to the constitutional Government of these kingdoms is supposed to be exercised: you, therefore, wish to know whether such an arrangement on the subject may not be devised as would render the nomination of Catholic Bishops in Ireland strictly *domestic*, and effectually remove even the apprehension of any foreign influence.

Before I answer this question, I must observe that, the Pope being supreme Pastor and head of the Catholic Church, he cannot surrender, or be deprived of his right of granting canonical institution to persons nominated, or postulated, for Bishoprics; which right he exercises in all parts of Christendom, whatever be their respective constitution or form of civil

government. I must likewise observe, that the nomination of Catholic Bishops in Ireland is, and has been, for a long time, *de facto*, purely *domestic*, as the Pope does not grant canonical institution to any but native Irishmen previously named, recommended, and postulated by the existing respective provincial Bishops of Ireland, or the clergy of the vacant diocese.

But, although this be notoriously the present general practice with respect to Ireland, the Alarmist will ask—Does not the Pope enjoy the abstract right of controlling it, and of granting canonical institution to whomsoever he pleases?—Allowing this abstract right, which he never exercises, except in his own temporal States, is it not most improbable that he will ever deviate from the established practice, or from the uniform conduct of his predecessors, during so many years, in granting canonical institution to Irish Catholic Bishops?

Nevertheless, the Alarmist may reply, and ask again, Is it not, at least, possible that his successor or successors may deviate from the practice; and is it not the duty of every wise Government to guard against such a contingency, and even the *possibility* of foreign influence?

In Catholic States, the exercise of the Pope's acknowledged right to grant canonical institution is regulated by Concordats, or agreements between him and the respective Catholic Sovereigns, by which they, as patrons and protectors of the Catholic Church, are privileged, under specified conditions, to nominate to Bishoprics.

Although such privilege cannot be granted to a Protestant or non-Catholic Sovereign or State, a Concordat, or agreement, between his Majesty of the United Kingdom and his Holiness might be entered into, whereby the present mode of nominating, recommending, and postulating, to Bishoprics in Ireland by the respective Catholic provincial Bishops or clergy of the vacant diocese would be confirmed, and the nomination rendered

in all future times completely domestic, precluding the possibility of any foreign influence.

I am confident the Pope would sanction such a Concordat, or agreement; nor will the Catholic Bishops of Ireland refuse their co-operation to effect it.

The Pope will probably depute a Nuncio, or other Minister, to the expected Congress on the Continent to negociate a peace. As Lord Castlereagh will be a principal member of it, his lordship will have an opportunity of conferring with the Nuncio, and of ascertaining by his means whether his Holiness is disposed to sanction and ratify the present mode of domestic nomination to Bishoprics in Ireland.

Should you write to Lord Castlereagh, I pray you to present my humble respects to his lordship.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

J. T. Troy.

Mr. William Hamilton to Lord Castlereagh.

Foreign Office, February 1, 1814.

My dear Lord—I have nothing to add to the communications to you from others contained in this bag; but that some embarrassment and delay have been occasioned by the fourth Article of the Treaty with Denmark, which stipulates that the Colonies shall be restored on the same principles as in 1801; which, being on the most liberal and gratuitous principles towards Denmark, would, if acted upon in this instance, entail an expense of at least half a million; as, in that case, compensation was made for the public revenue and all private losses occasioned by our occupation of the Islands, &c.

It is now intended to substitute either explanatory articles, or a declaration, stating that the Colonies are *now* to be restored on the principles usually adopted on similar occasions, with a saving clause for the disposal of property and protection of persons.

I believe that Addington will be despatched to-morrow, with

the arrangement, finally adopted, copies of which will be forwarded to you.

Believe me, my dear lord, faithfully yours,

W. HAMILTON.

The Hon. Sir Charles Stewart to Lord Castlereagh.

Chateau de Brienne, February 2, 1814.

My Lord—I am gratified in being enabled to send your lordship a far better report of the results of the battle of La Routière than if I had been so fortunate as to have been myself in the field.

Colonel Lowe's detail is so satisfactory and so accurate, from his having had the advantage of being with Marshal Blücher in the advance during the whole day, that there is little in the official reports that have come in, which the Colonel has not already noticed.

I think, upon every military reasoning, and the appearance, and reports of the preceding day, Napoleon's giving battle in his position of La Routière was improbable; and this opinion I not only hazarded to your lordship, but it detained me at Chaumont yesterday to receive your orders. However, during this campaign, Napoleon has hardly, in any instance, acted on common calculation, and he seems yesterday to have drawn up his army in two lines in the great plain before La Routière, occupying the villages, and neglecting much stronger ground in his rear, about Brienne, evidently showing he means to play his last stake with desperation. He led on his young guards himself to wrest the village of La Routière from the gallant corps of Sacken. But three repeated efforts were ineffectual. All agree that the enemy fought with great intrepidity. Napoleon seems to have set his life on a die, as he exposed himself everywhere, and had his horse shot under him. He had the mortification, however, of witnessing a battery of guns of the young Guard taken close under him.

If Marshal Blücher was not long since immortalized, this

day would have crowned him in the annals of Fame. For whatever were the apprehensions entertained by many for the result of the Prince of Wirtemberg's attack on the right flank, your lordship will see, by Colonel Lowe's report, the Marshal steadily pursued that combination upon which the result of the day depended. This foresight, judgment, and decision, is done justice to by all the Allied army. The Russian artillery are spoken of in the highest terms of praise. The ground was so covered with snow, and so deep, that they were obliged to leave half their guns in the rear, and by harnessing double teams to the other half they continued to bring them forward, and get a sufficient number into action.

The Allies had about 70 or 80,000 men in the battle. The other corps of the army, which are not enumerated in the report, were not up. The enemy are supposed to have had about the same strength.

The enemy's last attack on the village of La Routière was at two o'clock this morning. Immediately after, they seem to have commenced their retreat. Passing the Aube river, they took up a very strong rear-guard position at Lesmont, with their right, and extending behind the Oise. Dispositions were made to attack it, with the corps of the Prince Royal of Wirtemberg, Wrede, and Giulay; and there was a sharp fire all this morning on this spot; but the day was so very unfavourable, and the fall of snow so excessive, that the troops could make no progress.

In the meantime, the Field Marshal Prince Schwarzenberg has made his arrangements for the pursuit of the enemy, who have retreated on Vitry, Arcis, and Troyes. The two former places are supposed to have garrisons and cannon, and Vitry is walled, with a ditch of some extent.

The Grand Army march by Troyes on Paris, and the army of Silesia by Lesmont upon Vitry, making their junction with the corps of Wittgenstein, coming from Vassy, and the corps of York from St. Dizier, which was taken,

with some guns and loss on the part of the enemy, by General York.

The great force will thus operate on the shortest line to the capital; and Marshal Blücher, sweeping round by the right, and forming a junction with the corps above stated, will annihilate all before him, and probably come in contact with the corps of Macdonald, which, it is reported, is marching to unite near Vitry. Prince Schwarzenberg's head-quarters will be to-morrow at Vendœuvres, and Marshal Blücher at Beaux le Comte.

These are the few trifling observations which it occurs to me to make to your lordship from this place to-day, in addition to sending Colonel Lowe's report. I set out this night for Chatillon to obey your lordship's orders, and I hope to arrive there early to-morrow.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CHARLES STEWART.

Mr. Edward Cooke to Lord Castlereagh.

Foreign Office, February 2, 1814.

My dear Lord—I have been quite a wretch these last three weeks, but am better again, and, as the spring comes on, hope to revive with the tulips.

We hope no embarrassments will arise on the Danish treaty; but Thornton was not aware of what took place on the restoration of the Danish possessions, in 1801. I could have also wished he had not left Kiel, as Addington is so young, and in no official situation. He tells me that Mr. Bourke did not appear aware that the articles of ceding the conquests, as drawn by Mr. Thornton, were particularly or unusually favourable to Denmark; and, as there was no original disposition to overreach, I hope they will admit a fair explanation.

Your lordship will read in the Morning Chronicle a strange account of a mission to Lord Wellington and Suchet, of a M. Viel-Castel, for the restoration of the Bourbons. The

mission is true. Viel-Castel is here, who chose to go to a Freemasons' meeting, where the Duke of Sussex was in the chair, and Perry, of the Morning Chronicle, present as a mason. Perry stated something as to an understanding between Suchet and Lord Wellington. The Duke of Sussex appealed to Viel-Castel; and he told much about the object of his mission. Perry, very like a gentleman, put the whole in his paper. I believe Suchet is nephew to the Crown Prince. Of course I do not know what Viel-Castel's instructions are, but I understand generally they are to open the Crown Prince's views as favourable to the Bourbons; and I understand the Crown Prince talks openly that he will never make peace with Buonaparte.

Your intentions as to a mission for Denmark will be wanted.

I send a letter from Lord G. Seymour. I explained to him the difficulties as to his entering a diplomatic line, as he could not be entitled to any permanent allowance till after twelve years' service. He will feel most severely the loss of his place at St. Croix, which he states at £1,200 a-year.

Buonaparte's attempt on Ferdinand VII. seems most contemptible. I lament so little appearance of greatness of mind in the Prince. The Duc de San Carlos is deemed a very weak man, fit only to be a tool and a dupe.

The public mind here continues the same as when I wrote before.

With the most anxious wishes for your lordship's success in your great undertaking, I am ever most truly and sincerely your lordship's servant,

E. Cooke.

General Don's letters give accounts of great discontents in Normandy, but not of marked resistance in the people, and that conscriptions are still going forward. His intelligence is, I fear, such only as the Prefect of St. Maloes approves.

Lord Castlereagh to the Ministers of Russia, Prussia, Austria, and Sweden.

Langres, February 3, 1814.

The Undersigned, by direction of his Court, has the honour to communicate to the Ministers of the Allied Powers copy of a despatch received from his Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at the Court of Madrid. The Allied Sovereigns will not fail to remark that this Treaty,[1] obviously null and of no effect, as well by the law of nations as by those of Spain, was signed, in breach of the known and most solemn engagements of the Spanish Government, with the captive Monarch on the 11th day of December last. The Duke of Vicenza's letter, accepting the "*bases générales et sommaires*," as stated to have been proposed through M. de St. Aignan, bearing date the 2nd of December.

The Allied Courts will not fail, on this occasion, justly to appreciate the distinguished rebuke which has been given by Spanish honour and good faith to this disgraceful attempt to impose upon an imprisoned Monarch engagements subversive of those by which his kingdom was delivered from the subjugation to which it was destined by France.

CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool.

Langres, February 3, 1814.

My dear Liverpool—I delayed my departure to receive and forward the official reports of the victory which, I trust, will yet fructify to greater results; and I am now just setting off to Chatillon. The effects of the battle cannot fail to be most advantageous in all points of view, as well in confirming the improved temper of the Allied counsels, as in dissipating much of the alarm that was felt by some of the highest military authorities in the possible embarrassment of the Allied positions.

[1] Bonaparte's Treaty with Ferdinand VII. in prison.

It is unfortunate that Knesebeck's Memoir fell into the enemy's hands. It was taken upon a courier by the peasants, passing to Blücher's army.

I dined yesterday with the Emperor of Austria, and had a long and very unreserved communication with him after we broke up. It was evident, from his Imperial Majesty's conversation, that Prince Metternich had reported to him what passed between us at Basle. The Emperor spoke very openly upon the different alternatives to which the events in progress might lead, and seemed earnestly to deprecate for his interest its taking the shape of a Regency. His Imperial Majesty spoke so unreservedly, and is in his nature so entirely above all disguise, that I am sure, with reasonable counsels as to the conduct of our interest, he will not embarrass any course of policy to which events may lead, and which can be made subservient to his main object, which is a solid, and, if possible, an early peace.

I am just returned from Prince Metternich, to whom I communicated your private letter relative to Monsieur's visit to Switzerland, mentioning at the same time that you understood he would be authorized on the part of Louis XVIII. to delare his readiness, if restored, to conclude a peace with the Allies on the basis of 1789. His observation was, "*Voilà la question bien placée, et nous verrons que la nation en dira.*"

I think these two anecdotes will satisfy you that Austria is not disposed to be unreasonable on this question, if not pushed too far or too fast.

CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord William Bentinck.

Chatillon, February 4, 1814.

My dear Lord—In proportion as Murat's support became less indispensable, one's repugnance to the arrangement in his favour has increased. I still believe, (however much I dislike

it) that, even at the moment the Treaty was made, it was both wise and necessary. The only thing that can make it palatable will be liberal arrangement for the Sicilian family. This I shall press with my utmost might; but I see numerous claimants for indemnities, great beyond the means to supply them: and, as I do not see any chance of an equivalent being procurable, their hopes ought not to be carried too high. You may possibly find the means of making Murat himself work this point, in order to secure his own title. We shall take no step towards actual peace with him, without combining our negociation on the question of indemnities with his settlement.

We are assembled here to-day, to open preliminary conferences with Caulaincourt. The four great Powers act as one interest; and, as nothing but high terms can or ought to satisfy them, in the present state of Europe, I do not feel myself authorized to check in the smallest degree your military measures.

You probably are aware of the great outline of the operations in progress. The Grand Army that entered France on the side of Switzerland, united with the Silesian army that crossed the Rhine, near Mayence, are now upon the banks of the Upper Seine, operating towards Vitry and Troyes. On the 29th ult. and 1st inst., they have had two battles, both in favour of the Allies, in which the enemy lost 70 pieces of cannon and three or four thousand prisoners. In the first, Marshal Blücher, with 25,000 men, repulsed double his force. On the latter day, the numbers were nearly equal. The enemy retires, and the Allies are advancing. Denmark has made her peace, and joins the Allies, and the Crown Prince's army is marching from the Elbe towards the Rhine. This will give you some notion of our prospect.

Ever yours, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord William Bentinck.

Chatillon, February 4, 1814.

My Lord—That your lordship may fully understand the part taken by his Majesty's Government, with relation to the negociations in which the Austrian Government has been engaged with Murat, I herewith transmit the series of correspondence on this important subject, which has taken place since the renewal of our diplomatic relations with the Court of Vienna. This subject is so familiar to your lordship in all its parts, and the principles upon which the British Government has acted are so fully detailed in the correspondence, that your lordship will be enabled to bring it under the consideration of the Court of Palermo, in the manner which will best serve to place the conduct observed by the British Government throughout these transactions in the most correct point of view.

It would have afforded the Prince Regent the truest satisfaction to have seen his Sicilian Majesty replaced on the throne of Naples by the exertions of the Allies; but there has been throughout the obvious danger that, in aiming at too much, his Sicilian Majesty might lose all; and that the Allies, in endeavouring to assert too tenaciously the interest of the Sicilian family, might sacrifice the common cause. This consideration has been the governing principle throughout; and it is one to the justice of which the Hereditary Prince himself, upon discussion with your lordship at a former period, was not insensible.

In recurring to this principle, your lordship will be enabled to satisfy his Royal Highness's mind that, if the necessity for the measure had been less pressing, from the successes of the Allies, it had hardly become less important in the great scale of the war. Murat's force, if thrown in support of the Viceroy's, must have neutralized the Austrian efforts in Italy—the deliverance of that important feature of Europe must have been postponed, if not hazarded—and the use of Marshal Belle-

garde's force altogether lost to the prosecution of the war in France itself.

Under these circumstances, there was only one honourable and prudent line to pursue—to endeavour to combine his Sicilian Majesty's interests with those of the common cause, and to secure for him a proper indemnity rather than hazard all the interests concerned.

My Note to Prince Metternich of the 27th ult. will put your lordship in possession of the steps I have already taken, on the part of my Court, to support his Sicilian Majesty's claims. I cannot hope that such a possession as Naples can be found for his Sicilian Majesty; but the British Government will support his interests cordially, and avail themselves of their existing relations with Murat to give weight to their intervention.

I shall be glad to receive from your lordship on this subject any information you conceive may assist you in furthering his Sicilian Majesty's claim to a suitable indemnity.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool.

Chatillon, February 6, 1814.

My dear Liverpool—Until we see our channels well established, I have not deemed it prudent to send you duplicates of my political letters now on their way by Holland, not having time to put them in cipher. With this precaution, you may send me any facts or instructions you deem material. The other line perhaps is still the most prudent for political communications not in cipher.

I cannot arrive at any precise idea as to the strength of the enemy's army. Schwarzenberg puts it in his paper at 120,000. Cathcart says some of the prisoners taken at Brienne called it 160,000. Caulaincourt, I have understood, states it at the latter number. They drew off from the last battle better than

was expected. Their loss in cannon was out of proportion heavy, from the state of the country,

Ever faithfully yours,

CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool.

No. 8. Chatillon, February 6, 1814.

My dear Liverpool — I have deemed it advisable to accept of the facilities of a direct intercourse; the Duke of Vicenza has undertaken to send a messenger with *mine* to see the necessary arrangements established on the road and at Calais, so that your despatches may reach me without delay.

I send you duplicates of the latest military reports; the originals of all, except the last, are gone round.

Ever faithfully yours,

CASTLEREAGH.

Lord William Bentinck to Lord Castlereagh.

Naples, February 6, 1814.

My dear Lord—In the month of December, soon after the battle of Leipsick, when the war seemed near its end, and nothing remaining to be done, but to settle, by a general peace, the future condition of the different States of Europe, I had prepared a despatch to you upon the political state of Sicily. I did not complete it, because affairs immediately took a different turn. My remarks, at least many of them, were no longer equally applicable, and the consideration of the subject not immediately necessary.

My object was to secure, if possible, to this great population the attainment of the blessings which have been placed within their reach, and which is the subject of universal desire. Their incapacity to seize this desired liberty arises from their misfortune, and not their fault, from the nature of the active and debasing tyranny under which they have lived. But I will not detain your lordship with a description of the Sicilian

character, which must be already pretty well known to you, and regarding which Mr. Graham, who is the bearer of this letter, is able to give you the fullest information.

I supposed that the peace would restore King Ferdinand to Naples. In this case, one of two things must happen: either Sicily would be reunited to Naples, when Sicilian liberty must inevitably be crushed by the superior power of Naples; or Sicily would remain independent, and its liberty would be equally endangered, either by the reunion of the Crown and the Barons, for the re-establishment of their lost rights, or from licentiousness on the part of the people. The protection of Great Britain I considered to be indispensable to the welfare of Sicily. All the Sicilians desire it; but I judge that the King would be happy to shake off this dependence, and to wreak his vengeance not only upon the constitution itself, but also upon its supporters, and upon the friends of the British alliance. It is not easy to conceive the terror universally felt at the unforgiving temper of their Majesties.

It occurred to me that the guardianship of Great Britain might still be preserved to Sicily, and might be made reconcilable both to the wishes and interests of the King, and advantageous to our own country. The idea was suggested by a declaration more than once made to me by the Queen, under different forms: 1st, that the King would have been happy to have sold Sicily to England; 2dly, that he would give it for an equivalent on the Continent. And I have no hesitation in asserting that Sicily, in the hands of Great Britain, would become in a very few years a source of wealth and strength, and, after Ireland, the brightest jewel in the British Crown. The capacity of the country exceeds all belief. It is only necessary to have seen it fully to believe all the accounts transmitted by history of its former greatness. But I affix more importance to the character that Great Britain will acquire by the successful establishment of Sicilian liberty than to the value of Sicily as a British possession. I wish Sicily

to exist as a perpetual example of the blessings of our friendship, in comparison with that of France; and, in the event of a new war, which, if Buonaparte lives, must soon recur, I would have Sicily become not only the model, but the instrument of Italian independence.

Impressed with the advantage of this idea to all parties, I took advantage of the freedom with which the Hereditary Prince encourages me to address him upon all occasions, to sound his Royal Highness's sentiments upon such an arrangement. I have unluckily left this correspondence in Sicily, but I will send it to you by the first messenger, and Mr. Graham is fully acquainted with it. I established as a principle, what I believe to be true, that Sicily could not at present stand by itself; that it would not permit its reunion with the kingdom of Naples; that a Sicilian Government alone could not preserve the island from anarchy; and that Sicily, with a free constitution, could only be successfully governed by Great Britain. I added, that I thought Sicily, in the hands of Great Britain, would be more useful to the King of Naples than in his own possession. It is not now necessary to explain this idea. I proposed that the King should receive either an equivalent in Italy, or, not obtaining that, an equivalent in money.

The Hereditary Prince negatived the proposition but feebly; and he dropped the remark that, if he had listened to it, he should not have been satisfied with the extent of the compensation proposed. I did not augur unfavourably of my proposition from the refusal, because such is the ordinary proceeding of Italian intrigue, with the view of making a better bargain. I feel confident both the King and the Prince would have eventually agreed to the offer, because it would have given them all the pecuniary advantages of the possession, without its political inconveniences. It would have ensured to them much more effectually for the future the aid and protection of Great Britain.

Murat being now seated on the throne of Naples, and the

King and Hereditary Prince being confined to Sicily, they will probably be now the first of their subjects to desire the continuance of the British protection, as well against revolutionary excesses, of which they are both dreadfully afraid, as against their dangerous neighbour. With respect to the independence of Sicily, the dear object of its people, the King and his subjects have now the same feeling and interest, and I should hope they will both be disposed to give their cordial support to that system which can alone ensure the safety of the country. But your lordship may be assured that it will be perfectly impossible to withdraw for the present the British force from the Island. All the Sicilian Ministers are unanimously of this opinion. It must require two or three years at least before the Government can take consistence, and before the new establishments, military and political, can have any force. I have avoided touching this subject with the Prince, because I would wish that the idea should originate with his Royal Highness. If the British Government should lend themselves to such an arrangement, as I most ardently desire they may, I should conceive that it might be effected without any sacrifice. A portion of force will always be allotted to the Mediterranean garrisons. A small augmentation would easily allow 5,000 men to be stationed in Sicily, retaining possession of the citadel of Messina. A new offensive and defensive alliance might be made, by which, in return for this assistance, in time of peace, and of additional protection, undefined, in case of war, Sicily, on her part, should place at the disposal of Great Britain a given number of troops.

I am anxious to know from your lordship how far I may be authorized to encourage the hope of the Sicilians that, at the general peace, they may not be deprived of the protection of Great Britain.

I remain, my dear lord, very faithfully yours,

W. C. BENTINCK.

The Hon. Sir Charles Stewart to Mr. Edward Cooke.

Chatillon, February 6, 1814.

My dear Cooke—I know you will be very eager just now, and I wish I had time to write to you as fully and as confidentially as I wish. But, as this goes by Calais, I cannot say much. However, I see no objection to send you my Minute of Conference, which, I believe, is nearly *verbatim* of what passed: as I write quick, I took all down, and Aberdeen has made his report from it. Of course, I make none; and my part puts me in mind of some play, where three conspirators stalk in, muffled up in cloaks, and sit down, and two remain very quietly on the bench, while the one who is to perform gets up and makes his speech, and stabs the King.

The two last defeats were very decided: that at Brienne, by old Blücher, most glorious, considering *his* numbers, and the superiority of the enemy. That at La Routière was of most importance, from the immense loss of cannon to the enemy. I know not why we have fewer prisoners than usual on such great days.

Bonaparte has taken up ground at Troyes. He makes front also in the countries of Vitry and Chaillons. I have no doubt what might be done, but it is difficult to pronounce what will. You will hear the Allies are moving to their left, to Bar-sur-Seine, this day. This may be changed to-morrow—*m'entendez-vous?* Nothing has appeared as yet to show he is not *de facto* what he appears. The legions still stick by him. To do them justice, they fought well the other day.

You know what chimeras are in the cauldron about C. J.: his *rémuant* spirit, aided, as it tacitly is, in a certain quarter, is not to be overlooked. Still, if we could force our own opinions and wishes by other instruments, it would be glorious. But how much do we risk! The House of Hanover is not to be slighted; and what has been sent home annexed in his own handwriting on M.'s *travail* should be well weighed. I am of

opinion, if we have entered fairly, we should prudently, but not precipitately, pursue the act of entering into Conference with him; extinguishing in some degree what would be most our object to see in a flame. I like bold measures, and hate chicane; and indeed I do not understand its depth. A part is playing here in a great quarter I don't approve: still I am silenced by superior judgment. How much I extricated our commencement and entanglement God only knows!—once in a strong degree committed, without an unexpected convulsion, how depart? It is not *sound* to do so on slight and feigned pretences. I think C. set out with this; but, I believe, your despatch from England, L. and B.'s *longings* for things as they were, have made him rather wink at what is the evident driving in another quarter. A. is for pressing; R. for holding. We are a little passive.

This is all I can say; and I hope you will make it out. I don't care how soon things are at an end here. Let me hear from you by every messenger; tell me real opinions. Will you be satisfied with old F. and B? I think we can get this: indeed, from yesterday's appearances, we have only to dictate. You may write some words in cipher, if you send by Calais.

Believe me ever most affectionately yours,

CHARLES STEWART.

Lord Castlereagh to A. Horne, Esq.

Chatillon sur Seine, February 6, 1814.

Sir—As, in the present state of the Continent, the Prince Regent is enabled to re-establish a regular diplomatic intercourse with the different States, I am to acquaint you that his Royal Highness has no further occasion for the services of persons not regularly accredited. I cannot, however, make this communication to you without adding the expression of my entire satisfaction with the zeal and activity which you have uniformly displayed in the discharge of the several duties which have been entrusted to you.

Under these circumstances, if you have any wishes of a personal nature, I have to request that you will address yourself to Mr. Cooke, at the Foreign Office in London.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Clancarty.

Chatillon sur Seine, February 8, 1814.

My Lord—I have the honour to transmit to your lordship, under a flying seal, a despatch which I have this day addressed to the Earl of Liverpool, upon the subject of the military arrangements which it may be expedient to make for the defence of Holland.

Your lordship is at liberty to take a copy of this despatch, (so far as it relates to that point) and you will use your discretion in communicating the substance of that extract to the Prince of Orange; although I have reason to believe that the sentiments of the Prince Regent's Government upon this important subject do not differ from those which I have expressed. Your communication to the Prince of Orange respecting it must be made in the strictest confidence, until you shall receive (as you probably will at an early period) more precise and definitive instructions from England.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Sir George Burgman.

Chatillon sur Seine, February 8, 1814.

Sir—I have received from Count Nesselrode, the Russian Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the official notification that his Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia has appointed M. de Gervais his commissioner for transacting all affairs connected with the Federative Paper lately established by the Allied Courts.

This gentleman has been directed by his Government to

proceed to Amsterdam, and I hereby authorize you to enter into official communication with him, on his arrival there, upon all the subjects relating to the important business with which you are charged.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Edward Thornton, Esq.

Chatillon sur Seine, February 8, 1814.

Sir—As there is reason to suppose that the Prince Royal will arrive on the Rhine, and that his army will be assembling in that quarter about the middle of the month, I deem it expedient that you should proceed, without loss of time, to his Royal Highness's head-quarters.

You will not disguise from the Prince Royal the disappointment, or rather the dissatisfaction, which was produced by his Royal Highness's movements, with the great mass of his force, to the Elbe, instead of to the Rhine, as he undertook to do when at Leipsick; the effect of which divergence from the main operation was to put the enemy in a situation to defend the Dutch fortresses and the Low Countries, which must otherwise have fallen without a blow.

You may state that your Court could have the better reconciled themselves to this departure from the understood principle upon which the campaign was to be conducted, if the necessity for it, on any grounds of Swedish policy, had been openly avowed, and if the various assurances transmitted through you, that it was not his Royal Highness's intention to carry the mass of his army to conquer Norway in Holstein, had not proved successively illusory.

Having done justice to the grounds on which your Court could not conceal their dissatisfaction, you will acquaint the Prince Royal that the British Government is not the less disposed to cultivate an intimate union with Sweden; that they rejoice in the prosperous result of his Royal Highness's campaign; that they have cheerfully made the sacrifices to Denmark

necessary to secure the cession of Norway to Sweden. With respect to the Prince Royal himself, you may assure him that they are willing to give to what is past the most favourable construction, and to concert their views, with respect to the future interests of both States, cordially with his Royal Highness.

You may state to the Prince Royal that their first wish is that his Royal Highness would actually direct the force under his orders to the reduction of the military power of the enemy; being assured that the Allies have no disposition to impose upon France any terms of peace inconsistent with the honour or interests of the French nation, fairly understood.

You may represent to his Royal Highness, with respect to the British troops in Holland, that they have already been sent as an auxiliary force, and placed under the orders of the Prince of Orange; that the composition of the force in Holland with Dutch and British, and the state of the country, yet imperfectly delivered from the enemy, preclude either for the present from being employed in distant operations; that it is hoped hereafter this army may enter upon more active service, in which case, the Prince of Orange, if his Royal Highness should take the field in person, or whoever may be placed at the head of that army, will no doubt be prepared to combine their operations in the most cordial manner with those of his Royal Highness.

With respect to the views of Great Britain and the Allies, in the prosecution of the war, the four principal Powers, acting in the spirit of the known views of the other confederate States, are engaged in preliminary discussions with the enemy, with a view of ascertaining whether France is prepared to return to a a state of possession and power consistent with the security of other States, and calculated to re-establish a just equilibrium in Europe.

With respect to the existing ruler of France, (however personally calculated to inspire distrust) these discussions have been entered upon with him: so long as he shall continue to be

recognised by the French nation in that character, these discussions will be pursued to their legitimate conclusion.

Whatever Great Britain might feel of increased confidence in signing a peace with the ancient family restored to the throne of their ancestors, it belongs not to her to excite or originate a change, which, to be stable, must be the act of the nation; and from the result of which, involving, as it must do, the personal safety of individuals, as well as the fortunes of a great nation, it is not for her to make herself responsible. So far as the British Government may be entitled, without an unbecoming interference, to express an opinion, or a wish, upon an event of such a nature, they would most strongly deprecate a recurrence, on the part of the French nation, (if Bonaparte should cease to rule) to any intermediate system, whether of Regency, or of substituting another military chief in his room.

Such a state of things would, in all human probability, be merely transitory, probably troubled, and most certainly weak. It might again divide Europe, as apparently tending to connect France too closely with one of the greater military Powers, and ultimately lead, through new convulsions, to the return of the ancient family, as the only remedy to rival and conflicting pretensions.

You may, at your discretion, open these views of this question to the Prince Royal; and I trust that, if there is to be a change, his Royal Highness, from a regard for the repose of the nation which gave him birth, would be disposed to employ his influence to give it a direction which could occasion umbrage to none of the Cabinets of Europe. Such would be the effect of the return of the Bourbons—such is likely to be the effect of Bonaparte's dreaded authority; namely, to preserve, as a defence to Europe, the system of union that has saved it.

You may state that no peace is looked to by Great Britain which does not substantially reduce France within her ancient limits, and that, to facilitate such an arrangement in favour of

the Continent, Great Britain will be disposed to act most liberally towards France, being desirous to give such a peace stability, by rendering the arrangement at once honourable to France, and such as may promote her prosperity.

You may also apprize his Royal Highness that it is the intention of the Allies to annex the Low Countries, at least as far as the Meuse, to Holland. Less of territory would be insufficent to uphold the army requisite to defend her barrier, which is indispensable for her own security and that of the North of Germany. The experience of former times sufficiently proves how feeble that line of defence must be for any country, which is held by confederates of clashing interests.

I am not aware that any further explanations are at present called for. Sweden may, as heretofore, rely upon a friendly support from Great Britain in the pending negociations: the point of Guadaloupe may make some difficulty; and it is highly satisfactory to me to know that the Prince Royal is disposed to afford facilities. It may possibly be necessary to propose some exchange on this point. The British Government will not fail, however, to use its good offices to render the concession made by them to Sweden in this instance conducive to her future interests.

In giving you authority to open yourself upon these points, you will understand that it is not meant as an injunction, but a permission. You will do it with caution, and, as far as you can, upon a previous knowledge of the system of measures in which the Prince Royal may be at the moment embarked.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

The Hague, February 8, 1814.

My dear Lord—The accompanying papers will acquaint you with all that I can inform you of since I last wrote. The draft of the despatch No. 29, sent to England by the last

packet, and the draft of that, No. 32, which will go to-morrow to your address in London, will show you that I have been obliged to have a little brush with this Government.

There is an unfortunate *besoin de faire* in his Royal Highness which is to be compared to nothing I have ever seen, except the same disposition in his Minister, M. de Hogendorp; added to which, the latter seems to be unfortunately impressed with the erroneous notion that trick and *ruse* form the principal qualifications of an accomplished Minister for Foreign Affairs, and that these are to be used equally towards those who are struggling to accomplish, as towards those who are endeavouring to counterwork, the object they may have in view.

I hope the effect of what has been endeavoured to be done through the instrumentality of the rabble in the Low Countries, will not embarrass your negociations; that you will think I have been right in the line I have taken; and that, if so, these attempts will not again be furtively made: indeed, against this I am tolerably well guarded by the information I shall receive through Mr. Johnson and others now present in those provinces.

From Graham I have heard nothing since the morning of the 4th. At that time, little effect had been perceived from the bombardment of the day before. All that Graham conveys in his note of the 4th you will find in the accompanying draft of my despatch No. 31, and at the close of my private letter to Liverpool of the 5th, both herewith sent.

Yours, my dear Lord, most affectionately,

CLANCARTY.

Since writing the above, the despatch of which I enclose a copy has reached me from Graham. He adds, in his private note to me, that he has agreed to take up a line in front of Breda, in order to assist in keeping up the line of communication with General Bülow for some time; at least, till he shall be strong enough to act alone. I understand that

it is proposed that the Saxons are to co-operate with Graham; but this, I fear, will not raise his force to the amount capable of operating offensively against Antwerp, as long as they consist only of those already advanced into the United Provinces, which, as I am informed, only reach 7,000 men.

Adieu! many thanks for your permitted perusal of your interesting despatches.

[Enclosure.]

Lord Clancarty to Lord Liverpool.

The Hague, February 5, 1814.

My dear Lord—I most sincerely congratulate you on the capitulation of Gorcum, which, now that I am informed of the outline of the terms, I the more rejoice at, in consequence of some conversation which I had on Thursday last both with M. Fagel (the Ambassador) and the Prince of Orange. The former called upon me at an early hour on that day, stating that he came to me directly from the Prince, in order to represent to me that hostilities had been renewed, after a short cessation of arms, between the troops blockading that place and the garrison of Gorcum; that the power of overflooding the whole of the rich country of the Albasser Waert was in the hands of the enemy; that an exertion of this power would ruin thousands, and necessitate advances from the State, which must necessarily cramp their exertions in the common cause, unless aided by us; that the tenacity of the garrison could only be attributed to their fear of being made prisoners of war; and that he was commissioned by the Prince to consult me on the propriety of offering terms to the garrison, by which, upon their surrender, they should be allowed to return to France.

I told M. Fagel that to admit of this would be highly objectionable; that he must be aware how anxious the Allies had shown themselves, and with great reason, to prevent the return of troops composing the garrisons of blockaded places to France, there again to make efficient head against them; that, how-

ever much it was the Prince's duty to watch over the interests of those immediately confided to his care, these interests would be best consulted by acting on the general principles of the Alliance; and that if he had a duty to perform to those immediately under his care, he had also one of a no less pressing, and in my mind more important, nature to perform to the Allies, without whose means the liberation of these countries could never have been effected or obtained.

M. Fagel seemed to enter completely into my arguments upon this subject, and, as I was just going to his Royal Highness's audience, he told me that the Prince would probably address me upon this point, and requested me to state the argument I had urged in conversation with him to his Royal Highness. Almost immediately upon my entering the room, the Prince of Orange asked me whether I had seen M. Fagel, and what the result had been. I answered by stating, among others, the arguments I had urged to M. Fagel, and the conclusion which I was of opinion ought to be drawn therefrom. He replied that, in that case, I was responsible for all the losses which might be incurred by his people, and all the damage they must sustain from the inundation, which would necessarily oblige his Treasury to make advances from his funds to indemnify the sufferers, and thereby prevent those funds from being applied in aid of the general cause. To this I observed that it was a little hard to place me thus between a double responsibility; that, in the one case, if I should admit the offer of the terms suggested to the garrison of Gorcum, his Royal Highness would ride off on my responsibility *vis-à-vis* the Allies; that, in the other case, my responsibility might also be eventually brought forward to exempt his Royal Highness from those efforts which I am sure a moment's reflection would sufficiently persuade him ought, under every circumstance, to be made by his Government for the general cause; that the Russian, the Prussian, the British Governments, had all made sacrifices sufficiently great, of which the Dutch Go-

vernment were now actually enjoying the fruits; and should it be said, or could it stand to reason, that no sacrifice whatever was to be made by the Dutch for the maintenance of their independence?

His Royal Highness said that he had no intention of placing me in a state of irksome responsibility, but of consulting with me on the expediency of a measure, and that he would not act, in this instance, in opposition to my opinion. I told him that, without caring much for responsibility in matters wherein I conceived myself at present in the right, I had no hesitation in giving it as my decided opinion to his Royal Highness that no terms ought to be offered to the commandant of Gorcum which should permit the garrison to return to France.

From what I have above written, you may judge whether it does not give me satisfaction to have heard that the garrison are to surrender prisoners of war on the 20th, and that, in the mean time, the *digues* are to be repaired.

Before the messenger who left Sir T. Graham with the note addressed to me, quoted in my despatch, quitted Merxem, which was at half-past twelve yesterday, he says that one of the great towers of the church had fallen in consequence of our fire. What credit is to be placed to this account I know not. The messenger is a Dutchman, otherwise unknown to me.

It was strongly reported at Rotterdam this morning that Buonaparte, immediately upon leaving Paris, visited the northern fortifications, and had been at Lisle. You will recollect that there have been considerable movements among the populace in these districts, on account of the conscriptions.

CLANCARTY.

Mr. Edward Thornton to Lord Castlereagh.

Chatillon sur Seine, February 8, 1814.

My Lord—I beg to transmit to your Lordship two papers which have been given to me for your Lordship by the Comte de Paoly Chaguy, who has been for some years past under the

protection of the British Government, and who receives a pension from it.

I did not promise that your lordship would read these two pieces, the first of which, however, the supposed letter of the Prince of Asturias to the King of Spain, contains some remarkable passages: but at least I acquit myself of my engagement, in transmitting them both to your lordship. They are the work of a man of considerable talents.

I remain, &c., EDWARD THORNTON.

Mr. Edward Thornton to Lord Castlereagh.

Chatillon sur Seine, February 8, 1814.

My Lord—I think it right to mention to your lordship that I have, on repeated occasions, received from the Prince Royal of Sweden the most positive assurances that in case of the negociations for peace taking a favourable turn, the cession of the island of Guadeloupe to Sweden should never, for an instant, form an obstacle to the conclusion of that desirable work, and that Sweden would readily make this sacrifice to the general good. His Royal Highness did not even make any formal demand of any equivalent, but expressed his conviction that Great Britain would estimate the merit of this sacrifice, and would not fail to give it its due consideration, in her future transactions with Sweden.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

EDWARD THORNTON.

Mr. Hamilton to Lord Castlereagh.

Foreign Office, February 8, 1814.

My dear Lord—Enclosed are copies of the despatches from Sir H. Wellesley, to the 21st instant, communicating the last proceedings of the Cortes and Regency on the mission of San Carlos and the treaty with Bonaparte. You will also see that Fernan Nuñez is named Plenipotentiary to the expected Con-

gress. He expresses himself very sorry at it, although evidently flattered by the nomination. He is in doubt what to do, whether to set out immediately, or to wait for events. Both he and his Government are afraid he should be left to be summoned by the higher Powers to attend, when all is ready for the smaller Powers, to assist and accede to the terms already agreed to; and yet he is equally fearful of not being received at all or, if received, not treated with equal confidence.

By a paragraph in the Madrid Gazette, it would seem that, since the Government arrived there, their ideas are very much raised. They seem shocked at giving to France the boundary of the Pyrenees, while they recollect how much on the north of that line has, in a succession of years, been conquered from Spain; and they add, the time is now come when it is equally necessary for the repose of Europe to strip France of the unjust conquests of Louis XIII. and XIV. as of those of Napoleon. They particularly mention the Basse Navarre and Roussillon.

Baron Wessenberg has presented a letter to Lord Liverpool, stating how much they were pleased at head-quarters by your arrival.

Lord Bathurst and Lord Liverpool feel so much the probability of Lord William Bentinck's being absent from Sicily, and the necessity of having a person of weight there, that it has been finally determined to send out A'Court with credentials to present, in that event, to remain there, on Lord W. Bentinck's coming away, until you dispose of him elsewhere: perhaps you may think of sending him hereafter to Turin. Casamajor (the eldest) has asked to be sent to Gottenburg. A civilian would be a more proper person.

Enclosed is a note from Foster, asking for Baker to be put as Secretary to the negociators with America.

Baron Jacobi asks me, on every arrival from Basle, if any thing more is heard of his letter of the 12th of October.

I have nothing more to add than that ninety-nine out of every hundred here hope that you will agree to nothing on the

other side of the water till you are at Paris, and Bonaparte either above or below ground.

Your obedient servant,

W. HAMILTON.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

The Hague, February 11, 1814.

My dear Lord—Your despatch, marked No. 2, Continent, reached me yesterday, with its three enclosures; that of the 4th of February, three days later dated, marked No. 3, arrived here the day before yesterday. My despatches to England and private letters to Lord Liverpool, which have been duly forwarded to you, will have acquainted you with what has passed here respecting his Royal Highness's attempts to raise the Pays Bas Autrichien in favour of his sovereignty, and that I had conceived it to be my duty to remonstrate against them. These have been very different from the steps you recommend should be taken by him, through the medium of "Emissaries, or other means, *quietly* to encourage the people of the Low Countries to look to him as their future sovereign;" and, besides having been undertaken without the slightest communication with the British Government, or with you, have had the effect of unhinging the public mind in some parts of the Low Countries, and distracting the attention of the inhabitants from their almost unanimous hatred of French rule, by the agitation of disputed points of future sovereignty. To the quiet means recommended in your despatch No. 2, there can be no objection, and this I have told the Prince of Orange, and so far from checking, have encouraged him, by publications, &c., to set up the advantages enjoyed by the Dutch under his mild Government, the benefits about to be conferred upon them by a fixed form of Government, and the liberality shown by the Prince in putting an end to all invidious distinctions arising from difference of religion. The manner in which his Royal Highness had been advised to act; the imprudent steps taken

by him; the effect of those steps in such parts of the Austrian Netherlands in which they had been taken; and the want of frankness with which all this had been conducted, with an effort of cautious concealment from my Government, had not only induced me very strongly to remonstrate with his Royal Highness and his Minister, (who, by the by, has been the mover in this instance) but also, as you had given me a discretion in your despatch No. 3, to withhold from his Royal Highness the communication authorized by that despatch.

I am most happy now to inform you, that on an interview yesterday had with the Prince, (who at bottom is really a very amiable person) he at once entered upon the subject of the difference which had arisen between us; assured me of his regrets that such difference had occurred; expressed his sense of the impolicy of the conduct he had been led to adopt, which he had taken effectual means to stop; and, in a manner really affectionate, and, I firmly believe, with the utmost sincerity, dwelt for a considerable time upon the numerous instances of kindness which he had received from the British Government—on his entire gratitude for them; and added the most positive assurances that he would in future observe the most unreserved confidence towards his Majesty's Government in every proceeding of his in which they might have an interest.

In answer to this, I told him that I could not but place complete reliance on his professions; and, as an earnest of the frankness with which the British Government were inclined to act towards him, and of the extraordinary interest they took in his welfare, I communicated to him, in the strictest confidence, the object you had in view respecting the combination of an army to be placed under his orders, and the exertions you were making with the Allies to confer upon him the provisional administration of a part of the Austrian Netherlands; qualifying, however, this communication with the information that, as he might suppose, I had thought it my duty to acquaint my Government and you with all that had lately passed between

us upon the subject of his proceedings in the Austrian provinces, the effect of which I could not foresee, as applicable to these objects; but that it would equally be my duty to communicate to them his Royal Highness's conduct and frank assurance then given, which would certainly be felt by his Majesty's Ministers. We parted with the most cordial, and, I firmly believe, sincere expressions of *private* as well as *public* and reciprocal friendship.

Gordon, who is gone hence this morning, will communicate to you the intelligence given us yesterday by two Brabançon gentlemen, with respect not only to the state of the public mind in the Netherlands, but also in respect to that in the northern provinces of France. It appears to me that the Bourbons (through whose restoration, in my mind, the world can only look to a peace of any permanency) stand at present in a very awkward predicament. The people of France, whose minds have been so long enchained, and who have been kept in a state of the most complete ignorance of most public events, however much inclined to support the cause of their ancient kings, know not how a rising in their favour (which I believe a very considerable portion of them would be inclined to make) would be taken by the Allies; and they have felt too much the effects of former efforts, unarmed as they are, to make any grand demonstration of their opinion, while uncertain of that of the Allies; while, on the other hand, whatever the more sane opinion of the Allies may be, they profess that they will not initiate a change of dynasty; so that it might happen that nine-tenths of the French might be eager for the return of the Bourbons, and that the best opinion in their favour might be entertained by the Allies, and yet that they should still remain cast off, and incapable of profiting by even a general feeling.

The only despatches sent by the last mail, in addition to No. 32, a copy of which has been already sent, were two, Nos. 33 and 34, drafts of which go herewith. The enclosure

in No. 33 was a long memorial upon the subject of certain moneys lent to the people of Amsterdam, on mortgage, by the planters in the Danish islands, especially in St. Croix; and its object was to obtain from the British Government the payment of such sums as had been received by our Government during the time which has elapsed since the capture of those islands, on account of these mortgages.

I send you also copy of my last private letter to Lord Liverpool, and an extract of all that was political of my last note to Hamilton.

Yours, my dear Lord, most affectionately,

CLANCARTY.

Mr. Rose to Lord Castlereagh.

Munich, February 12, 1814.

My dear Lord—You will, I trust, believe it is with very great reluctance that I have, in any degree, left any of your orders unaccomplished: the reason of my so doing I could not well state in my public despatch. It was that this morning, before I went to M. de Montgelas, I told Mr. James, to alarm him, that he must now make up his mind to a prolonged incognito of ten or twelve weeks, which it would require for the nomination, preparation, and journey, of a Bavarian envoy, and my consequent appointment as envoy here, and its time on the road. He told me he imagined there must be something requiring explanation in the matter, as, when you represented to Sir Charles Stewart at Baden the expediency of his (Mr. James's) repairing to Munich at once, you said that my credentials might probably have arrived there by the time he reached it. Is it in this manner that this might happen—that your *locum tenems*, understanding your instructions to me as I understood them, may send out these credentials, conceiving the condition required to be accomplished? I send you a copy of the only part of them bearing upon this point. (I am nearly sure that Lord Aberdeen has a copy of my whole

instructions.) I felt the extreme inconvenience which would result from their arrival here (should it take place) before the presentation of a Bavarian envoy at Carlton House, after I should have required, as an indispensable preliminary to their being made out, such presentation; and I adopted, in consequence, the line of conduct I have followed, as the best I could devise in this dilemma.

The King, without having ever seen me, is wonderfully civil to me. He was deranged, I find, by his daughter's illness, from a plan of surprising me incognito. I trust I am well at Court; for I have just learnt, to my extreme surprise, that my English cook, by express order, dressed for his Majesty, a few days since, a sirloin of roast beef, mashed potatoes, and a plum-pudding, upon which he dined exclusively, and protested he had not made such a dinner these ten years.

Mr. James appears to be a remarkably gentlemanlike and well-tempered man.

I am, my dear lord, most faithfully yours,

G. H. Rose.

A thousand joys on your victory. I think this will find you in Paris.

Extract from Lord Castlereagh's despatch No. 1, *to Mr. Rose, dated December* 7, 1813.

"As no formal notification has hitherto been made by the Court of Munich to this Government, either of the separation from the French alliance, or of the royal title assumed by the Elector, you cannot be furnished with regular letters of credence, as his Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, until this preliminary step shall have been taken."

PS. If my credentials arrive—

1st. Shall I present them at once?

2ndly—or shall I wait till this Envoy is named?

3rdly—or till he is shipped off?

4thly—or till I learn his presentation at St. James's?

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

The Hague, February 12, 1814.

My dear Lord—I send the messenger Walsh with the produce of the mails just arrived from England, and wish much we had made sufficient progress in these parts to ensure the safe passage of our couriers through the old frontier of France direct for Chalons: but this is not the case; we must send round by Coblentz, from whence our messengers have for some time been instructed to take the most direct course for the grand head-quarters; and so Walsh will be directed to Chalons sur Seine.

I dined yesterday with the Prince. Before dinner he took me aside, and again repeated all the professions he had made to me the day before, adding that, if he had before been impressed with the impolicy of his proceedings in the Pays Bas, he was now most fully convinced that the efforts he had made, through his agents, for the purpose of obtaining a cry and *soulèvement* in his favour, were improper; that he was fully impressed with the necessity of his waiting the result of your exertions in his favour, with the promptness and magnitude of which he expressed the most entire satisfaction, and to you personally great obligation; and finished by assuring me again that, except in quiet endeavours to prepare the public mind for the reception of his sovereignty, he would remain passive.

Robert Fagel, who is just returned from Bülow's head-quarters, informs me that this officer has been by no means well pleased with being made to play second fiddle to Prince Frederic, in consequence of the intrigues among the rabble to promote cries in favour of the House of Orange, or to listen to those cries, when none were made upon the subject of the Prussian liberators of the country: he felt so much upon this subject, that he stated his intention of taking the Orange ribbons from the caps of his troops; and, as I understand, has actually written to the Prussian Government for instructions for the

government of his conduct. How far the grant of an annuity of a thousand ducats per annum, with the present of a sword from the Prince of Orange, will tend to pacify him, I know not. Fagel's deputation was for the purpose of tendering both these, and they have been, as I understand, accepted.

The account given me by Fagel of the state of the public mind at Brussels and its neighbourhood, from the very frontier, confirms what I had, from other information, concluded it to be, viz., hatred to France, a desire among all the people of consequence to be returned to their former Government, but in default of this, acquiescence in the decision of the Allies, and readiness to be made over to the Dutch Government.

M. de Nyvelt is returned here, in pursuance of the directions received by him, in consequence of the conversation held at M. Hogendorp's, of which you are already apprized.

Yours most sincerely, CLANCARTY.

Mr. Hamilton to Lord Castlereagh.

February 12, 1814.

My dear Lord—You will find in the red box, sent according to your request, all that we have received or despatched of sufficient interest to merit your attention in your present busy moments. I sometimes feel for your not having sufficient manual assistance. If you want more, you can easily command it in a few days.

Your observations on the treaty with Denmark have unfortunately come too late for the remedy, unless you have given the same instructions to Thornton.

The cry of No Bourbon! no peace! is become as popular, since you went away, as No song, no supper, ever was in more quiet times. But we have not the advantage of being behind the scenes.

The Austrian Ambassador is not yet arrived—Fernan Nuñez has one foot in the stirrup—Castelcicala pricking up his ears

and smelling a rat—Jacobi mourning over the want of pay and money at Berlin—and Funchal still washing himself at Worthing.

I have received two notes; one from Keppel Craven, and one from his brother, Lord Craven, reminding me of a kind of promise your lordship is stated to have made, to put the former on the diplomatic list. *Quære*, what answer? Lord L[iverpool] has some idea of sending young Baker *pro tempore* as chargé d'affaires to Denmark.

W. H.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord William Bentinck.

Troyes, February 15, 1814.

My Lord—On my way from Chatillon to this place, I met Captain Coppen, who was proceeding to Lord Aberdeen, with your despatch to his lordship of the 1st of January; and on the 13th instant Captain Foljambe arrived here with your letter of the 22nd ult., and with one from Mr. Graham, from Naples, of the 20th ult.

I shall have no hesitation in submitting to the approbation of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent the whole course of your proceedings with regard to Murat, as detailed in these despatches, and have every reason to be satisfied with the conduct of Mr. Graham, in the circumstances in which he was placed.

It would, perhaps, have been advantageous, if the duration of the armistice which Mr. Graham negociated had not been made to depend upon the conclusion of a definitive treaty of peace between Great Britain and Naples, the arrangement of which might have been involved in considerable difficulty; and Murat might have availed himself of this condition of the armistice, in order to delay the peace, with the view of obtaining better terms for himself, without being exposed to the hostilities of England in the mean time.

I trust, however, that my letter to your lordship from Basle,

which you must have received not many days subsequent to the date of the armistice, will have enabled you to obviate any difficulties, and to make such an arrangement with Murat as may give to the Austrian operations in Italy the entire benefit of his military means.

You will have observed by that despatch, as well as by one which I addressed to your lordship from Chatillon sur Seine, that his Royal Highness the Prince Regent takes the most cordial interest in the welfare of his Majesty the King of Sicily; and I have no doubt that your best exertions will not have been wanting to impress upon the mind of Murat that no accommodation can take place with him, on the part of Great Britain, except upon the principle of his uniting in procuring a suitable and just indemnity for his Sicilian Majesty, as well as of his co-operating in the common cause against France.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Bathurst.

Chatillon, February 17, 1814.

My Lord—In reference to my letter No. 7, of February 1st, I have the honour to enclose to your lordship copies of two letters which I have received from Prince Metternich and Chancellor Hardenberg, in reply to a note which I addressed to the Ministers of the Allied Courts upon the subject of Holland, transmitted to your lordship in my letter No. 7. I have not yet received an official answer from Count Nesselrode, but I have no doubt that his Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia participates in the sentiments of the Allies. I have forwarded copies of these letters to the Earl of Clancarty, for the information of his Royal Highness the Prince of Orange.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Mr. Edward Cooke to Lord Castlereagh.

Foreign Office, February 17, 1814.

My dear Lord—Hamilton has been at Harrow to-day, so I send off Browne.

I have not much of importance. The Prince Regent is still unwell, and requires great attention.

The violence of *The Times* you can account for. Of course, all preparation is making to take advantage of what may possibly be construed inadequate terms. If what I deprecate, the defeat of Sacken and Blücher, be true, people will be a little more reasonable. We have French Bulletins, which alarm, about the 10th and 11th. Stocks, which were at 71½, are at 70½, on account of the above news.

I send the account of Palafox's mission. Fernan Nuñez has sent in a proper Note upon it, which I have not time to send. Bunbury is returned from Lord Wellington, who is advancing. Soult had certainly duped him a little.

My accounts from Don are that Britanny is now favourable for a counter-revolutionary impression, yet nothing very distinct and specific, nor from any important authority.—The Duke of Berry at Jersey. The Duc d'Angoulême had arrived at St. Sebastians by the last accounts, having experienced a severe passage.

I do not think the nomination of Clay and Russel to be Plenipotentiaries a very pacific measure. I have thought that Ward, who was in my situation, and wrote against Schlegel on the maritime question, might have been a good person to treat.

Of course the argument will be made upon the *power* of the Allies, and it is felt, not possibly without truth, that the *effect* ought to be as the *power;* and, if not so, that it is from want of union in the *power*, and that want will be interpreted to our deficiency of *ability*. But this is easily answered.

I think that the paper you received as to the value of the

Colonies, was from Colquhoun: he gave me the same valuation yesterday, in conversation.

I should think you could manage so that no cause of difference should arise, in case we continue war with America.

The apathy of the Hollanders is strongly felt; but the warlike class has been greatly drained in the provinces. Fisher, our messenger, who is a Dutchman, was astonished at the change in Holland. The cessions will be much felt, chiefly Demerary and Berbice, which are Anglicized; and the *multis utile bellum* will act against you in the shipping, mercantile, and accoutrement classes; but the proprietors must be with you.

I am happy you read that letter to C[harles] J[ean]—had he been true, the game would have been up.

The St. Croix merchants are, of course, angry at the short time allowed—to sign a definitive treaty in the first instance, where complicated arrangements are concerned, is very unusual: Th. ought to have given his Court time for arrangements.

Viel-Castel is not gone, as I hear. By an Admiralty account it appears that Norway had been acquainted with the peace, but had refused all communication with Sweden. The account is not specific and distinct.

Castelcicala is, of course, in a squaring attitude. "Russian guarantee—No compensation—England's breach of treaty, in breaking down the Sicilian army, and sending away part of our quota, which, if it had remained and threatened Murat, he could not have moved."

The wording of the Protocol on the marine point is much approved. I hear not of any Cabinet differences of any kind.

Ever most truly, E. C.

PS. Ireland seems disturbed by the renewal of the Defender system—Orangeism the pretext. You will see the Derry Resolutions against the Catholic Board. I know not what facilities you may have, in case of relief of the Pope, to get favourable concessions; or how you may combine in system

with the Anti-Catholic Powers, Lutheran, Calvinistic, or Greek; or what use you may make consequentially of the French Concordat; but I think you might put this iron into the fire; and I hardly conceive you will let Pius VII. enter the Vatican without parting with to you one bolt at least of his Irish thunders.

I should think Austria, on restoring the Pope, would not be averse to insist on a similar Concordat to that obtained by France. Holland will have much to do on this subject, if she gets Brabant. From the old feuds in the seventeen Provinces, an arrangement will be necessary, if Provinces essentially Catholic are to be united to those essentially Protestant. If an arrangement be not made, France will act as she did with the Confederates in Poland. E. C.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool.

Chatillon sur Seine, February 18, 1814.

My dear Liverpool—I send you enclosed a letter from Count de Lieven to the Emperor;[1] and, as the original was transmitted to me through Count Nesselrode, the Secretary of State, and has since been expressly referred to on more than one occasion by his Imperial Majesty, as containing the sentiments of my Government, upon which he felt himself called upon to act, I have deemed it proper, before I returned the letter, there being no injunction to the contrary, to take a copy for your information. It is the more necessary that you should be in possession of it, and that I should receive your explanation, from the very embarrassing publicity that has been given here to this document. The first knowledge I had of it was from Prince Metternich, to whom the Emperor had reported its contents, and with the singular candour of adding that he (Prince Metternich) was personally rather roughly handled in

[1] So in the original—from an evident mistake, as the accompanying copy of the letter in question is addressed to Count Nesselrode.

the despatch. I next heard of it from Hardenberg, the Prussian, and again from Münster, before it was sent to me. I have since had the mortification to learn that it was sent to this place to Count Rasumoffsky, to be communicated confidentially to Lord Cathcart. It is so much the system of foreign Courts to act by double and contradictory channels, that it may make less sensation here, and the knowledge of the transaction rest where it is; but, as I cannot doubt your sentiments upon the utter inadmissibility of this system, as it has already placed me personally in the most distressing predicament, so it has essentially complicated the business with which I have been charged, and exposed the Prince Regent's name to be very unpleasantly compromised—I cannot, either in justice to his Royal Highness, to you, or to myself, avoid placing the whole in your hands, convinced that you will do what is most proper upon it.

I have felt myself bound, with all deference to Count Lieven, to express my entire disbelief of the accuracy of his conception of the sentiments which he has thus attempted to convey. More than this it was impossible for me to state as to the substance of the letter. I could only represent to the Emperor of Russia, which I did, of course, with great pain to myself, that I should feel it my bounden duty, as the responsible servant of the Crown, acting on the spot, to deliver my opinion, on the part of my Court, in direct opposition to the instruction which that despatch was supposed to convey.

I am, my dear lord, ever yours,

CASTLEREAGH.

[Enclosure.]

Secret Despatch from Count Lieven to Count Nesselrode.

Londres, ce 14-26 Janvier, 1814.

Monsieur le Comte—L'objet de l'expédition que je fais aujourd'hui est de porter à la connoisance particulière de sa Majesté Imperiale un entretien que je viens d'avoir avec le

Prince Régent, et dont il m'a demandé avec instance de rendre compte sans délai à l'Empereur.

Le Prince me fit mander de me rendre chez lui hier. Il me rapella d'abord que l'Empereur, entre autres preuves de son amitié, lui avait demandé de ne mettre aucune réserve dans sa confiance envers lui, et m'avait indiqué comme la persomne qui, étant honorée des bontés de sa Majesté, était digne de recevoir les confiances les plus intimes du Prince, dans ses relations avec son auguste Allié—que la loyauté et la confiance que l'Empereur lui avait montrées dans toutes les occasions l'autorisaient aux termes de la plus absolue réciprocité—et qu'il allait me faire part de ses idées et me développer ses principes, non point comme Souverain de la Grande Bretagne, mais avec toute la sincérité d'un particulier.

Il me dit que l'Europe entière et l'Angleterre en particulier, reconnaissait dans l'Empereur le libérateur de tous, le chef de cette coalition auguste qu'il guidait encore, après l'avoir délivrée pour accomplir le but glorieux de la liberté de l'Europe et de la sureté de tous les États—que la Providence, ayant mis dans le cœur de l'Empereur la volonté sublime de donner la paix à l'univers, et entre ses mains tous les moyens pour y parvenir, ce serait tromper le vœu de la Providence que de ne point achever et établir sur des bases inébranlables un repos qui a déjà couté tant de sang—que jamais l'univers n'avait vu réunis des moyens aussi formidables; que ces efforts étaient uniques; que les forces physiques et morales des Alliés ne pouvaient jamais dans aucun tems se retrouver dans un degré aussi éminent; et que c'était l'instant d'assurer pour des siècles le bonheur de l'Europe—qu'une paix, quelqu'avantageuse qu'elle pût être, faite avec Napoléon, n'assurerait jamais qu'une trève plus ou moins longue à l'humanité; que l'histoire de toute sa vie présentait une série de mauvaise foi, d'atrocité, et d'ambition; et que le sang de toute l'Europe n'aurait coulé que pour un repos très problématique s'il devoit reposer sur les traités conclus avec le perturbateur éternel de ce repos—que son

opinion était qu'aucune paix ne pouvait être conclue avec Napoléon, et que sur ce principe (que l'expérience de toutes les nations avait consacré, et que le cœur et les lumières de l'Empereur devait reconnaitre aussi) il croyait qu'une déclaration faite à la nation Française, qui séparât ses intérêts de ceux de son tyran, devai tmener plus directement au but général de la paix.

Cette déclaration porterait le vœu unanime des Alliés pour une paix, si nécessaire à toute l'Europe; le désir d'assurer le bonheur et le repos de la France en la lui donnant; mais resolution énergique de ne point contracter avec Napoléon que sa perfidie a rendu odieux à tous les États de l'Europe, qu'il a successivement trompés et envahis, et que son ambition insatiable a rendu le fléau et le devastateur de la France. Elle offrirait aux Français la paix du moment qu'ils cesseraient de reconnaitre le tyran, et la résolution des Alliés de la conclure avec tel maître qu'ils voudraient se donner, hors celui sur la bonne foi du quel ni eux ni les Alliés ne sauraient compter.

Le Prince Régent trouve de l'intérêt et de la loyauté de tous les Souverains de laisser une nation respectable libre de disposer d'elle; mais il pense qu'il ne serait point inutile de rappeller aux Français l'existence de leur dynastie légitime; qu'en son particulier il ne pourrait que prendre un vif intérêt aux Bourbons; et qu'il était persuadé que l'intérêt politique de l'Empereur et sa conviction intime le disposaient également en leur faveur; mais que dans tous les cas cet intérêt devait être subordonnée au vœu de la nation.

Quant à l'accession des Alliés pour une déclaration pareille, le Prince ne revoquait point en doute les principes du Roi de Prusse: l'Autriche serait peut-être plus difficile à convaincre; mais il s'en rapportait là-dessus à l'Empereur, auquel il coutait si peu d'entrainer par la confiance qu'inspirent sa sagesse et sa loyauté.

Voilà, me dit le Prince, le seul vœu qu'il me reste à former, le seul complément qui manque à l'œuvre glorieux de votre

Maître—faites le lui connaitre. Chef de cette coalition immortelle, c'est vers lui que se portent toutes les espérances, c'est à lui qu'appartient l'honneur de donner la paix au monde; c'est sous ses auspices que cette déclaration doit se faire. La forme du Gouvernement de mon royaume m'interdit une démarche publique aussi décisive. Je vous demande même de m'en garder le secret envers tout le monde, mais que l'Empereur connaisse ma façon de penser, qu'il sache que je n'attends que son exemple pour soutenir sa Déclaration, et qu'il sache surtout que mon principe invariable est de ne jamais me séparer de lui dans la guerre comme dans la paix.

Quoique le Prince m'avait demandé le secret sur l'objet de notre entretien et qu'il m'eut assuré que c'était sa façon de penser individuelle qu'il m'exprimait; je connaissais trop bien son caractère et sa circonspection naturelle pour ne point y voir une intention concertée avec ses ministres, ou tout au moins avec Lord Liverpool; et les relations d'intimité et de confiance que j'ai toujours eu soin de cultiver avec le Ministère m'autorisant à m'ouvrir à Lord Liverpool confidentiellement sur cet objet, je crus pouvoir, tout en me faisant un mérite de ma franchise, m'instruire par lui du degré de sureté qu'on pouvait mettre à l'assurance du Prince Régent de soutenir la déclaration qu'il demandait à l'Empereur de faire.

Je me rendis en conséquence ce matin chez Milord Liverpool: il me sut gré de la preuve de confiance personnelle que je lui donnais. Je le trouvai en effet parfaitement instruit de l'ouverture que le Prince Régent m'avait faite. Il me dit à ce sujet que son opinion ne pouvait point différer de celle du Prince; qu'il reconnaissait parfaitement l'utilité de la mesure projettée; mais qu'il ne se dissimulait point les difficultés qui pouvaient en entraver l'exécution; qu'en premier lieu, le Gouvernement Britannique ne pouvait point contracter l'obligation de reconnaître et soutenir publiquement la déclaration des Alliés, puisque l'opinion, étant un pouvoir si despotique en Angleterre, il faudrait que des chances heureuses justifiassent

un pareil acte, pour donner au Ministère le pouvoir de le soutenir—que tout dépendrait donc des circonstances; qu'elles devaient nécessairement aussi déterminer les démarches des Alliés; mais que si la prudence les empêchait de faire une déclaration aussi officielle, il ne voyait point que rien put s'opposer à ce qu'ils fissent circuler en France des publications partielles tendantes à instruire la nation des projets des Alliés, à lui faire comprendre qu'ils veulent la paix, qu'ils la feront même avec Napoléon, si le vœu de la nation conserve à cet homme le Gouvernement de la France; mais que les Alliés ayant appris à leur dépens à se méfier des traiteés conclus avec lui, ils exigeraient naturellement des garanties et des suretés, qui les missent en mesure de ne le plus craindre, et que par là même une telle paix serait plus difficile d'obtenir; que si la nation, lasse des malheurs que la domination de Napoléon a attirée sur elle, se déciderait à s'y soustraire, et se choisit tel autre chef, les Alliés mettraient toutes les facilités à conclure la paix, et la feraient plus avantageuse pour la France, à raison de ce qu'ils n'auraient plus à se défier de l'ambition de Napoléon; et enfin que si les Français rappellaient leurs anciens Maîtres, il y avait sur-le-champ cessation d'hostilités et paix immédiate.

En faisant ainsi ressortir ces nuances, Lord Liverpool pense que ce serait indiquer à la nation Française ce que son intérêt lui préscrit de choisir, et assurer en même tems son bonheur et celui de l'Europe. Il croit d'autant plus nécessaire de faire soit une déclaration publique, si les circonstances le permettaient, soit des publications partielles, telles que je viens de les citer; que la nation Française doit se trouver dans la perplexité du parti qu'elle aurait à prendre, si même elle était disposée à secouer la tyrannie de son Maître, puisqu'en même tems que l'entrée des Alliés en France semble l'inviter à se joindre à eux, elle voit ces mêmes Alliés négocier avec le Gouvernement de Napoléon.

La dernière dépêche du Lord Cathcart, en date du 14 de

Basle, a porté au Ministère communication de la dernière lettre adressé par le Prince Metternich à M. de Caulaincourt; et Lord Liverpool n'a pas pu s'empêcher de m'observer combien il redoutait cette propension extraordinaire du Cabinet Autrichien à la paix, puisque, dans un moment où les chances les plus brillantes ouvrent la route de Paris aux armées formidables et victorieuses des Alliés, l'empressement que témoigne le Prince Metternich en invitant M. Caulaincourt à se rendre à Chalons, afin de perdre le moins de tems possible pour entrer en négociation, ferait craindre qu'on ne mit point dans les opérations militaires la confiance que tant des victoires et de brillants succès devraient justifier.

Cette circonstance semble intimider le Ministère, mais Lord Liverpool me dit que toute la confiance du Gouvernement Britannique réposait sur la personne de l'Empereur; et, en effet, cette confiance est sans bornes, et je puis attester que sa Majesté la possède au plus éminent degré.

Il me répéta encore ce que le Prince Régent m'avait dit de l'indissolubilité de l'union entre les deux États dans la paix comme dans la guerre, et m'assura que le Gouvernement ne voyait point des sacrifices assez grands pour seconder la grande et noble œuvre entreprise et menée par l'Empereur—que, sous peu l'armée de Wellington serait porté à 120 mille hommes par la résolution qui venait de prendre le Ministère de la faire joindre par 40 mille hommes des troupes Espagnoles, armées, equippées, et soldées par l'Angleterre. L'ordonnance vicieuse qui avait regnée dans les finances du Gouvernement Espagnol ayant empêché les soldats de recevoir une solde régulière et suffisante avait été cause des excès et du pillage aux quels ils se livraient. En se chargeant entièrement de leur entretien, le Gouvernement Britannique obvierait à cet inconvénient, et mettrait Lord Wellington à même aussitôt que la saison le permettrait, de porter de grands coups.

Je ne me dissimule point que de tous ces raisonnemens du Prince Régent et de Lord Liverpool, il n'en est pas un que sa

Majesté Imperiale n'aye été dans le cas de faire et d'approfondir elle-même—que, par consequence, les details dans lesquels je suis entré, ainsi que l'objet même de mon expédition ne sont point d'un intérêt qui eut nécessité l'envoi d'un courier; mais, le Prince Régent m'ayant vivement enjoint d'en faire partir un sur le champ, je n'ai point osé manquer de satisfaire à ses instances pressantes. J'ai l'honneur d'être, &c.,

LIEVEN.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Clancarty.

Chatillon, February 17, 1814.

My Lord—In reference to my letter to your lordship of February 1st, I have the honour to enclose to you copies of two letters which I have received from Prince Metternich and the Chancellor Hardenberg, in reply to a note, which, on the 27th ult., I addressed to the Ministers of the three Allied Powers respecting an addition of territory for Holland, and the admission of a Commissioner, on the part of the Prince of Orange, into the Central Administration of the provinces recovered from the enemy. The Prince of Orange will see by these letters that the Courts of Austria and Prussia are actuated by the most cordial desire to promote the interests of his Royal Highness, in compliance with the wish I had expressed, on the part of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent. I have not yet received an official answer from Count Nesselrode; but I have no reason to doubt the disposition of his Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia to co-operate with his Allies upon this important subject, and to contribute to the assignment to Holland of a just and suitable extension of territory. I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Clancarty.

Chatillon, February 17, 1814.

My Lord—I have the honour to enclose to your lordship a copy of a letter which I have received from Baron de Stein,

which you will lose no time in submitting confidentially to the Prince of Orange, and in recommending to his Royal Highness to take the necessary measures for removing any embarrassment which may have arisen from the error alluded to in the enumeration of such portions of the Belgic provinces as might be confided to the administration of his Royal Highness.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

The Hague, February 18, 1814.

My dear Lord—I have little to send you by the present courier, whom, however, I think it necessary to expedite, with the produce of the British mail, arrived yesterday, although none of the packets addressed to you appear of consequence, lest you should be in want of messengers.

Lord Liverpool writes me word that, if the continuance of your presence in France should become necessary, it is by no means of importance that you should return for the first days in March: the Parliament, he says, can either be further adjourned, or such matters proceeded in as are not likely to produce debate or create opposition.

Although scarcely worth looking at, I send you the drafts of my last despatches to England, with a copy of my last private letter to Lord Liverpool.

The sortie made by the French from Naarden on the 14th, and their attack on Muyden, were as unsuccessful as those on the preceding days.

Gorcum is to be delivered up to the blockading troops on Sunday, under the capitulation; and the French troops march out to-morrow, lay down their arms, &c.

You need not in the least fear the Prince of Orange neglecting anything wherein his own interests are concerned. As an instance of this, he was no sooner acquainted by me privately with your message, that he might almost reckon him-

self safe as far as the Meuse, than, in conversing with Fagel upon the subject, this last acquainted me that his Royal Highness's imagination dwelt upon nothing but the country on the South East of that river!!

Graham has requested me to move his Royal Highness to place 3,000 of the Dutch new levies at his orders, with which, in co-operation with his own troops, he wishes to undertake an operation against Bergen-op-Zoom. These, after some delay, arising from the coquetry of wishing to be consulted (and to which I see no objection), he has promised to send on the side of Gertruydenberg from the blockade of Gorcum on the 21st; and the Hereditary Prince goes to Graham's head-quarters to-morrow, to concert with him on their future employment.

By a report received from M. D'Yoog, dated from Brussels, the 15th, it appears that Bülow intended to advance on the next day towards Mons—General Maison is reported to be still at Tournay, with about 3,000 of the enemy.

Brigadier-General Gore, on his march from the North to join Sir Thomas Graham, will be at Campen to-night. Small as his brigade is, and of not the best description of force, the reinforcement will be most acceptable to Sir Thomas, whose position, since the forward movement of the Prussians on Brussels and Mons, is by no means enviable, in scattered cantonments, with such a force opposed to him as that which the garrisons of Antwerp and Bergen-op-Zoom present, headed by Carnot.

We long much to hear of the further progress of the Allied armies, and equally desire, and, at the same time fear, to hear of the progress of their negociations. The passage of your despatches hereafter through Calais will, I should apprehend, prevent us from being so well furnished with information in future as we have been.

With respect to the Bourbons, we know that the insurrection of the peasantry about Lille, Arras, and in Picardy, although

at first brought about in order to avoid the conscription, almost immediately assumed as its professed object a change of dynasty, in favour of their legitimate Princes.

In M. D'Yoog's report to his Royal Highness above alluded to, he states that "*des nouvelles particulières annoncent une insurrection dans la Bretagne et la Normandie.*" Thus, in two parts of France, the public opinion seems to be pretty plainly expressed: what it may be in the East, you are better informed than I can be; while, in the South, if we may credit the private letters from Wellington's army, the disposition in favour of their ancient Princes is scarcely less pronounced than in the North and West. My wishes perhaps get the better of my judgment upon this theme. If they do, I cannot help it. D'Yoog thinks the French will abandon all Flanders, with the exception of Antwerp.

Yours, my dear lord, most affectionately,

CLANCARTY.

PS. I send you some information respecting some of the frontier towns in France, which I think interesting. Directions have been given to communicate these and all other matters to General Bülow.

Mr. Edward Thornton to the Hon. Sir Charles Stewart.

Cologne, February 19, 1814.

My dear Sir Charles—You will see, of course, all my letters to Lord Castlereagh, by this messenger, and I explain to you, therefore, the allusion in one of them to your military opinion that the Prince Royal could not with propriety leave behind him the French and Danes, and march upon Holland, or upon the Rhine. The opinion of another great man, to which I allude, is that of Lord Wellington himself.

It so happens that Sydenham, who corresponds with his lordship, has received an answer from him, in which he says expressly that he was always of opinion that the Prince Royal

could not, with any military propriety, leave the Danes and Davoust behind him. The military question being settled, everything else must necessarily yield: because the question becomes then precisely the same as it was when Hope's plan of campaign was in contemplation. I shall have a copy of this letter of Lord Wellington's, which I will send you.

On the other points, I beg you, on every account, to make Lord Castlereagh sensible how necessary it is to have some *ménagement* of the Prince Royal, especially in what appears to touch himself. He imagines, and it is not for me to say the contrary, for I sometimes believe the same thing, that the exclusion of Sweden from the preliminary Conferences has been done for the sole purpose of degrading him in the eyes of Sweden, and perhaps of France, at any rate, of humiliating him and of weakening the opinion which may exist in the world of his influence in the councils of the Allies. That England is a party to the same idea of humiliating him, God forbid that I should say what I never can believe! The proof of it, if any were wanting, is that the same idea was conceived at Frankfort, before Lord Castlereagh's arrival; but I ask you, my dear Sir Charles, whether *every* English Minister at Frankfort discouraged such an exclusion? You and I have the best reason, from parallel evidence, to answer in the negative.

With regard to the fact itself of the exclusion of Sweden from the preliminary Conferences, a kind of explanation from us (and not from any other) may do away much of the feeling, which is, however, deep, and may become bitter: but I assure you sincerely, and it is my duty to assure Lord Castlereagh that, if it is intended to follow up these preliminary Conferences by positive negociations for peace, and that peace is to be made for Sweden, without her having any part in it, and by the negociations of the four principal Powers, you may depend upon it that it will not be consented to, that some desperate resolution will be taken, for which we shall all be sorry, because the worst of it will be that we shall be in the wrong, and that the Prince

Royal, or Sweden, for whom he speaks, will be in the right. He has nothing to do but to throw himself on the Treaty of Stockholm with regard to Guadeloupe, to prove that we have no right to negociate for Sweden in that particular, so as to give up the island to France without her direct interference. England has ceded her rights to Sweden—such as they are—rights of conquest—and it rests with Sweden alone to abandon them to France, either by a direct negociation, or by consenting that Great Britain shall negociate for her.

Remember, my dear Sir Charles, this is not my language; it is that of the Prince, which I did not choose to put into a despatch: as I always trust to the influence of calm reasoning and reflection to bring him right. But he told me, in the heat of the discussion upon this subject, that he retracted every promise he had made with regard to yielding up Guadeloupe, if Great Britain wished it so—that he would declare to the world that he would hold it not by force, which he could do neither against England nor against France, (not having besides a single soldier in the island) but by the right of his treaty with England, by which treaty England had yielded to Sweden all her pretensions to the island, and could not negociate, except with her consent or for her advantage, with any other Power for the purpose of ceding it in any shape. You will say perhaps that this is desperate language, and perhaps in the long run it would turn out so; but you cannot say that it is the language of an unsound reasoner—for he is right.

You will say that he is combating shadows, and that there is no intention of negociating definitively for Sweden her peace with France, without her intervention, and by the negociation of the four principal Powers. God forbid that I should say the contrary!—for, as far as I can infer from the language of Lord Castlereagh's despatch upon this point, and from the conversation with which he honoured me, I have no reason to believe that there is an intention of signing a peace with France

with Sweden, without letting her have a direct voice in it. I can say positively that Sweden—that is, the Prince Royal—will never consent to it, and that he will allow himself to be ground to powder before he will yield; not that he is absolutely of our way of thinking, or could desire a better peace than we could procure for Sweden; but the idea of degradation and of humiliation, which, he thinks, accompanies this mode of treatment, will never let him consent to it. Of this be assured.

With regard to the rest of the important points contained in Lord Castlereagh's despatch, I beg you to tell his lordship (for, if I were to write a regular despatch, I should never get my messenger away) that I find the Prince perfectly well-disposed; that he admits the question with regard to the augmentation of Holland most readily; that he entered even with expressions of great approbation into Lord Castlereagh's view of excluding every intermediate Government between the Bourbons or Bonaparte, though he expressed his doubts that this would inevitably be the case, if something were not determined speedily one way or other: for he says that Soult and many other of the military Chiefs are beginning to entertain their own views, and that there is talk among them of dividing France, by a sort of federative system, among different Chiefs. Whether this is the case or not, I cannot say: it is not the first time I have heard of it.

Pray tell Lord Castlereagh (for I forgot it in my last despatch) that the Prince talked to me of a report he had heard of the French beginning to form an army, or *corps d'armée*, at Lille and Valenciennes, so as to act upon the right flank of this army. It can only, however, be a corps of new levies, for there is no body of old troops to make the *noyau* of such an army.

I have always had too much business on my hands to write, and I forgot to tell you at Chatillon that I procured for Mrs. Bogue the distinction Colonel Bloomfield wanted to be sent for

the children. On my mentioning the thing at Kiel to the Crown Prince, just after you left it, he not only yielded to it instantly, but asked me what was the pecuniary situation of Mrs. Bogue by the death of her husband; that it would give him the greatest pleasure to help her; and he authorized me to offer to her as much as ten thousand dollars for the education of her children, and for her own support. I made, in consequence, this offer to Mrs. Bogue, and she finds herself in circumstances which induce her most thankfully to accept it. She has written to me, and also to the Prince Royal, letters which prove her to be a very superior woman in understanding as well as in sentiment. I will one day or other send you copies of these letters, with which you will be pleased; and I am sure you will do justice to the Prince, who is really a man of heart.

Ever, my dear Sir Charles, yours most truly,

EDWARD THORNTON.

Mr. Edward Cooke to Lord Castlereagh.

London, February 19, 1814.

My dear Lord—I have read the Protocols to the 13th, and seen what goes to-night. I could have wished that the Protocols had been detained till they could have been accompanied with your sentiments respecting them. A judgment could not then have been formed on the Protocols alone: and your judgment upon them, and consequent instructions, would have precluded observations here. The line which you have so invariably pursued and so successfully maintained, makes me perfectly satisfied as to the part you took on the perusal of them.

We certainly had expected a decision upon the ultimatum—an acceptance or rejection *in toto*. Now we have a solecism before us—an ultimatum *sine die*—in short, no ultimatum at all; and everything is to begin again on Bonaparte's projets.

But I am confident you will have been able to rectify all this confusion, and that on the arrival of your next despatches all will be set right.

The public mind is as feverish as ever, and carried away by every rumour of success of the Allies. Blücher's account came first in a Hague Gazette: it was thought a total victory in all its parts. Then came an *aide-de-camp* of the Duke of Saxe-Weimar, who verbally added the deaths of Marmont and Sebastiani, and a victory at Soissons. Then came Lowe's accounts, which moderated our tone, after firing the guns, &c.

We were gulled by the idea of Schwarzenberg at Fontainebleau, of a victory at Corbeil, of the Allies being at Charenton, and a rumour came from the Court of Bonaparte being driven towards Rouen. The true accounts then arrived, and to-day the protecting of Rheims by Bonaparte.

We have had letters in town from France that Wellington was at Bordeaux: we hear of Soult going over, but I have nothing credible but an account that says that Wellington had advanced beyond Roquefort, nor do I know the date. The account comes in a letter of the 12th from Don, who had received it from St. Maloes, and who states there was a great *rassemblement* of malecontents in Brittany, and great insubordination on all that line.

You see the terms of peace are in the Courier. Street says he got them from the Continent. I doubt it, though I have been often told *no* peace with Bonaparte would go down. I never have known that the answer I gave did not silence. No one ventures to place the continuation or dissolution of the Coalition on that issue—no one but admits that a Minister ought to be impeached for dissolving the Coalition upon that issue.

Bonaparte, I see, still plays for continental peace—gives up everything to the continental Powers to retain power against us, to which our negociators, *except your brother*, seem to be blind. All admit if the Allies can maintain themselves till

Wellington advances to the Loire, Bonaparte must fall. All think justice has not been done to the Bourbon cause. There are letters which state that Lyons sent to Bubna that they would declare for the Allies, and open their gates if he would declare for the Bourbons. He repulsed the offer.

I can say no more, and regret that your opinion upon the Protocols did not accompany them. We have the account of Bonaparte's retaking Rheims.

I think I shall be *well* before your return, and lament the loss you have had for want of a person of activity in my office.

Yours most obediently, E. C.

Mr. George Jackson to the Hon. Sir Charles Stewart.

Troyes, February 19, 1814, at night.

My dear Sir Charles—I was sorry to be obliged to send you such a scrawl yesterday. I was thinking of re-despatching the sergeant with what to-day might produce, when Mr. Robinson arrived. The town has been in a complete bustle from the first of the morning, and he determined to delay sending to you till something more was known of the cause and of its probable consequence.

Prince Metternich, having lost his way yesterday, found himself at night at Sens, instead of at head-quarters, and did not reach them till this morning, after everybody was gone or going. He is not yet returned; but I understand that Count Paer was not allowed to proceed further than the French outposts, and that, as yet, no answer has been returned to the letter of which he was the bearer, which is considered merely as an experiment, from which it might or might not be possible to derive some advantage, and which, at all events, would not be binding upon the allied army longer than might suit their purpose.

Everybody seems in extreme ill-humour, not exempt from anxiety. General Knesebeck's opinion is that there will be

a great battle in this neighbourhood: others think Bonaparte is not strong enough to risk an attack, or even to oppose the junction of Blücher with this army. It is ascertained from prisoners that Bonaparte has made all his late attacks with the same troops; that he has not above 60,000 men seems to be the general opinion; and that, as these must have sustained, though successful, great losses, as well as fatigues, he will not hazard any further offensive movement. If so, the whole army will again be concentrated in the course of to-morrow or next day. Gneisenau writes that, by that time, Blücher will have 100,000 men. This I am inclined to think much exaggerated, but you will be better informed from his head-quarters.

I am very anxious to know how your *besogne* goes on, and whether late success will make Bonaparte rise in his pretensions. I don't think this retreat ought to do so, because, however discouraging the moral effect may be on the public mind, he, viewing it as a military man, cannot but feel that the situation of the Allies is very much strengthened by it.

Receiving, as you do, regular reports from Lord Burghersh and Colonel Lowe, it would be useless for me to pretend to go into any military details. I shall, therefore, not stop to state to you what I hear of the positions of the different corps, but merely say that, up to ten o'clock this morning, the enemy had not shown themselves.

Baron Wetterstedt has received no less than three couriers in the last three days. On the 12th, the Crown Prince was still at Cologne. Woronzow had crossed the Rhine; and, by the 25th, the last of the Swedish troops were to be on this side.

I should have wished to have sent the sergeant with these despatches, and kept the Messrs. Mills; but he is so loaded that nothing but a carriage can carry them all. I shall, therefore, send you the former, if anything new occurs to-morrow. In the mean time, believe me to be, my dear Sir Charles, your very faithful, &c.,

GEORGE JACKSON.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Bathurst.

Chatillon, February 20, 1814.

My Lord—I herewith transmit to your lordship copies of several despatches, Nos. 37, 39, 40, 41, which I have received from Lord Burghersh, detailing the late operations of the Grand Army, under Field Marshal Prince Schwarzenberg—I shall send the originals by the first messenger through France.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Clancarty.

Chatillon, February 20, 1814.

My Lord—My circular note to the Allied Sovereigns will explain the grounds on which I deemed it proper to press for some express engagements on those objects most interesting to Great Britain. You will observe Austria is quite unqualified in her stipulation; Prussia not less so in substance, but wishes, if placed between the Meuse and the Moselle, to have some connecting territory on the right side of the Meuse with those provinces beyond the Rhine.

Hardenberg agrees to sign and to put himself in my hands; Russia alone has held back, not upon any objection, but from a disposition to make conditions. The accompanying private note from Count Nesselrode, with its enclosure, will explain a little their temper. I have seen Count Rasoumoffsky: the object is to prevail upon Great Britain and Holland to take upon them jointly a debt of eighty millions of florins, which Russia owes in Holland. This demand was pressed upon us early in the war, and refused. I gave the Russian Minister no sort of encouragement, and have no notion that our Parliament would listen to such an arrangement. And why pay Russia rather than Austria and Prussia? It comes as a condition with the worse grace, after our recent gratuitous concession to Denmark, to fulfil a Russian engagement. I regret,

however, that any ostensible step should have been taken to prejudice the question of ultimate possession. The intercourse may facilitate, if quietly conducted; but, if more is assumed at present, it will counteract, and not promote, the object we have in view. I have, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to George Rose, Esq.

Chatillon sur Seine, February 20, 1814.

Sir—I have to acknowledge the receipt of your several despatches to No. 15, inclusive, with the exception of No. 13.

I herewith transmit to you your letter of credence from his Royal Highness the Prince Regent to the King of Bavaria, together with his Royal Highness's answer to the notification of that sovereign of his assumption of the royal dignity; but am at the same time to direct you not to present these letters until you shall have received an official notification from the Bavarian Government of the appointment by them of a Minister to the Court of London, together with an assurance of his having been ordered immediately to proceed to England.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord William Bentinck.

Chatillon sur Seine, February 21, 1814.

My Lord—Your despatches were delivered to me yesterday by Captain Graham, who reported to me such information as he had been enabled to collect on his route.

The point now of most importance is to secure the effective co-operation of the Neapolitans, whose active assistance appears indispensable to give to the Allies that rapid and commanding success which may speedily decide the fate of Italy. I am sorry to find that Murat had, under some pretext, delayed the signature of the treaty in its amended form, and that he still continues to show some *ménagement* towards the enemy. I

should rather impute this to a desire still to push some personal views with the Allies, than to any understanding with France. Certainly, Caulaincourt's language here leaves no doubt that his government considers him as hostile.

My letter by the messenger will have put your lordship fully in possession of our views on this subject. The British Government never liked the measure; but, being taken, they are perfectly ready to act up to the spirit of the Austrian Treaty, and to acknowledge Murat upon a peace, on two conditions: 1st, that he exerts himself honourably in the war; and, 2ndly, that a reasonable indemnity (it cannot be an equivalent) is found for the King of Sicily. I should hope, with this basis to work upon, you may not only quiet any alarms Murat may have felt, as to the nature of our armistice, but furnish him with two very powerful incentives to come forward effectually. In doing so, he will facilitate all his own views; and, by assisting in the indemnities to the King of Sicily, he may secure his own title to Naples.

I have forwarded your lordship's military despatch to London. The exertion you have made in assembling this corps is highly creditable; and its presence must largely contribute to the successful issue of the campaign.

I shall be anxious to receive reports of your lordship's progress. If sent to Marshal Bellegarde's head-quarters, Sir Robert Wilson will forward them to me. The armistice, as now arranged by your lordship, is perfectly satisfactory.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Mr. Hamilton to Lord Castlereagh.

Foreign Office, February 22, 1814.

My dear Lord—As we have nothing later from you than the 10th, we do not think it right again to attempt the route by France. The French papers to the 16th only let us know the battles to the 14th, between Bonaparte and the several detached

corps of Blücher's army. The enclosed papers contain almost everything of consequence which we have received since the last communication by Browne.

Rehausen has applied, in consequence of the reports concerning Norway, that no ships might be allowed to clear out for Norwegian ports till further advices were received. This has been acceded to.

Lord Liverpool is indisposed with a bad cold.—I have no news.

Your lordship's obedient Servant,

WILLIAM HAMILTON.

Lord Aberdeen to Lord Castlereagh.

Chatillon sur Seine, February 23, 1814.

Dear Castlereagh—As a messenger from Thornton is going to head-quarters, I take the opportunity of informing you of some things said by Caulaincourt yesterday evening, as I think you might wish to be in possession of them before your return. After dinner, he began by observing to me that the Emperor had transferred his head-quarters to Bar sur Aube. I told him that I had heard the report. He went on to enlarge on the successes of Napoleon. He may have exaggerated the amount, but, on the whole, was sufficiently accurate. He said that if Napoleon had lost military reputation, it must be confessed that he had now regained it; that everything had been done by his personal interference, and in consequence of his individual exertions. He said that, for his own (Caulaincourt's) part, he thought it made no difference in the state of the war, but that, by saving the *amour propre* of Bonaparte, it gave him a good opportunity of concluding peace with some degree of credit.

In talking of the position of the armies, he said it would require at least seven or eight marches before Blücher could complete his junction with Schwarzenberg. He said that so large a portion of his force was in the direction of Soissons,

that it would require a considerable time to be up and in position. I thought it wise not to undeceive him in this notion; for, if it should be the belief of Bonaparte, it may have most important consequences. I only said I understood that our military position was considered to be good.

He continued to say, that though he was ready to make the same sacrifices for peace as when he first came to Chatillon, we had done everything in our power, by the form of the *projét*, to make it difficult. He said that he must be supposed to know his own master; and that he was satisfied, if it had been possible to see you for an hour, he might have so changed the form, without altering the substance, as to make it palatable to Bonaparte, instead of being revolting. He said that he had almost determined to venture and see if it were not possible to obtain some alteration, before he sent the *projét* to Bonaparte; but had given up the intention, from the little prospect of being able to enter with you into the subject.

I told him that I was not aware of any intention to offend or degrade by the *manner* in which the treaty was made; and that, if the provisions were substantially obtained, I did not believe that any attachment existed to a particular phraseology. For the rest, I professed not to understand what he meant. He said, "For instance, in the article in which England is most concerned, you insert a condition which compels us to abolish the Slave-trade: this may be a very fit article to insert in a treaty with *Denmark*, but not with us. If you wish us to abolish the Slave-trade, we will meet you half-way, and arrange it between ourselves; but the compulsory article you have inserted can never be tolerated by a great people, who are not yet in a situation to be insulted with perfect impunity." I merely said that it was an object which Great Britain had at heart; and that I did not believe it had been introduced with any view to degrade or insult the French Government.

He went on to adduce another instance, and said—"You represent all Europe—you say you treat for your Allies, and

profess to bind them by your engagements; and yet you offer to employ your *good offices*, in order to persuade Sweden to give up Guadaloupe to France." He said, if there was anything in the world which could be revolting to Bonaparte, it was to employ good offices with *Bernadotte*, in order to obtain the colony. He said a good deal about the personal character of Bonaparte, and how much would be done by a little attention to the manner.

He spoke in a perfectly good humour, and said all this in a half-laughing manner. He did not go further into detail, and I did not encourage him; but I thought it as well that you should know what passed. Yours ever sincerely,

ABERDEEN.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

The Hague, February 24, 1814.

My dear Lord—I am so unwell with a violent attack of ague in the head, that I have only power to refer you to the accompanying papers, which will convey to you all the information of this mission since my last.

We are in utter darkness here concerning all your proceedings and all the movements of the Grand Armies since the 8th.

The expedition of your couriers by Calais has deprived us of all our means of information here.

At Lord Liverpool's suggestion, the Prince and the Hereditary Prince are to write letters to the Regent, containing our formal demand of the Princess Charlotte for the latter; and M. De Vanderdagen will go hence next week, as the bearer of these letters. Yours most affectionately, CLANCARTY.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Aberdeen.

Draft. Chaumont, February 25, 1814.

My dear Aberdeen—I am afraid you and your colleagues will not easily forgive me for my silence; but nothing is so unsatisfactory as a report full of doubts and no decisions.

I found them on the move at Troyes, and thought it best to

keep near the head-quarters till we saw daylight. Two propositions of armistice, proceeding from us, which I cannot too much condemn, and a retreat, perhaps not unwise, if boldly and candidly avowed, have materially injured our authority, and produced nothing but two very haughty and insulting letters from Buonaparte and Berthier to the Emperor Francis and his General.

We are now falling back towards Langres, not, as far as I can learn, much pushed by the enemy. Indeed, I doubt the possibility of his advancing boldly, leaving Blücher, now with 80,000 men, on his left flank, which army will, in a few days, be equal to Buonaparte's own. If he turns on Blücher, we shall turn on him.

The political question has been miserably prejudiced by opposite extremes of management: at one time too proud to listen to anything; at another, so impatient to be delivered from the presence of our enemy, as to make our prolongation at Chatillon almost ludicrous.

I hope we have yet more of equanimity in our counsels than a bystander would predicate. You will see by the instructions sent this night to Count Stadion that the Allies, without wishing to give to their *démarche* the appearance of seeking a rupture, are decided upon bringing the negociation to a short issue; and that, whatever may be the turn of the war, in or out of France, they are determined to support the cause of Europe, as the only hope of real peace, firmly and perseveringly against Napoleon, till he shall substantially acquiesce in the terms they have proposed to him.

The Emperor of Russia and King of Prussia have determined, in the absence of the Prince Royal, to place Winzingerode, including Woronzow and Strogonoff, together with Bülow, absolutely under Marshal Blücher's orders. He will thus have a very formidable force, daily increasing, while this army is also falling back upon its reserves. The fact is, we are only inferior in unity of counsel.

I shall not leave the head-quarters for the present, as the enemy may advance upon Chatillon. I think you ought to have an express understanding with Caulaincourt upon the neutrality of Chatillon; also as to our couriers, who ought to be allowed to go by the shortest route to Calais, and to return by the same. I should also wish you officially to ascertain whether I am admitted to be *a protected character* or *not*. I apprehend this can hardly be disputed, if the French Government means that the British plenipotentiaries, acting under my instructions, shall have the means of conducting the negociation without unnecessary reference to England. If Caulaincourt makes no difficulty, send me two passports for couriers to Calais, without restriction as to route, and the name of the King's messenger blank, for me to fill up: but it is probable all this arrangement may be obviated by an early termination of the discussions. It can have no other result, if Buonaparte holds the same language at Chatillon as he has done to the Emperor, his father-in-law.

When I inquire whether I am considered as a protected character, it is not that I have, under present circumstances, any intention of returning to Chatillon, seeing no disposition in the French Government to promote peace, to which, either for the sake of the Allies or of Great Britain, I could feel myself justified in giving even the countenance of my presence.

You will consider this letter as jointly addressed to your colleagues and yourself.

I am, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Clancarty.

Chaumont, February 27, 1814.

My Lord—The enclosed despatch to Mr. Thornton will put you in possession of the decision of the Allied Sovereigns. It has been deemed indispensable, at the present critical conjuncture, to augment Marshal Blücher's command to the utmost,

and, as the means of doing so, to give the Prince Royal a different destination.

In the present state of the campaign, I deem it of the last importance to the interests of Holland to secure a great force for its immediate objects. I hope I have managed this; and, although upon principles different from those before proposed, yet the object is worthy of the risk, and the necessity such as to be paramount to all minor considerations. I beg you will open this arrangement to the Prince of Orange. His Royal Highness will give me credit for having his interests sincerely at heart, and that nothing but an intimate knowledge of the importance of the measure could have induced me to depart from the plan I had previously formed for his service.

You will observe that I have so arranged that the Prince Royal's command shall neither interfere with the interior of Holland, nor with the Prince of Orange's provisional administration of the Brabant departments. It will be simply the command of an army (with the exception of the troops of Holland) altogether composed of corps either paid or subsidized by Great Britain.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Edward Thornton, Esq.

Chaumont, February 27, 1814.

Sir—The pressure of business prevented me from writing to you yesterday by the Emperor of Russia's aide-de-camp. You will, no doubt, have been made acquainted with the object of his mission. I have had a full explanation with Baron Wetterstedt and Count Löwenhjelm upon the subject, who both appeared to me to approve the considerations which had dictated this decision.

The object is, at least partially, to return to the Prince Royal's own military advice—namely, to consolidate more regularly, as we proceed, the fruits of our victories, and not to

pour all our strength prematurely into France. The natural course to effect this is to incorporate all the force now advanced on the Nancy and Chalons line into one powerful army, and to assemble everything in the rear into a great army in the Low Countries, to complete the conquest of the fortresses on the side of Holland, and so to organize itself for active service in the field, as to form a rampart, upon which the more advanced may retire in case of need.

It is the wish of the Allied Sovereigns to confide this important command to the Prince Royal; if his Royal Highness will undertake it heartily and cordially, in the spirit of the political views which have been opened to him, and which have already received his Royal Highness's sanction and approbation. Our intentions, with respect to the compensations to be given for the capture or destruction of the enemy's fleet in the Scheldt, have already been declared.

In entering upon this extended command, composed, as it must be, of different nations, and to be exercised in a country of which the provisional military administration is already invested in other sovereigns, viz., in the King of Prussia and in the Prince of Orange, it is material, in order to avoid confusion and misunderstanding, that the relative state of authority and organization should be previously explained and understood. I herewith enclose a memorandum for that purpose, which will enable you to enter upon the subject with his Royal Highness. My wish is that the troops naturally connected with Great Britain should be placed under Sir Thomas Graham's orders; as the corps hitherto connected with Hanover have been under General Walmoden. Including the troops in the North of Germany, to the command of which, you will observe, the Prince Regent is entitled to nominate, there will be ample means of forming two powerful divisions, in which may be incorporated the Danish corps, which Great Britain is to subsidize. The Swedes will then form a third division, under their own commander; and the Dutch army will constitute the

4th *corps d'armée*. I shall write to Lord Clancarty, to submit the whole arrangement to the favourable consideration of the Prince of Orange, and shall use my good offices to prevail on his Royal Highness to concur in the general wish entertained by the Allied Sovereigns at head-quarters that the Prince Royal should be invited to charge himself with the command of the whole, as Generalissimo; and that, with this view, all the troops acting in advance of the Meuse should be placed under his Royal Highness's orders, as soon as it is ascertained that the Prince Royal accedes to the views of the Allies. It is desirable that you should correspond directly with Lord Clancarty and the Hanoverian Government on all details. Count Münster is here, and I shall lose no time in putting him in relation with you on this subject.

I am very glad to find, by your last despatches, that the Prince Royal approves of the general views you were instructed to open to him. With respect to the reception of his Minister in the Allied councils at Chatillon, we are all very sincerely disposed to put ourselves into his hands. If, upon reflection, his Royal Highness persists in claiming it, we are of opinion it cannot be refused; but we must decline, in that case, the odium of excluding other powers upon nice shades of distinction which we could not expect them to admit, and which, without prejudice to the common cause, we could not attempt to maintain. The alternative then practically is whether this tentative for peace shall be made by four Powers or by four and twenty. In the latter case, any hope of secrecy is at an end; and it is impossible to foresee the variety of questions which may be put forward to embarrass these preliminary proceedings. The Powers now acting feel no predilection for the task they have undertaken. If the advantage of it is not felt and admitted, they do not look to exclude any power interested from concurring in the discussion; but they cannot dissemble from themselves the embarrassment to which it may give birth.

You will apprize Lord Clancarty, without loss of time, of

the Prince Royal's determination; and I shall give contingent orders to open the arrangement to the Prince of Orange.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Aberdeen to Lord Castlereagh.

Chatillon sur Seine, February 17, 1814.

Dear Castlereagh—As I was about to address a note to Caulaincourt upon the subject of your request, I received the enclosed letter, which appears to satisfy every desire you may have relating to this affair.

When I saw Caulaincourt to-day at dinner, I asked for two passports. He said that he would send an officer to conduct a messenger from any place you might desire; but that it would not be desirable for him to go alone, as there was considerable danger, and complaints might be made, when the French Government was not to blame. There is an officer waiting here to accompany the first messenger who may arrive, and there are others at Calais for the same purpose.

Perhaps it might be as well, as long as we remain here, to direct your messengers through this town, unless you should be in advance, or unless you wish that they should go unaccompanied, in which case Caulaincourt desired me to say that he would send passports whenever you pleased. If you should think it right to come here yourself, and the neighbouring district is in its present disturbed state, he offers also to send an officer to escort you.

Our garrison left us the day before yesterday, and we have since been in the hands of the national guard. Small parties of French cavalry have entered the town, and some *gensd'armes*, but there is no appearance of any force. The peasants are armed, and bring in stragglers and sick, &c., as well as the cattle and forage which they can take from the weak parties who escort them.

I received your letter this morning. Cathcart and Stewart have taken copies. This evening we have agreed on our mode

of proceeding towards Caulaincourt. We shall have a conference to-morrow at two o'clock, and we mean to send a messenger to you in the evening. In the mean time, I profit by Stadion's courier, who goes early in the morning.

Yours ever sincerely,

ABERDEEN.

Mr. Hamilton to Lord Castlereagh.

Foreign Office, February 27, 1814.

My dear Lord—Enclosed is the answer returned to Prince Castelcicala's note upon the late transactions in Italy, which was forwarded to you last week. You will find, in another packet, copies of the most important papers which have passed through the Office since that time.

The despatches from Lisbon are to the 5th of February, with nothing of any interest. Those from Brazil are no later than the 20th of October. They are very voluminous; and, if any appear sufficiently important, they will be forwarded by the first messenger. They have only been received this afternoon.

Your lordship has probably been applied to by Werry, who was attached to Lord Cathcart, and is now released from all further connection with his lordship. I hope you will be able to employ him actively on the frontiers of France, or in your Chancellerie. He is very intelligent, active, and faithful, and I believe he and his chief have only parted from *incompatibilité de mœurs.* As Lord Cathcart has often assured me, he found him very useful, Lord Walpole would be delighted to have his assistance—he has repeatedly applied for some aid, and it was once in contemplation to make Werry a fixture at Petersburg, where, I have no doubt, he would make his way very well, and prove useful.

A'Court will probably set out for Sicily in the course of a week. It is at present intended that he should go by the Royal Sovereign.

Did I mention in a former letter that Keppel Craven had written for diplomatic employment?

Your lordship's obedient servant,

W. HAMILTON.

Lord Aberdeen to Lord Castlereagh.

Chatillon sur Seine, February 28, 1814.

Dear Castlereagh—I send you the Protocol of the last conference, as well as a report of that held to-day. In giving in the declaration to Caulaincourt, it was thought right to omit that part which professed to be a citation from his letter to Metternich of the 9th, because it was very inaccurate. At the same time, we did not like to insert the real words of the letter, not knowing what conclusion you wished to draw from them. On making a calculation of the time necessary to go to the French head-quarters and to return, it appeared that eight days were indispensable: it was, therefore, thought that eight and forty hours' consideration might be allowed.

We have nothing new. The peasants are rapidly arming, and the people of the town go out in parties to hunt and shoot the stragglers. They have killed about forty Austrian soldiers between this place and Dijon. A party of three hundred peasants took two officers yesterday, and brought them into the town. They appear to be most enraged in the immediate neighbourhood of this place, and we are advised not to go far from the gates. The Mayor has published a most touching address to the inhabitants in our behalf, from which one should almost imagine that they were Anthropophagi, and require much persuasion to prevent them from devouring us.

I am happy to find that you think the military position good; and I trust that a speedy success will be the means of restoring to us all we have lost. On this part of the subject, I have never had any serious apprehensions: the enemy is, in my view, a source of danger much less to be dreaded than what arises among ourselves. I cannot too often represent to

you the real state of the minds of *those weak men* by whom Europe is governed. The seeming agreement at Langres covered distrust and hate. A little success will cement them again; but, if they are to be severely tried in adversity, their dissolution is certain. *Your presence has done much, and, I have no doubt, would continue to sustain them in misfortune, but without it they could not exist.*[1] It is not a bystander who speaks, but one who knows what their *real* feelings are, and who knows that they are actuated by feelings more than by principle. In all events, I am heartily rejoiced that you are in a situation to see and judge for yourself in all things. It will do you no harm to see and know the interior of a Coalition.

I trust there is no chance that the endeavours of Bonaparte to disunite us should produce any effect. We know nothing of his letter to the Emperor, except what is contained in a letter from Metternich to Stadion: the extract relates to England. Stadion mentioned it to Caulaincourt. He regretted the *passion* of his master; he said that he laboured daily to destroy his prejudices on this subject, and hoped that he should succeed. For himself, he was ready to declare that nothing could be more frank and upright than the conduct of the English Government on this question.

Believe me, most sincerely,

ABERDEEN.

PS. Three days ago, Rasumoffsky showed a letter from Nesselrode, which said no more than that circumstances had rendered *verbal instructions* necessary, and desired that Anstett should be immediately sent to Langres for the purpose of receiving them. This is rather singular, and is worth attending to, especially from the character of the person employed.

PS. 12 o'clock. I have this instant received your letter,

[1] How clearly does this whole letter prove that the entire settlement of Europe was owing alone to Lord Castlereagh!—EDITOR.

written, I suppose, last night, but dated incorrectly. The success of Schwarzenberg is most important in every point of view, and especially in mine. Firmness and perseverance will certainly do all; and, *as long as you remain*, the Allies may have these qualities, whatever may be their fortune. But, as your absence must sooner or later take place, it is well to be provided against it in the only manner in which it can be done effectually.

Lord Castlereagh to the Earl of Liverpool.

Chaumont, February 28, 12 at night.

My dear Liverpool—I hope you will approve our change of policy about the command on the side of Holland. It is the only mode in which unity of command could have been secured here, and the means provided of finishing our work there, which is of the last importance. This success against Victor will be of great value in keeping up our tone. It may also perhaps save us from the armistice, which, although now taken upon a better key, is still a sad falling off.

I trust, upon the whole, you will consider the instruction at Chatillon, and the Emperor of Austria's answer, satisfactory. I pressed the necessity of the latter step earnestly upon Metternich, and I think he has executed it handsomely by us.

Pray lay your shoulders to Antwerp: till that is secured, we run a great risk in case of disaster. The temper of the people is getting very sour. In the towns, the Allied troops are now fired at in their retreat; and, in the villages, small parties are attacked and driven out. Want of magazines leads to pillage, and pillage to hostility. I see no spirit, except in favour of peace, and the getting rid of the troops.

Ever sincerely yours,

CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

The Hague, March 1, 1814.

My dear Lord—Johnson brought me your despatches and private letter of the 20th, and was immediately sent off for England. We had been in a state of great anxiety till his arrival here, open to all rumours, and ignorant of every real transaction, subsequent to the 8th of February, the date of your former accounts transmitted by the Hague. You see, therefore, that your forwarding your despatches by Calais has subjected us here to very great privations; how far prudent under other points of view I shall not pretend to determine.

How fortunate that you should be upon the spot, to endeavour to keep all the horses of the great waggon at steady work, notwithstanding the obstacles they have had to encounter, and the kicking, curvetting, and jibing propensities of some of them! Your letter to Metternich is an admirable piece, and the answer does honour to his Sovereign.

Notwithstanding your lordship's sneers at my Bourbon speculations, it is nevertheless true that there is, and has been for some time back, an insurrection in favour of them between Arras and St. Omer, and which still keeps at defiance everything which Buonaparte has been able to bring against them. To encourage this in any manner to go on, while your negociations are proceeding, would be impossible: how then can the nation be expected to act for itself, when they have not even a declaration from the Allies that, in the event of peace, their interests shall be secured, and their efforts exempted from punishment? How far it might be proper for the Allies to act for them is another question: any difference of opinion on this point must necessarily influence its solution. Such difference of opinion is much to be lamented; but, I am willing fully to admit, must be yielded to. All I wish to establish is that, after all the French have suffered under revolutions, with a system of espionage and difficulty of

inter-communication with each other, such as has existed, without any guarantee upon a peace, which they know is actually negociating, it can be taken as no proof of their attachment to the Buonaparte dynasty, or of their want of love to that of the Bourbons, that a general rising has not taken place in favour of the latter.

Anything effectual against Antwerp is for the present out of the question; in truth, with the force which Sir Thomas Graham has under his command, since the advance of Bülow and the Duke of Saxe-Weimar, he has reckoned himself rather fortunate in not having been attacked from that and the garrison of Bergen-op-Zoom. Not seeing any prospect of being able to undertake operations against the former fortress, and unwilling that his force should remain inactive, when increased by the junction of Gore's brigade (which has just taken place), and strengthened by the landing of his artillery, still frozen up near Williamstadt, he desired me, as you have been already informed, to obtain for him 3,000 Dutch troops, lately employed in the blockade of Gorcum. These have since joined him, but so wretchedly supplied with clothing that Sir Thomas has almost voted them in the aggregate unfit for service. He has, however, absolutely objected to one of the battalions, as being so ill composed of boys, incapable of fatigue, that orders have, at my request, been given for this corps to be withdrawn, and it is, if possible, to be replaced by some other more efficient. This speaks ill of his Royal Highness's military exertions, but more of this presently.

Sir Thomas's design is to attack Bergen-op-Zoom, when properly reinforced, as the garrison of that place is so weak as not to promise much resistance; and, if successful, any future operations against Antwerp will become more easy.

In the mean time, I have endeavoured, hitherto unsuccessfully, to open a negociation with the Commandant of the former place, through Johnson, to see what can be effected by money. It would, in my mind, be a cheap acquisition, if we could obtain

the town and fleet for five millions of francs; and, though I have no authority for the offer of such a sum, yet, at the risk of being disavowed, I have told Johnson he may go to that extent, taking, however, due care to obtain the purchase, if at all to be obtained, at the most moderate rate.

I shall write to the Duke of Cambridge to hasten the Hanoverian troops, which indeed, to do his Royal Highness justice, he seems very desirous to do: but the frost has prevented the arrival of the necessary equipments from Heligoland, where, he informs me, they actually are.

From England, I have yet heard nothing upon the subject of your despatch to Lord Liverpool, of the 3rd of February, relative to confiding the command of the British and Hanoverian troops to the Prince of Orange. Probably, the impression which has been made in England, from the reports of those who have visited this country, of the backwardness of the military exertions of the Dutch Government and people, added to the reports which I have thought it my duty to make upon the conduct of his Royal Highness's agent in the Austrian Low Countries, may have withheld instructions which might otherwise have been given me relative to the projected command. Upon both of these subjects I have some observations to make.

On the first, viz., the want of military exertion in the Government till your arrival here—although your cousin Yarmouth and other idle and unobserving travellers had spread reports in England that no exertions were making, I must confess I thought this charge extremely unjust. Till the period in question, and for some short time afterwards, the Government had, at my request, furnished me with lists from time to time of their army, which marked the progress of the recruiting service, and which were by me regularly transmitted to England. From these lists, it appeared that the progress of enlistment was at the rate of somewhat more than 1,000 men per week, dating from the 3rd of December, the day after

his Royal Highness returned from Amsterdam, on accepting the sovereignty. This, though not perhaps so rapid a levy as, from the enthusiasm evinced upon the relief of the country from French tyranny, might have been by some expected, yet, considering how much the country had already been drained of men, the slow habits of the people, and their want in all latter times of anything like a military spirit, I did conceive that the steady and uniform advance of the recruiting service produced full as large a force for the time, and, moreover, gave earnest for its regular and progressive advance to the full extent of what might reasonably have been looked to.

Soon after your departure hence the Militia drawings commenced. The Militia, you will observe, in this country, although differently levied, is, to all intents and purposes, when drawn out, equally available with what is called the regular army for continental operations, being, though limited in point of duration of service, unlimited in the scene of those services, and equally liable with the regular army to be marched beyond the frontier, and its officers not appointed, as with us, from this or that district, but selected and commissioned by Government.

It was obvious that the raising such a body as 20,000 men by lot, and the provision of substitutes, must necessarily operate upon the recruiting levies, and therefore I was prepared to see the weekly progress of 1,000 men per week diminish, and thus continue till the operations relative to the Militia should have terminated; but, whether from the fear of showing this effect, or from whatever other cause, I know not, but ever since the commencement of the actual drawing for the Militia, Government discontinued furnishing me with these lists. In vain, from time to time, I have spoken to his Royal Highness the Prince of Orange and to the Minister of War to have them sent to me as usual, admitting to each the fact that the recruiting must have diminished by the operation of the Militia levies, and urging the necessity of my being put into possession of the true state of things, for the purpose of communicating

them to my Government, in order that they might be enabled to combat the reports of want of exertion, and prevent, as far as possible, the pre-occupation of the public mind in England with the idea of the slackness of the Dutch Government and people in the general cause, which could not but produce the very worst effect upon this service. I never could obtain, however, the object which I sought; an awkwardness was always apparent in his Royal Highness, whenever the subject was renewed, and my efforts on this point were always without effect.

Upon the receipt, however, of your letter of the 20th, in which you desire to be furnished with the amount of force the Dutch Government have under arms, and with information on their state of forwardness, I was determined to renew the demand to his Royal Highness, and to obtain an *oui* or a *non* upon it. Accordingly I told him that it was utterly impossible for you to take credit with the Allies for the military exertions he was making in the general cause, without knowing what the effect of those exertions was; or for the Government in England to meet all the idle rumours to the detriment of his service, unless they were furnished by him with proper materials for that purpose; that you had actually written to me for information on this point, and I put it to him whether he would have me write in answer what alone I could write with any regard to truth, uninformed of particulars as I was, viz., that, by the last returns I had seen, the army then raised amounted to somewhat more than 9,000; that this was some seven or eight weeks since; that, subsequently to that period, I could never obtain a return, although, as his Royal Highness knew, frequently solicited by me, and that very recently Sir Thomas Graham had obtained a reinforcement of 3,000 men from his Royal Highness, all of which were conceived unserviceable for want of proper equipments, and one battalion utterly so from the badness of its composition; and that none of them were in a forward state of discipline.

After much trouble, and several, as I thought, very lame

excuses, his Royal Highness promised I should have the information I required, and accordingly has given part of it to me late this evening; but the returns are in Dutch, and so many of them, that it will be impossible to detain this courier till they can be translated and transcribed, and almost equally so to give you, with any exactness, the general information you require. Counting the 7th, 8th, and 9th battalions, which are the Orange levies, the two last not yet arrived in Holland, and the three amounting to 2,174 men, and the Nassau and Frankfort regiments, which are stated in the returns at 1,062 men, the gross return of regular and militia force amounts to 20,875 men: of these 5,755 are militia, so that, if from the gross return you subtract the amount of the Orange levies, that of the Frankfort and Nassau regiments, and the militia, the result of the progress in recruiting service will be, from the commencement, a total of 11,884. You will see, however, that, though this reduction marks the number of men raised here by recruiting, the whole gross total of the return, viz., 20,875 men, would be available for the public service, if they were in a proper state of equipment with arms and clothing, and properly formed and disciplined; but, unfortunately, among all the papers delivered to me by his Royal Highness, there is not one word said upon the state of forwardness of these troops, neither can I tell you what portion of them is armed. I believe, however, the far greater part, if not the whole, have either had their arms delivered or appropriated. By one of the returns, it appears they have received 50,320 muskets from England, and of these have delivered 35,332, so that there remain with them 14,988. By another return, it appears how the 35,332 muskets have been delivered; but this return states the names of the persons to whom they have been delivered, and not the battalions; so that it is impossible to state with any exactness whether the whole, or what portion, of the troops have received their arms, or to distinguish what portions have been delivered for the Landsturm, &c., from those delivered for the troops.

As to the state of forwardness in equipment, I cannot say much, from what I have seen, and from the complaints made to me by General Sir Thomas Graham. By the next courier, I hope to put you in possession of more precise information upon the subject. In the mean time, I send you a copy of an apologetical note from the minister of war, which accompanied the several returns given me by his Royal Highness.

Upon the second subject, to which I have referred as having observations to make—I shall after, however, acquitting his Royal Highness's Government of being instrumental to the continuance of the ill-advised measures which have been taken in the Low Countries formerly under the Government of Austria, and placing the whole to the account of the folly of the agents themselves, now, as I believe, not only disavowed, but forbidden further to meddle—transcribe a passage from a letter from Mr. Johnson, then just arrived from Brussels, dated the 25th February, from Graham's head-quarters at Groot Zundert.

"I beg leave to call your lordship's attention to a subject which I mentioned on a former occasion—I allude to the measures adopted by the Dutch Government to prepare the minds of the people of the Netherlands for the expected incorporation of this country with Holland. It would be difficult to give an adequate idea of the mischief which has been already occasioned by these intemperate and injudicious proceedings: and I fear that, if they are persevered in, they will lead to very serious evils. The great majority of the nobility, who, if the fate of their country were *irrevocably* fixed, would probably not be unwilling to worship the rising sun, have been provoked by these premature discussions to make declarations very unfavourable to the Prince of Orange; and, as they are a high-spirited people, it is not unlikely they will continue their hostility to the Prince, merely to show their consistency in adhering to principles so publicly avowed.

"I should not have dwelt so much on these circumstances,

had not two so-called agents of the Dutch Government received, on the 20th inst., a letter from M. Van Zuylen, thanking them for their exertions, and exhorting them to persevere. The two individuals in question, who form part of a numerous flock, have committed every kind of folly; one of them has assumed the title of Minister of the Prince of Orange, and sent a challenge to a nobleman of the first respectability, who presumed to state a doubt of his ministerial character. That these absurdities bring discredit on the Prince of Orange appears evident from the language of the Marquis de Chasteler to me, which I literally transcribe. 'Whatever may be the future fate of this country, or the wishes of the Prince of Orange, it is unworthy of me to endeavour to accomplish his object by exciting a civil war amongst us, and decorating his partisans with a signal of discord.'

"M. Van Zuylen has written to say he means to return to Brussels, but I think the Dutch Government ought rather to send some other agent, in order to get completely rid of a set of unprincipled adventurers whom it has so incautiously employed.

"The Duke d'Aremberg, who has made himself so notorious a partisan of the French, and the Duke d'Ursel, late mayor of Brussels, who was arrested a few days ago by order of the Duke of Weimar, are the only noblemen who, to my knowledge, have declared themselves in favour of the Prince of Orange."

Upon my stating the substance of the above passage to his Royal Highness, he assured me, in the most solemn manner, and with such an air of sincerity that I cannot doubt him, that he had most absolutely recalled all the Dutch agents, and forbid those of Brabant to continue their proceedings from the moment at which our last conversation on this subject was held. But this proves how much easier it is to set people in motion than to stop them, and justifies my apprehensions, stated in my despatch of this date, that too much, rather than

too little, was likely to be done, by way of preparing the public mind in these provinces.

We expect the corps of Walmoden in these parts in about ten days. This will prove a seasonable reinforcement. I understand it to consist of about 7,000 men, comprising two regiments of cavalry.

Adieu, my dear lord: you must be as heartily tired of me as I am of writing. Yours most affectionately,

CLANCARTY.

Lord Castlereagh to the Hon. Sir Charles Stewart.

Chaumont, March 3, 1814.

Sir—By your communication it appears that the Hanoverian levies, including the Hanseatic and Dessau corps, as also the Russian German Legion, have, from the circumstances under which the several levies were made, exceeded by about 3,000 men the numbers to which your orders required they should be limited.

Approving entirely of the decision taken by you upon this question under your instructions, the Prince Regent, having concluded a subsidiary arrangement with the Hanoverian Government, to take effect from the 24th of last January, is nevertheless desirous of relieving the said government from the charge of this extra force to that date; I am to signify to you his Royal Highness's pleasure, that you do issue the necessary directions to the Paymasters accordingly.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Edward Thornton, Esq.

Chaumont, March 3, 1814.

Sir—You will receive enclosed copy of a letter, which Count Münster, by my desire, has addressed to his Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge, in execution of arrangements taken by the Allied Sovereigns, as notified in a former despatch. I also transmit a private memorandum received

from his Royal Highness, of the progress of the formations in Hanover. The battalions, as fast as they can be rendered effective, will be put successively in motion for General Graham's head-quarters.

The army under Prince Schwarzenberg, which had retired on the line towards Chaumont and Langres, have again resumed the offensive, reinforced by the Austrian reserves, which are progressively arriving at the latter place. The corps on the Chalons line are executing the operation entrusted to them, which has already had the effect of compelling Buonaparte, with the greater part of his army, to return towards the Lower Marne, in which quarter, if his force should be successfully united, we flatter ourselves Marshal Blücher cannot fail to establish a decided superiority.

The main army has re-occupied Vaudœuvre and Bar-sur-Seine, and is by this time in the neighbourhood of Troyes.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Aberdeen.

Draft. Chaumont, March 3, 1814.

My Lord—I have to acknowledge the receipt of your lordship's letter of the [blank], covering one from the Duc de Vicenze, in which his Excellency announces the orders he has received from his government, to afford to me all the necessary facilities and protection, both so far as my presence at Chatillon may conduce to the progress of the negociations, and also for my eventual return to England by the most direct route.

I request your lordship will express on my part, and in the name of my government, to the Duc de Vicenze, suitable acknowledgments for this mark of attention on the part of the French Government, and that you will add my personal sense of his obliging civilities on all occasions.

I am, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Clancarty.

Chaumont, March 4, 1814.

My Lord—I have the honour to enclose your lordship some papers which I have received f ı Baron Stein, relative to the Provisional Administration of (rtain countries therein mentioned.

I am to desire that your lor ıhip will communicate these papers to his Royal H' 'ı ıe Prince Sovereign of Holland, and afterwards t ıit ies of them to England.

I l &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Clancarty.

Chaumont, March 4, 1814.

My Lord—Referring to my despatch to your lordship, No. 7, I have now the honour to transmit to your Excellency a further despatch, with its (losures, which I have written to Mr. Thornton on the same ı ıbject, and copies of which I request you will have the goodı s to transmit to England.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Aberdeen.

Chaumont, March 5, 1814.

My Lord—I have been informed by Mr. Robinson, since his arrival here, that during his journey from Calais to Chatillon, the whole of his expenses, of every description, were paid by the French officer who was appointed to conduct him; and that, when he made inquiry upon the subject, he was informed that it was done in consequence of orders from the French Government. As, under the circumstances of our present communication with England through France, there can be no reciprocity in this arrangement, I feel it my duty to direct your lordship to submit to the French Minister for

Foreign Affairs the extreme embarrassment in which it places us. I am sure that the Duc de Vicenze will not suppose, from my noticing this circumstance, that I am at all insensible to the attention which the French Government has shown in regard to such persons as have been employed, either by me or by my government at home, in carrying despatches through France. But you will signify to his Excellency my particular request that the expenses of all such journeys may, in future, be defrayed by the British Government, and not by that of France.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Bathurst.

Chaumont, March 5, 1814.

My Lord—Mr. Robinson returned from England, after a very expeditious journey, yesterday evening. He delivered to me your lordship's despatch of the [blank]; and I beg your lordship will express to the Prince Regent the gratification I have derived from finding that the course pursued by me, under all the circumstances of the case, has been honoured with his Royal Highness's approbation, and that of his confidential servants.

Should the conferences at Chatillon be broken off, I shall not fail to bring the future policy to be pursued under the deliberation of the Allied Courts, and shall acquaint your lordship, for the Prince Regent's information, with the result.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool.

Chaumont, March 5, 1814.

My dear Liverpool—Robinson arrived at Chatillon the fourth day from his leaving London, and joined me here last night. He came by Paris, where he staid a few hours, without hearing or seeing anything particular.

Your private letter is entirely satisfactory to all my feel-

ings, public and private, and it will altogether remove any possible prejudice which might have resulted to the public service from misconception, as to my language not being sanctioned. I took occasion this morning to show it to the Emperor, saying everything that might protect Lieven against any unfavourable impression as to what had passed. I also read to his Imperial Majesty part of your private letter of the 12th, in order to satisfy him that our views have been consistent and essentially coincident throughout.

The discussions at Troyes were necessarily painful, and gave to my intercourse with the Emperor a more controversial character than I could have wished; and I had reason to know that he was not a little impatient of the opposition he had met with from me; but this is all gone by, and his Imperial Majesty now encourages me to come to him without form. I see him almost every day, and he receives me with great kindness, and converses with me freely on all subjects.

As it may be material that you should undeceive Wellington as to any reports of an armistice, I have thought it material to despatch a messenger, without waiting for intelligence from Blücher.

I don't know that the negociation, as it has turned out, has had any effect whatever upon the operations, however it may, from the extraordinary circumstances under which it was brought forward, have tempted the enemy to presume upon the Allies politically; and, in ending so, I hope we have so managed as to recover our position of authority, which has restored harmony and confidence amongst ourselves.

The Austrian reserves are now arriving daily, and as Winzingerode, Bülow, St. Priest, and the Saxons, are all either up, or at hand, our military position is essentially improved. I know of no other defect in it than the difficulty of bringing the two armies into more close connexion; Buonaparte having the advantage of the central position.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Liverpool.

The Hague, March 5, 1814.

My dear Lord—My despatch, No. 49, will give you a general *aperçu* of the state of the actual and probable military means of this country. I think the efforts I have made to obtain this information have been productive of the good effects of infusing a little more life into the exertions of this Government to put forth an army.

It is now in contemplation, in proportion as the several corps can be brought forward, to assemble them at and in the neighbourhood of Breda, and to place his Royal Highness, the Hereditary Prince, at their head. He, although only a Major-General in the army of Great Britain, bears the highest rank in the army here. How far this may produce embarrassment respecting command, or may create difficulty respecting combined operations, you are far better able to judge than I am.

You will also be able better than I am to determine whether, if it is at all in contemplation to follow up the communication made by me to the Prince of Orange, now some time since, respecting his having the command of the combined British, Hanoverian, and Dutch troops, which notification was also made through Mr. Thornton to the Crown Prince, the present is, or is not, the time to do it.

Mr. Johnson was so eager for a communication with Carnot on the subject of A[ntwerp], that he had determined, finding no person fit to employ upon such a mission, to have himself taken prisoner of war, and carried into the place. This I have written to dissuade him from doing, the chance of success being so remote, as not to come in competition, in my judgment, with the certainty of losing his services. His correspondent at Brussels, a M. de Ternois, writes me word that a reinforcement of from 5 to 6,000 Saxons have reached Brussels, on their way to join the Duke of Saxe-Weimar; that the Allies

had made themselves masters of Arras, and that the Cossacks had advanced six leagues beyond that town. He further writes of an insurrection of the peasantry in the neighbourhood of Ostend. I know not what corps of the Allies is alluded to as having taken possession of Arras: that of the Duke of Saxe-Weimar was in that direction at Ath; but, if it had been this corps, as the Duke had repaired to Brussels, for the purpose of reviewing the troops just arrived here to reinforce him, it is probable he would have sent official intelligence here.

General Sir Thomas Graham moved yesterday his quarters to Calmhout, and has advanced in force, so as to cut off the communications between Antwerp and Bergen-op-Zoom.

Yours, &c., CLANCARTY.

PS. The messenger Grey has arrived from Chaumont since writing the above: he is the bearer of despatches to me, which will be copied and sent by this mail in an additional official despatch from me, according to Lord Castlereagh's desire. Grey will go by this mail, with all the despatches from Chaumont and from hence.

Lord Castlereagh to Edward Thornton, Esq.

Chaumont, March 7, 1814.

Sir—Your despatches, Nos. 19 and 20, have reached me this morning. I regret extremely the intelligence contained in No. 19, of the turn which affairs have taken in Norway. You may repeat to the Prince Royal the assurance which you have already given him, of the entire disposition of the Prince Regent's Government to act towards his Royal Highness with perfect good faith; and that nothing can be further from the truth, than any notion that the British Government feels the slightest inclination to support or connive at the independence of Norway.

As a proof of the sincerity of the British Government in

this respect, you will state that I have this morning received intelligence from England, that, in consequence of a representation made by M. de Rehausen, with regard to the state of affairs in Norway, immediate orders had been given, in compliance with his request, that the communication with that country, which had been opened after the signature of the peace, should again be closed. Upon the subject of exchanging the ratifications, I think it right, under the circumstances stated in your letter, to instruct you to suspend that measure until further orders, or until satisfactory explanations shall have been received on this subject.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury.

Chaumont, March 7, 1814.

My Lords—I have the honour to inform your lordships that, in consequence of the renewed representation of the Chevalier Pizarro, Spanish Minister at the Court of Berlin, of the destitute condition in which he has found several Spanish officers and members of Juntas, who have escaped from confinement in France, and of his total inability to afford them any relief, I have thought it right again to furnish M. Pizarro with the sum of two hundred and fifty pounds sterling, for this service; and I have accordingly this day drawn on your lordships a bill in triplicate for that sum, at thirty days after sight, in favour of the Chevalier Pizarro, which I request your lordships will direct to be paid when due.

These sums should, in my opinion, be placed to the account of the subsidy furnished to the Spanish Government.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

The Hague, March 7, 1814.

My dear Lord—My despatch by this messenger will acquaint you with the ready manner in which his Royal High-

ness the Prince of Orange has met and assented to the decision of the Allied Sovereigns, respecting the chief command of his troops in the field, in conjunction with those in British pay, and those enumerated in your despatch No. 7.

In my conversation with the Baron de Hogendorp last night, after he had without reserve, in the most unqualified manner, announced to me the determination of his Royal Highness on this point, he expressed to me the wishes of his Royal Highness: first, that he should be immediately placed in the Provisional Government of the departments allotted to him, and this previous, if possible, to the assumption of the command of the troops in the field by the Prince Royal; secondly, that, if possible, the other departments composing those countries over which it is intended that he should hereafter permanently rule, should be added to those already allotted and entrusted to his provisional administration; thirdly, that, at least, the department de la Dyle, which contains Brussels, the capital of the former Pays Bas Autrichien, should be added to the provisional administration already designed for him; and, fourthly, that, in the line of demarcation between the command of the army in the Prince Royal's hands, and the civil authority of whatever departments may be placed under the provisional administration of his Royal Highness, it should be expressly stated that the levies of troops, contributions for their pay, clothing, &c., in short, all that relates to the civil branch of the army, should fall under the management of the Prince of Orange.

Upon the first of these topics I should conceive little difficulty can occur: indeed, as you will have already perceived by my letters by the last courier, we conceive some mistake has occurred, from which we have been prevented from already seeing his Royal Highness in the actual exercise of the provisional government of the departments stated in M. de Stein's note; and this supposition is fortified by several expressions in your last despatches.

With respect to the second point, I refer you to a note which I have this morning received from the Prince, and to one also from M. de Hogendorp, copies of which are sent herewith, enclosed; and, I must own, it appears to me that there is considerable weight in several of the arguments made use of in both these pieces. Both the Prince and M. de Hogendorp, however, agree with me that there may be difficulties, and objections of which none of us here can be aware, in obtaining the object in view: they are both desirous of placing themselves in your hands, sensible that his Royal Highness's interests in this, as in every other respect, will meet with every attainable degree of success through your efforts.

Upon the third: it indeed does appear that the greatest permanent advantages would be likely to follow the entrusting the city of Brussels to his Royal Highness's provisional government. Here resides a high-minded and spirited noblesse, much attached to the Austrian Government, entertaining, perhaps, unreasonable prejudices against any other government, to conciliate whom, at the earliest possible period, appears to be of the greatest consequence to the views of the Allies for the permanent disposition of these countries.

Upon this point, if, as we conceive, the provisional government of the department de la Dyle is intended to be vested in the King of Prussia, M. de Hogendorp informs me that he does not conceive, considering the close connexion between his Royal Highness and that Prince, that there could be any great difficulty in obtaining his consent to the transfer of the entire department, or even of any other parts of the Pays Bas entrusted to his provisional management, to that of his Royal Highness.

With respect to the fourth head, I think it very possible that you may have already drawn that very line of demarcation between the military command and civil branch of the military service required by the Prince; but, if not, and if it

is still feasible, surely, as well with a view of drawing out in the most equal manner the resources of these countries, as with that of producing those resources in the most available manner, and to their utmost extent, these objects were most likely to be obtained under the management of a Prince, who will feel no less interest in the permanent welfare of the country, than in the utmost efforts which its inhabitants may be capable of making in the common cause, of which he is to reap the immediate and permanent advantage.

After the very handsome and dignified manner in which the Prince has acted relative to the command, I doubt not you will do all that can reasonably be done to promote his wishes.

With this messenger you will receive my despatch to England, No. 49, and copy of my private letter to Liverpool. I do not send you my despatches 50, 51, 52; they are not worth troubling you with. The first is relative to some property claimed by a former Dutch chartered fishing company; the second transmits copy of the Prince of Orange's proclamation on the completion of the Constitution; and the third forwards your despatches received from Chaumont.

I hope you have not over-rated the amount of the army to be assembled in this quarter under the Crown Prince. Of the Hanoverians, we have only heard of the march of Walmoden's corps of 7,000 men. The frost has prevented the arrival of the stores for the equipment of the Hanoverian levies from Heligoland; but, after the arrival of these, the Duke of Cambridge has only hitherto given me hopes of the immediate march of 4,000 men more. I have, however, lately written to his Royal Highness for all the aid he can furnish, and shall by the first courier request him to send me account of his present and the probable state of his future reinforcements, with the times at which they may be expected. My despatch No. 49 will put you into possession of the present and probable state of the Dutch army. By what I can learn, the Swedes do not amount to more than 15,000 men.

Adieu! *I heartily congratulate the world that you are upon the spot to keep all things well together.*

Yours most affectionately, CLANCARTY.

[Enclosure.]

His Royal Highness the Prince of Orange to Lord Clancarty.

La Haye, le 7 Mars, 1814.

Le Prince d'Orange présente ses complimens à Lord Clancarty, et a l'honneur de lui renvoyer les Papiers qu'il avoit confié à sa garde. Il se flatte que le Baron de Hogendorp aura déjà donné à connôitre sa détermination au sujet des désirs écrits par Lord Castlereagh, et espère qu'il y sera trouvé une preuve de son empressement à concourir aux vues de ce Ministre, et à ce qui est jugé utile et nécessaire pour la cause générale.

Le Prince n'a pas hésité un moment à porter le sacrifice de ses désirs, et même l'espérance qu'une défense future de ses États, devenant malheureusement encore nécessaire durant le cours de cette guerre, dependroit des vœux qu'il auroit a cet égard. Il osé d'autant plus compter sur les dispositions des hauts Alliés de remettre à son administration civile et militaire, en leur nom, *et comme Gouverneur-Général*, le département francois dont la presque totalité est destinée à faire à la paix la barrière de la Hollande contre la France. Ce ne sont point de vues particulières où le désir de s'immiscer avant le temps dans l'administration des dites provinces, qui le portent à mettre ce point en avant, mais la pleine conviction que le bien de la cause générale et des hauts Alliés l'éxige pour pouvoir utiliser la Belgique, sans la pressurer, et, en cherchant à électriser ses habitans, les porter à des sacrifices et des moyens de défense, et à des armemens que la force seule auroit de la peine à effectuer.

Le Prince Royal de Suède auroit par là tout de suite un nombre de troupes disponibles plus considerable, puisque l'intérieur n'éxigeroit point de garnisons, et ses armées re-

cevroient promptement des renforts composés d'une nation belliqueuse qui se battroit fort pour l'indépendance de ses propres foyers.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

The Hague, March 7, 1814.

My dear Lord—Since closing my former letter of to-day, I have received a letter from Mr. Johnson, dated Brussels, the 6th inst. He had intended to have been taken prisoner by the garrison at A[ntwerp], not conceiving any one so well qualified as himself to open his business with C[arnot]. Sir Thomas Graham, however, and I have dissuaded him from this, from the improbability of success. He has, however, since pitched upon a person, who, he thinks, may be of service in the business, and whom he will send into the place to try his ground, but without specifying the amount of the consideration. Johnson has also opened a communication with Valenciennes, and is to meet a person thence as to-day: with the result I am to be made acquainted.

Some advance has been made also through him at Maestricht; and here the difficulty experienced is not I understand the principle, but the value of the purchase; 5,000*l.* have been offered: the result not yet known.

Mr. Johnson put into my hands accepted bills to the amount of 84,857,, 2,, 14 florins, which he had received from Lord Aberdeen, and he has now called for these, in order to carry on this service, if I approve of it. As I do not conceive that any better purpose can be answered by the disposal of any public money than sparing great expense of money, time, and, above all, blood, in the siege of strong places, I do not hesitate to comply with Mr. Johnson's wishes.

Mr. Johnson has transmitted me a bulletin, said to be received at Brussels on the 5th, from the Duke of Saxe-Weimar; its substance is, that Blücher arrived at Meaux on the 1st inst., Bülow and Winzingerode on the same day at

Soissons; that the Prussian General Thümen, having, on the 28th of February, directed himself on la Fère, took that place, after a short cannonade, with 400 prisoners, and magazines full of military stores, the value of which is estimated at twenty million francs.

Lord Liverpool cautions me against believing in French insurrections, because Robinson, who passed through Paris, and thence direct to Calais, saw nothing of them. Had he gone between Arras and St. Omer, near Aire, although he might not have seen, he would have heard of their existence; but, if he had gone by that route, he would have made a considerable detour.

Sir Thomas Graham has placed his troops so as to cut off all communication between Antwerp and Bergen-op-Zoom, and I hope he will shortly be able to accomplish the capture of this last place. His change of position a merchant who left Antwerp on the evening of the 5th states to have caused an apprehension that the bombardment was about to be renewed, and he says that two Dutch line-of-battle ships, the Tromp and Royal Hollandais, had been filled with stores, and sent half a mile lower down the river, in company with the French line-of-battle ships, Le César and l'Anversois, which last were armed, for what purpose I could not learn.

Sincerely do I hope your estimate for our army here is not much too high. The Dutch levies, though increasing in number, are still far behindhand in discipline and clothing equipments, and the economy of this army by no means yet *montée*. I must own, I have my apprehensions of the Commander you have given them and the other troops in this quarter, fearing that, unless you are successful in the South, he will make no effort in the North, but hang back, and under various pretences refuse to act. Farewell, my dear Lord,

Yours most affectionately,

CLANCARTY.

The Hon. Sir Charles Stewart to Lord Castlereagh.

Chatillon, March 8, 1814.

My dear Castlereagh—If we did not approach so near our term, and that I was not unwilling to be out of the way, and if Caulaincourt did not dine with me to-day, I should have rode over to converse with you on the instruction received this morning. As it is, I have told my ideas to Stadion: I know not if he will think them worth making use of, but I give you them precisely with the same openness you always allow me.

I do not think it would have been difficult to have answered generally the points set forth in Count Stadion's despatch; by doing so, you would have provided for the most probable course from the French Plenipotentiary, and have countenanced some shade of discretion in your negociations: we should always have had the reference to head-quarters in our power; we never should have committed you; and you would have left us in the belief that you really are desirous of peace, if your *projét* is in substance admitted.

It appears to me, as instructions stand, that, if we were all sick, our *lacquais de place* could just as well do our duties here; everything is to be taken *ad referendum;* and, in the letter of this day, it is rather curiously argued, that the delay of twenty-four hours can make no essential difference in the determination that may be taken by France. Now, this is entirely in the teeth of all our former doctrines; for, inasmuch as we have laid down that the events of the war must necessarily alter our terms, so in justice must France have the same advantage, and a battle gained by Buonaparte during the reference to head-quarters might entirely change Caulaincourt's answer. My impression on this is, that you must fix your general ideas better, and give us some more extended discretion, if you mean we should be an efficient congress for peace or war: if, on the contrary, you like to train on the

things left us, we should know your drift. You have certainly so distinctly stated that every rejoinder that comes from the French Plenipotentiary should be taken *ad referendum*, that the only possible case where we should be puzzled would be the acceptance of our *projét* by Caulaincourt, and the request from him, on our part to sign the preliminaries. Now, though I admit this is very improbable, still it is in the cards, by a great defeat of Buonaparte by Blücher, and a sudden order sent here to close on the *projét*. As negociators, how should we stand, if we delayed accepting the terms we have laid down? and still, according to your orders, we must even in such case refer. It is most probable that Caulaincourt will accompany his *projét*, if he comes near our conditions, by a direct proposition for an armistice, yielding very likely to your line of demarcation. He has appeared very much cast down that this has fallen to the ground.

As events stand now, twenty-four hours may make the whole difference, and the Allies should not play so very changeable and undefined a game. I am told, if we do nothing here, and all breaks off, the armies and some of their chiefs will be again as clamorous for armistice, to change the theatre of the war, to give repose, &c., as they have been before. It is only the hope of our doing something that has reconciled them to the breaking off of the armistice. You should know all this better, but some of the contingents and their leaders think they have fought enough on French ground.

Now really, after having resounded *ad referendum* on every key in our ears, you put us in rather an awkward situation upon the only point on which you have taken a decision, and which you leave us to execute, but I defy the ingenuity of man to make the proceeding of the negociators under your orders *consistent* and dignified.

In our instructions of the 25th of February, *which forms part of the Protocol*, you direct: "Vous vous concerterez avec le négociateur Français à l'égard du tems indispensablement

nécessaire pour communiquer avec son Gouvernement par la route la plus directe, et vous declarerez là dessus que, si *à telle époque une réponse conforme en substance à la base établie dans le projét des Alliés n'était point arrivée, la négociation serait regardée comme terminée et que les Plénipotentiaires des Cours Alliées retourneraient au quartier-général.*"

Now, after this formal proceeding, it seems deviating largely from a firm and dignified declaration, to follow what is pointed out in the following paragraph, in your instructions of the 7th of March:

"Dans le cas, peu probable au reste, où le Plénipotentiaire Français laisserait écouler la journée du dix sans réponse quelconque, votre Excellence voudra bien dès la matinée du onze lui remettre conjointement avec Messieurs ses collègues une note pour lui annoncer que ce fait a été porté à la connoissance des Cours Alliées."

It must here be remembered that our proceeding is by Protocol, and that notes are out of the order laid down, if we are to act from the declaration of the 25th of February. Much more, if we are to depart from it, we owe it to our course of business to ask for a conference, and have it inserted upon the Protocol, that we have, for such and such reasons, taken such a step, and have not carried into effect what we first laid down.

I have ventured, my dear Castlereagh, to give you, entirely privately, my own observations. They may be worth little. If I could get to you, I am sure I should be as usual set right, but, as I can't, I send Wood[1] over with this, and who will bring us back the news.

Lord Aberdeen to Lord Castlereagh.

Chatillon sur Seine, March 8, 1814.

Dear Castlereagh—I send you some despatches from Wilson. I hope the affair of Cattaro may be settled; but

[1] Major Charles Wood, brother of Colonel Wood, of Littleton.—EDITOR.

this Bishop of Montenegro and his robber subjects may cause some difficulty. I some time ago received a letter from Captain Hoste, of the Bacchante, who seems to have acted precipitately in abandoning the place to these banditti; the more so, as he must have had Admiral Freemantle's instructions to avoid all co-operation with them.

I also send you the letters of Caulaincourt and myself, on the subject of messengers, which, I hope, meet your wishes.

I must give you an account of what passed yesterday at his house, where we dined. Before dinner, he asked if we had any news from the armies. I answered in the negative. He then asked what was the state of the negociations for an armistice: I told him they had terminated. He expressed surprise and regret, and asked on what grounds the treaty had been broken off. I said that the proposition of the Allies had not been accepted, and I rather believed that the line of demarcation was the cause of the difficulty. He seemed to be greatly astonished, and lamented it very much. He continued to say, that he feared it was an additional obstacle in the way of peace; for, while the armies changed their position daily, an arrangement was more difficult.

He pressed this a good deal, and I could not help saying that his lamentations might possibly be right; but, for my own part, I had never seen anything in the disposition of his Government which made me at all surprised at any measure tending to impede the restoration of peace. He denied this inference, and professed great anxiety on the subject. He asked in what instance there had appeared anything the least like an anti-pacific disposition, and declared that all his intercourse with his Government was of a different character. I mentioned the letter of Bonaparte to the Emperor of Austria. He protested, on his word of honour, that he had never seen this letter: he had collected from conversation with Count Stadion and others, that such a letter existed, and had written on the subject to his Government, but had received no answer,

nor had any notice been taken of his request. He inquired into the nature of the letter, and wished to learn the particulars; but I thought it best not to enter into any statement of this kind. I merely observed that it was a letter of *passion*, and certainly not written in a pacific tone. He asked if an answer had been returned, and if it was firm and decided in its character, which he most sincerely hoped it was. I told him the *passion* of the letter had given a great advantage to the answer, which was as wise and firm as he could possibly desire. After a few general observations, the conversation ended. This ignorance of Caulaincourt is a very singular fact, on which you may put different constructions; but that he is really in the dark respecting the views and intentions of his master, I have no doubt whatever.

I am almost inclined to believe that we shall receive no answer on the 10th; but this must be materially influenced by the military operations. We have received our fresh instructions, which are certainly sufficiently precise to remove all difficulty from *us*. Perhaps, in some respect, their appearance is not quite what one could wish. We have declared to the French Minister, according to order, that, if we received no answer, or if the answer to our *projét* differed essentially, we should return forthwith to head-quarters. This turns out to be a false declaration; for I apprehend we are to remain, in any case. If an answer should be received substantially agreeing with the *projét*, we have declared also, in writing, that we are willing to treat on the subject of modifications. This also is not true; because, whatever the answer may be, it is taken by us *ad referendum*.

Metternich's reasoning on this subject is rather comical: he says that a delay of twenty-four hours can make no difference. How did he learn that? It may make the whole difference between acceptance and refusal. For it is clear that if Caulaincourt accepted the substance of our proposition, and we took it *ad referendum*, in case his master gained any great

success in the interval, he would be bound to nothing. This is according to the principle on which the Allies have acted. There may be no great danger, but it might have been obviated.

Stewart is writing to you at length on the subject of the instructions. So far as we are concerned, I think we should be satisfied. It removes the possibility of any difference of opinion; for, where there is no discretion, there can be no difference. It is altogether more consistent with the spirit in which the negociation has been carried on throughout by the Sovereigns themselves, and not by their Plenipotentiaries.

There is only one point on which I would observe, with a view to any change, and I would say nothing, if I did not think it was an oversight, notwithstanding Metternich says he has *mûrement pésé* the affair. If no answer is returned, we are directed to give in a *Note*, informing Caulaincourt that we have brought this fact to the knowledge of our Governments. Would it not be better to have a *Conference* for this purpose? We have yet had no interchange of *Notes*. If we begin, it is difficult to say where we shall stop. We deviate from the principles mutually agreed on at the beginning of our proceedings, and without any reason that I can perceive. If we take this liberty, the French Minister may follow our example, and the whole course of proceeding may be changed. After all, this is a matter of form, and therefore of less consequence. If it has been adopted with due consideration, I have not a word to say.

Believe me ever sincerely yours, ABERDEEN.

I send you enclosed two letters which Caulaincourt has received for you. If you have any answers to send, he offers to take charge of them.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool.

Draft. Chaumont, March 8, 1814.

My dear Liverpool—I enclose, for yours and Vansittart's consideration, a note which I have received from Count Nesselrode, with my answer, on the subject of which the Emperor

of Russia spoke to me himself with much solicitude. You will recollect that this object was pressed upon us soon after the restoration of amicable relations with Russia, and was then declined. The intended aggrandizement of Holland has suggested a new occasion on which that Power hopes to relieve herself from this incumbrance.

You must have observed that a considerable interval occurred between the execution of the instrument lately signed, relative to the Low Countries, on the part of Russia, and its signature by the two other Powers. This arose from an endeavour directly to connect the liquidation of the Dutch loan as a condition with her accession to the Convention in question. To this attempt I had no hesitation in giving a direct negative. The Convention was signed, and the claim confided to the liberality of the Prince Regent's Government.

I have stated distinctly to the Russian Minister the difficulties of this question, but I have felt so strongly the immense importance at the present moment of not wholly discouraging the interested motives which may carry forward Russia in this, to her, most expensive and distant struggle, that I have undertaken to bring the subject thus privately under your favourable consideration.

You will observe that the request is wholly founded upon the previous successful execution of our views for uniting Brabant with Holland. It is not proposed that the capital of the loan should be paid off, but that the interest, with a moderate sinking fund, should be defrayed. I have also reason to believe that the Emperor would not be dissatisfied, if the annual charge thus to be computed was to be defrayed equally between the three Powers, viz., Russia, Great Britain, and Holland.

I am aware that this transaction differs essentially in its character from any aid which the Parliament of Great Britain has hitherto been prevailed on to afford to a foreign State; and yet practically, in its political influence, it may be of more real importance, both upon the war itself and upon the future

happy construction of the Continent, than a greater sum provided in the ordinary shape of subsidy.

I certainly consider the advantage by no means unimportant of giving Russia *a direct interest* in the execution of our views on the side of Flanders, and especially if the Prince Royal is charged with the conduct of the operations in that quarter. A consideration of this nature may not be requisite with the Emperor himself, but it would furnish him with a useful instrument to repress the clamour with which I know he is assailed, for being so prodigal of the blood and treasure of his people upon objects remote from his own frontier.

The demand in itself appears to me much more one of policy than justice. In the latter sense, Austria and Prussia are in some respects equally, if not more, entitled. If it can be done, I have no doubt Russia could induce both these Powers to support her views, without bringing forward any claims of their own; and if Great Britain is prepared to bear her one-third, I do not think it would be an unreasonable condition to make on the part of the Allies with the Prince of Orange's Government, having first conquered these rich provinces at their own charge, at the moment of their transfer to his family to charge them with some inconsiderable portion of that expense, in favour of the particular member of the confederacy, which certainly has made, and continues to make, the most inconvenient sacrifices for the common interest.

If I am enabled to give encouragement to these views on the part of Russia, I am of opinion that it may be attended with the most beneficial consequences, in bringing the contest in which we are engaged to a satisfactory issue.

Lord Walpole to Lord Castlereagh.

St. Petersburgh, March 8, 1814.

My Lord—I trust I shall stand excused for the step which I mentioned as having taken in my secret and ciphered of January 14, 1814. The fulfilment of my agreement was

dependent upon your lordship's approval of its entire success. Since this, I have been assured of the hearty concurrence of the first person mentioned therein, but circumstances, which it is impossible to detail to your lordship, have subsequently much diminished the credit of the second. I have, however, reason to think that he has regained a part, and he will be always a *valuable friend*.

The finances of this country are in a deplorable state: various proposals for their amelioration have been made to a committee appointed for that purpose, among which is one, something similar (at least in its effect) to the public bankruptcy declared a few years ago in Austria, viz., the emission of a new kind of paper money. It is enough to state that the theatres are totally ,[1] and would in this country most probably produce a revolutionary effect: it is not unlikely that a demand for some sort of assistance may be made upon England.

In spite of all solemn promises, &c., to the contrary, the clandestine issue of the paper money of this country by the Government has been lately enormous; and it is daily lowering in value throughout Germany and the Continent. The exchange with England is here considered as the touchstone of finance; but, in spite of every kind of effort, it has been, and is rapidly falling.

The state of the interior is not less alarming. The slavery of the peasantry, with the lately acquired knowledge of their own force, forms the most prominent feature. The Emperor seems always to have wished, and has gone some way towards their emancipation; but it will require a strong and dexterous hand to direct this universal sentiment, which threatens to shake this empire to its foundations.

Considerable fear of Turkey is visible; troops on their march to the army have been ordered to that frontier, to be replaced in Germany by the depôts and new levies. It is much to be regretted that the Emperor could not have been

[1] An evident omission, but no blank in the autograph original.

induced to recede from what equally exasperated the Turks, and gave well-founded jealousy to Austria.

I have reason to believe that Mr. Laval is concerned with those I mentioned in my private letter to your lordship, of February 19, 1814. Mr. Merry, of Leeds, sends abroad steam-engines, and in the packages of the necessary apparatus are mixed the machinery desired to be exported. The smaller parts are concealed in the pipes and tunnels belonging to the steam-engine; and the whole escapes the inexperienced eye of the Custom-house officer. A young Englishman, lately gone through Sweden, with his sister, is also a party employed.

I have the honour to be, &c., WALPOLE.

Lord Walpole to Lord Castlereagh.

March 9, 1814.

My Lord—By the next opportunity, I shall have the honour of sending you the copy of a memoir given to the Emperor last year, by a General Guillaume de [Vaudoncourt],[1] General in the Italian army, and made prisoner at Wilna. He had long been desirous of quitting the French service, and must be a man of considerable talents, as he was at the head of the Geographical Depôt de la Guerre, and Chief of the Council of Engineers appointed by Buonaparte to consider of the best means of defence for Italy.

There are above 10,000 Italian prisoners, with a great many officers, in Russia, mostly in the Ukraine; and his proposal was to embody these, to march them through Hungary into Italy, or to send them from Odessa by sea, to form a noyau and support to insurrection.

Should affairs not have taken a decided turn in that country, he might be of essential service to Lord William Bentinck, from his local knowledge, or his plan might possibly engage your lordship to speak to the Emperor on the subject.

I have the honour to be &c., WALPOLE.

[1] Blank in original.

Lord Aberdeen to Lord Castlereagh.

Chatillon sur Seine, March 9, 1814, 12, P.M.

My dear Castlereagh—As Rasoumoffsky sends a courier to-night, I take the opportunity of writing a few words, although I have not much to say. I think the instructions of a supplementary nature, which you promise us, will obviate any objections which might have been made to the former. Something of the kind will be necessary; for the conjecture which I formed some time ago, and communicated to you, will, according to present appearances, be confirmed.

There seems to be little probability that we shall receive any answer from Bonaparte through Caulaincourt. To-day, after dinner, he took Count Stadion aside, and said that he intended to ask for a conference to-morrow; he confessed that he had heard nothing from his master, but, being in hourly expectation of it, he hoped we would permit the conference to be postponed till the evening. He wished to engage us to defer our departure; and, although he was not enabled to answer the *whole* of our *projét*, he hoped he should be in a condition to make such observations on *parts* of it, as would engage us to give the subject a further consideration. He complained of the state in which his Goverment left him. He entreated Stadion to consider his situation, and to recollect that he had to carry on a negociation with his own Government, perhaps more difficult than with us.

He again asked Stadion about Bonaparte's letter to the Emperor and the answer: he hoped that it was firm and decided, and augured well from the account which Stadion gave him. I advised Stadion, for the present, to confine his description of the letter to a general statement. He merely said that Bonaparte was sufficiently civil to Austria, but most injurious to Great Britain and Russia. Stadion added, that Metternich had endeavoured to expose the injustice of these reproaches, and had again stated the indissoluble nature of

the coalition. Caulaincourt appeared perfectly satisfied. He repeated his assertions that peace would be made, and only hoped that the Allies would continue firm and moderate.

I believe Humboldt saw Caulaincourt in the morning, and that a conversation of a similar nature had taken place between them. I rather avoided him to-day, not wishing to have more of his *confidences* than the others.

Yours most sincerely, ABERDEEN.

PS. I will send a messenger to-morrow night with the result of our conference.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Aberdeen.

Draft. Chaumont, March 9, 2, A.M.

My dear Aberdeen—The instruction you have received was decided on in a hurry, and perhaps all the possible cases were not sufficiently weighed. You will receive an explanatory one in the course of to-morrow, so as to be prepared for the 11th.

There can be no objection to a declaration in Conference *instead of a Note*. Metternich's idea in authorizing a reference, even in case of no answer, was not to prejudice the *possibility* of the ten days being insufficient, under certain turns the operations might take since the period of ten days was fixed.

I have suggested for consideration that the declaration should be on our part, if no answer or explanation is given, that the negociation is considered as terminated; *if an explanation is given*, that you should be authorized to refer that explanation for the decision of the Sovereigns. This will save our consistency, without putting the result upon the issue of a courier.

So much depends on the tone and *ensemble* of the answer, that I do not conceive it possible to give any directions as to the mode of treating the *contre-projét*, or conducting the negociations, till we have seen the *contre-projét* itself.

In the almost inconceivable case of a dry and unqualified

acceptance, perhaps there might be no objection to give you power to accept, subject to the redaction of the *projét* in due form. At present it is mere *projét*, and not even preliminary treaty. It omits prisoners and other points usually included. I am scribbling half asleep.

You will exercise your own discretion about despatches. If you forward them to England, send me the substance, if not a copy. Ever yours, in great haste,

C.

Lord Aberdeen to Lord Castlereagh.

Chatillon sur Seine, March 10, 1814.

My dear Castlereagh—Our conference is just concluded, but I must refer you to Stadion's despatch for the particulars, as it is late, and the only important part of the proceeding consists of a long declaration given in by Caulaincourt, by way of observations on our *projét*, and a list of the cessions which Buonaparte is prepared to make. The original papers will be transmitted by Stadion. From what has passed, you will be able to judge what new instructions we require, or if we require any. I do not believe that Caulaincourt received these declarations from his master, but that they have been composed here. The list of cessions is so worded as to compromise Buonaparte as little as possible. You will observe that, when mention is made of the *limits* of France, they are not described. Nothing is said of any cession in the Netherlands. The independence of Italy is, indeed, admitted; but it is not said in what manner it is to be established, whether as a kingdom, under Beauharnois or any other person. The only object which Caulaincourt appeared to have much at heart, was to engage us to remain; and this he testified in a manner too obvious to be mistaken.

I think you are perfectly at liberty to do what you please, for we did not even take the declarations of Caulaincourt officially, *ad referendum*, but received them almost in silence.

He was particularly anxious that we should not consider anything he said as a refusal of our *projét*—on the contrary, he declared repeatedly that he was ready to enter at once *dans le fond de l'affaire*, but wished that the observations might have the weight they deserved. He proposed to fix a time for another conference, but Stadion said that we were not in a condition to listen to any proposal of that nature.

I must observe that he came up to me before dinner to-day, and asked about you: he asked if there was any hope of your return. I professed ignorance of your intentions. He said, "For the love of God, engage him to return! If he were but here, and would listen to my propositions, so that we might understand each other, we should speedily conclude the affair. How is it possible to conclude matters at a public conference? Neither party can easily be brought to declare the last word; but I am confident, if we could discuss the points separately, there would be no material difference. You are not to judge from a public declaration, made to save appearances, what may be the ultimate intention." I made no reply whatever to this very remarkable speech, which, I have no doubt, was intended to have reference to the transaction of this evening.

I shall be anxious to hear to-morrow what may be your instructions. I will send a report of this night's conference, when I have been able to concert it with Cathcart and Stewart. In the mean time, I send the protocol of the conference of the 28th of February.

Ever most sincerely yours, ABERDEEN.

Lord Castlereagh to Mr. Hamilton.

Chaumont March 10, 1814.

My dear Hamilton—I have been a very bad correspondent, but I have found it difficult to supply one intelligible report of the many events passing here. In order to avoid trouble in classing, I have addressed the whole to Liverpool. When I

return, I can settle with him what despatches shall be made official, in which case Lord B.'s name can be substituted.

I send you my treaty, which I hope you will approve. We four Ministers, when signing, happened to be sitting at a whist-table. It was agreed that never were the stakes so high at any former party. My modesty would have prevented me from offering it; but, as they chose to make us a military Power, I was determined not to play a second fiddle. The fact is, that upon the face of the treaty this year, our engagement is equivalent to theirs united. We give 150,000 men and five millions, equal to as many more—total, 300,000. They give 450,000, of which we, however, supply 150,000, leaving their own number 300,000. The fact, however, is that, sick, lame, and lazy, they pay a great number more. On the other hand, we give to the value of 125,000 men beyond the 300,000. What an extraordinary display of power! This, I trust, will put an end to any doubts as to the claim we have to an opinion on continental matters.

I am not aware of anything in the treaty which may require revision. As it is an instrument of great moment, I shall, however, stay the ratifications here till the return of the messenger, whom I beg you will expedite. If it can be avoided, better make no change; if there is any essential error, being all assembled, we could, without any serious inconvenience, execute new copies, and cancel these. As soon as I hear from you, I shall send off the ratification of the three Powers, to be exchanged in London. By laying the treaty before Parliament before the holidays, we can discuss it immediately on my return. Yours truly, CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Burghersh to Lord Castlereagh.

Troyes, March 12, 1814.

My dear Lord Castlereagh—I send you a despatch, with, I fear, but little news in it. Our operations are, in my mind, very singular: the fact is, we are afraid of fighting. I am

convinced this army will not be risked in a general action; without one, I don't see how we are to break down Buonaparte. Schwarzenberg would almost wish to be back upon the Rhine; he has so many difficulties to face in his present advanced position, that nothing but a victory could extricate him; but this he thinks a dangerous remedy: to go back without being forced, would require great nerve to bear the responsibility, so he continues where he is, without, I fear, any great prospect of doing much, unless the way was made easy for him by victories gained by others of the Allied armies.

Some time ago, a Swiss officer, Lieut.-Colonel Freudenreich, who was formerly in the English service, and on the staff of General Hope, when he was with the Austrian armies, proposed to attach himself to me, if I could give him an appointment. I answered, it was impossible; but, from some confusion in a message delivered to him, he joined me at this place before our retreat. I explained to him I could do no more than offer him my table: he has remained with me. I must say he is of great use to me; without, therefore, saying anything to him, I wish you could allow me to give him an appointment of secretary, such as is at present allowed me, and amounting to fifteen shillings per diem. The truth is, I very much want a person like him, who speaks German. It remains, however, for your decision.

My messenger Vich takes this letter; he is very unwell, and can't ride. I wish you could send me another who was more active.

Peace is the constant cry of every officer in this army. It is very disgraceful, but it is my duty to tell you of it—the army is in a state of great disorganization, pillage and plundering at its utmost. The inhabitants of this town can get no bread: they are starving, and eat the dead horses which are to be met with in the streets.

Believe me ever yours most sincerely,

BURGHERSH.

Lord Castlereagh to Sir Henry Wellesley.

Chaumont, March 12, 1814.

Sir—I enclose, for your confidential information, copy of a treaty which has just been signed between the Courts of London, Vienna, St. Petersburg, and Berlin. Until the ratifications are exchanged, it cannot be made regularly the object of an official proceeding, but you may communicate confidentially upon it with the Spanish Government, and prepare them for the early invitation which they may expect to receive, under the Second Secret Article, to accede to this treaty.

The importance of its policy, and the value to the nations of the Peninsula of having the great military Powers of Europe solemnly pledged to their defence, will, as I have no doubt from your past correspondence, be duly appreciated both by the Regency and Cortes. This measure is now perhaps more than ever important, in order to discourage, on the part of France, any attempt hereafter to presume upon the engagements which were lately so disgracefully imposed upon Ferdinand VII. in his captivity.

I shall be desirous of learning, as early as possible, the sentiments of the Spanish Government upon this important subject. Should they feel disposed to accept the invitation to be made them, I should wish the necessary instructions to be sent to their Ambassador in London, to treat as to the number of troops, &c., to be furnished by Spain. On this point I should be glad of any preliminary information your Excellency can procure, as to the sentiments of the Government.

I have, &c. CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Cathcart to Lord Castlereagh.

Chatillon sur Seine, March 12, 1814.

My dear Lord—There was not much to add to the original documents transmitted in the night of the 10th and 11th, to

put your lordship in possession of all that took place at the conference of the 10th; and, as Lord Aberdeen and Sir Charles both wrote private letters after we had conferred together, I did not think there was anything worth troubling you to read a third letter.

The long paper was, I have reason to believe, drawn up here, with much labour, and at the expense of many *brouillons*. Its length was calculated to create delay in copying, and in considering, and still more in discussing, had it produced this latter end. It has occasioned some delay in the present stage; for this morning, at a meeting of the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts, upon receiving Prince Metternich's letter, and the copy of the instructions drawn up by the Cabinet at Chaumont, it was agreed to send a message to the Plenipotentiary of France, to propose a conference at eight o'clock this evening, which was accepted. But it was found impossible to engross the Protocol of the last conference, including that paper, within the intermediate time; and therefore it was proposed by the Plenipotentiaries of Prussia, and agreed to by Count Rasoumoffsky, to put off the conference till to-morrow. *We* urged the expediency of employing more hands, and of meeting an hour or two later this evening. But punctuality even under this appeared so doubtful that it was abandoned, and the meeting stands for to-morrow at one, p.m.

I take it for granted the French Plenipotentiary will endeavour to avail himself of the twenty-four hours, and that it will therefore be Monday, the 14th, before the conferences will be declared at an end. I have no expectation of acceptance, or even of a counter-*projet* upon or near the basis offered.

I have a few lines of the 3rd, from Sir T. Graham's headquarters at Groot Zundert. That army is now not in force to block Antwerp; for the Prussians and Saxons have allowed 3,000 French to come back into Flanders, by Courtray, to Ghent, who may get to Antwerp by the Tête de Flandre, which would make that garrison 13,000. Sir T. Graham was

taking precautions to prevent anything being thrown into Bergen-op-Zoom.

Ever, my dear lord, most sincerely yours,

CATHCART.

Lord Aberdeen to Lord Castlereagh.

Chatillon sur Seine, March 12, 1814.

My dear Castlereagh—I enclose a private letter which I have received from Johnson. You will probably have the means of forming a just estimate of the state of the public mind in the Netherlands to which he alludes. This strong desire of States which have formerly been under the Austrian dominion to return to their ancient condition, is at least a proof of the practical mildness of the Government.

I hope all this party-spirit may subside, and with a little management it ought to do so, there being nothing in reality to keep it up. Believe me ever sincerely,

ABERDEEN.

The new instructions you have sent us are sufficiently precise. A delay has taken place in their execution. I will write to-morrow evening, when we shall see the result.

[Enclosure.]

Mr. Johnson to Lord Aberdeen.

Brussels, February 20, 1814.

My Lord—The bearer of this letter, whom I have the honour to introduce to your lordship's acquaintance, is the Marquis de Chasteler, one of the members of the deputation appointed by the City of Brussels to convey to his Majesty the Emperor of Austria the prayer of the inhabitants that the Belgian provinces may be governed by a prince of the Imperial Family. The choice of the members who compose this deputation is very judicious, as they are all distinguished by the purity of their political principles; and, whatever may be the ultimate fate of this country, it appears to me that the

determination of its inhabitants to express in a suitable manner their attachment to their former Sovereign will be gratifying to his Majesty the Emperor of Austria and to the Allies in general.

I am sorry that it is not in my power to give your lordship any very gratifying account of the state of this country. The people are discontented at not seeing any Austrian troops amongst their deliverers; and some injudicious measures which have been adopted to procure partisans for the Prince of Orange have created a violence of party-spirit, which is very prejudicial to the general interest.

Should it appear necessary, during the progress of the war, to call forth the military resources of the Netherlands, this can only be done effectually by the immediate intervention of Austria. Baron M. has not been so successful as we had reason to expect; but I believe that whatever has been done by the inhabitants in aid of the common cause may be attributed to his efforts.

I direct all my attention to the object which principally interests us. Mr. Gordon will have informed your lordship of the failure of the first attempt made in this business. I am now repeating the experiment, and, if I succeed, I shall lose no time in communicating the intelligence to your lordship. I have the honour to be, &c.,

J. M. JOHNSON.

Lord Aberdeen to Lord Castlereagh.

Chatillon sur Seine, March 13, 12 o'clock.

My dear Castlereagh—Many thanks for your good news, which I have just received in time to enable me to send it to Liverpool, Caulaincourt having detained our messenger a couple of hours, in order to accompany one of his own. The effect of these successes just at this moment is incalculable.

I have sent to Liverpool a duplicate of the report of our former conference, as well as that held to day, which I now

send you. It is full, and, I think, accurate, taken from notes made at the time. By comparing it with Stewart's, and the report of Stadion, you may judge. You will see at last that we have obtained the promise of a *contre-projet;* yet I doubt if his present instructions will enable him to go far enough to fulfil our conditions. Since the conference to-night, two couriers have arrived, who may have brought further orders.

It has been quite impossible for me to get a copy made of Caulaincourt's long paper. I have but one assistant, who has been necessarily employed; besides which there is but one copy here, and it is in the hands of Rasoumoffsky at present, and must circulate. I have described it to Liverpool, and quoted the principal features, which may do for the present, as nothing depends on it.

I could wish you to take a look at us here, if we are to remain. Most likely we shall not, but it is possible. The most Caulaincourt can do to-morrow will be to present such a *contre-projet* as may deserve to be sent to you; but it is very doubtful if we shall not be obliged at once to declare the negociation at an end; at least, this seems to be the present intention, unless he deviates very widely indeed from the Frankfort basis.

Yours most sincerely, ABERDEEN.

PS. I send you some despatches just arrived from Wilson. If it enters into your views, the sum of £45,000 is not a great deal for Venice. I think there are three or four line-of-battle ships. If you have any instructions to give, be so good as to let me know, or write yourself. W. says it is understood that no part of the arrangement shall take place, unless the Allies are first *actually in possession* of the town and arsenal: so you have plenty of time.

Lord Cathcart to Lord Castlereagh.

Chatillon sur Seine, March 13, 1814.

My dear Lord—I have seen Lord Aberdeen's account of the conferences of this day, and I am not aware that it is

necessary to trouble you with further details than what you will find in his report, and in that which I have no doubt but that Sir Charles will send.

Your lordship will, I think, see that the French Plenipotentiary wished to amuse us by entering into vague discussion of the points stated in his *observations* and verbal declaration; and that even the declaration would not have been given on the same day, if the observations had not been declared to be no more than general animadversion. In like manner, this day he was prepared to contend that the declaration was not only an answer, but a concession of six important points out of seven, and that he would discuss these or any of them at any length we pleased; and that, as to the other points, he would go into them in discussion when we had done with the former; and that, either to put us upon reference to our Courts, or to discourage us from pressing a counter-*projet*, he named the Frankfort communications as what he would take for his counter-*projet*. Driven from that by our adherence to the demand of acceptance, rejection, or counter-*projet*, within twenty-four hours, he solicited leave to send to his Court for fresh instructions; and it was not till it was explained that, if he persisted, we must declare the conferences at an end, by the refusal of France, that he consented to give a counter-*projet* within the twenty-four hours, if, considering the state of La Bernardiere's health, it could be got ready by nine o'clock to-morrow night: if that was impossible, next day.

This confirms me in my opinion that it is considered by the French Cabinet to be of the utmost consequence to keep the conferences alive, but to avoid making real progress; on the other hand, that a little firmness will oblige them to come to the point rather than break off the negociation, and will very soon compel them to declare the decision for peace or war—a most difficult question at this moment.

I hope, on these grounds, that it will be the policy of the Allies to continue to press the decision upon the *projet*, and

that the successes of that army which is brought into contact with the enemy, and the menacing attitude of the whole preparations, will render it impossible for Bonaparte to venture to break off the negociation.

I most heartily congratulate you on the despatches you were so good as to send under flying seal, and your complete success. The Convention and the Treaty are most important, and reflect the highest honour on you who planned and obtained them. The Treaty cannot fail to give the English satisfaction at home.

The nation will also, I am sure, be proud of the engagement you have taken for the part Great Britain is to take, when it is understood. It is impossible to place the exertions made in a better light, or more calculated to increase her influence on the Continent.

Ever, my dear lord, most sincerely yours,

CATHCART.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

The Hague, March 13, 1814.

My dear Lord—Your letter of the 4th, marked private, having notified to me the expectation of the Allies that, in consideration of the continental arrangements proposed to be made in favour of the House of Orange, his Royal Highness should be prepared to give up a West India colony to Sweden, to indemnify her for the proposed cession of Guadeloupe to France, and having placed it at my discretion at what time to open this business to the Prince of Orange, it appeared to me that the most immediate and frank manner of communicating with his Royal Highness upon this matter was the best line I could take upon it.

Accordingly, having been admitted to a private audience with his Royal Highness on Thursday last, I at once opened the business, and, at the same time, communicated to him the accession on the part of Russia to the barrier of Holland,

before agreed to by Austria and Prussia, and the intention you entertained of incorporating the whole in a secret article of the first treaty between Great Britain and the three Powers.

The Prince appeared so much satisfied with the accession of all the great Powers to the advanced barrier of Holland, that he received the communication of the sacrifice expected from him far better than I should have imagined. Without offering any objection to the principle, he requested me to make known to you two propositions, which he was anxiously desirous should be acceded to as the price of the proposed cession. The first of these is, that the property of all private individuals connected with the ceded colony should be secured; and, secondly, that those of his subjects who should possess plantations in such colony, should be permitted freely to carry on a direct trade between the United Provinces and the colony to be ceded, in the same manner as they were now permitted so to do, while the sovereignty was in fact vested in his Majesty; and that such freedom of direct trade should be stipulated and secured, notwithstanding the cession.

I told him that I would not fail to make known his wishes to you, and that I had no doubt his interests would not be neglected in your hands, wherever they could be reasonably pushed; that, with respect to the first proposition, I should hope little difficulty would occur in its attainment; but that, upon the second, although under special circumstances, and from the deep interest which the Prince Regent's Government took in his concerns, it had been allowed by us, yet that the object was so directly at variance with the colonial principle of all countries, and so hostile, perhaps, to the very indemnification to Sweden for which the sacrifice was proposed, that, though I was sure everything would be attempted which could in reason be sought for the gratification of his Royal Highness, I could not be sanguine that any attempt of this nature could be successful; but that, if it should, far from

having any sacrifice to lament by the cession of the colony, his Royal Highness would have to congratulate himself upon a substantive advantage, as he would thereby be exempted from all the expense of maintenance, while he, at the same time, would reap all the advantage of a direct commercial intercourse with the ceded colony. In subsequent conversations, I have held the same language both with the Prince and M. de Hogendorp, and they are both desirous of placing themselves in your hands, for the final arrangement of this matter, satisfied that you will do the best you can for his Royal Highness's interests.

I have but this moment heard from Sir Thomas Graham upon the subject of the disaster of the 8th, at Bergen-op-Zoom. Poor fellow! as I had guessed, he had not the heart to write before of the failure there, and its bloody consequences. I send you copies of his notes to me, and of his despatch to Lord Bathurst.

I send you also the copy of a letter I have received from Mr. Johnson. Upon the paragraph relating to the mission from General Maison to the Crown Prince, I have written to Mr. Thornton, giving him a copy of this paragraph, for the purpose of enabling him to make such inquiries as he may think fit. Yours, my dear lord, most affectionately,

CLANCARTY.

The only despatches written since my last are not worth sending. These are No. 53, acknowledging their despatch No. 14, and acquainting Government with the Prince of Orange's assent to place the command of Dutch troops under the Crown Prince, as required by your No. 7, Continent; No. 54, forwarding two reports of d'Yoog to the Prince of Orange, of news from Bülow's army; No. 55, forwarding your despatches Nos. 8 and 9, from Chaumont; and No. 56, transmitting a copy of the Constitution (of which an abstract is making for you to be sent by next messenger), and stating the proposed ceremonial of the acceptance.

[Enclosures.]

Sir Thomas Graham to Lord Bathurst.

Head-quarters, Calmhout, March 10, 1814.

My Lord—It becomes my painful task to report to your lordship that an attack on Bergen-op-Zoom, which seemed at first to promise complete success, ended in failure, and occasioned a severe loss to the first division of Brigadier-General Gore's brigade.

It is unnecessary for me to state the reasons which determined me to make the attempt to carry such a place by storm, since the success of two of the columns in establishing themselves on the ramparts with very trifling loss must justify the having incurred the risk, for the attainment of so important an object as the capture of such a fortress.

The troops employed were formed in four columns, as per margin.[1]

[1]

No. 1. Colonel Lord Proby.	R. and F.
Detachments of Guards	1,000

No. 2. Lieut.-Col. Morrice, 69th regt.	R. and F.
33rd	600
35th	250
69th	350
	1,200

No. 3. Lieut.-Col. Henry, 21st regt.	
21st	100
37th	150
91st	400
	650

No. 4. Lieut.-Col. Carleton, 44th regt.		
44th		300
21st, 37th	Flank Comps	200
Royal Scotch		600
		1,100

TOTAL.

No. 1	1,000	3,950
2	1,200	
3	650	
4	1,100	

No. 1, the left column, attacked between the Antwerp and Water-port Gates. No. 2 attacked to the right of the New Gate. No. 3 was destined only to draw attention by a false attack near the Steenbergen Gate, and to be afterwards applicable according to circumstances. No. 4, right column, attacked at the entrance of the harbour, which could be forded at low water; and the hour was fixed accordingly at half-past 10, p.m., of the 8th instant. Major-General Cooke accompanied the left column; Major-General Skerrit and Brigadier-General Gore both accompanied the right column. This was the first which forced its way into the body of the place.

These two columns were directed to move along the rampart, so as to form a junction as soon as possible, and then to proceed to clear the rampart and assist the centre column, or to force open the Antwerp Gate. An unexpected difficulty about passing the ditch on the ice having obliged Major-General Cooke to change the point of attack, a considerable delay ensued, and that column did not gain the rampart till half-past 11.

Meanwhile, the lamented fall of Brigadier-General Gore and Lieutenant-Colonel the Honourable George Carleton, and the dangerous wound of Major-General Skerrit, depriving the right column of their able direction, it fell into disorder, and suffered great loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners.

The centre column, having been forced back with considerable loss by the heavy fire of the place (Lieutenant-Colonel Morrice, its commander, and Lieutenant-Colonel Elphinstone, 33rd regiment, being both wounded), was re-formed under the command of Major Muttlebury, marched round, and joined to Major-General Cooke—the left wing of the 55th remaining to remove the wounded from the glacis.

However, the Guards too had suffered very severely during the night, by the galling fire from the houses on their position, and by the loss of the detachment of the 1st Guards, which, having been sent to endeavour to assist Lieutenant-Colonel

Carleton, was cut off after the most gallant resistance, which cost the lives of many most valuable officers.

At day-break the enemy, having turned the guns of the place, opened their fire against the troops on the unprotected rampart, and the reserve of the 4th column, the Royal Scotch, retired from the Water-port Gate, followed by the 33rd. Major-General Cooke then despairing of success, directed the retreat of the Guards, which was conducted in the most orderly manner, protected by the remains of the 69th and right wing of the 55th regiments, (which corps repeatedly drove the enemy back with the bayonet) under the Major-General's immediate direction. The General afterwards found it impossible to withdraw those weak corps; and having then, with the genuine feelings of a true soldier, devoted himself, he surrendered, to save the lives of the gallant men remaining with him.

I should wish to do justice to the conspicuous gallantry and great exertions of all those officers who had opportunities of distinguishing themselves. I have not yet been able to collect sufficient information. Major-General Cooke reports to me his highest approbation generally of all the officers and men employed near him, particularly mentioning Colonel Lord Proby and Lieutenant-Colonels Rooke, commanding the 1st Guards, Mercer, commanding the light companies of the brigade, (the latter unfortunately among the killed) Majors Muttlebury and Hoog, of the 69th and 55th, as deserving of his warm praise.

He laments, in common with the whole corps, the severe loss of the service of those distinguished officers, Lieutenant-Colonel Clifton, commanding the 1st Guards, and of Lieutenant-Colonel the Honourable James Macdonald, of that regiment. These officers fell, with many others, at the Antwerp Gate, all behaving with the greatest intrepidity; and Lieutenant-Colonel Jones, with the remainder of the detachment, was obliged to surrender.

The service of conducting the columns was ably provide for by Lieutenant-Colonel Carmichael Smyth, commandin Royal Engineers (he himself accompanied Major-Genera Cooke, as did also Lieutenant-Colonel Sir George Wood, com manding Royal Artillery), who attached officers to lead eac column, viz.: Captain Sir George Hoste, Lieutenant Abbey to the left, and Lieutenant Sparling to the right, and Captai Edward Michell, Royal Artillery, who volunteered his ser vices, to the centre column. Lieutenant Abbey was dan gerously wounded, and Captain Michell was covered wit wounds in the act of escalading the scarp wall of the plac but I trust there are good hopes of his not being lost to th service.

Your lordship will readily believe that, though it is impos sible not to feel the disappointment of ultimate failure in thi attack, I can only think at present, with the deepest regret, the loss of so many of my gallant comrades.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

THOMAS GRAHAM.

PS. Returns will be transmitted as soon as they can po sibly be received. Meanwhile, I send the most correct nomin list of the officers killed, wounded, and prisoners.

Mr. Johnson to Lord Clancarty.

Tournay, March 10, 1814.

My Lord—The accompanying telegraphic despatch wa published by General Maison previous to his retreat fro Courtray. The facts which it reports do not appear to be importance, and with the exception of the occupation Rheims by a French force, seem little entitled to credit.

A few days ago, Maison despatched a French officer to th head-quarters of the Prince Royal of Sweden, charged wit communications to his Royal Highness, which he represente to be of the greatest importance; but, on his passage throug the head-quarters of the Duke of Weimar, he requested tha

he might not be questioned as to the object of his mission, with which I believe his Serene Highness is wholly unacquainted. The officer in question, on his arrival at Liege, had an audience of two hours with the Prince Royal, the result of which has not transpired. This officer, who accompanied Madame Bernadotte to Sweden, has remained at the headquarters of the Prince Royal.

The Duke of Saxe-Weimar received last night a despatch from Marshal Blücher, dated Laon, the 8th inst. The Marshal had retreated to that place, for the purpose of uniting himself with the corps of General Bülow. His united force, including the corps of Winzingerode, Kleist, &c., is said to amount to between 80 and 90,000 men. He had been pursued with great activity by the French army, commanded by Buonaparte in person; and, on the 7th, an affair of artillery and cavalry had taken place between his rear-guard, commanded by Winzingerode, and the advanced guard of the French army, in which Marshal Victor and Generals Grouchy and Laval were wounded. Marshal Blücher having concentrated his force at Laon, was determined to give battle to the enemy; and, as he is superior in force, the result is looked to with great confidence. The battle will probably have taken place on the 9th inst.

We have no accounts from the army of Prince Schwarzenberg, which, as the Duke of Weimar informs me, had retreated to Langres, to receive a reinforcement of 50,000 men, commanded by the Archduke Ferdinand.

I am, &c., J. M. JOHNSON.

Sir Thomas Graham to Lord Clancarty.

Calmhout, March 11, 1814.

My Lord—It has not been in my power sooner to give you an account of an attempt I made to gain possession of the important fortress of Bergen-op-Zoom. But, being anxious to put into your hands all the information on the subject

which you may wish to lay before his Royal Highness t
Prince of Orange, I send copies of the despatches I have se
home by Major Stanhope.

I trust in all this his Royal Highness will see not only
proof of my zeal to be useful to the cause, but will be satisfi
that the enterprise must have been successful, had the troop
particularly of the right attack, not been sacrificed in smal
unsupported bodies—a misfortune which I endeavoured t
prevent, by the orders that were given to the different colum
of attack. I have the honour to remain, &c.,

THOMAS GRAHAM.

Sir Thomas Graham to Lord Bathurst.

Head-quarters, Calmhout, March 11, 1814

My Lord—I have the honour to inform your lordship th
General Bizanet, the Governor of Bergen-op-Zoom, allowe
Lieutenant-Colonel Jones to come here with letters fro
General Cooke, in consequence of which I sent in my aide-d
camp, Major Stanhope, with full powers to conclude an agre
ment relative to an exchange of prisoners, a copy of which
have the honour to enclose,[1] agreeably to which, all but t
wounded were marched out from Bergen-op-Zoom yesterda
for the purpose of being embarked for England, as soon as t
navigation of the river shall be open; and I trust that m
conduct in pledging my honour to the strict observance of th
agreement will be approved of, and that an immediate relea
of French prisoners of corresponding rank will take pla
with the least possible delay.

I must not omit this opportunity to express my enti
satisfaction with the indefatigable zeal of Lieutenant-Colon
Jones relative to the comfort of the prisoners, and m

[1] To this passage my copy of this despatch has the following margin
note, probably by Lord Clancarty:—"The copy of this agreement is n
sent: the principal feature is an obligation not to serve till regular
exchanged, rank for rank."—EDITOR.

obligation to that officer and to Major Stanhope on this occasion.

I am anxious to do justice to the conduct of General Bizanet, which, truly characteristic of a brave man, has been marked from the first with the most kind and humane attentions to the prisoners. He has sent me the name of an officer, prisoner in England, formerly his aide-de-camp; and I would gladly hope that, in compliment to the General, this officer would be immediately released without exchange.

Major Stanhope, who can better than anybody inform your lordship of all particulars you may wish to be informed of, is purposely sent as the bearer of my despatches, which makes it unnecessary for me to add more.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

THOMAS GRAHAM.

Lord Castlereagh to Edward Thornton, Esq.

Chaumont, March 14, 1814.

Sir—I enclose copy of a despatch addressed to the Earl of Clancarty, in reply to one received from his lordship, on the subject of the Low Countries. As this letter develops the general system of the Allies on this important question, and, as the Prince Royal very properly desired to be assured that the Allied Powers were prepared to support the interests of the people of Brabant upon a peace, before his Royal Highness encouraged them to encounter the hazards of an armament in their own defence, I am anxious you should submit the whole without delay to his Royal Highness, trusting that it must prove altogether satisfactory, and enable his Royal Highness to act with satisfaction to his own feelings in the command of that army, with which the troops to be levied in Brabant will be combined.

When the Prince Royal has digested his arrangement for the conduct of operations, I should be glad to be favoured

with a confidential communication of his Royal Highnes views and sentiments.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Clancarty.

Chaumont, March 14, 1814.

My Lord—I beg you will express to the Prince of Oran the sense entertained by the Allied Sovereigns of the dignifi and liberal manner in which his Royal Highness has be pleased to signify his readiness, in conjunction with the oth Powers, to place the corps of Dutch troops destined for s vice in the Pays Bas, under the command in chief of t Prince Royal of Sweden.

The letter addressed to your lordship by M. de Hogendo has been maturely considered by the Allied Ministers, and have had the advantage of conversing with M. de Spaen the subject. Your lordship is also probably aware that deputation, composed of the Duke of Beaufort, the Marquis Chastelet, and two other persons of distinction, have been the head-quarters, charged, on the part of the Provisio Government established at Brussels, to ascertain, as far possible, the intentions of the Allies with respect to th future fate and interests. These deputies have been receiv by the Allied Sovereigns and their Ministers with eve mark of respect and attention. Their presence has led to very full consideration of this important subject, and I ha now the satisfaction to enclose to you the result of these de berations, in the shape in which it was delivered to the deputies this morning, previous to their departure. They authorized to communicate the sentiments of the Allies, therein expressed, to their countrymen, on their return; a this document will form the basis of a Proclamation to issued, on the part of the Allied Powers, by the Governor be forthwith appointed, upon assuming his functions.

It is quite clear that the prevailing wish of the people

Flanders is to return under the dominion of the House of Austria. The Emperor has been quite explicit in declaring that, however gratified his Royal Highness [? Imperial Majesty] must be by this testimony of their affection and fidelity, he cannot, in justice to them or to himself, embark in the defence of provinces so distant from the mass of his dominions.

Their inclination would perhaps have led them, in the next place, to look to a separate system, under an Austrian Prince: this we have all combated, as inconsistent with the preservation of their independence. They begin to understand that to be free they must be strong; to be strong, they must be incorporated into a large system, and under proper arrangements and securities. Holland is the connexion, which, failing in their being reclaimed by Austria, there is every reason to suppose will be the most acceptable and congenial to the sentiments of the people.

You will perceive that the great Powers have been quite explicit in their offer of protection. They are assured, whatever may be the contrariety of sentiment in the Low Countries upon other subjects, that there is but one determination as to the resistance which all are disposed to oppose against their return under French authority. This being the state of the question, the object is to arm and organize the country for its own defence as rapidly as possible, under the protection of the Allies. This levy will be effectuated according to the existing system of Central Administration; the military Government acting through the local civil authorities, of which the Provisional Government at Brussels is to be considered as the head.

This, it is conceived, will best combine the national sentiment with the furtherance of the service, and will at once relieve the Prince Royal of Sweden, in the chief command of the Allied Army acting in the Low Countries, from the endless details of an administration inconsistent with his high functions.

In forming this system of administration, the object ha been to put forward an Austrian authority, as the one, in th first instance, most congenial to the habits of the people. I order, however, that no misconception may be produced b this step, the Emperor and his Minister have declared that i is not to be considered as indicative of any permanent con nexion, but a species of mediation, on the part of a Sovereig whom they regard, to see them justly and happily settle upon a peace.

There is but one opinion that, to make Holland or Belgiu capable of sustaining a real independence, upon the confine of France, they must form one State. To this system, ev dently wise and necessary in itself, the good sense of bot nations will speedily accommodate. In the mean time, th object is to secure a plan of administration the least calc lated to provoke a conflict of political sentiment, and to tu the minds of the people to the defence of the country, in th first instance, against France.

I beg you will submit these arrangements to the Prince Orange, and I trust his Royal Highness will be of opini that the Allied Powers, perfectly agreed in sentiment up the expediency of uniting the Low Countries, or the great part of them, to Holland, under his Royal Highness's swa have adopted that course which is, upon the whole, mo likely to lead to that auspicious result, without doing violen to any of the existing prejudices of either nation.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Clancarty.

Chaumont, March 14, 1814.

My Lord—I omitted, in my last despatch, to state that was proposed that the Governor of the Low Countries shou be assisted in the discharge of his functions by an Austria Russian, Prussian, and Dutch Commissary, or Intendant- also, that the Prince of Orange should be allowed to accede

the treaty of general administration upon a footing corresponding with that of Sweden and Hanover.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH

Lord Castlereagh to Edward Thornton, Esq.

Chaumont, March 15, 1814.

Sir—I have the satisfaction to acquaint you that the most signal success has attended the operations of Marshal Blücher. Napoleon pursued him across the Marne, in the hope of attacking him with superior force. The Marshal fell back, and successfully effected his junction with Winzingerode and Bülow. He defended Soissons successfully, but, his left wing being turned by Berry au Bac, he was compelled to fall back on Laon, always fighting.

On the 9th, Bonaparte attacked his whole line. He was everywhere repulsed with great loss; and, at the close of the day, or rather after dark, Generals Sacken and Yorck conjointly executed an operation, without firing a shot, against the corps of Marmont and the Duke of Padua, which has proved nearly fatal to both corps—45 pieces of cannon, tumbrils, &c., 2 or 3,000 prisoners. They were pursued to Berry.

On the 11th, Bonaparte commenced his retreat upon Soissons. On the 12th, General St. Priest took Rheims by storm, with 3,000 men and 12 guns.

On the 28th ultimo, General Bülow took the fortress of La Fère, in which there were 1,000 men. It was an arsenal full of all sorts of military and ordnance stores—above 100 pieces of field artillery, a train of pontoons, small arms, &c. The whole the General values at five or six millions of Prussian dollars.

The news from the South is not less gratifying. General Bianchi beat the enemy at Maçon, with the loss of cannon and prisoners. Geneva is relieved, and the whole of the Allied Force, amounting to 70,000 men, is concentrating, with a view to advance upon Lyons.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Aberdeen to Lord Castlereagh.

Chatillon, March 15, 1814.

My dear Castlereagh—I send a report of the conference, or rather the *contre-projet*. You will see the copy sent by Stadion to Metternich. Of course, if we hear nothing from head-quarters, we follow the course prescribed for to-morrow, as we are unanimous.

We had some discussion as to the immediate course to be pursued. Our three colleagues were agreed. I wished to follow them, but my own colleagues differed. I will give you my reasons to-morrow, but Stadion's courier is just going. The thing, of course, was decided by the three Ministers of the Allies being united.

Yours most sincerely, ABERDEEN.

I enclose a letter received from Johnson, which is worth your reading.

Of course, you will hear from Metternich the good news from Wellington. Stadion has learnt, from a certain source (I mean a *sure* one), that a very brilliant affair has taken place between Orthes and St. Sever, with the whole of Soult's army, about 32,000 strong—four generals killed, and 40 cannon taken. The affair was decided by a charge of cavalry, led by Lord Wellington, accompanied by the Duc d'Angoulême. Soult had retired to Agen. Lord Wellington's advanced posts were on the Garonne, I believe at Roquefort, seven leagues from Bordeaux.

Lord Aberdeen to Lord Castlereagh.

Chatillon sur Seine, Tuesday night, March 15.

My dear Castlereagh—I send a minute of my reasons for the opinion I held this morning, in opposition to my colleagues. I could add many more, but I hope the thing is not of sufficient consequence to deserve it. This is the first difference of opinion we have had on any matter of the least

importance; for Stewart's objection, the other day, to the drawing up of the Protocol, does not deserve to be mentioned.

Yours ever sincerely, ABERDEEN.

Memorandum.

Chatillon sur Seine, March 15, 1814.

The Duke of Vicenza having presented his *contre-projet* to the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts, at a conference held this day at three o'clock, it was by them unanimously judged to be inadmissible. The question proposed was, whether a declaration to this effect should be made to the French Minister in the course of the evening, or deferred for twenty-four hours.

The Plenipotentiaries of Austria, Russia, and Prussia, approved of the delay. Viscount Cathcart and Sir Charles Stewart opposed it. Lord Aberdeen's dissent from his colleagues was principally founded on the following reasons:—

1. Because the Plenipotentiaries, by the instructions of the 14th of March, in the event of their unanimously thinking the French *projet* inadmissible, were ordered to demand a conference *dans la journée*, for the purpose of declaring their opinion to the Duke of Vicenza. This seems to admit of twenty-four hours. The first conference had not terminated before three o'clock. The *projet* given in by the French Minister, although unsatisfactory, was an elaborate and finished production. In many respects, it was plausible and insidious, and could not be simply rejected without assigning some reasons and refuting its fallacies. A certain time was necessary for the arrangement of a suitable declaration to accomplish this purpose. The *projet* delivered by the Allies was hastily put together, and in many of its important details crude and incomplete. The French *projet* was of a very different character; and the rejection of this complicated and laboured document, without twenty-four hours' consideration, would have been neither wise nor decent in the eyes of Europe.

2. Because an additional reason for the delay was the proximity of the Sovereigns, and the certainty that their pleasure might be known in twenty-four hours. This appeared to be desirable, from the character of the whole negociation, and the little discretion left at any time to the Plenipotentiaries. It may be said generally that, though promptitude and decision may justly be considered as the essence of military operations, perhaps the reverse is true in negociation.

3. Because the Plenipotentiaries acted under a common instruction, received by Count Stadion from Prince Metternich; and as Count Stadion had also received a letter from Prince Metternich, explanatory of the instructions, by which it appeared that the decision of the Sovereigns was substantially executed, it was not intended to prescribe the precise hour or moment. Under these circumstances, although the Plenipotentiaries of the Allies could not be bound by the letter of Prince Metternich, yet, in the absence of other explanations, it might be admitted to possess considerable weight.

4. Because, from the perfect unity which had existed between the Allied Sovereigns and their respective Ministers throughout the negociations, it appeared desirable that this should be preserved. When, therefore, the Austrian, Russian, and Prussian Plenipotentiaries had pronounced an opinion in favour of the proposed delay, and no injury appearing to result from it to the common cause, still less to any British interest in particular, there existed no adequate reason for acting in opposition to the Ministers of the Allied Powers.

ABERDEEN.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

The Hague, March 15, 1814.

My dear Lord—I have very little to send you from hence (with the exception of what he has just brought with him from England), by the messenger Williams.

A copy of the letter from Johnson, respecting the mission of an officer from General Maison to the Crown Prince, was conveyed to Mr. Thornton by the messenger Proudman, who went last with despatches to you, *viâ* Liege; and Williams, who will take the same route, will also pass through the Crown Prince's head-quarters, and bear a letter from me to Mr. Thornton, with an extract, as far as relates to this purpose, of a letter from Johnson, respecting the mission of Maison above alluded to. A duplicate copy of this I send herewith.

I also send enclosed a copy of a plan transmitted from a person at Brussels, in whom the Prince of Orange places much confidence, said to be arranged by Carnot, which, though I think of very doubtful execution, I have communicated to General Sir Thomas Graham and to Mr. Thornton, to be by the latter, if he shall think fit, placed under the view of the Prince Royal.

A despatch reached me last night from Mr. Thornton, dated the 10th, acquainting me that the Crown Prince had accepted the proposed command in Belgium—"with, however," as it is added, "a complete understanding that the treaties between Russia and Sweden, and between Prussia and Sweden, relative to the auxiliary troops to be placed under the orders of the Prince Royal, shall be considered and executed in their full force and tenour." Now, I am in total ignorance as to the provisions of these treaties, and have, therefore, written to Mr. Thornton for information concerning them, as they form a subject on which the Prince of Orange will doubtless question me, with reference to his troops.

A very fine regiment of landwehr marched hence for Sir T. Graham's quarters yesterday, perfectly clothed and equipped, and in a sufficiently fit state of discipline—its strength 900 men. Two more will follow, I hope, in the course of this week, and afterwards from time to time, as they become fit.

The Hereditary Prince is to have the command of the

Dutch part of the combined army, under the command of th Prince Royal. This is, at least, a compliment to the latter.

I cannot send you the abstract of the Constitution, havi had no time to make it.

The Duke of Clarence is still here, waiting, as he says, f a ship to carry him to England.

Her Imperial Highness, the Grand Duchess of Oldenbur arrived yesterday, and proposes to embark for England Thursday next.

My most hearty congratulations on Marshal Blücher's vi tories of the 9th and 10th, at Laon.

Yours most affectionately, CLANCARTY.

[Enclosure.]

Mr. Johnson to Lord Clancarty.

Tournay, March 12, 1814.

My Lord—The officer whom I mentioned to your lordsh in my last letter, as having been despatched by Gene Maison to the Prince Royal of Sweden, passed through th place yesterday, on his return to Lille, with the Prince Roya answer. This mission has given rise to various conjectur The willingness which Maison showed on a former occasion listen to terms, would lead to suppose that he is now dispos to treat in his own name with the Prince Royal (his form chief), whereas the publicity given to the mission by Mais and the *avowed* circumstance that the letters from Mada Bernadotte to her own Consul, of which the officer was bear had been transmitted from Paris (the present residence Madame Bernadotte), seem to indicate that Bonaparte is ignorant of the transaction, and give some appearance plausibility to the opinion that, in his present distress, he made an appeal to the feelings of the Prince Royal, in ho of detaching him from the coalition. Be this as it may have very little doubt that a secret negociation is going between Maison and the Prince Royal, and it will appear

me very singular, if no communication is made on the subject to Mr. Thornton by the Prince.

The Duke of Saxe-Weimar is now employed in endeavours to prevail on the Prince Royal to undertake the defence of the Netherlands, in order that his Serene Highness may be enabled to advance in support of the Allies. The Prince de Croix Sobre is immediately to repair to the head-quarters of the Prince Royal, to endeavour to accomplish this object; and, at the desire of the Duke, I write to Mr. Thornton to enforce the importance of it.

I am *in treaty* with the principal, relative to one of the speculations alluded to in my former letters. The victory obtained by Blücher renders this object less urgent than it would have been in the event of his defeat, and must consequently have the effect of modifying the conditions.

I am, &c., J. M. JOHNSON.

Extrait d'une Lettre de Bruxelles en date du 1 *Mars,* 1814.

Carnot reçoit par la Flandre, ou il n'y a que quatre mille Prussiens et Saxons, très regulièrement toutes les nouvelles de la France. Il sait que l'Empereur a besoin de concentrer toutes ses forces, et qu'une diversion lui serait très salutaire. Il a imaginé le plan d'attirer à Anvers la garnison de Bergen-op-Zoom: en surprenant ou subtilisant les assiégeants, il faciliterait l'entrée à Anvers par une sortie vigoureuse au moment d'un signal. En attendant, Carnot a mis tous les hommes capables de porter les armes en réquisition, et les a fait exercer. Maintenant tout est préparé pour faire passer l'Escaut à son armée, et en marches forcées se réunir à Maison, qui, de son côté, rétrograderoit sur Gand, et faciliterait les troupes françaises dans l'isle de Walcheren de se joindre à lui. Il compte laisser 2,000 hommes dans la citadelle d'Anvers et la bourgeoisie pour occu perla ville, qui n'est que faiblement bloquée, en leur assurant que du premier mouvement contraire aux vœux de Carnot, on mettrait le feu au bassin, au chantier, et

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Clancarty.

Chaumont, March 18, 1814.

My dear Clancarty—The negociation draws to a close, and, from present appearances, it will break off. Caulaincourt gave in two papers on the 10th, neither of them constituting an acceptance, in the shape of a *contre-projet* of the substance of our *projet*. We have ordered our Plenipotentiaries to demand such an answer in twenty-four hours, or to declare the negociations at an end. The first paper was a political pamphlet against our *projet*, and pretty much against all concession. The second was a *note verbale*, containing the Frankfort basis, and little else.

Bonaparte finds himself better supported of late, and will, I dare say, fight to the last, in which case, the sooner we close our discussions the better, as they distract and embarrass the military operations. We expect hourly a great crash between Blücher and Buonaparte. The armies were in position on the 8th, near Laon, and in hourly expectation of a battle. Blücher has near 100,000 men; Buonaparte not so many. On the other line I do not think they are doing much. If Blücher gains a battle, we shall then do wonders: but at this moment we are too distant to assist him; and, while there is a chance of Buonaparte beating the Silesian army and turning upon us, Schwarzenberg will not push on to Paris, leaving his communications exposed to a movement by Chalons and Vitry, on the line of the Marne.

I send under a flying seal, for your perusal, my private letter to Liverpool upon the Dutch loan. Having stated my ideas therein pretty fully, I have only to say you will abstain at present from taking any step upon it at the Hague.

The Deputies from Brabant are here. All their views are Austrian; and, although I have used my best endeavours to remove any unfavourable impression, by stating what your and the Prince of Orange's conduct has been, it is clear that mis-

On receipt of the instructions this morning, a conference was settled for half-past two in the afternoon; and, in the mean time, the form of the proceeding was regulated, and the necessary copies were made and collated of the declaration. The Plenipotentiary of France said little, but observed that it was too much to expect that he could answer so long a paper, and one drawn up with so much care, without having time to read it over and to consider it. He therefore requested that the sitting might be adjourned for a few hours, that he might have time to prepare the words he would wish to have taken down on the Protocol, as it could not be meant that he was to receive such a communication in silence.

He was told that what he pleased to say would be entered on the Protocol; but that, if he meant to draw up a reply, it must be addressed to the Courts, as the functions of the Plenipotentiaries were to cease. And it was settled that we were to meet at nine this evening, to regulate the Protocol and to sign; understanding that his answer was to be brought in shape, to be put at once upon the Protocol.

He stated that he was ready to discuss anything in the spirit of conciliation; that he was very far from considering his *contre-projet* as an ultimatum; and adverted particularly to the princes of the family of Napoleon in a manner which indicated that it was not meant to insist particularly upon them.

About eight, the messenger arrived with the additions to be made to the Declaration. The Secretary usually employed was already gone to the French Secretary, to adjust the Protocol of the morning as far as possible, and was told that the French reply could not be ready before nine.

It required some time to assemble the Plenipotentiaries, and to arrange the insertion so as to add it to the document, which was already in the hands of the Plenipotentiary of France, and to which, as it stood, his answer was prepared; and it was obvious that this addition, especially the part per-

concerning the battering train and ammunition supplied by Great Britain for the siege of Dantzig.

Your lordship will observe, by the proportion of ordnance and ammunition which remained in a serviceable state at the conclusion of the siege, that there is more than enough to meet the demand which has now been addressed to your lordship.

I conceive that this equipment remains at Dantzig, or near it, at least that it has not repassed the Belt, but I cannot speak confidently from hence. As to the transports, or to the probable period when it could be embarked and removed to Lübeck, or to the nearest point with reference to the siege of Hamburg, this also must depend upon the period when the navigation of the Baltic will become safe. Major Macdonald has made his reports to Lord Bathurst, and to the Master-General and Board of Ordnance.

Under these circumstances, I should imagine the most expeditious course would be to make the demand in London, stating the importance of its being carried into effect in the most expeditious manner. If the stores and ordnance are at Woolwich, and unappropriated to the extent of the demand, probably it would be more expeditious to embark them in the River, and to send them to the Elbe or Weser, probably the former. But, if the transports for such service are not ready, and that, on the other hand, the transports which carried the ordnance to Dantzig have wintered in the Baltic, it may, in that case, be more expeditious and much cheaper to send a messenger from London to the officer commanding his Majesty's ships in the Baltic, and to the officer having in his charge the battering train used at Dantzig, to order such part as may be destined for Hamburg to the nearest point, as soon as the navigation is open, which must very soon be the case.

I have the honour to remain, &c.,

CATHCART.

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promise to write officially about the intended visit of the Archduchess Catherine to England? Nesselrode writes so to Count Lieven. All the necessary orders have been given for her reception, and she will come over either in an English frigate or sloop, as may be judged most commodious on account of the weather. The Pulteney Hotel is taken for her, at the enormous rent of 210 guineas a week.

Fifty thousand muskets have been promised to Count Lieven for the service of Russia, and those asked for by him for the Duke of Oldenburg have also been promised. The Austrian Ambassador has made a large demand for about 80,000 yards of cloth. Are we to deduct the value of this, and the supplies furnished last year, from the amount of this year's subsidy? To the application of Count Meerveldt for the release of all German prisoners of war, it has been replied that all will be released except those who have been taken *in the French service*, not as fighting in that of their respective Sovereigns—a proposition to which his Excellency has readily acceded.

A Mr. Sarratia has arrived within these few days from Buenos Ayres. He has not made his appearance at the Office; but Captain Bowles, senior naval officer in the Plata, writes word that he is come on a mission to you, and that the late unfavourable events to their cause (the repeated defeats of the Buenos Ayres army in the interior), have disposed them more than ever to solicit the mediation of Great Britain on the former principles.

You have only sent us *a copy* of the Definitive Alliance. Properly, we should have had one of the four originals, as the ratifications must be prepared from it, and ought to be word for word, which cannot exactly be the case, as there are some abridgments (verbal ones), and it is inaccurately copied. Lord Bathurst has written to Lord Clancarty, on an application from the Treasury, to request the Dutch Government to relieve the bills of credit to be issued at

trifled with. I confess I thought Caulaincourt throughout sincere, and if it had depended on him we should have brought things to bear. A higher game will, however, be played now, and I have no doubt this will agree better with your blood. For myself, I rather like Bonaparte the better for being another Catiline, and the masterly military movements he has of late made, with an inferior army against two armies both superior, must increase his military reputation.

I think he has never shown himself greater, or played a desperate game more skilfully, than since the battle of Brienne. Before that, I thought he had lost all wits. On the Elbe he was quite insane, and his lengthened stay there was the cause of the battle of Leipsig and all his subsequent misfortunes. However, to return to the actual position of our affairs. It seems Napoleon, beaten by Blücher on the 9th and 10th, retires before him, and heads this way. He makes his march from Fere Champenoise on Plancy, and with a view of intimidating Schwarzenberg, hopes by demonstration of an intention to attack him by passing the Aube, to force him to retire. Napoleon, however, being slower than was expected, enables Schwarzenberg to concentrate and withdraw his left from Troyes and Nogent sur Seine, and assemble before Plancy and Arcis. The enemy try to debouch on the 21st, at Plancy: finding themselves strongly opposed, they move in greater force to Arcis, and yesterday morning it was believed they would pass the Aube at both places, and attack Schwarzenberg, whose whole army was in position on some very favourable ground, between Pougis and Arcis sur Aube. There was fighting all day yesterday. The only report just arrived is, that the enemy were beat, and are retiring at all points; 1,000 prisoners of the old guard taken, and eight cannon. I do not think it has been a general battle. I never thought Bonaparte would debouch across the Aube, and place his army between that river and the fork formed by the junction of the Seine. Such an attempt would be out of ordinary

his talents and knowledge. As I before observed to your lordship, he had long ago proposed to the *Emperor* to organise the Italian prisoners now in Russia, and to transport them, either by the way of Hungary or Odessa, into Italy, to form a noyau of troops in that country, to which those desirous of shaking off the French yoke might attach themselves. He has means of information here, and a more accurate statement of their numbers and situation will be procured. He is inclined to state them, at the lowest, at about 14,000 men, the Piedmontese and Tuscans incorporated into the French regiments included. Of officers there may be perhaps proportionably fewer, but he is not inclined to think so.

They are, for the greater part, stationed at Kharcoff and Pultawa, from whence the march to Kherson and Odessa would not be long. Some few are at Novogorod, not a great way from this capital. The means of arming and accoutring them cannot be procured here, except in small quantity; but the means of transport from Odessa might possibly be obtained.

Whatever your lordship may judge best of this plan, I cannot but recommend the procuring from the Emperor the liberty of this officer, either with the view of sending him to Lord William Bentinck, or the occupying him in England for the present.

Mr. Young, son of the famous Arthur Young, is lately gone to England, to raise money by the sale of his living, being a clergyman, or by any other means, in order to buy land in the Crimea, where he has lately purchased considerably. He is said to be employed by Romanzoff, to engage workmen from Wedgewood's and the different potteries, and is connected by similar views with those whom I have lately mentioned to your lordship.

I have often mentioned the finances of this country as being in a wretched condition. From what Mr. Gourieff has lately let drop to me, they are greatly in want of money. As Minister of Finance, he complains of no treaty of subsidy

well informed, who say that the Emperor was surprised that such a step should be considered advisable, since, from the moment they agreed to a Congress in the heart of France with such a man as Caulaincourt, the Allies would lose the confidence of the French of every party, and put arms into the hands of the common enemy, who had lost all moral and physical power to resist.

These criticisms have become more severe since the principal English Minister has joined the Congress, and since the English newspapers have taken pleasure in transcribing such French articles as seem to indicate a very good understanding between the Ministers of England and those of Bonaparte; and the two strong anti-English parties in this country, viz., the French party, and the other, formed of German merchants, who had contrived to get all the trade into their own hands, to the great harm of the Russians, ever since the rupture with England, grow more violent daily in their language against Great Britain: even those begin to censure her conduct, who hoped that the first British Minister would have laboured only to give additional weight to the excellent principle of his Imperial Majesty to destroy all usurpation by the destruction of the chief usurper.

These hopes were the more fervent, as the Emperor was without his minister; and Lord Castlereagh, well knowing the false principles of the Court of Vienna, was believed to have been sent to counteract the baneful consequences of the Congress, and to destroy the last seeds of the Revolution, by the re-establishment of the legitimate Government, the only means to insure the safety of the whole.

I will not speak at length about the suspicion entertained by the whole nation against Austria; the details would be too long. I think it sufficient to inform your Excellency that, from the moment Prince Schwarzenberg obtained the chief command of the Russian army, nothing was augured but sinister combinations; the jealousy of the Austrian Cabinet

against Russia b known from experience. The pu-
lication of the nego between that Court and Murat
has increased the which such a horrible transaction i
too much calcu to excite; and all that has since hap-
pened in France and I , both of a military and a politica
nature, accords with t se just fears; and it is to be hoped
that, without loss of t e, some means may be found t
counteract the evil; that the advantages of a glorious cam-
paign, which has carried the war from the Wolga to the
Seine, may not be lost.

Opinions so strongly expressed cannot fail to reach the ear
of his Imperial Majesty; for it frequently happens that
opinions received from that quarter coincide with those
advanced here; and by the last courier we know that his
Imperial Majesty has had much reason to complain o
Austria in more than one respect. I hope some brilliant mili-
tary success will replace the operations of the armies in a
prosperous course, without which it is much to be feared tha
the Austrian and French cabinets will gain a great politica
influence, which would produce the greatest evil.

IL DUCA DI SERRA CAPRIOLA.

The Duke de Serra Capriola to Prince Castelcicala.

Extract. (Translated.) Petersburg, March 22, 1814.

You cannot imagine what a noise the enemies of Engla
make respecting Lord Castlereagh's mission to the Congre
It is enough to make one lose one's senses, and me in par
cular, who have set myself up to support England, with
whom nothing can be done. I hope the English mails,
which twenty are due, will soon arrive, and contradict many
the things that are reported, especially the passage of Engl
messengers through Paris to London—a circumstance wh
indeed amazes me; for nothing could give greater help
Bonaparte, than to see England upon such good terms w
him at a time when the Allies are surrounding France,

order to destroy his tyranny. I hope soon also to hear in what manner England has regarded the conduct of Lord W. Bentinck so late as the 10th of January, in avoiding to admit negociations with Murat, who wished to divert his lordship from the preparations he was making for landing a force in the kingdom of Naples. Everything I have heard from Palermo of that date does honour to Bentinck. I hope all communication with Murat will be broken off, as soon as it is known at Palermo that the negociations between the Court of Vienna and Murat have not produced the desired effect, and that the treaty was not ratified on the 1st of this month.

I must tell you that the Ministers here who are in opposition to the English system encourage the idea that the English Prime Minister is the only one who is to support the Emperor at the Congress; and that the continued residence there of the said Minister has chilled the good dispositions of the French in the provinces occupied by the Allies.

You can hardly conceive what battles I have to go through, having always taken the part of England. I hope and trust the wise Minister of England will have ceased to comply with the desires of the Court of Vienna, and that he will have given such instructions to the other English Ministers, especially at Palermo; for what Austria is doing with respect to us occasions such a feeling of horror here as I cannot describe to you, and as must make some impression upon the mind of the Emperor, when he receives reports from hence. If England took such a wrong view of the affairs of Italy as Austria does—a thing which is impossible, unless she wished to create herself a formidable enemy by sea and land—she would only augment the strength of the two grand parties here; whereas, by proceeding with loyalty, in the real spirit of the English character, and by supporting her faithful Allies, she would support herself, and promote the continuation of that superiority which it has cost her so many sacrifices to acquire, especially as great Powers ought to establish a per-

messenger from the armies, the Emperor is far from pleased with the Austrian Ministers and commanders. I hope England will get timely intelligence from her principal Minister, in order to shun the principles of the Austrian Cabinet respecting the existence of usurpation—principles which cannot but be most prejudicial to the interests of England. If the English Cabinet is once thoroughly persuaded of this truth, Europe will be saved, and Italy, in particular, delivered from the distress which the most shocking negociations cause her still to suffer; and the King, my august Master, and your Royal Highness will be as happy as I wish you to be.

The DUKE DE SERRA CAPRIOLA.

Mr. Hamilton to Lord Castlereagh.

Foreign Office, March 22, 1814.

My dear Lord—At ten o'clock to-night, the Dutch mail brought us the originals of your public letters of the 12th of March, with the original also of the treaties, with which we shall now get on as rapidly as possible, and, I hope, so as to get them laid before Parliament previous to the holidays. I have also had the pleasure of receiving your private letter of the 12th, and beg leave to congratulate you on the termination of your Grand Alliance before the late favourable explosion in the South.

The treaty has not yet been communicated to Rehausen or to Count Funchal. The accession of Sweden will, of course, be settled on the Continent, and that of Portugal must be referred to the Brazils. Count Fernan Nuñez would willingly have pledged the accession of his Government to it, and would have fixed his quota of troops, subsidy, &c., but, on examining his full powers, it does not appear that the Government contemplated any other treaty than a treaty of peace, or one simply leading to a peace; and that he is not authorized to bind Spain down to any line of policy after a peace.

The treaty will, therefore, be forwarded to-morrow to H. Wellesley, with your despatch.

Yours, &c.,

W. HAMILTON

Mr. Edward Cooke to Lord Castlereagh.

Foreign Office, March 22, 181

My dear Lord—The capture of Bordeaux, and the ma of it, and the raising the Bourbon standard, has made a g sensation here to-day, and, of course, obliged Government make a new communication to your lordship. Should p minaries have been signed before this news reaches you, disappointment of the public mind will be great. If t should not, after knowing the proceedings at Borde you shall authorize the signature. I fear the case mus of extreme urgency to make it in any degree support here.

Your lordship sees that Wellington's letter is now very decided cast, and he feels strongly and decidedly a the policy.

When the rumour of the preliminaries being signed arri it threw down the stocks one per cent. The public sentim is formed upon the apparent *existing* power of the Allies, no doubt is felt here that, by good management and pe verance, every point must be gained, and the re-establishm of the Bourbons, which is considered as the *sine quâ no* security and disarmament, effected. I have no doubt that, were the whole game played, it would totally succ The same joy which was shown at Bordeaux on our tr arriving, was shown at Pau.

Soult had quite ravaged the country, taken off all youth, and what provisions he could. The inhabitant Mont Marsan prevented his carrying off the *magasins.* were greeted as deliverers, and our excellent discipline preserve the attachment of the people. Courvoisier, our

senger, says nothing can equal the *alégresse* of the army and inhabitants, all singing and huzzaing.

You see, by Soult's moving on Tarbes, he is keeping Wellington in check, and trying to *prêter la main à Suchet.*

Admiral Penrose is gone round to Bordeaux. Beresford thinks he shall have little difficulty with Fort Medoc; and Fort La Blaye, on the right bank of the Garonne, is in bad order.

We have much lamented that the 10th was not definitive; as then all would have remained in the power of the Allies. We have the French papers of the 18th, with nothing but the King of Rome enlisting the National Guard; so I conclude all is favourable on the line.

The Prince Regent is in pretty good health, but feeble in the feet from his gout. Parliament seems disposed to wait events, and parties to take advantage of them.

Ever most truly and obediently, E. C.

The desertions from Soult are immense and continued. Will you send to Monsieur?

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

The Hague, March 22, 1814.

My dear Lord—I know of nothing which ought to be officially communicated to you by this messenger, though you will find my packet of enclosures tolerably large. From the Crown Prince I expect nothing effectual in these, or, indeed, in any other parts. He is still at Liege, and though I have repeatedly written to Mr. Thornton to urge him forward towards Antwerp, no assurance is returned of his being even inclined to move from Liege. In the mean time, he is doing all he can to irritate the Dutch by his treatment of the district about Maestricht as an enemy's country, and loading it with frequent and severe requisitions.

You will see also by my despatch to London of the 19th,

the draft of which g rewith, that he even affects to r
to recognize the Prince Orange by his proper titles. U
both these subjects his yal Highness has complained to
and I have told him t I would write upon them both
Ministers in England : to you. Upon the latter, altho
his Royal Highness has taken the matter up with the
good taste, resolving not to notice the neglect, which
noticed, must be taken highly, yet it is evident that he
the slight, and natural that he should do so. In truth,
inconvenience might ensue, if this conduct should be
severed in, in the event of the Dutch troops being actu
placed under the command of the Crown Prince, and
frequent intercommunications between him and this Gov
ment, which must thence result. I send you my private l
to Lord Liverpool of the same date, in order that you
have the opportunity of extinguishing my suggestion at
tail of it, in case it should be injudicious.

In return for yours also, transmitted by Robinson, I
you information furnished to me by the Prince of Or
respecting Antwerp, copies of which have also been sen
Sir Thomas Graham and Mr. Thornton. The despatc
which the accompanying paper is a copy reached me
morning, whence you will perceive that, though we are
mised Walmoden, not a word is uttered upon the advan
the Crown Prince from Liege. I wish to God we were
rid of this chap, and that he was put down in the mid
his newly acquired territories in Norway, where h
already, it should seem, fully as popular as he is here,
where he would, at least, be prevented from doing harm.
explanation has yet been given to me by Mr. Thor
respecting the communications between the person in que
and General Maison.

Your despatches Nos. 10 and 11 I have communicate
the Prince of Orange; and, although the failure of his w
with respect to the Provisional Government must occ

some disappointment to him, yet I can assure you he evinced none in my interview with him on this point; he seemed satisfied you had done all you could for him, and inclined to comfort himself with the permission of his Minister to enter into the Central Administration, and with the appointment by him of an Intendant to assist the Austrian Government, in conjunction with those named by the three great Continental Powers. I have just seen the Prince of Orange upon the subject, and also mentioned the same to Hogendorp, who, however, threw out to me that he conceived this appointment of an Austrian Governor was likely to mislead the people into the idea that Austria might hereafter be induced to take charge of them permanently; but, upon some conversation, he appeared at last to give up this idea.

I have also spoken to the Prince of Orange upon the subject of Lord Bathurst's despatch marked No. 20, of the 15th instant, not received till last night, and of which, and also of his private letter, copies go enclosed. His Royal Highness did not make the least objection to the principle of the proposition: on the contrary, he seemed to be fully impressed with the necessity of carrying it into the most complete execution, and desired me to assure my Government that he would do his utmost to meet their views, and that the numbers furnished, and to be furnished by him, would not be limited by anything but the means within his reach.

With respect to the enumeration of troops stated in Lord Bathurst's despatch, he, however, desired me to observe that the Frankfort regiment neither was nor ever had been at his disposal, having been met by orders from their own Sovereign at Helvoet, immediately to march home, which had been accordingly obeyed — that the Nassau regiment, consisting only of 400, were at Bois-le-duc, and to the extent of their numbers available—that the Prussian battalions which were lately at Breda, amounting to about 2,400 men, had never been under his orders; nay, that he did not know whether

they still continued, n removed from his territories—
that if their assistance cou be obtained, it would certainly
be very desirable, but had no means of obtaining it.

In addition to Perponcher's brigade, consisting of
about 3,400
He had lately sent a battalion . . . 950
Two more will be ready to march in a few days . 1,900
The Nassau regiment 400
And if to these you add the Prussians . . 2,400

The result will be . 9,050

and, from week to week, other battalions will be pushed forward to the greatest possible extent he can command.

Upon the subject of artillery, three batteries of fixed artillery are already pushed forward, and a fleet of gun-boats is about to move for the Scheldt; the number he could not furnish me with: but, with respect to siege artillery, he wishes to be furnished with an account of what may be required, and of these he will be ready to give all within his power which can be given with prudence, without unfurnishing his fortresses, which, in case of reverse, it would be impolitic to leave bare.

I send you a copy of a letter from Mr. Johnson, received this morning: the paragraph respecting Walmoden you will contrast with that in Mr. Thornton's despatch.

An abstract of the Constitution proposed as the foundation for the future government of Holland, goes herewith.

Yours, my dear lord, most affectionately,

CLANCARTY.

PS. I have not said a syllable here of the Russian debt to Holland, or to any one but Lord Liverpool. If, as I suspect, the Prince Royal will not advance upon Antwerp, I should think we can do without (and if without, better than with) him; but, in this case it will be necessary to cover our siege, which can only be done, as I conceive, by the Duke of Saxe-

Weimar remaining either at Tournay or Courtray, or on that line, so as to prevent the entrance of a French force into the country, or sorties from the neighbouring garrisons from interrupting us.

In that case, the besieging army would consist of—

The British, at present 10,000, but, as the Militia battalions are said to be embarked for this country, say, upon a guess . . .	13,000
Hanoverians, actually at hand . . .	7,000
The Dutch troops, which, though undisciplined, can work well in trenches, and possibly storm a breach, as well as others at present ready, and ready to join in a few days . .	7,000
The Prussians on the spot, if you can obtain them	2,400
Total ready to be brought forward .	29,400

which appears to me, with our fleet, the marines and seamen it will furnish, and the Dutch gun-boats, sufficient force for the attempt, to be reinforced by the Hanoverian and Dutch levies, as they become ready. C.

Lord Castlereagh to George Rose, Esq.

Bar sur Aube, March 23, 1814.

Sir—I have received your successive reports on the subject of the Tyrol. I have every reason to hope that the arrangement with the Court of Austria is likely to be satisfactorily settled—Marshal Wrede having received an authority to confer with Prince Metternich on the subject, and to settle it without loss of time.

As I recollect, the Bavarian Minister, in one of his conversations some time since with you, expressed his anxiety as to the future security of Bavaria upon a peace, I send you the copy of a treaty which I have recently concluded with the Allied Courts, which, I trust, will effectually relieve his

anxiety upon this subject. I conclude this treaty has been already communicated by Prince Metternich to the Court of Munich; at least, such was his determination, if the pressure of events has not delayed it—Bavaria being one of those Powers whom we shall all be most desirous of including in our defensive system, you are authorized to converse with Count Montgelas on the measure, which holds out to Europe the effectual means of its own preservation.

The Congress of Chatillon broke up *re infecta*, on the 20th instant. It was clear that Buonaparte was using these discussions as an instrument of war, and not of peace. The impression that he could at any moment command peace, and that he only fought for advantageous terms, was too palpable an advantage to confer upon an opponent. It became indispensably necessary, under these circumstances, to bring his intentions to a distinct issue, which terminated in the rupture of the Conferences.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Bathurst.

The Hague, March 23, 1814.

My dear Lord—Your despatch No. 20, and private letter of the 15th, reached me yesterday. I very sincerely hope that Taylor's mission will prove successful: he has, however, a much more tough and cross-grained material to work upon than I have had.

My despatch will acquaint you that I had no difficulty in obtaining from the Prince of Orange the most cordial assurances of his readiness to co-operate to the utmost in an object which is of such importance to the general cause, and which he feels to be so essential to his interests. All his disposable means will, I am sure, be applied to this object. The troops already employed in the blockade of the Helder, Naarden, Grave, &c., cannot be diverted from those services; but all the rest of his force, as it becomes in any degree fit for active

operations, will be sent forward towards the British army, with a view of accomplishing the important acquisition in view: and, though not from him, yet from sufficiently credible authority, I have learnt that, after my leaving him yesterday, the most peremptory orders were issued for the march and assemblement of 20,000 men in the neighbourhood of Breda, by the 3rd of April. In the mean time, my despatch will have informed you that we have no power over the Prussian troops mentioned in yours; but, as they would be a great addition to our combined force, I have yesterday written to Lord Castlereagh, in the hopes that he may have the means of obtaining permission for their employment in this quarter, from the King of Prussia.

General Perponcher, who called on me this morning, and who is aware of the issue of the order for the 20,000 men, assures me that at least the half of these will be in an advanced state of discipline, and that the other, if kept in the rear for a time, may speedily advance in formation, so as to become very soon efficient troops. Till these shall be assembled, what we actually have to count upon is—

General Perponcher's Brigade, at least .	3,400
Byland's Battalion at Gorcum . .	950
The 3rd Battalion marched the day before yesterday for the same place . .	950
Another Battalion now here, to march before the close of the week . . .	950
Nassau regiment, at Bois-le-Duc . .	400
Cannoniers attached to Perponcher's Brigade	274
Total Dutch troops, immediate .	6,924
If the Prussians can be obtained . .	2,400
Walmoden's Corps was at Liege on the 19th, and had orders to move the next day to join Sir T. Graham, as notified by Mr. Thornton	7,000
	16,324

Brought forward .		16,324
British Troops, say .	10,000	
Additional Troops said to be embarked, say . .	4,000	14,000
Grand Total almost immediate .		30,324

These to be reinforced almost immediately by 4,000 Ha verians, ready to march, as announced by the Duke of Ca bridge, as soon as their equipments arrive from Heligola and by 13,000 Dutch, under the orders already issued by t Prince of Orange; so that, even in the event of Taylo failure, we shall have a force of 30,000 men to act with him, with the well-grounded expectation of an additional re forcement of 17,000 men at an early period. But, in t case, it would be necessary for us *vue* the nature and amou of our troops, to keep the Duke of Saxe-Weimar, with force, in Flanders, to cover our siege towards France, a prevent interruptions by the neighbouring garrisons; and up this subject I have written last night to Lord Castlereagh.

I also wrote last night and despatched the courier for hea quarters through Liege, for the purpose of delivering it Taylor, giving him a detailed account of the success of m interview with the Prince of Orange. The facility wi which the Prince of Orange entered into all your views, ma it totally unnecessary for me to make use of any of the arg ments stated in your private letter, and which may therefo be reserved for some more difficult occasion. You are awa that the Hereditary Prince is to have the command of t Dutch troops.

With respect to artillery, two batteries of 6-pounders a already with Sir Thomas Graham; one battery of the sam calibre is also disposable at Breda; and, at the commencemen of April, two other batteries of the same number and weigh of metal will be ready—making in all forty pieces of fie artillery. How many we can bring forward of a descriptio

t for siege must, as he says, depend upon the considera-
on of the wants of the army in this respect, regulated by
ıe prudence which must necessarily oppose the unfur-
ishing two strong places, and thereby leaving them exposed
› immediate capture, in the event of sudden reverse. He
as, however, desired me to request from Sir Thomas
hraham a general statement of what may be required, in the
ouble supposition of the Crown Prince assisting, or of his
eclining; and he says that, consistently with the security
f his own fortresses, he will do the utmost in his power to
id the supply.

He has eighteen gun-boats, which he is sending also forward
› the Scheldt, under Captain Musquetier, to reinforce the
ivision there, under Captain Joly de Nyvelt. Some of these
essels require repair, which will be performed at Rotterdam
s speedily as possible; and each vessel, when repaired, will
e sent successively into the Scheldt. He, however, states
ıat he is in almost total want of ammunition, of which, there-
›re, more particularly powder, he can undertake for no
ıpply.

Since writing the above, the Prince has sent to tell me that,
efore this week expires, he will have 7,609 on the spot,
:ady to answer your purposes, thus composed:—

Perponcher's Brigade.	1st Battalion of the Line	701
	7th „ „	728
	1st „ Chasseurs	876
	2nd „ „	957
Regiment de Nassau at Bois-le-Duc		355
3rd Battalion Chasseurs, at Breda		472
12th Battalion Landwehr, at Gorcum		890
13th Battalion marching to Gertruydenberg		926
14th Battalion to march this week for Breda		862
15th Do. do. do.		842
		7,609

Brought forward	7,09
To which will be added, in the course of the next week, under orders to march towards Bois-le-Duc and Breda, 8 Battalions of Landwehr, forming a total of	2,57
Total Dutch Troops	11,46

You will observe that in this communication the Prin says nothing of the 20,000 men stated to have been order to assemble in that quarter by the 3rd of April. I am nev the less satisfied he will endeavour to have them there as soo as can be; and, if he fails, it will not be for the want of th best intentions and strong exertions to have the greatest po sible force ready; but he seems desirous of not throwing ou to me more to raise hopes than he is assured of being able t satisfy.

Farewell, my dear lord. I trust I have said enough, an perhaps have reason to fear that I may have said more tha enough. Yours very sincerely,

CLANCARTY.

Mr. Edward Thornton to Lord Castlereagh.

Aix-la-Chapelle, March 25, 1814, 7, P.M.

My Lord—The messenger Fisher passing through this place, with the mails to the 18th, enables me to inform your lordship of my arrival here, and that the Prince Royal may be probably expected in the course of the night. He set off from Liege for Verviers, for the purpose or pretext of reviewing the troops, and he will proceed with the same pretext hither; for no person, as far as I can find, at Liege is apprized of his intended journey.

I saw the Prince this morning about eleven o'clock, at which time no intelligence of any importance had reached Liege. I have the honour to be, &c.,

EDWARD THORNTON.

The Hon. Sir Charles Stewart to Lord Castlereagh.

Head-quarters, Fere Champenoise, March 26, 1814.

My Lord—Napoleon having failed in his attempt to debouch from Plancy to Arcis, across the Aube, and having abandoned his idea of attacking Prince Schwarzenberg in his position of Mesnil les Comtesses, seems to have been guided in his next operations by the desire of preventing the junction of the armies of Prince Schwarzenberg and Marshal Blücher. Did he not succeed to the utmost in this object, it was evidently his best policy to force their union and their communication as far to the rear, and to make it as circuitous as possible. It is further manifest, by intercepted letters, that Bonaparte was of opinion that the movements he had determined on on the right of Prince Schwarzenberg might induce him to fall back towards the Rhine, for fear of losing his communications; that he thus would be enabled to relieve his places, and be in a better situation to cover Paris.

It generally occurs that manœuvres are made with the advance or head of an army, but Bonaparte, in his present undertaking, seems to have pushed his object so far, by the passage of the Aube with his whole army near Vitry, as to have left himself completely open to that bold and magnificent decision which was immediately adopted. Napoleon put his whole army in motion on the evening of the 21st for Vitry; that night he remained at Lomenessins; on the following day the advanced corps of his army arrived at Vitry, and succoured the place. It had been placed by Colonel [blank] in a very tolerable state of defence, and there it had a garrison of between 3 and 4,000 Prussians. Marshal Ney endeavoured by every menace to obtain a surrender, but the brave Prussian Colonel [blank] resolutely refused, and held the town, which reduced the French commander to cross the Marne river by bridges constructed near Trignecourt. Napoleon here passed his army on the 23rd and 24th, and was immediately ascer-

tained to have taken the direction of St. Dizier. These o
jects might be now in his view by the movement round o
right to force us back, if this failed to operate upon our co
munications, and even proceed to form a junction with Ma
shal Augereau, or finally by moving to his fortress of Vitr
and to prolong the war by resisting on a new line, while
placed us in the centre of France, having taken the best p
cautions in his power for the defence of the capital, wh
there: such is a hasty outline of the movements of the Fren
army.

The Allies, on the 22nd, having crossed to the right of t
Aube, lost no time in adopting the bold resolution of formi
the junction of the two armies to the westward, placing the
selves thus between the French army and Paris, and proce
ing with a united force of at least 200,000 men to the capi
of the French Empire. In order the better to mask th
movement, the march of the combined army was made fro
Pougy, Tesmont, and Arcis, on Vitry; and his Imperial M
jesty the Emperor of Russia, by two extraordinary marches
eighteen and twelve leagues, established his head-quarters wi
those of the Field-Marshal at Vitry, on the 24th inst.
very brilliant capture of several pieces of cannon, 1,500 p
soners, and a large number of caissons, &c., was made
General Augerouski, of the cavalry of the Russian Guard,
the 23rd, and on this day and the preceding several advanc
guard affairs took place between General Wrede's corps, t
Prince Royal of Wirtemberg, and the enemy. At the pa
sage of the Marne by the enemy, owing, as it is said, to t
late arrival of orders, Marshal Wrede with the Bavaria
missed an opportunity of attacking Ney with advantag
as he defiled under the heights where the Marshal was
position, and the French army had the Prince Royal's cor
following their rear at the same moment. So soon as t
Prince Marshal took his decision, he made his dispositions
forming a corps on Bar sur Aube, since which he has co

submitted to the care of General Duca, to protect the head-quarters of the Emperor of Austria, his supplies, &c., and to carry them, if necessary, towards the army of the South, and also, by vigorously pressing forward in his operations towards the capital, to secure his rear while he pursues his objects in front. The combined army marched in three columns to Fere Champenoise on the 25th; all the cavalry of the army formed the advance, and were to push forward to Sezanne. The 6th and 4th corps formed the advance of the centre column; the 5th was on the right; and the 3rd corps and the reserves and the Guards on the left. Marshal Blücher was reported to have arrived with a great part of his army at Chalons. General Winzingerode and General Czernicheff, with all their cavalry, entered Vitry on the 23rd, and were immediately detached to follow up Napoleon's march on St. Dizier, threatening his rear. General Winzingerode's infantry had remained at Chalons with Marshal Blücher, together with Woronzow's and Sacken's corps. General Bülow had marched to attack Soissons, and Generals York and Kleist had moved on Montmirail.

By these general, combined, and well directed movements, your lordship will perceive that, had Bonaparte even not crossed the Marne, and passed between our two armies, he probably would have found himself in a similar position to that at Leipzig, and the result would have been, I have no doubt, of the same nature. The army was to have bivouacked on the 25th at Fere Champenoise. It appears that the corps of Marmont and Mortier, who had been retiring from before Marshal Blücher, were moving down towards Vitry, to connect themselves with Napoleon's operations: ignorant, perhaps, of his intentions, which may not have been fully formed until he found himself too far committed, these corps of his army were much perplexed when they found themselves close to Prince Schwarzenberg's army, when they expected to meet their own. It is a singular but curious fact that Marmont's advance was within

a very short distance, on the night of the 24th, from Vitry, without the enemy's knowing it was in the occupation of the Allies.

On the morning of the 25th, the 6th corps, under General Riefski, fell in with this advance, drove them back from Haussemont, Connandray, and through Fere Champenoise: in the former place, a large number of caissons and waggons and baggage were taken. In the mean time, on the left, the Russian cavalry of the reserves, under the Grand-Duke Constantine, were equally successful, charging the enemy, taking eighteen cannon and many prisoners. But the principal movement of this day occurred after the Allied troops in advance had passed through Champenoise. A detached column of the enemy, of 5,000 men, under the command of General Ariani, had been making its way, under the protection of Marmont's corps, from the neighbourhood of Montmiral, to join Napoleon with his grand army: this corps had in charge an immense convoy, with 100,000 rations of bread and ammunition, and was of immense importance, from the force attached to it. It had left Paris to proceed to Bonaparte, and the cavalry of Marshal Blücher's army were the first to discover and observe this corps, on their march from Chalons. My aide-de-camp, Captain Harris, was fortunate enough, looking out with some Cossacks, to give the first intelligence to Marshal Blücher of their position. The cavalry of Generals Korf and Basilschikoff's corps were immediately detached after them, and they were driven upon Fere Champenoise as the cavalry of the grand army were advancing. Some attacks of the cavalry were made on this corps, who formed themselves in squares, and, it is but justice to say, defended themselves in a most gallant manner, although young troops, and being Gardes Nationales. When they were completely surrounded by the advanced cavalry of both armies, some officers were sent to demand their surrender, but they still kept marching and firing, and did not lay down their arms. A battery of Russian artillery opening on them, and renewed charges of the cavalry,

completed their destruction, and General Ariani, Pacthod, General of Division, five brigadiers, 5,000 prisoners, and 12 cannon, with the convoy, fell into our hands.

Marmont and Mortier's advance seems to have drawn off in the direction of Sezanne; and it is difficult yet to say whether they will be able to effect their escape. Every disposition is making to harass and surround them; but the moment is so eventful, and every intelligence gives rise to such new conjectures, that I can only beg your lordship to excuse the very imperfect manner in which I am obliged to detail.

The grand army marches to-day to Mailleret; head-quarters at Treffau; and the advanc eis to push as far as La Ferte Gaucher. Marshal Blücher was to be last night at Etoges.

Your lordship, I am sure, will lament to hear that that deserving officer, Colonel Campbell, was unfortunately wounded by a Cossack, in the *mêlée* of the cavalry, not being known; the pike was run into his back, but he is doing well. I am also particularly sorry to report the death of Colonel Rapatel, who was shot going up to one of the columns with a flag of truce. The loss of an officer so much and so justly beloved in this army, from his attachment to General Moreau, his excellent qualities, and his devotion to the good cause, have occasioned a universal regret in the army.

I have the honour to enclose your lordship reports from Colonel Lowe up to the 24th of March.

I am, &c., CHARLES STEWART.

The Hon. Sir Charles Stewart to Lord Castlereagh.

Head-quarters, Colomiers, March 27, 1814.

My Lord—The reports from the different corps not having been received when I sent off my despatch No. 27, added to the hurry of the moment in which it was written, must be my apology for having much underrated the successes of the 25th instant.

Upon the retreat of t, Mortier, and Arrighi, and corps, before the several co s of the Allied armies, who junction had been effected b een Fere Champenoise and Chalons, above eighty pieces cannon, besides the convoy alluded to in my despatch No. 27, and a great number of caissons, fell into our hands. The guns were abandoned in all directions by the enemy, in their d retreat, and were captured not only by the cavalry of the Grand-Duke Constantine and Count Pahlen, but also by the corps of Riefski and the Prince Royal of Wirtemberg. Generals York and Kleist, who moved from Montmirail on La Ferte Gaucher, where they arrived on the 26th, very greatly augmented the enemy's discomforture. General York's corps was very seriously engaged with the enemy, and took 1,500 prisoners at the latter place; and it may be fairly estimated that this part of Napoleon's army has been so roughly handled, as to have lost one-third of its efficiency, in point of numbers, with nearly all the artillery belonging to it.

Nothing but continued forced marches could have enabled any part of the corps above alluded to to elude their victorious pursuers; and when I detail to your lordship that Marshal Blücher's army was at Fismes on the 24th, and was fighting at La Ferte Gaucher on the 26th, making a march of twenty-six leagues, it will be evident that no physical exertions can exceed those that the present unexampled crisis brings into action. The grand army was in position at Mailleret on the 26th. The march was continued in three columns from Fere Champenoise. The head-quarters of his Imperial Majesty and the Field-Marshal Prince Schwarzenberg were at Treffau; the cavalry of Count Pahlen were pushed beyond La Ferte Gaucher, joining Generals York and Kleist; the cavalry and the reserves were bivouacked at La Vicquière, on the right of the great road. The 6th and 4th corps were in the centre, the 5th on the left, and the 3rd remained in the rear, to cover all the baggage, the artillery park, and train,

and to make the march of the whole compact. Generals Kaiseroff's and Lestaing's partizan corps occupied and observed the country about Arcis and Troyes, and between the Marne and the Seine rivers. Intelligence was received from Generals Winzingerode and Czernichef, who continued following Napoleon's rear with 10,000 cavalry and forty pieces of artillery, that he was marching by Brienne to Bar sur Aube and Troyes, hastening back to the capital with the utmost precipitation—a plain demonstration, if any were wanting, that superiority of manœuvring, as well as superiority of force, was in his adversaries' scale.

The Prince Field-Marshal continued his march this day without interruption. The head-quarters were established at Colomiers. The 6th corps arrived at Mouran. Count Pahlen's cavalry and the Prince Royal of Wirtemberg, who were sent to turn the enemy's right, followed one part of the corps now before us, which seem now to have separated, to Crecy, while Generals York and Kleist pushed the other, by advancing from La Ferte Gaucher to Meaux, where they will secure the passage of the Marne for Marshal Blücher's army. The 5th corps took up its ground near Chailly; the 3rd at Reveillon; and the cavalry of the Guards and the 9th reserves in front of this place.

Marshal Blücher's head-quarters are to the right, at La Ferte Jouairie, and to-morrow his army will pass the Marn, which I apprehend the grand army will also do at Saquy; thus concentrating nearly their whole force on the right bank of the river, and taking position on the heights of Montmartre.

I am as yet ignorant of the motives that may have directed the corps of the enemy in our front: whether a part has fallen back to form a noyau to the Gardes Nationales at Paris, and whether with some of these they will dispute momentarily the passage of the Marne to-morrow, and whether the other part is moving by Provens to join Napoleon, remains to be seen, but in neither instance to be apprehended.

Whatever may be the ul e result of the operations in progress, howsoever brilliant they appear, the sovereigns who are present, and the Prince Field-Marshal who leads their armies, will have the proud and consoling reflection that by their intrepid manœuvre they have acted right by their countries, their people, and the great cause. They must bring it to an issue: that issue, after such a decision, must rest with Providence alone, who seems miraculously to have brought about the present era.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CHARLES STEWART.

I enclose your lordship a copy of the Declaration of the Allies which I have just received.

Lord William Bentinck to Lord Castlereagh.

Verona, March 27, 1814.

My dear Lord—I have been sadly disappointed with the state of affairs here, and I fancy the same feeling is experienced by the whole army. I have known Marshal Bellegarde for these fifteen years. He is totally without energy, and the check he received the other day *l'a totalement démonté.* Nothing will, I am sure, be done, when much might. But Bellegarde and Murat are exactly playing the same game, each wishing to gain time, in the hope that events elsewhere will decide the contest; each throwing the responsibility upon the other. If the war goes on, it seems to me indispensable that there should be a more efficient Commander. The army appears to me not very good, certainly very inferior to what I remember it; and perhaps requiring an animating Chief.

I have heard the opinion that the Archduke Charles, if Archdukes are again ever to be employed, would be best suited to this command. Rank has great effect in Italy. It is almost necessary to counterbalance the pomp, and parade, and authority, even of Murat; and his popularity in Italy would

be usefully useful in establishing discipline, and in recalling the affections of the people, which have been much alienated by the bad conduct of the troops.

The country is sadly treated. It is quite shameful that the Viceroy is enabled to keep his ground, with an army inferior both in numbers and in quality. Murat has been a great embarrassment. If there was a decided man at the head of the Austrian army, Murat's misconduct, if not his defection, would be of little consequence. There would still be time to prevent the bad effects; but, as it is, we permit his power to increase, clearly foreseeing that, in the end, it will fall upon ourselves.

I have taken the liberty of asking for leave of absence, in case of a peace, and after the Sicilian Parliament, and I shall be much obliged if you could obtain me this indulgence.

I remain, my dear lord, very sincerely yours,

W. C. BENTINCK.

W. Wilberforce, Esq., to Lord Castlereagh.

London, March 28 [1814].

My dear Lord C.—I have recollected with some concern that, in the letter with which I lately troubled your lordship, I neglected to suggest that, if France would not consent to an unqualified and general abolition, yet that, at least, if we should restore to her any of her colonies, it ought to be a condition that no slave should hereafter be imported into it from Africa.

I am persuaded I need not trouble your lordship by suggesting the considerations which enforce this stipulation. I have named it also to Lord Liverpool. In fact, our not having mentioned it when a deputation from the African Institution waited on his lordship, the other day, arose from our keeping our eye only on the favourable side of the contingency, and not having in view the less favourable side of the alternative.

I am ever, with respect and regard, your lordship's obedient and faithful servant, W. WILBERFORCE.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Bathurst.

Dijon, March 29, 1814.

My Lord—My [illegible] he 15th from Chaumont, and of the 22nd from [illegible], addressed to the Earl of Liverpool, will have re[illegible] your lordship's mind from all apprehension as to the Conferences at Chatillon being suffered to linger on, to the prejudice of the general interest.

I regret my having desired Lord Aberdeen to forward by my messenger, passing through Chatillon, the proceedings up to the latest period, under these circumstances necessarily unaccompanied by explanations from myself, should have given occasion to the misconception under which your lordship's letter of the [blank] appears to have been written.

You will perceive, from the fourth case provided for in the general instructions of the 14th to the Allied Plenipotentiaries, that it never was intended to allow the French Plenipotentiary to present a counter-*projet* in the ordinary sense of that term, his Excellency was restricted, in doing so, substantially to adhere to the Allied *projet*, which was in spirit deemed to be an equivalent to an alteration. The allowing, or rather the requiring, him to state his modifications in the form of a counter-*projet*, was, upon full deliberation, adopted as the course best calculated to avoid delay. It compelled him to give an *ensemble* to his demand, which enabled the Allies at once to negative the whole, as trenching upon the substance of their ultimatum, without being obliged to discuss the *projet* itself in detail, under a pretext of modifying it. The object was to throw the proposition on him, and to reserve the affirmative or negative to the Allies.

Conceiving the *projet* in question not to have been one to which, in all its parts, an acceptance or rejection could have been peremptorily required, I apprehend no course could have been pursued better calculated than that I have described, to bring the matter to an immediate issue, with a due attention to the good faith and decorum of our proceedings.

An unforeseen delay of forty-eight hours certainly arose from the reference made to head-quarters of the counter-*projet*. This delay was altogether unforeseen, because the French proposition clearly fell within the first case provided for in the instructions of the 14th, namely, being one utterly inadmissible in the unanimous judgment of the Plenipotentiaries, and consequently one which they were authorized to reject at once without reference. The majority of the Plenipotentiaries, however, thought it desirable, and, upon the whole, I believe, they acted judiciously, to enter upon the Protocol a reasoned rather than a dry rejection of so elaborate a counter-*projet*.

Such was the simple cause of the short delay which took place, and I trust your lordship will find no occasion to regret, so far as the reputation of the Prince Regent's councils is concerned, that this limited interval was afforded to the Sovereigns themselves authoritatively to pronounce upon the concluding act of the negociations at Chatillon, instead of suffering so important a result in appearance to rest upon the judgment of their Plenipotentiaries.

I have now the honour to enclose to your lordship, for the Prince Regent's information, the declaration which has been issued by the Allied Sovereigns upon the rupture of these discussions.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

The Hon. Sir Charles Stewart to Lord Castlereagh.

Draft. Head-quarters, Bondy, March 29, 1814.

My Lord—On the 28th, the grand Allied Army and that of Silesia continued their advance to Paris. The 6th and 4th corps, the Austrian Grenadiers, the guards, and reserves, and the cavalry of the Grand Duke Constantine, took up their ground in the neighbourhood of Coulley and Nanteuil. The 3rd corps was this day at Mouson. The 5th remained at Chailly with the advanced guard in the direction of La Petite

Gaucher, observing the r… Sezanne and Provens. The head-quarters of the … ny v … stablished at Cuencey.

The passage of the … Meaux was effected by the 6th corps with little … . Part of Mortier's corps, under the immediate com… l the French General Vincent, who retired through the above … ıce, broke down the bridge on his retreat, and detained the Allies in their pursuit. About 10,000 of National Guards, mixed with some old soldiers, endeavoured to make a feeble stand before the army of Marshal Blücher between Ferte Jouairie and Meaux. But General Horn attacked them, and placing himself gallantly at the head of some squadrons, he pierced into a mass of infantry, taking himself the French General prisoner. The passage of the river was also disputed at Fripport, where the army of the Marshal passed, but, notwithstanding the fire of the enemy, the bridge was soon completed, and the whole of the army passed the Marne to-day. The French, on their retreat from Meaux, caused a magazine of powder of an immense extent to be blown up, without the slightest information to the inhabitants of the town. They thought themselves by the monstrous explosion buried in the ruins of the place. Not a window of the town that was not shivered to atoms, and great damage was done to all the houses, and to the magnificent Cathedral. The corps of York and Kleist advanced this day to Claye. The corps of Langeron was on their right, and Sacken in reserve. The corps of Woronzow was in the rear at Meaux.

Different bridges were constructed on the Marne, to enable the grand army to file over in various columns.

Your lordship will perceive that so soon as the passage was effected, the Allied armies, who had abandoned their communications, immediately opened another more advantageous, considering the manner in which the country they left was exhausted. It must always be distressing to great armies to be without direct communications, and to depart from the base of their operations; but the line of Brussels, the Low

Countries, and along the coast, would now afford so many facilities, that, from the moment of the passage of the river, I conceive the armies may be deemed in security. It is not that Napoleon may not attempt by an operation on our rear, by Chateau Thierry or some other point, to act in the above direction; but, with the army of the Prince of Sweden and the army in Holland, Bonaparte would be much exposed by such an attempt. General Bülow's corps has blockaded Soissons, and is in march towards the Marne. He will afford an additional security. General Winzingerode, who had pursued Napoleon's rear towards St. Dizier, seems to have been assailed on the evening of the 26th and the morning of the 27th, by a very preponderating force of the enemy, especially as to infantry. The details of the affair are not arrived, but it appears the general was obliged to retreat in the direction of Bar-le-Duc. From the most recent reports, Napoleon was himself at St. Dizier on the 27th, and it is said his advanced guard is at Vitry. It would thus appear that he is marching after the Allies, or directing himself on the Marne, but it is hoped this is now too late. On the 29th, the army of Silesia, leaving a corps on the Marne, was directed to its right, to advance on the great road of Soissons to Paris. Count Langeron was on the right, near the village of La Vilatte. Generals York and Kleist moved from the Meaux route into that of Soissons, to make room for Prince Schwarzenberg's army. Generals Sacken and Woronzow were in their rear.

On the 28th, in the evening, a very sharp affair occurred at Claie, between General York and the enemy's rear; the ground they were posted on was very favourable for defence, and in a very severe tiraillade General York lost some hundred men; but the enemy were driven back at all points. The 6th corps passed at Fripport, and reached Bondy at night and the heights of Pantin. The 4th corps crossed at Meaux with the guards, reserves, and cavalry: the former was

immediately direct to ; nign road from Lagny to the capital, and to tal t neights of Chelle.

The 3rd corps to t the 4th ; the 5th moved to Meaux, and on ft of the Marne, having their cavalry at Crecy a Co On the advance of the 6th corps, some slight e made at Villaparis ; and, as it was necessary to eve G s York and Kleist, and move them more to the right, on of hostilities for four hours was agreed on by mutual c t, which delay prevented the march forward being so as usual. The armies this night may be stated to e tl ir right towards Montmartre, and their left near the wood of Vincennes.

I have the honour to be, &c., C. S.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Bathurst.

Amsterdam, March 29, 1814.

My dear Lord—I send you a private letter, which I received the day before yesterday from Sir Thomas Graham, and think, from the tone of it, that, without in the least adverting to the circumstance of any hint upon the subject having been received from me, it might be advisable to impress upon his mind not only how great an object the capture of Antwerp is, particularly to Great Britain, and generally to all the Allies, but the great consequence also of time in this matter, and that what can be done ought to be *quickly* done.

I agree with him in thinking that it is probable Taylor's mission with the Crown Prince may not succeed ; but it should seem, to my ignorance perhaps, that with 18,000 men between the Hanoverians and British, with 11 or 12,000 Dutch troops, the enterprise might be undertaken. I think also that Sir Thomas rather underrates the numbers of effective, in comparison to their force on paper, of the Dutch troops. It is most true, they are far behindhand in drill instruction and field discipline, and that, for active operations of manœuvre in the field, they might very correctly be stated according

to the proportion of effectives estimated by Sir Thomas; but for the business of a siege, at least for a considerable part of it, all that relates to the labour of throwing up works, they will probably be found as effective as more formed troops; and even for the subsequent operation of storming a breach, which appears to me to require more of courage than discipline, they might be found not altogether useless.

I send you enclosed herewith the copy of a Proclamation issued by the Governor of Demerary, in the year 1812. Similar proclamations were probably issued in the other Dutch colonies; and though, as I should conceive, the change of circumstances has put an end to the effect of these proclamations with respect to the Dutch, who, although aliens, have ceased to be *alien enemies*, yet the people here have so much apprehended that they are still liable to their influence, that M. de Hogendorp has requested me to write to solicit their revocation. I do not apprehend there will be any difficulty in this.

Heartily congratulating you upon the termination of the *lenteurs* at Chatillon, I remain, &c.,

CLANCARTY.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

Amsterdam, March 29, 1814.

My dear Lord—I most sincerely congratulate you upon the rupture of the negociations at Chatillon, and the more so from the circumstance of my having (happily erroneously) conceived that Caulaincourt would still have contrived to play with you all for some time, without the slightest advance in the work of peace upon any practicable terms.

Your courier, with this acceptable news, reached us this morning, and the despatches brought by him will be forwarded to England by the mail of to-morrow. I am obliged to send Basset back again to you, with the produce of a British mail arrived this afternoon, having no other messenger here fit for service.

We arrived here [illegible] and Princess, the Princess Mother, [illegible] family, have been received in the most satisfactory [illegible] The Constitution was to-day accepted by the A[illegible]lée[illegible]s Notables: there were 473 Members present, of which 4[illegible] were for, and 25 against, the acceptance. Of the 25 obje[illegible]s, I do not understand there is one who is the least di[illegible] to the Government, or hostile to the sovereignty of his [illegible]yal Highness; their objections were founded on different parts of the Act, and their reasons have been sent to the Prince of O[illegible]nge in writing, to show the precise grounds upon which t[illegible]eir respective objections were founded.

You will perceive that, out of the 600 Notables who had been summoned, only 473 attended. Among the remaining 127, I have no doubt there were some who objected altogether to the new arrangement, and who are not altogether well disposed to the Prince; but they find the feeling of the country so general against them, that they thought the most prudent course to adopt would be to remain at home.

Our friends, the Romanists, have not been idle here. Where will they ever be so till they are at the head of everything? Not content with having all offices, civil and military, laid open to them, with the sole exception of the sovereignty itself, which the Constitution determines shall be held by a person of the Reformed religion—not content with having this assured to them, and even an establishment secured for their clergy, they delivered in a remonstrance to the Notables against the clause securing a Protestant sovereign to the State. Such is, and such ever will be Popery, as long as an interested priesthood shall be enabled to work upon the fears and superstition of women, and through them to subjugate the stronger sense of men.

We shall return to the Hague on Saturday next. To-morrow, the ceremonies of taking the oaths and receiving homage are to take place in the New Church; on Thursday,

a launch of a brig of war, and a great concert; and on Friday, a great ball given by the city.

Yours, my dear lord, most affectionately,

CLANCARTY.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord William Bentinck.

Dijon, March 30, 1814.

My Lord—This instruction will be delivered to your lordship by a courier of Prince Metternich's. I propose in a day or two to forward, by an English messenger, a military instruction which I have received for your lordship from Lord Bathurst; but, as his lordship's despatch is framed upon a supposition that the operations are much further advanced in Italy than is the fact, the delay of this communication for a few days can be of no prejudice.

I cannot dissemble from your lordship my disappointment that the great superiority of force which the Allies possess over Marshal Beauharnois, has not before this produced the results which, for the honour of the arms of the respective Powers and the ulterior objects of the war, we were entitled to expect from such ample and extended means.

In your lordship's intercourse with the Marshals Bellegarde and Murat, you will not conceal from them that such are the sentiments of the British Government, and that we conjure them by union and exertion no longer to suffer their great and commanding armies to be paralysed by an enemy so much their inferior. As the object is to promote union, and put aside every minor consideration, I am to signify to your lordship the Prince Regent's pleasure that you do make every effort to this effect, by lending yourself to whatever measures may best tend to combine the exertions of the Allied armies for the early expulsion of the enemy from Italy.

For this purpose, you will to the utmost conform to the views of Marshal Bellegarde, regulating at the same time your conduct towards Marshal Murat upon principles of cor-

diality and confidence ; , in order the better to effect th
and publicly to evince 's desire felt by your Governm
zealously to unite their ms with his, your lordship w
select an officer of suitable rank and military talents to re
at the Neapolitan head- rters, whom you will direct to c
respond with me and th your lordship, as Sir Rob
Wilson at present does.

Your lordship is already fully apprized of the ear
interest the Prince Regent takes in the restoration of the K
of Sardinia and the Grand Duke of Tuscany to their anc
dominions. You will give every aid to both, but you
studiously abstain from encouraging any measure which mi
commit your Court, or the Allies, with respect to the ultim
disposition of any of the other territories in the North
Italy, the destination of which must remain to be discu
upon a peace.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH

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*Articles of Agreement entered into on the part of the Bri
Government by Lord Viscount Castlereagh, with Count Mün
on the part of the Government of Hanover.*

[Not dated

The British Government, being willing to assist his Majes
German dominions in their exertions against the com
enemy, and considering that the King's German Legion
for the greater part employed in the Peninsula and in Si
from whence they cannot be recalled without injury to
service, have agreed to arm, equip, and pay, a corps of Ha
verian troops, amounting to 15,000 rank and file.

Having, by a treaty with the Russian Government, sig
at Peterswalde 24-12 July, 1813, agreed to take into Bri
pay a corps of Germans raised in Russia, his Majesty's
vernment determined that this corps should form a part of
above-mentioned 15,000 men. The northern provinces
Hanover, together with Mecklenburg and the Hanseatic tow
having been afterwards re-occupied by the enemy, Governm

in order to avoid the troops raised in those dominions from being disbanded, for want of means to support them, joined to the Russian and Hanoverian levies the Hanseatic, Mecklenburg, and Dessau levies. To these have recently been added some new Dutch formations.

These latter corps having, however, according to the conventions agreed upon with their respective superiors, merely been taken into British pay until their respective Governments shall be able to resume their authority, they are not to be considered as belonging to the 15,000 men intended to be subsidised for Hanover.

The British Government, wishing at present to simplify their military exertions on the Continent, have agreed on the following articles:—

1. Great Britain to pay to Hanover, for 15,000 men, a subsidy of £600,000 sterling during the term of twelve months, from [blank].

2. This subsidy to be paid by monthly instalments of £50,000, on the [blank] of every month.

3. The army of Hanover so subsidised to serve on the Continent of Europe as the Prince Regent shall direct.

4. The Russian German Legion, to the extent of 6,000 men, to form part of such 15,000 men.

It having been stipulated, in the treaty concluded with Russia, that the Russian German Legion should not exceed 10,000 rank and file, and this corps having been considerably diminished on their march, so as to arrive in Germany only about 5,000 men strong, and the two battalions raised in the mean time by Lieutenant-General Count Walmoden, with the assistance of the British Ambassador, Lord Cathcart, having been joined to the Hanoverian levies, it was hoped that these Russian levies would not have been carried further. It having, however, since that time been reported that Major-General Arentschildt, of the Russian Legion, has published a proclamation to call the subjects of the Duke of Oldenburg to enlist

in the said Legion, e… …ll be made by both contracting parties to avoid the corps being carried above the number of 6,000 men, which nearly their number, according to the return of the 19th of Oc…ober last.

Since it is difficult to judge at present how far the transfer of the Russian German Legion to the Hanoverian service, as stipulated in the treaty of J…y, 1813, be expedient, or even feasible, the Hanoverian Government for the present agrees to take upon itself the obligations of the British Government towards the Russian Legion, except such obligations as relate to the equipment of the same.

5. The Hanseatic, Dessau, Mecklenburg, and Orange corps are to remain at the charge of Great Britain till transferred to their respective Governments.

6. The above corps of 15,000 men is to be armed and clothed the first year by Great Britain; all other expenses to be borne by Hanover out of the subsidy.

7. The detachment of the British German Legion, sent to Hanover for purposes of discipline, or otherwise, to be at the charge of Hanover whilst there.

8. The Landwehr of 25,000 men to be armed and clothed in the first instance by Great Britain: all other charges to be defrayed by Hanover.

The Hon. Sir Charles Stewart to Lord Castlereagh.

Heights of Belleville, near Paris, March 30, 1814.

My Lord—After a brilliant victory, God has placed the capital of the French empire in the hands of the Allied Sovereigns—a just retribution for the miseries inflicted on Moscow, Vienna, Madrid, Berlin, and Lisbon, by the desolator of Europe.

It would be injustice not to declare that, if the Continent has had the curse of all the evil arising out of the existence of Bonaparte, it is also crowned with the blessing of possessing a legitimate Emperor, who, by a series of firm and glorious con-

duct, has richly deserved the appellation of the liberator of mankind. I must very imperfectly detail the events of this glorious day at such a moment as the present, and therefore throw myself on your lordship's indulgence.

The enemy's army, under the command of Joseph Bonaparte, aided by Marshals Mortier and Marmont, occupied with their right the heights of Fontenay, Romainville, and Belleville; their left was on Montmartre; they had several redoubts in the centre, and on the whole line an immense artillery of above 150 pieces. In order to attack this position, the Silesian army was directed on Montmartre, St. Denis, and the villages of La Vilatte and Pantin; while the grand army attacked the enemy's right on the heights before alluded to, at Romainville and Belleville. Marshal Blücher made his own dispositions for his attack. The 6th corps, under General Riefsky, moved from Bondy in three columns of attack, supported by the guards and reserves, and, leaving the great route of Meaux, attacked the heights of Romainville and Belleville. These are very commanding, as well as Montmartre. The ground between is covered with villages and country seats, and the possession of the high grounds commands Paris and all around them. Prince Eugene of Wirtemberg's division of the 6th corps commenced the attack, and, with the greatest spirit, endured for a long period a very galling fire of artillery, being supported by the reserves of grenadiers. He, after some loss, carried the heights of Romainville, the enemy retiring to those of Belleville behind them. The 4th corps supported this attack more to the left, and was directed on the heights of Rosny and on Charenton. The 3rd corps of the army was placed in *échélon* near Neuilly, in reserve, as well as the cavalry. The attack of the grand army had commenced some short period before, that of the Silesian army being delayed by some accident. But it was not long before York and Kleist debouched near St. Denis on Auberville, and here and at Pantin a very obstinate resistance was made. His Royal

Highness Prince Will[illegible]Prussia, with his brigade, to-
gether with the P[illegible]g [illegible]ds, was much distinguished.
The enemy's cavalry a[illegible] to charge, but were brilliantly
repulsed by the Bra[illegible]rg; d black hussar regiments. A
strong redoubt and [illegible] t[illegible]e enemy's in their centre kept
General York's co[illegible]in[illegible]t for some part of the day; but,
their right flank b[illegible]g[illegible]a by the heights of Romainville,
as well as their l[illegible]in every [illegible]rt of the field, and finally their
complete discomfiture at every point, reduced them to the
necessity of sending a flag of truce to demand a cessation of
hostilities, they giving up all the ground without the barriers of
Paris until future arrangements could be made. The heights
of Montmartre were to be placed, by the generosity of a beaten
enemy, in our possession; Romainville and Belleville being
carried at the moment when Count Langeron's corps were about
to storm and had already taken possession of the crest of the
hill, and when Count Woronzow's division also carried the
town of La Vilatte, charging with two battalions of chasseurs,
and possessed themselves of twelve pieces of cannon, when
they were also stopped, near the barrier of Paris, by the flag
of truce. However, his Imperial Majesty and Prince Schwar-
zenberg, with that humanity which excites the applause, while
it calls for the admiration, of Europe, acceded to a proposition
to make arrangement in order to save the capital from being
sacked and destroyed.

Count Paer, aid-de-camp to Prince Schwarzenberg, and Colonel Orloff, aid-de-camp to his Majesty the Emperor, were sent to arrange the cessation of hostilities; and Count Nesselrode, his Imperial Majesty's Minister, went in at four o'clock this evening, when the battle ceased, to Paris.

The results of this victory cannot yet be known; numerous pieces of artillery were taken on the field, and a large number of prisoners have fallen into our hands. The number of guns in the margin are already reported:—

Blücher, 16; Prussian guards and Baden guards, 14; Gene-

ral Riefski and General Rosen, 21; Prince Royal of Wirtemberg, 6; Count Woronzow, 12. Total, 69.

Our loss has been something considerable. But we may have the consoling hope that the brave men who fell will have contributed to accomplish the work of the downfal of despotism, and to rear the standard of renovated Europe under a just equilibrium and the dominion of its legitimate sovereigns.

I take the liberty of sending my aid-de-camp, Captain Harris, with this, being with me during the day: he will make his way, I hope, with Cossacks whom Count Woronzow has given him, and will acquaint your lordship verbally with details I can but imperfectly enter into. When I receive Colonel Lowe's report, as well as Colonel Cooke's, I shall not fail to despatch again, to put you in possession of all further information in my power of this interesting and wonderful day.

PS. Since writing the above, Prince Schwarzenberg has received a letter from Mortier, stating that Caulaincourt had gone to the Emperor of Austria, and that Prince Metternich was with Napoleon, settling the terms of peace, and that he would not enter into any arrangement *ad interim*. A very proper reply has been transmitted, declaring nothing but a surrender would be listened to.

The Empress left Paris yesterday evening, and went to Rambouillet.

The Hon. Sir Charles Stewart to Lord Bathurst.

Paris, April 1, 1814.

My Lord—Separated as I am from the Minister of the King of Prussia, who remained at the head-quarters of the Emperor of Austria, and secondary as this Power is to those of Russia and Austria, who have the initiative in all political as well as military proceedings, I am sure your lordship will extend me your indulgence, if I give you less information, and am not so much in the secret as to the plans carrying forward,

as I should be, had I more ms or was in a more prominent position.

The Emperor of R l his Minister, Count Nesselrode, together with M. A t and General Pozzo di Borgo behind the curtain, are the C inet in whose hands all arrangements now lie, and he trusts that I must do them full justice, in finding fault with everything but the preponderance which this state of things makes so visible. Prince Schwarzenberg, by nature easy and complying, has to all outward appearance given up the control of the army, except, indeed, nominally; and, as Prince Metternich is not here to assist in ability and talent what the other wants in firmness and management, I am not sure whether things have not turned out altogether for the best. It seems, indeed, a decree of Providence that the Emperor of Austria should have been separated from the rest at such a moment, and prevented from witnessing the humiliation of his daughter.

The Emperor of Russia and King of Prussia dined with Talleyrand yesterday, incognito. I hear he was some time before he took his decision, but that he did it in the end manfully. The Proclamation directing the formation of a Provisional Government is hardly sufficiently known yet, to judge of its effects. Talleyrand is to be at the head of this Government, with Barthelemy, the Duke d'Albert, and some others.

Caulaincourt was at Paris when the battle was fought, and the following day came out in a most impudent manner to the Emperor of Russia at Bondy, with the deputation from the municipality, who came to make arrangements for the occupation of the town. I was sorry that the Emperor received him; but at the interview I learn that Caulaincourt declared he would sign the Chatillon *projet*, or any other *sur le champ*. No answer was given to him. Prince Schwarzenberg afterwards saw him: he declared he did not come in the capacity of Minister of Foreign Affairs, but as one of the municipality of Paris. It seems that Talleyrand, who is personally his

friend, has been labouring the point to keep him with the party of the new Government, and to make him remain in Paris. I trust that this will neither succeed nor be allowed; for, however he may be amiable and well meaning for peace, supposing he would even desert Napoleon, still there is so much ignominy attached to his name, that his presence in any Government acting for Louis XVIII. would do much more evil than good. I heard last night that he had resolutely resisted Talleyrand's offers and entreaties to remain, and was to leave Paris. But I saw him myself last night: I hinted to him that I should like to send a courier by Calais, but I received no encouragement.

Paris is quite tranquil; and although Bonaparte's emissaries are in every quarter, and working on the people with money and promises in every way to rise on the Allies, as yet I have heard of no instance of disorder. M. de Jaucourt and the Abbé Montesquiou are two more of the leading persons in the arrangement of the new Government. I understand, so much does Caulaincourt despair of the possibility of Napoleon's return, that he sounded the Duke d'Albert and Talleyrand as to what the Allies destined as his future lot; for he was a lost man. Caulaincourt is still in Paris, and was closeted with the Emperor Alexander until four o'clock this morning: but I am positively informed that he goes off to-night.

The Senate met to-day, to deliberate and pronounce their decision; but, after the declaration of the Emperor Alexander, in the name of the Allies, they have but one course to adopt: they must declare Napoleon *hors de la loi*. The National Guard, who were commanded by Marshal Moncey, are without a leader, he having fled. Count Montmoreau has remained; what part he will take I have not heard, but M. Huleau, General Moreau's brother, is mentioned as likely to be placed at the head of the National Guard. But indeed as yet every arrangement must necessarily be in its infancy.

In the hurry yesterday, I was not able to get the copies of

those letters relative to Prince Royal of Sweden, to whi
I alluded in my l secret letter sent by Capta
Harris, but I shall not lose ght of them.

A report has arrived he by a letter from Toulouse, of
battle on the 23rd , between Lord Wellington an
Soult, in which the lat v completely defeated, and entered
Toulouse with only ce of artillery.

I e the honour to be, &c.,

CHARLES STEWART.

The Hon. Sir Charles Stewart to Lord Bathurst.

Paris, April 1, 1814.

My Lord—I have the honour to inform your lordship that, since I closed my despatches this day, I learn that the Senate had a meeting, and have declared that, as Napoleon has deserted them, they feel themselves authorized in choosing another Chief to the Government of France, and that they are unanimous in declaring for their legitimate sovereign, Louis XVIII.

I have no time for further particulars, as I fear that Lord Cathcart will have despatched the messenger.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CHARLES STEWART.

The Hon. Sir Charles Stewart to Lord Castlereagh.

Paris, April 1, 1814.

My Lord—I have the honour to annex herewith the capitulation of the city of Paris. I feel that it is impossible to convey to your lordship an accurate idea or a just description of the scene that presented itself yesterday in this capital, when his Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia, the King of Prussia, and Prince Schwarzenberg, made their entry at the head of the Allied troops. The enthusiasm and exultation that were exhibited must have very far exceeded what the most sanguine and devoted friend of the ancient dynasty of France

could have pictured to his own mind; and those who are less personally interested, but equally ardent in that cause, could no longer hesitate in pronouncing that the restoration of their legitimate King, the downfal of Bonaparte, and the desire of peace, have become the first and dearest wish of the Parisians, who have, by the events of the last two days, been emancipated from a system of terror and despotism, while they have been kept in an ignorance, by the art of falsehood and deceit, incredible for an enlightened people, and incomprehensible to the reflecting part of mankind.

The cavalry under his Imperial Highness the Grand-Duke Constantine, and the Guards of all the different Allied forces, were formed in columns early in the morning, on the road from Bondy to Paris. The Emperor of Russia, with all his staff, his generals, and their suites present, proceeded to Pantin, where the King of Prussia joined him, with a similar *cortège*. These Sovereigns, surrounded by all the Princes in the army, together with the Prince Field-Marshal and the Austrian État-Major, passed through the Faubourg St. Martin, and entered the barrier of Paris about eleven o'clock; the Cossacks of the Guard forming the advance of the march. Already was the crowd so enormous, as well as the acclamations so great, that it was difficult to move forward; but, before the monarchs reached the Porte de St. Martin, there was, to those on the Boulevards, a moral impossibility of proceeding. All Paris seemed to be assembled and concentred on one spot. One animus, one spring, evidently directed all their movements. They thronged in such masses round the Emperor and the King, that, with all their condescending and gracious familiarity, extending their hands on all sides, it was in vain to attempt to satisfy the populace; they were positively devoured amidst the cries of "*Vive l'Empereur Alexandre!—Vive le Roi de Prusse!—Vive les Rois liberateurs!*" Nor did the air alone resound with these peals; for, with louder acclamations, if possible, they were mingled with those of "*Vive le Roi!*—

The Allied armies march to-morrow, with the exception of the Guards and reserves, who remain here, towards Fontainebleau, and will take up a position, or be regulated by the movements of Bonaparte.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CHARLES STEWART.

The Hon. Sir Charles Stewart to Lord Castlereagh.

Paris, April 1, 1814.

My Lord—From the numerous details that will reach your lordship of the battle of Paris, it would be presuming and superfluous on my part to take up your lordship's time further, by any additional communication that I might make to my despatch No. 31. Indeed, I am persuaded that I could add nothing so satisfactory as is containod in the military reports of Colonel Lowe and Lieutenant-Colonel Cooke. These letters will throw light upon many of the minor occurrences, and give much additional interest which it was not possible to afford at the moment of the departure of my aide-de-camp.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CHARLES STEWART.

Mr. Edward Thornton to Lord Castlereagh.

Nancy, April 1, 1814.

My Lord—Your lordship will receive with some surprise, no doubt, a letter from me, dated at this place, and perhaps will hear with no less that, having come thus far, I should not continue my journey to the place where, as I have only learnt to-day, your lordship is at present.

The first of these circumstances will be sufficiently explained by my despatch (No. 29, in triplicate) which accompanies this letter; the second, by the information it gives to your lordship that the Prince Royal arrived here yesterday, and, on finding, from the reports of the Governor, M. d'Alopeus, and from the detention of a considerable number of officers and couriers, that

the communication with the Imperial head-quarters was for
moment entirely cut off by the assembling of armed peas
and the movements of the enemy's troops, (an account f
confirmed by the interception of M. de Wessenberg
General Skiöldebrand) he resolved on returning immediat
and actually set off at midnight on his return. His R
Highness did not even learn that the residence of his Maj
the Emperor of Austria was at Dijon, and that your lord
was likewise there, although I will not say that his knowl
of that circumstance would have changed his determinatio
return; because the absence of the Emperor of Russia an
the King of Prussia would naturally have rendered the att
ment of the object of his journey very incomplete.

It is not at a moment like the present, and in the ac
difficulties of correspondence and communication, that I c
have the honour of writing to your lordship on the natur
this object, even were I fully acquainted with it. But I beli
that my former despatches will have furnished your lord
with the circumstances which have for the most part de
mined the Prince Royal to undertake this journey.

It is now his Royal Highness's intention, as he apprized
last night, before his departure, to endeavour to reach
head-quarters of the Emperor, by the other route of Nan
to the army of Marshal Blücher, from which it appeare
him that the communication would be easy, or could be ea
forced, to the Imperial head-quarters. This intention
certainly derive additional weight from the intelligence
ceived here to-day) of the victory obtained by the grand ar
on the 25th ult., at La Fere Champenoise, and of the adva
of Prince Schwarzenberg's head-quarters to Meaux. Bu
am sure, at the same time, that only half the object of
Prince Royal's journey will appear to him to be attained, i
cannot have the hope of seeing your lordship at the same t
with the Emperor of Russia. Your lordship will best ju
whether, under the present circumstances of the troops an

the country, this is practicable; but it is extremely to be desired.

I shall follow the Prince Royal to-morrow night, and, as I shall travel without intermission, shall certainly reach him before he returns to Liege, or proceeds from thence to the head-quarters of the Emperor Alexander. If your lordship cannot, as I fear, be present, it is so much the more necessary that I should accompany the Prince, as we are agreed that I shall do.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

EDWARD THORNTON.

Mr. Edward Thornton to Lord Castlereagh.

Nancy, April 2, 1814.

My Lord—I received, both from Sir Thomas Graham and the Earl of Clancarty, before I left Aix-la-Chapelle, the Extraordinary Gazette of the 20th and 22nd ult., relating to the entry of the English troops into Bordeaux. His lordship mentioned to me that they had been sent to your lordship by a messenger direct; but I know of none that has passed through this place, and I think it best to have the honour of transmitting to your lordship the copies I received.

I put also under this cover a despatch from Major-General Taylor, who came to me at Aix-la-Chapelle, after seeing the Prince Royal at Verviers. This despatch, which I have the honour of transmitting to your lordship under this cover, and by the hands of Major Angibau, will be destroyed by this gentleman, should he encounter any danger on the road to Dijon.

The Comte de Bombelles arrived here yesterday from Dijon, and returns thither to-day. I have no knowledge of the object of this journey, with which I trust, however, your lordship will have been made acquainted.—I return, this evening, to Liege, and hope to arrive there as soon as the Prince Royal. I have the honour to be, &c.,

EDWARD THORNTON.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

The Hague, April 2, 1814.

My dear Lord—I am this moment, five o'clock, p.m., returned from Amsterdam, and shall only detain the courier Hunter, who arrived by the mail this morning from England, to say that the manner in which the Orange family have been received and treated during their stay at that place, marks that the attachment of the people of all descriptions to their Sovereign has in no degree diminished since the Princes first arrived from England.

On Wednesday last the Constitution was accepted, as I formerly stated to you, by a great majority; and of the twenty-five dissentients, all have professed the greatest zeal and loyalty to him, and a thorough conviction that, without a central government, and an executive with sufficient powers to maintain itself in the execution of the laws, no happiness could be expected by the people. Their objections, therefore, do not, as I understand, go in the least to limit the prerogatives marked out as necessary to the Prince by the Constitutional Act, but are founded upon other parts of the details, some of very trifling import, as that *Jews* should be suffered to enjoy offices in the State, and seats in the Legislature; others, of somewhat a graver nature, viz., that the Militia conscription savours too much of French legislation; and others even object, because, in their estimation, the Constitution does not afford to the Prince all the power which they conceive should be placed in his hands.

During the rejoicings upon this occasion, I do not believe any relaxation has taken place in the march of their troops to the frontier. The Hereditary Prince sets out on Tuesday to take the command of the Dutch troops, and will be accompanied by his brother, Prince Frederick, and the Hereditary Prince of Nassau-Weilburg. In the mean time, our affairs in Flanders are not in so flourishing a state as we could wish.

The French, under General Maison, have latterly advanced to Ghent, as was conceived at first, with the view of still further strengthening the garrison of Antwerp. The advanced force consisted, as it is said, of 4,000 infantry and 900 cavalry; and to this, I understand, a part of the garrison of Antwerp, consisting of about 3,000 men, subsequently joined itself. General Graham, however, writes me by a letter, dated yesterday, that these troops, thus reinforced, have left Ghent for the French frontier, but that there was but little probability that the Allies would be in sufficient time to interrupt their march; and though this would leave Antwerp feebly garrisoned, it would make the enemy formidable upon the old frontier, and would render a more considerable covering army necessary, to secure from interruption any operation undertaken against the place.

My last despatch was merely to announce the acceptance of the Dutch Constitution, and is not, therefore, worth sending. A copy of my private letter to Lord Bathurst is sent herewith. Taylor, who is here on his way from Liege to England, has acquainted you with the ill success of his mission to the Crown Prince. My private letter to you, of the 15th ult., will have informed you of the fact of some transaction existing between this Prince and his former aide-de-camp, General Maison. I hope Mr. Thornton has been able satisfactorily to account to you on the nature of this proceeding: to me he has said nothing upon the subject; and this, coupled with all I hear, leads me to conceive that from the Prince Royal of Sweden no good can be expected; and as he now expresses a frequent desire to retire to Norway, it would be well, in my humble judgment, to take him at his word, and let him go there.

Farewell. Yours most affectionately,

CLANCARTY.

Our ladies do not return from Amsterdam till Tuesday.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Liverpool.

The Hague, April 2, 1814.

My dear Lord—I returned from Amsterdam this evening, after witnessing as strong expressions of public satisfaction, and as general demonstrations of public attachment to the Prince and his family, as could well be shown. It will be quite sufficient to say that the testimonies of exultation afforded by every class of persons, on the acceptance of the Constitution, were scarcely less than those shown upon his Royal Highness's first arrival from England.

I refer you to Sir Thomas Graham's and General Taylor's despatches for what is passing in Flanders, as far as relates to the advance of General Maison to Ghent, his probable motives for going there, and the measures taken in consequence. By an intercepted letter from Antwerp of the 26th inst., it appears that a considerable part of the garrison of that place had marched to join the force under General Maison at Ghent, and that the object of this movement is to attack whatever force might be at Brussels, and clear the route of Flanders, so as to open the whole of that province to the garrison.

This object has been, for the present, defeated by the advance of Walmoden upon Vilverde, and of Thielmann to Alost, which may have the effect of preventing the united French force also from retiring upon Antwerp, and thus reinforcing the garrison, but which, I fear, cannot also have that of cutting off their safe retreat to Lille. The consequence of having an increase of force in this quarter is most apparent, and that to an extent to operate against the place, and to cover the operations from the attack and interruption of this increased corps of General Maison's. For this purpose, in addition to the reinforcements of Dutch troops, and those from Hanover, the most obvious method appears to me, now that the Crown Prince has declined affording the assistance of the Swedes, to organize, equip, and arm, the Brabant and Flemish levies.

Upon this subject a memorandum, the copy of which I send herewith, has been put into my hands by the Count Murray, a general in the Austrian service, appointed by the Emperor to superintend the Belgic levies. From me, of course, he has had no answer; and, though I think it would be advisable as far as possible to furnish the means sought for the equipment of these levies, with a view to our own more immediate objects, yet it is impossible for me, upon such a subject, except on very partial grounds, to form a judgment, or indeed to know, whether, consistently with other more pressing demands, it will be practicable, however desirable, to yield to that preferred by Count Murray.

M. de Hogendorp has just sent me a private letter, of which I transmit a copy for your information. I do not, however, apprehend there is anything to fear, even if the facts therein stated should prove correct. General Fagel has been with me, this moment, from the Prince, upon the same subject, and I have recommended that means should be, in the first instance, taken to ascertain the fact, and, if possible, what steps had been pursued by Benningsen, in consequence thereof; but that no relaxation should be made in forwarding the march of the troops for the frontier of Flanders, on account of those rumours, at least till we become assured that there are some legitimate grounds for apprehension.

We are continuing our endeavours to obtain Antwerp by other means. The difficulties are great, I fear even insuperable, though some impression has been made; however, as our persevering in the trial will cost nothing, we shall continue till all hope of success shall vanish.

Yours, &c., CLANCARTY.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord William Bentinck.

Dijon, April 3, 1814.

My dear Lord—I regret the complications in which we are all placed, but we must make the most of them. I agree with

you that we must not suffer Murat to execute his purpose of extended dominion, but I do not agree with you in the mode of solving the problem. It is not by fighting British against Neapolitan influence in Tuscany, nor by abandoning Austria to Murat's augmented intrigues, that good is to be done. It is by staying where you are upon any reasonable system, and making the tide flow so strongly in favour of the Allied cause, that Murat will be *entrainé* with it. When he offered you the military occupation of Tuscany, I think it was difficult to make their concession of the civil authority *to you* a *sine quâ non*. The Archduke's restoration is the true cure for the whole, and this is the point to press, and the true touchstone of Murat's policy, which is altogether one of calculation.

Our affairs are highly promising in France, and this will assist you; but, whilst Buonaparte can call himself Emperor, and has half the fortresses of Europe in his hands, we can in wisdom risk no relaxation or diminution of strength in any quarter. Use, therefore, every exertion to decide the fate of Italy as early as possible. Except through Italy, I see no other useful or natural line of operations, by which you can unite yourself with Lord Wellington. Coast or insular operations are now become secondary: the contest is directed to vitals; and, if you turn your back on Italy, it will be felt that you have done mischief instead of good; and it will be imputed to us that, in the spirit of our Sicilian politics, we endeavoured indirectly to dissolve an alliance which we did not venture openly to oppose. I need say no more.

There will be no difficulty about your leave of absence.

I am, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

As it may not be unimportant to your lordship to be informed of the real sentiments of the Austrian Minister, I send, in the utmost confidence, a letter of Prince Metternich's to M. Bellegarde. I know it will not be the less acceptable because it observes freely, and in a manner not altogether calculated for your perusal.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord William Bentinck.

Dijon, April 3, 1814.

My dear Lord—The enclosed communications, received from Lord Liverpool, will inform your lordship of the inconveniences that have resulted from your confidential insinuations to the Hereditary Prince in December last, and will prove how dangerous it is, towards characters so suspicious and intriguing, to hazard any speculations not only wholly unauthorized, but inconsistent with the existing relations of your Court.

When Mr. Graham mentioned your lordship's impressions to me at Chatillon on this question, and afterwards sent me a memorandum upon the subject, considering the whole, even in your lordship's view, as necessarily at an end, in consequence of the connexion formed with Murat, I paid little attention to the point, and, in the press of other business, did not till yesterday read Mr. Graham's paper. It is only more necessary that your lordship should explain to the Hereditary Prince, however difficult it is ever to separate the official and individual acts of a person filling a responsible situation, that your Government neither knew nor approved of this suggestion; and that his Royal Highness had not given a very liberal interpretation to the confidence in which this speculation was thrown out by your lordship, by founding upon it, if such has been done with his sanction, an official representation in London.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord William Bentinck.

Dijon, April 3, 1814.

My Lord—As several couriers have lately been intercepted, I send you my despatch of the 30th ult., in duplicate, also the instruction therein referred to from Earl Bathurst. Your lordship will perceive that the object of the former is to accelerate those results which may enable you to execute the

important object to which the latter is directed, namely, the concentration of the British disposable force employed on the side of the Peninsula and Mediterranean, under the command of Field-Marshal the Marquess of Wellington, in the heart of France. In order to bring the Italian campaign to a speedy and successful result, it is essential that your lordship should consider your force merely as an auxiliary corps, and that you should accommodate, as far as the safety of your army will permit, to the views and wishes of the Austrian Commander-in-Chief. It is from him your lordship will best learn what are the intentions of the Allies, including those of your own Government; and, should your lordship find any difficulty in executing this service, arising from what may appear to your lordship to be a departure, on the part of Marshal Murat, or any other member of the confederacy, from the true principles of the Alliance, your lordship will refer the matter for the opinion of the Austrian Commander, avoiding as much as possible any separate discussions, which might interfere with the general union and necessary subordination which ought to pervade the whole.

Whilst the Court of Naples was hostile, and the interior tranquillity of Naples by no means assured, if my recollection is not incorrect, your lordship's military instructions restricted your operations to such parts of the coast of Italy as might facilitate the return of your force to Sicily, should its presence be required. The subsequent change of circumstances, recognised clearly in the despatch I now send you from Earl Bathurst, seems to assign no other limits to your lordship's movements than such as the military expediency of the moment may suggest; and, subject to the better judgment of your lordship and Marshal Bellegarde, I have no hesitation in stating it as my opinion that, both with a view of giving complete development to the active operations of the Allies against the Viceroy, as well as of securing to the Austrian Commander that weight and preponderance which it is desirable

he should possess, your lordship's corps can in no manner be so advantageously employed as by incorporating it at once with the Neapolitan army, and thus creating such a force on the right bank of the Po, as may assure the offensive, without reference to distant or complicated combinations. This course of operations will also best and soonest approach your lordship to those passes into the south of France, which may enable you, either alone, or probably in conjunction with a part of Marshal Bellegarde's army, to effectuate your junction with Lord Wellington, in obedience to the orders herewith sent.

Your lordship will perceive, from the enclosed documents, the extent to which alarms and suspicions are pushed, to the obstruction of all useful concert and co-operation. I have no doubt faults exist on both sides, but we should not despair of correcting them. Many of them arise out of former combinations; many of them out of jealousies, not unnaturally resulting from the characters and peculiar relations of the parties; and some, no doubt, from a spirit of encroachment and political speculation; but the latter must be vigorously repressed, and I should hope are much exaggerated—for, were it otherwise, it is not for military concert, but for war amongst ourselves we should prepare: and, unless the parties can place themselves towards each other in not only friendly but confidential relations, they will create the evil which they desire to avoid.

On the question that has arisen between your lordship and Marshal Murat, with respect to Tuscany, I am unable, in the absence of any report from yourself, to form a judgment; nor do I find that Prince Metternich has any knowledge whatever of the Convention stated to have been signed by Count Neipperg with your lordship. I can easily conceive, without aiming at its ultimate appropriation to himself, that Murat will cling as long as he can to the enjoyment of the resources of so rich a country: there are sufficient indications, however, that he has

not been exempt at times from larger views upon Tuscany, and indeed upon the whole of Italy south of the Po. He now, however, professes his readiness to deliver over the country to its former Sovereign; and this seems the only effectual and just remedy for the existing evil: as its resources will then be administered by those most nearly interested in preserving them; and both the British and Neapolitan troops will have their respective lines of military operation secured to them by a friendly Sovereign, in whose territories they will find themselves equally received as Allies.

I trust before this reaches your lordship that measures will have been taken by Marshal Bellegarde, in consequence of orders sent him to this effect, for establishing the authority of the Grand-Duke in Tuscany. But this is not the only evil which it is essential should be made to cease, and to which your lordship's attention should be directed. It is in vain to hope for any useful concert from Murat whilst a system of menace prevails (and, as he may suppose, with the countenance of the British Government) with respect to his title to Naples. The enclosed Order of the Day, issued by the Hereditary Prince of Sicily, as it appears, to troops actually proceeding upon service under your lordship's orders, is in itself sufficient to blast all the prospects of advantage to the common cause, which the Allies proposed to themselves from forming a connexion with Murat. I request your Lordship will immediately report to me, for the information of the Prince Regent and his Allies, the circumstances under which this document was issued, and whether your lordship has adopted any and what steps for disavowing it on the part of your Court.

Whether the King of Sicily will or will not relinquish his rights to the Crown of Naples, it is altogether within his competence, as an independent sovereign, to decide; but it is impossible for his Majesty to pursue, by his own means, these rights, to the counteraction and prejudice of the views of the Allies, and to retain any claim upon them for support of any sort,

either as to the recovery of his Neapolitan dominions, or a possession in lieu thereof. It is true, his Britannic Majesty has not yet contracted any engagements with the existing ruler of Naples, and that, from delicacy and attention to the interests of an Ally, the King of Sicily, the British Government has, without any strict obligation to do so, declared their intention to be that their treaty with Murat should *marcher de front* with a suitable arrangement for the King of Sicily: but, if his Sicilian Majesty shall think fit to counteract them in this their generous and friendly policy, having by their armistice admitted the principle of the Austrian treaty with Murat, they will feel themselves released from all further forbearance, and will find themselves compelled to enter into an immediate treaty with Murat, in order to protect the common cause against the disunion which the injudicious conduct of the Court of Palermo must inevitably produce.

Your lordship will lose no time in making an official communication to the Sicilian Government, to the above effect; and I am to signify to your lordship the Prince Regent's pleasure, should you find that the employment of his Sicilian Majesty's troops on the Continent necessarily leads to impressions incompatible with the existing system of the Allies in Italy, that your lordship do, in that case, take immediate measures for sending them back to Sicily—an extremity to which, however, under proper explanations with the Sicilian Government, and also with Murat, I flatter myself your lordship will not find it necessary to have recourse.

There is one subject further upon which I deem it necessary to say a few words—not that I entertain the smallest doubts as to your lordship's own conduct being regulated in strict conformity to the present system of your Government, but as your lordship very properly, and under orders from home, gave great countenance, at a former period, to the only system which, previous to the revival of the Continent, could afford a prospect of shaking the power of France, it is the more neces-

sary, now that a different and better order of things has arisen, to guard against any act or expression which might countenance an idea that either your lordship or your Court was actuated by "*une arrière-pensée*" inconsistent with the arrangements understood between the great Powers of Europe.

In your lordship's Proclamation there may perhaps be found an expression or two, which, separately taken, might create an impression that your views of Italian liberation went to the form of the Government as well as to the expulsion of the French; but, taking its whole scope, and especially its opening and concluding paragraphs together, I cannot assent to the interpretation the Duke of Campochiaro, on the part of his Government, has attempted to give it; but this and the incident of the colours prove how necessary it is, surrounded as your lordship must be by individuals who wish for another system to be established in Italy, not to afford any plausible occasion or pretext for umbrage to those with whom we are acting, but with whom our relations may not be such as at once to generate confidence. This course of policy, on your lordship's part, will best enable us to put Marshal Murat's intentions effectually to the test, which can by no means be suffered to remain equivocal, and to reduce his conduct strictly within the circle of his obligations.

Should your lordship have brought any supply of arms with your expedition, I must particularly enjoin your lordship not to employ them in any loose or general armament of the people. It is not insurrection we now want in Italy, or elsewhere—we want disciplined force, under Sovereigns we can trust. As far, therefore, as you can aid the Archduke or the King of Sardinia in the levy of troops, you have full authority so to do; but, under the extent of our pecuniary engagements to other Powers—greatly extended, as you will observe, by the treaty, copy of which I now enclose—I must request your lordship will not charge yourself with the pay or expenditure of any other force than what you have actually brought with you from Sicily.

Notwithstanding the favourable state of operations on this side of the Alps, I do not attach the less importance to the success of the Allied arms in Italy. Union and energy can alone extricate the Allies from the pernicious inactivity to which misconceptions amongst themselves appear to have given occasion, to obviate which in future, and in order that no misundertaking may take place in any quarter as to the upright intentions of the British Government, I propose to communicate to the Duke of Campochiaro here the substance of the orders I now send to your lordship, and to furnish Prince Metternich with a copy of this despatch, for Marshal Bellegarde's information and guidance, in his intercourse with your lordship.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

PS. Although I have thought it proper to send your lordship, for your confidential information, a copy of the Duc de Campochiaro's Memoir, I wish your lordship to understand that, considering it in many respects unbecoming in its tone and language, and unfounded in point of fact, both Prince Metternich and myself have refused officially to receive it. Your lordship will not require any assurance from me that the British Government never pretended to answer for the consent of the King of Sicily to any arrangement whatever, to the prejudice of his resumption of the Crown of Naples: they never did more than answer for their own conduct upon a measure that was felt to be necessary to the general interests of Europe.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord William Bentinck.

Dijon, April 3, 1814.

My Lord—Although I presume that your lordship will have heard from England that Mr. à Court has been appointed to fill your lordship's diplomatic situation at the Court of Palermo, during your absence in command of the army, I think it right to mention this arrangement to your lordship in

this despatch, and to enclose, for your confidential information, a copy of a secret Memorandum which his Majesty's Ministers at home have given to Mr. à Court, for the guidance of his conduct; and I request your lordship will furnish Mr. à Court with every additional information in your power upon the important subject connected with his mission to Sicily.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord William Bentinck.

Dijon, April 3, 1814.

My Lord—After I had closed my despatch of the present date, your lordship's from Verona, to the 27th, inclusive, have been received. I find nothing to change in the sentiments I have expressed to your lordship, and little to add. I continue strongly to wish your lordship not to withdraw from the co-operation with the Austrians, upon the footing which Marshal Bellegarde has pointed out, in his note to your lordship of the 25th of March; and I have accordingly to signify to your lordship the Prince Regent's pleasure that you do adapt your conduct to the principles therein laid down.

I shall forward these despatches by Mr. Werry, who can give your lordship all necessary information of the state of affairs here, and shall detain the officer who brought your lordship's letters till I can send him back with the result of the operations of the armies now concentred under the walls of Paris.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

The Hon. Sir Charles Stewart to Lord Liverpool.

Paris, April 4, 1814.

My Lord—I am apprehensive that the communications I may make, circumstanced as I am at present, may be of little importance; but, in weighing such intelligence as I detail with

the more regular and official information your lordship will receive from his Majesty's Ambassador at the Court of Petersburg, you will be enabled to form some idea of the political state of Paris.

I have already acquainted you how entirely the management of every concern is with the Emperor, and of the confidential Cabinet which he has selected. Count Nesselrode, very distinguished and independent as he is, leans, I fear, to Talleyrand; and General Pozzo di Borgo, who is the person accredited by his Imperial Majesty to the Provisional Government, though a man of consummate ability, yet is not of sufficient calibre to afford any check to the French mode of proceeding. It is deeply to be lamented that his Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, by accidental occurrences, has been thrown out of the way of affording that incalculable benefit which his presence would not fail of producing here at this moment.

From the best information I can obtain, and the most attentive observation, I am induced to believe that the Provisional Government are straining every nerve to consolidate their power so effectually that, on the arrival of Louis XVIII., or his representative, he will only be a shadow of a king, and find himself dependent on these people, and enveloped in their proceedings. Every office in the Government will be filled up; the Constitution formed precisely as they point out. The Senate and Corps Legislatif having decided on it, the Provisional Government will approve of it, and it will be presented for the acceptance of the King; and thus I fear the root of the new Government will be Talleyrand and his creatures, instead of their legitimate sovereign, under a proper form of legislation. Napoleon managed everything by his immense military power and the satellites appertaining to it. I hope Talleyrand, who is equally ambitious, is not endeavouring to become another absolute ruler, by chicane and political manœuvring.

From what I have said, your lordship will perceive how

much I hold it of importance that Count d'Artois, or some of the family, should arrive in the capital with the smallest delay. A surveillance on the manners of the new Government, and some immediate control, are essentially necessary, for the satisfaction and contentment of the great majority of the people of France, and the success of the cause of the Bourbons. It is the more necessary, because it is evident that the Emperor of Russia's policy throughout has been rather that of coquetting with the nation than making any public or manifest declaration of any wishes relative to Louis XVIII. A singular instance of this occurred the other day, which has been very much remarked, when he received the deputation of the Senate. His declaration relative to the French prisoners was made to them, and at their instance, when it afforded so great an opportunity to have done the act for their legitimate monarch. This circumstance and others give rise to conjecture whether the Emperor has not some hidden wishes; and he has conducted himself with so much address since his arrival here, that it is incalculable the hold he has obtained on the Parisian character.

The more I reflect on the subject, the more I am convinced the Allies, and Great Britain in particular, have little to hope for from the present Provisional Government more than at the commencement of some new Revolution; whereas, they would have everything to look for if the ancient Government was established. There would be less intrigue, ambition, and personal animosity, which so much govern the present proceedings in this capital. It is universally known that people whom Talleyrand protects can be employed in any situation they like. In the Provisional Government, I believe every man, except the Abbé Montesquiou, is a creature of Talleyrand's. Caulaincourt, I have reason to believe, would have been included by Talleyrand, if he could have prevailed on him to desert Napoleon; but, after a good deal of negociation, he remained faithful.

Jaucourt is a very sensible man, but Talleyrand got him made a Senator, and afterwards Great Chamberlain, so he is entirely in his power, as well as Beurnonville, who is a man of less consequence. Barthelemy is equally devoted; the Abbé Louis, another slave of his, has been appointed Minister of the Tresor Royal; three Senators, who are Dutchmen, three Italians, and one or two Germans, who were introduced when Holland, Italy, and Germany, were *provinces* of France, still remain, taking part in the deliberations: this gives offence, aud there is much observation on the subject of these being now permitted to officiate.

Two articles appeared in the same paper, the Moniteur, of yesterday, which have produced much discussion and insinuation as to the perfidy of the Allies; the one being the account of the rupture of the negociations of Chatillon of the 16th of March, by which it appears if Bonaparte had accepted our *projet* we should have treated with him. The other is Lord Wellington's Proclamation, dated February 2nd, relative to the Bourbons. It is demanded how such different measures are to be reconciled.

The Revolution certainly appears to be carrying forward with a degree of tranquillity very unaccountable. Your lordship will see, by the Moniteurs enclosed, the different appointments by the Government: those of General Dessoles to be Governor-General of Paris and the National Guard, and of General Dupont to be Minister of War, are very highly approved of. Malouët, Minister of the Marine, is also a good appointment.

I had an accidental conversation with M. Talleyrand yesterday: steps are taking to communicate with the armies and the fortresses. Talleyrand believes strongly in a movement amongst them: Marmont and Le Febvre are the Marshals who, it is supposed, will declare first. On the other hand, it is reported that Napoleon has an immense number of emissaries in Paris; that Girardin, who is Berthier's aide-de-camp, is

here, with large sums of money; and that some hundreds of the old Guard have been introduced to head the insurrection; that Napoleon is determined *de se faire jour* into Paris at any risk. These, however, I attribute greatly to the alarmists of the day; but I confess I do not like the excessive tranquillity, and even indifference, that seems to exist. But much of this would cease, if there were on the spot some individuals who would be pure from all the suspicions which twenty years of revolution have saddled on all those who are now carrying on the Government.

I feel a considerable degree of anxiety on this head, and for a high personage duly authorized to communicate everything that is going forward, and who should be as much accredited to this Provisional Government as any person from the Emperor of Russia; and this is the more necessary, as it is impossible to be certain whether, in the present amicable temper of the Emperor of Russia and Talleyrand, commercial regulations and other matters of moment may be settled, agreeably to the projects of their respective countries, without duly weighing the rights and interests of others.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CHARLES STEWART.

The Hon. Sir Charles Stewart to Lord Liverpool.

Paris, April 4, 1814.

My Lord—I have much gratification in detailing to your lordship, that upon a communication which has been made to Marshal Marmont, he has consented to pass over with his whole *corps d'armée*, amounting to between 9 and 10,000 men, and enrol himself and his followers in the cause of their legitimate Sovereign. I understand that he stipulated two principal conditions: the one, that Bonaparte's person, if taken, should not be sacrificed; the other, that, if on his march he should be attacked, the Allied troops were to support him. This very favourable event so decidedly denotes the downfal of the

last hopes of Bonaparte, that the peace of the world is at hand. I have been but hastily and imperfectly informed of these circumstances; but they appear to me of so interesting a nature as to induce me to incur the risk of sending information of them even by a private conveyance to Calais. I have also the satisfaction to acquaint you that Victor, Nansouty, and Kellermann, and several other officers of note in Paris, have all declared themselves in favour of the good cause.

The Allied army remains in position at Chevillet. The army of Silesia has experienced, by the illness of its gallant and veteran leader, an irreparable loss; but all the armies fervently hope that the Almighty will restore to him that state of health that will enable him to enjoy those wreaths of laurels which encircle his head. General Barclay de Tolly is placed at the head of that army, with General Diebitsch as chief of his staff. General Gneisenau has succeeded to General Knesebeck's situation about the King, the latter being left ill at Chaumont. The head-quarters of Barclay de Tolly are at Massy. Bonaparte was behind the Essoles, with his head-quarters at Coudray.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CHARLES STEWART.

The Hon Sir Charles Stewart to Lord Castlereagh.

Paris, April 5, 1814.

My Lord—In addition to the *corps d'armée* of Marshal Marmont, of 12,000 men, armed and fully equipped, which have passed to the standards of the liberators of France, and which are arrived at Versailles, Marshals Ney and Macdonald, together with the Duke of Vicenza, are now in Paris, endeavouring to treat for any sort of terms and existence for Napoleon.

I believe they have been endeavouring to have a decision for a Regency with Napoleon's son. This has been most peremptorily refused. I am not acquainted with all that's

going on; but I venture to urge your lordship in the strongest manner to arrive here with the utmost expedition, or to send some instructions which can authorize Lord Cathcart or myself to present ourselves for the necessary information.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CHARLES STEWART.

The Hon. Sir Charles Stewart to Lord Castlereagh.

Paris, April 5, 1814.

My Lord—I hope you will receive a more perfect and detailed account from Lord Cathcart than I am enabled to furnish you with, of the proceedings of last night and this day. The conferences of the Marshals with the Emperor of Russia, collectively and separately, led to the determination of offering Bonaparte the island of Elba as a retreat, with an income of six millions of livres; three millions for himself and Maria Louisa, and three to be divided between his brothers and sisters. It is supposed he is fallen so low as to accept of this.

M. Caulaincourt and Ney were very violent and strong in their entreaties for a Regency, Bonaparte having abdicated with that view. The Emperor of Russia was firm, and gained Macdonald, Marmont having been already secured. His Imperial Majesty declared the Allies had already announced they would not treat with Napoleon Bonaparte or any of his family, and that they were determined by the voice of the nation to proclaim Louis XVIII. Bonaparte's decision is expected to-morrow.

I beg your lordship's excuse for these few hasty lines, which I write very late, at the moment of the departure of the messenger.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord William Bentinck.

Dijon, April 5, 1814.

My Lord—Having detained Captain P. Laurent to be the bearer of the result of the operations against the enemy's

capital, I have the gratification of acquainting your lordship that it was delivered from the authority of its oppressor on the morning of the 31st, amidst the loudest acclamations of a grateful and loyal people.

The whole population of Paris, with white cockades, were assembled to greet the Sovereigns and their troops, who, on their triumphal entrance, immediately defiled through Paris in pursuit of the enemy, leaving the armed inhabitants to guard their own capital for their King, in whose support they had with one voice declared.

It appears from Lord Burghersh's despatches, that the results of the victory of the 25th proved much more extensive than had been at first supposed. The prisoners alone are estimated at 10,000, and the number of cannon immense. After this brilliant exploit, the combined army passed the Marne at Meaux, and, leaving Marshal Wrede and General Sacken to cover that river, whilst General Winzingerode, with 9,000 cavalry, observed Buonaparte's movement, who was endeavouring to regain Paris by Troyes, the whole force marched upon the capital by St. Denis. Including Marmont's, Mortier's, and Girard's corps, the garrison consisted of 25 or 30,000 regular troops, and as many National Guards. The whole was in position, on the side of Montmartre, under Joseph's command. They were attacked on the 30th, and defeated with great loss on all points, leaving 84 pieces of cannon in the hands of the Allies. This victory led immediately to the results I have stated, which you will find more particularly detailed in the enclosed Bulletin, which your lordship will have reprinted and circulated in Italy as extensively as possible.

Buonaparte, afraid to retire from Arcis at once upon Paris, and possibly hoping to manœuvre the Allies to a distance from the capital, appears to have been entirely disconcerted by the bold and decisive movement adopted by Prince Schwarzenberg; viz., the uniting his army with Blücher's, in the deter-

mination to march at once upon Paris. Buonaparte had retraced his steps as far as Fontainebleau on the 31st, when he heard that the city had capitulated, and declared for the Bourbons. We are not informed of his subsequent movements: probably he will direct his march to the Loire, and endeavour to draw to him Soult and Suchet. The Empress and Ministers are gone, it is said, to Orleans. Prince Schwarzenberg was assembling his army for a forward movement between Longjumeau and Jurigny.

Amidst these glorious and decisive successes, I must still impress upon your lordship the necessity of leaving nothing to chance. To avoid the horrors of a civil war, the enemy must be speedily, as well as effectually crushed; and it is of the last importance that the state of Italy should not be such as to afford him an asylum, if, under the favour of Providence, the Allies should succeed in driving him from France.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Liverpool.

Hague, April 5, 1814.

My dear Lord—After the glorious intelligence, from the joyful effects of which you will scarcely have recovered upon the arrival of this letter, I can scarcely hope that anything it conveys can be read with much interest.

The cheering information of the victory obtained at Paris on the 30th, and the consequent surrender of that city, reached me yesterday, in a letter from Sir C. Stewart, accompanied by an abstract of his despatch. In communicating these grateful tidings to his Royal Highness the Prince of Orange, I have not omitted to impress upon his mind the absolute necessity of continued exertion, and am happy to find that he entirely agrees with me on this point. I have taken the liberty also, in a letter to the Duke of Cambridge, of transmitting a copy of the abstract of Sir C. Stewart's despatch, humbly to recommend that no relaxation of effort should take place.

If the Allies upon the spot, who seem by their declaration to the Parisians to have begun well—if we all, upon whom the conduct of the war in any degree depends—shall still struggle to leave nothing undone while anything remains to be done, we may now, at length, form legitimate hopes that the reign of tyranny is overpast, and that, with the restoration of the ancient dynasty in France, peace, on a solid and permanent basis, will again revisit the earth.

For all that relates to Flanders and to his mission to the Crown Prince, I refer you to General Taylor, who sails by this packet.

With respect to the projected attack on Antwerp, which, I sincerely hope will never be lost sight of, till the war shall cease, I cannot but think we may be enabled to proceed in it without the assistance of the Swedish troops, and, if I dare say it, still better without those under the direction of the Prince Royal, who, I am convinced, will never act cordially with us, and whom I cannot avoid suspecting even of hostility to the views of the Allies. His confidential communications with General Maison have never yet been cleared up. Upon this subject Mr. Thornton's letters to me have maintained an utter silence; and it is beyond me to conceive for what good and honest purpose confidential communication can be carried forward with an enemy's general, by a person in co-operation with others, while these are to be kept in total ignorance of the nature of such communications.

To commence, however, an attack on Antwerp, without the assistance of the Swedes, it will certainly be necessary, in the first instance, to procure authority for the Saxon corps, under the Duke of Saxe-Weimar, permanently to undertake to cover Flanders and Brabant. His corps consists of about 30,000 men, and should seem, and I believe is thought by Sir Thomas Graham and General Taylor, if properly disposed of, amply sufficient for this purpose. Upon this subject, I have taken it upon myself to write pressingly to Sir Charles Stewart;

but I should hope that this will not prevent your taking measures for the accomplishment of this essential object.

In the next place, it will be requisite that all the Hanoverian and other troops should be peremptorily withdrawn from the Prince Royal's command. He has, as I understand, still reserved some of the small portion which had originally advanced to Cologne, and these, to the number, as I should estimate, of about 3,000, are actually under the command of the Prince of Hesse-Homburg; and, in lieu of them, he has sent forward a body of Swedes, no doubt, in my mind, with a view to putting himself for something in an operation, the conduct of which he has virtually refused, and enabling himself, perhaps, by counter-orders from time to time, to impede the operations.

Some Prussian battalions are still at Breda, and the Prince of Orange has written for the services of these to the King of Prussia; and I have also written to Sir Charles Stewart to the same effect, and, in the mean time, have engaged General Vanderplaat, Governor of that place, and who has received permission from their Commander from that purpose, to detain them at Breda, till we can receive answers to our letters. We should thus have an army for this important service, of which the gross statement would be as follows:—

	Covering Army, Saxons . .	30,000
For the operations of the siege.	British Army	10,000
	Hanoverians	7,000
	Dutch	11,000
	Prussians	2,000
		60,000

Sir Thomas Graham will say that these are men upon paper, and that no such force can at present be counted upon for the field; and most certainly, till we are assured of the assistance of a strong covering army during the whole progress of the operation, there is not a word to be said in opposition

to Sir Thomas's observation. But, taking it for granted that we obtain the permanent assistance of the Saxons, or of some other force to an equal amount, without which I very readily admit that we should vainly make the attempt, I cannot but be of opinion that we have troops, and troops enough, for the immediate operations of the siege.

The garrison of Antwerp does not now exceed 4,000 men, but, in order to be sure, let us take it at 5,000. Surely, if properly covered from interruption, it ought not to take above 18 or 20,000 men, even composed, as the troops at our command actually are, of many undisciplined soldiers, to reduce the place; but we have above this number.

Reduced from paper to effectives, according to the proportions taken from Sir Thomas Graham's letter, the state of the force actually at our command is as follows:—

British,	reduced from	10,000	to	7,000
Hanoverians	,,	,, 7,000	,,	5,000
Dutch	,,	,, 11,000	,,	8,000
Total at our actual command				20,000
If we obtain the Prussians, more				1,500
To these may be added the Brabançon levies under General Murray				4,000
Total				25,500

And to these will constantly be added additional battalions of Dutch and Hanoverian levies, as they can be brought forward. As I know it would be improper for me even to detail my opinions to General Graham upon this subject, so foreign to my immediate functions, I have thought, however, that it did not counteract my duty to lay them thus privately before you; not that I have the presumption to imagine they can have any weight in themselves, but that, upon the facts stated, the opinions of others more competent may be taken, on which to form your decision. In the mean time, Sir Thomas Graham is very properly, in my mind, about to undertake the

reduction of Batz, and to blockade Antwerp on both sides of the river, all which will tend to facilitate the main object, if it shall be finally resolved on, and the necessary means provided of insuring the non-interruption of the operations of the siege.

I send enclosed herewith, the copy of the last letter I have received from Mr. Johnson at Brussels, stating a plan supposed to have been adopted by Buonaparte, and in execution of which, the late movements of General Maison are believed to have taken place. General Taylor will give you further information on this subject.

M. de Hogendorp is very anxious to receive a list of East Indian goods prohibited in Great Britain, which are alluded to in one of the forms transmitted from the Treasury, with reference to the establishment of duties here, similar to those in Great Britain prior to the trade between the Dutch and their former colonies. May I request you to give the necessary directions that this should be expedited? M. de Hogendorp also informs me to-day that he has been called upon by the merchants of Amsterdam and Rotterdam, to know whether his Majesty's Government would not permit this trade to be carried on in British registered ships, hired by the Dutch for that purpose, or in British built ships, to be purchased for this purpose by the Dutch.

With respect to the former, the shipping interest would certainly be for it; it would, however, tend to increase freight to the British merchant, and consequently operate against trade, while it advanced the interest of the ship-owner. As to the latter, it might be open to considerable fraud, in opening facilities to the purchase of British ships, taken as brigs of war by the enemy, and which had consequently lost all British character. If Government should be inclined to accede to the first of these propositions, an Act of Parliament, I should conceive, would be necessary to carry it into effect.

Yours, &c., CLANCARTY.

Our last letters from Lord Castlereagh are of the 23rd.

The despatches which accompanied them were immediately forwarded for England. I wish we could hear again from him, and that the Emperor of Austria had maintained himself against Buonaparte, and could continue to do so till the capture of Paris should have worked its effect throughout France.

The Hon. Sir Charles Stewart to Lord Castlereagh.

Paris, April 6, 1814.

My Lord—In announcing to your lordship that Napoleon Bonaparte has accepted the terms offered by the Allies for his future existence, and that of his family, I cannot resist offering my humble congratulations that the tragedy which has desolated Europe has come to a close, and that the exit of the individual from the stage where he has so long exhibited, should be marked by that degradation which his career has so deservedly entailed upon him. Almighty God has been pleased to teach the nations of the world a lesson which future ages will record, and the events of the French Revolution, connected with the Revolution of 1814, will hand down to posterity an awful and instructive example.

Marshal Ney writes that Napoleon Bonaparte will proceed to such place as may be indicated, accepting the island of Elba and the pensions granted by the bounty of the Allies. He requests to have his family sent to him without delay.

The French army will move to the environs of Paris.

Every individual officer, even Berthier, I am informed, has left Bonaparte, whose predicament now can only deserve that pity which is extended by Christians to the most unfortunate of their fellow creatures.

When I learn more details, I will write to your lordship at length.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CHARLES STEWART.

The Hon. Sir Charles Stewart to Lord Castlereagh.

Paris, April 7, 1814.

My Lord—In despatching Colonel Lowe, who has been attached to me during the last campaign, to England by Calais, and in furnishing him with copies of every official document of the Government which I have been able to procure, as well as an abstract of the Constitution, which I have the honour to enclose, in the handwriting of the Prince of Benevento, I hope I afford your lordship the best information of the great events that have occurred here within the last few days.

So much has been done, so various are the important objects to consider, and so multiplied are the reasonings that might be brought forward on every proceeding, that I deem it most prudent to be silent, and confine myself merely to a transmittal of the papers. It would be presumptuous, indeed, at such a moment to offer any observations. Colonel Lowe, who has been eye-witness of all these great events and this wonderful Revolution, will afford your lordship every information that can be derived from an observer of much intelligence, experience, and ability: to him, therefore, I beg to refer you for all farther details of the close of Napoleon Bonaparte's reign, which, "like the baseless fabric of a vision, will leave not a wreck behind."

I have, at the request of the Prince of Benevento, sent Lieutenant-Colonel Cooke, with a French officer of the same rank, to the Marquess of Wellington and Marshal Soult.

I have the honour to be, &c., CHARLES STEWART.

The Hon. Sir Charles Stewart to Lord Bathurst.

Paris, April 7, 1814.

My Lord—Very considerable apprehension has arisen, since his Imperial Majesty made the offer of the island of Elba to Napoleon Bonaparte, as to the mischief and ultimate danger that may accrue, if he is put in possession of it: its extreme proximity to the shores of Italy; the power and influence

Bonaparte still has there; the popularity of Eugene Beauharnois; the possible tergiversation of Murat; once more, and finally, the number of discontented French who might follow Bonaparte's fortunes to that quarter — all these and more reasonings are adduced, to throw great doubt on the policy of this arrangement.

The misfortune to us at this moment is, that Bonaparte remains in existence. Saddled as the world must be with this fallen despot, it is of the utmost moment to place him where he never can disturb its repose again. If he could escape into France, or get possession of Italy, which would rather live under his sole dominion than be parcelled out as it is likely to be; if he could carry French soldiers and followers into either country; if his large pension is paid him, and if the other dangers to which I have alluded above are to be apprehended, it might be well to consider, before the act is irretrievable, whether a far less dangerous retreat might not be found, and whether Napoleon may not bring the powder to the iron mines which the island of Elba is so famed for. It is of the greatest moment that this should be duly weighed; and I am most anxious for Lord Castlereagh's and Prince Metternich's arrival. The offer was made to Caulaincourt, by the Emperor Alexander. Talleyrand and the Government much disapproved of it, and the more so, the more it is considered.

I have the honour to be, &c., CHARLES STEWART.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Liverpool.

Copy. The Hague, April 8, 1814.

My dear Lord—Having received the copy of the Emperor of Russia's Declaration of the 31st ult. late at night on the evening of the 5th, I thought it advisable early the next day to suggest to this Government the policy of sending flags of truce into the several fortresses and places still held by the French, with details of the late intelligence. This suggestion has been adopted, and orders have been issued to carry it into

execution. I have little doubt that the same idea suggested itself to General Sir Thomas Graham, with respect to Antwerp, Bergen-op-Zoom, Batz, &c.; but, lest it should not, I wrote at the same time to him, requesting that he would take the policy of a measure of this sort into his consideration, and that, if he should approve of it, he would also convey his opinion upon the subject to Admiral Young, who might adopt the same with reference to Walcheren.

By my despatch No. 71, of this day's date, conveying that received from his Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge, you will see that the Duke of Brunswick, with his troops, may be speedily expected. This may give rise to some difficulties with respect to command, and I should, therefore, take the liberty of suggesting that Sir Thomas Graham may be made acquainted with the wishes of Government thereon.

In my despatch No. 70 you will perceive that a change in the Ministry, or rather a change of situation, with some addition, is about to take place here. M. de Nagel, who comes into the Foreign Office, you have probably known in England: he appears a worthy man, and much inclined in every respect to us.

M. Van Seire, who will be appointed Minister of Finance, is a person who, as I am informed, will work well and honestly, as long as things are likely to go on steadily with the present reigning family; but, in case of danger to the existing establishments, it is thought he would not be unwilling to make his peace with those who might be likely to succeed.

M. Molems, the assistant to the Hereditary Prince in the War Department, bears nearly the same character. Both have been employed under Louis and his brother Buonaparte. The first, however, is reckoned a strictly honest man, as far as relates to any views of illegitimate enrichment through the means of office.

Our letters from Liege, and those addressed to me from Brussels by Mr. Johnson, state that the mob of Paris had, on

e 31st ult., placed a rope about the neck of Buonaparte's atue, in the Place de Vendôme, and pulled it down.

M. de Hogendorp is very anxious that this Government hould be supplied with the Acts, when passed, which give oreign countries liberty of trade with the British empire in India: I therefore request you will give the requisite directions that these should be forwarded.

In the forms sent to the Treasury for the adoption of this Government, all Dutch articles, except those enumerated as being free, and those which are, by such forms, to be subject to a rated duty, on export hence to the Dutch colonies, are to be liable to a duty of five per cent. Corn, meal, malt, flour, and provisions, come within neither of these exceptions, consequently, will be subject to the duty, Is this intended?—I should think not: the Corn Laws of Great Britain, which probably will suffer some alteration in the course of the present session, stand upon a very different principle from that which guides the general trade of the country and that with her colonies, and I should see no possible objection to permit the Dutch to export corn, &c., for the supply of their colonies, to any extent, without requiring them to exact any duty whatever on the export.

I had scarcely written the last word, when Mates, the messenger, arrived from Dijon with despatches from Lord Castlereagh. Thank God, he is safe!—I was in some terror for him. The despatches will speak for themselves.

Yours, &c., CLANCARTY.

Lord Castlereagh to J. M. Johnson, Esq.

Dijon, April 9, 1814.

Sir—As a Provisional Government is about to be established at Brussels for the Low Countries, at the head of which will be placed the Austrian General Vincent, it is of considerable importance that the Prince Regent's Government should be enabled to communicate officially with that commission, and I

have the satisfaction to acquaint you that his Royal Highness has been graciously pleased to select you for this trust. You will receive the salary and appointments of a Chargé d'Affaires; and, having communicated to the Provisional Government the enclosed letter addressed to General Vincent, I have only to add that you will keep me informed of all matters connected with the Low Countries which may be interesting to the Prince Regent's Government.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Mr. Edward Cooke to Lord Castlereagh.

North Row, April 9, Evening.

My dear Lord—Most sincerely do I congratulate you; and be assured that the fullest justice is done to the great abilities you have displayed through the whole of the transactions which you have so successfully and wonderfully managed. Your superiority and authority are now fixed.

We lament that you may be called hither too soon, and I see no one to succeed you, unless you call up Lord Wellington, which I doubt not has occurred. I see Talleyrand has been naturally taking as much care as possible of himself and his revolutionary friends, which seems unavoidable.—I have not read the Constitution enough to form the least judgment whether it will work monarchically or oligarchically.

Louis XVIII. has been informed of the intelligence; and to-morrow the Lord Chamberlain goes with a letter from the Regent, and to offer him equipment.

I hope the Allies will not forget that we deserve something for the £700,000,000 we have spent in the contest, and that we cannot pay a soldier, a clerk, or a magistrate, before we have spent £40,000,000 for interest and redemption of our debt. It will be hard if France is to pay nothing for the destruction of Europe, and we are to pay all for saving it.

How I rejoice that the Crown Prince had nothing to do in the affair! He will still try to distract.

You will want all your power now, I think, more than ever. You know the Spaniards, hearing of Bourdeaux, proposed a treaty never to make peace with Bonaparte, and, if the Bourbons were restored, never to renew the Family Compact.

We have really no news here. The archduchess makes the only conversation.

The accounts of Norway are that Prince Christian is determined to play the Norway game throughout. He calls a Diet for the 15th of April, talks of 80,000 Norwegians in arms—that he is fully provided with provisions and ammunition. His accounts are said to be greatly exaggerated, and that the Norwegians are by no means unanimous: but I think, on information not yet accurate, the matter is likely to be very distressing.

Galatin is arrived at Harwich, having originally applied through Baring to go through England; and, being since nominated a negociator at Gottenburg, he has been obliged to resign his Secretaryship of the Treasury at least *ad interim*.

Walpole's letters from Petersburg say nothing. He transmits a statement of complaint against the commercial hardships of our merchants, which will be sent to you.

I should like to see less disposition to be duped by French flattery, and fewer liberal notions in an Autocrat. The flame may catch, and vanity is never warned by example.

May final success crown your efforts! I long to see your victorious entry into the House of Commons.

Yours most truly and obediently, E. COOKE.

Mr. Edward Thornton to Lord Castlereagh.

Liege, April 10, 1814.

My Lord—This letter will be delivered to your lordship by *three*[1] gentlemen, the most distinguished inhabitants of the district of Liege, who are proceeding to the Imperial head-

[1] As a marginal note to the original:—"*Four:* Comte Eugene de Meon; Comte de Geloës; Baron de Stockhem de Hïers; le Chevalier de Trousset."

quarters. The object of their journey is to present to the Allied Sovereigns the wish of the people of the Bishopric of Liege and of the country of Stavelot to follow the destination of the Belgic provinces, and to form a part of the same system of government, whatever it may be, as the Allied Sovereigns mean to confer on the Austrian provinces of the Low Countries.

I leave it to these gentlemen to have the honour of laying open to your lordship the ground of their desire, in the exposition which they mean to make to the Ministers of the Allies; but I cannot help expressing my coincidence in opinion with them, that any other or separate system will be attended with great embarrassments.

I ought to add that, while I was at Cologne, some of the most distinguished people represented to me the necessity of uniting with the system of Holland or of the Low Countries (but rather of the former) that town and territory, which, by its position on the Rhine and its artificial port, is so intimately connected with the commerce of that river to Holland.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

EDWARD THORNTON.

Lord Blayney to Lord Castlereagh.

Gueret, Department de la Creuze, April 12, 1814.

My dear Lord—This letter will be delivered to your lordship by Mr. Walter Boyd, late Member for Shaftesbury, and chief partner in the house of Boyd, Ker, and Company, whom I beg leave to make known to your lordship, and who will explain his private concerns.

Permit me most sincerely to congratulate your lordship on the glorious termination of the great, long, and arduous contest in which Europe has been engaged, and personally to congratulate your lordship on the distinguished part you have acted towards its successful and happy accomplishment.

I will thank your lordship to inform the Minister or Ambassador for the Emperor of Russia that, as his Imperial

Majesty must naturally be solicitous concerning his officers, that the Generals Poltoradzki, Ossouffief, and Heidenreich, passed some days here on their route to their depôt—they were treated with the greatest attention from the English who are prisoners; I supplied them with money, and such matters as they required; and that many officers in his Imperial Majesty's service, so well as those in the service of the coalesced Powers, passed through Verdun; that, as senior officer, and acting on the part of the British Government, they wanted for nothing which my means enabled me to contribute which was most requisite in their situation as prisoners, after a long march, undertaken at the most rigorous season of the year, and for which they have since expressed their sentiments, by letter, in the most grateful terms.

It has fallen to my lot to act, on the part of the British Government, for some time towards contributing to the relief of the soldiers in our service who are prisoners in France, and I conceive it my duty to inform your lordship that, during the period in which the war was carried on in the territory of France, the prisoners were unavoidably marched and countermarched in all directions through the French empire, during which movements they were exposed to severe hardships and privations: and that, either from the incapacity or negligence of their existing Government in not forwarding them with shoes, subsistence, or provisions, many perished.

The situation in which I acted, from the liberality and confidence Lord Palmerston, as Secretary at War, was so kind as to place in me, was fortunately the means of saving many lives.

The British prisoners in the several depôts at present are contiguous to the head-quarters of Lord Wellington's army; and as the soldiers, with few exceptions, composed a part of that army, I submit to your lordship the propriety of their joining their respective regiments, as preferable, in their present situation, to being marched through almost the entire of France and England, and from thence again countermarched

to join. This arrangement will enable the War Office, as well as the regimental agents, to settle the accounts and forward them to the regiments, which would be more regular and more accommodating for all parties, than for each soldier individually to ask for his private settlement in London. I do, therefore, think it advisable to represent this circumstance to your lordship, and shall act in obedience to your lordship's directions.

I understand Lady Castlereagh is in France; in such case, I beg you will be pleased to present my best compliments.

I have the honour to remain, &c.,

BLAYNEY, Major-General.

I can send an abstract of each soldier's account to his regiment, in addition to the general statement for the agents and War Office. B.

PS. I shall send a copy of this letter to Sir Edward Paget, who is Senior British Officer, in the expectation of his communicating his sentiments to your lordship, previous to any thing being acted upon. B.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool.

Draft. Paris, April 13, 1814.

My dear Liverpool—If you hurry the King off, I may be with you this day month. It may appear presumptuous in me to say so, but my remaining till this new scene takes a shape is beyond all comparison more important than my original mission. You must therefore manage it; and I cannot conceive it possible that any man in Parliament will now wish to discuss either the first or second act of this drama till the whole is submitted. The treaty being laid, I dare say they will not object to extend the vote of credit for subsidy, reserving the actual vote under the treaty to be considered in connexion with the general question of peace and foreign relations.

I send my brother Charles to-morrow to Wellington, to put

m in full possession of every thing here, and to acquaint me ith his views. I shall, however, express a strong wish to see im here, if he can manage it. I wish he would at the outset ndertake this embassy. His military name would give him nd us the greatest ascendency. His army may now return through France, delight the Parisians, and save their horses by passing at the ports of the narrow seas.

I had a very long interview this morning with Monsieur: he is inclined to conciliate.

Ever yours, CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool.

Draft. Paris, April 13, 1814.

My dear Lord—I am desirous, with as little delay as possible, to state what has appeared to the Ministry assembled here the course which our proceedings should take, and which will enable your lordship finally to decide as to the period of my return.

They consider the great object is to conclude *preliminaries of peace* with the least possible delay, in order to avoid the unfavourable impression which the protracted stay of the troops is likely to create in France. They at the same time feel that this can only be done with the King, and they have accordingly this day urged Monsieur to press his immediate arrival, and his acceptance of the Constitution, even with its faults, rather than risk the result of national discussions on political metaphysics. In the mean time, we propose to sign with the Provisional Government a suspension of hostilities by sea and land, under certain modifications, and further, to commence our deliberations upon the peace itself, so as to have it ready for signature upon the King's arrival.

Under these circumstances, I cannot hesitate to declare that I consider my continuing here till this act is perfected to be not only desirable but indispensable, and that there should be no hesitation in stating this in Parliament. Mr. Robinson

will be ready, at the shortest notice, to proceed to London; but, as his assistance is of the greatest value to me, and his presence might serve to provoke debate, I shall not think of parting with him, unless at your lordship's express desire.

The Emperor of Russia consulted us to-day upon the expediency of his making his excursion to England immediately, or between the signature of the preliminaries and the definitive treaty. We were all of opinion that his absence now would be injurious, and that his Imperial Majesty may, without prejudice to the general interest, absent himself whilst the preliminary treaty is under discussion in England, and previous to the assembling of a Congress.

As the subject was spoken of in one of our confidential meetings, I could not avoid expressing my persuasion that, if the two other Sovereigns could here *fill up* the same interval by a similar excursion, it would afford the Prince Regent the greatest satisfaction to assemble around him at such a moment the three great Monarchs whose arms and counsels, so intimately united with his own, had in fact saved Europe — that, proceeding there, accompanied by their respective Ministers for Foreign Affairs, our conferences might be continued in London, and all the essential points arranged for the ratification of Congress.

Whether executed or not, I was glad to seize the occasion to mark that I did not consider that there was any exclusive preference in his Royal Highness's politics; it being essential, I am confident, to his useful authority on the Continent, that the Prince Regent should be considered as the arbitrator to whom they all look up for protection against each other, and not as peculiarly leagued with any particular Court.

But I cannot but seriously feel that such an event would not only be a glorious termination to the splendid career his Royal Highness has run, but also be solidly useful to the best interests of our country and of Europe. Going as these Sovereigns would in a certain degree *incognito*, the addition of the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia would add little to the ex-

tent of reception required for the Emperor of Russia; and his Royal Highness might then confer the Garter on the two latter, in conformity with the intention which he has for some entertained, in the event of all going well. Having been himself the key of the arch, I own I should wish to see him surrounded by those by whom the great edifice had been raised.

I shall write again on this subject. I am sure what I have said will do good politically, if it ends here; and I hope his Royal Highness will not disapprove the liberty I have taken.

Lord Castlereagh to the Marquess of Wellington.

Paris, April 13, 1814.

My dear Lord—The compass of a letter is so inadequate to convey a just conception of the state of affairs here, that I have requested my brother Charles to carry to you the details, with which, as well as with my sentiments, he is fully acquainted. He will explain to you the strong wish I personally entertain that you could make it consistent with your other duties to be present here for a short time. He will also mention to you the importance which I should attach to your accepting the embassy, upon a peace, to Paris, if you have no other object immediately in view, repose after such exertions being in itself a very natural one.

I should not, perhaps, propose this task to you, after the station you have filled, if I did not think the situation might derive an additional interest from the era at which we are arrived, and the authority your name and services would give, through this Court, to our general politics on the Continent. I need not assure you that, in suggesting this proposal for your consideration, I should wish to be understood as not for a moment interfering with any claim for your services that may arise at home.

I am, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Mr. Edward Cooke to Lord Castlereagh.

Foreign Office, April 14 [1814].

My dear Lord—We are all joy here. The only check to my feelings is the French Constitution. Such a House of Lords! without family, property, character. The Court, the nobility, the people, must detest them: they may hope for the support of the armies. If the army can be detached from the Senate, it will fall. Were I a Bourbon, my first policy would be to get over the generals and the army; and, if they could be really secured, then to replace the Senate with the old nobility.

The next thing I would do is to pay the established religion only, and to increase the number and provision of the clergy. The clergy of France is by no means numerous enough for the purposes of religion or education.

I was talking with La Rivière to-day, who was President of the Council of 500: he says the Constitution cannot last a year.

People lament here that the Emperor of Russia is so easily flattered away. Despotism and Jacobinism. The Opposition are in love with the Emperor. At the same time, the line which has been taken has been most happy, as it has brought every thing to a termination without much bloodshed.

They say Bonaparte will be always ready at Elba, to place himself at the head of any discontented party in any State bordering upon the Mediterranean.

Mr. Thornton was with me to-day. He hopes you may be able to do something as to commerce with Russia. I said I was afraid the time was not favourable for more business. The fact is, that the German party are our rivals, and are ready, though foreigners, to submit to all the hardships of the Russian ukases, with the sole view of driving us out of Russia, as they imagine we will not submit to them long; and upon this part of the subject the Russians are indifferent. Upon the other

part, viz., the tariff of duties, the Russians are with us, as, being obliged to consume foreign manufactures, they do not like paying two and three hundred per cent. *ad valorem*.

I have had two very kind letters from Lord Grenville, who is delighted. I had sent him some Bulletins and Gazettes. Elliot is lamenting the Jacobinic mixture. The King of France can hardly put his leg to the ground yet, from gout. I know not what is to be the etiquette: it should proceed from this Office, through Louis's Minister.

Most truly your lordship's servant,

E. COOKE.

Lord Castlereagh to Robert Liston, Esq.

Paris, April 14, 1814.

Sir—I take advantage of the departure of a Russian courier for Constantinople, to communicate to you the general nature of the great events which have recently taken place in this capital. After a series of splendid successes, a capitulation was entered into by Marshal Marmont, commanding the French troops, for the surrender of Paris on the 30th. On the following day the Allied Sovereigns entered Paris, and on April 1st, the Senate decreed Buonaparte had forfeited the throne of France. This example has been followed by the Legislative Body, and a Provisional Government has been appointed, having M. de Talleyrand at its head. The feelings of the people were loudly and decidedly expressed in favour of the ancient dynasty; and the Senate has since formally promulgated the restoration of the old family, in the person of Louis XVIII.

Monsieur, Comte d'Artois, entered Paris on the 12th inst., and was received with every demonstration of joy, and a deputation has been sent to invite the accession of Louis XVIII. to the Constitution, as decreed by the Senate and Legislative Body.

Buonaparte is to retire to the island of Elba, and a consi-

derable revenue will be assigned to him. The Empress is to have the duchies of Parma, Placentia, and Guastalla.

I enclose you a series of French papers, from which you will obtain more precise details of these events, of which I have given you a sketch in this letter.

I am, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

PS. I have to request that you will communicate this intelligence in such quarters, and make use of it as may seem best calculated to promote the interest of his Majesty's Government.

Mr. H. Newman, Vice-Consul at Gottenburg, to Mr. Cooke.

Copy. Gottenburg, April 15, 1814.

Sir—With reference to my letter of the 12th instant, apprizing you of the arrival of the American frigate John Adams, with Messrs. Russell and Clay on board, I have now the honour to inform you that I have forwarded to the General Post-Office a bag of letters brought by that frigate for England, which I have requested Sir Francis Freeling will not deliver until he is favoured with your directions thereon.

I have the honour to acquaint you, for the information of his Majesty's Ministers, that a Danish gentleman of distinction, Mr. Gulnpalm, who came here last night from Copenhagen, with a passport to this city from the Swedish Minister at that Court, and another from Count Engeström, permitting him to go to Norway (but the latter dated early in February), was placed under arrest by the Commandant, and sent to Count Essen, the Governor of Wennersberg, with his trunks sealed, under an escort of hussars.

Nothing of any consequence appeared on the examination of his papers, until the person who was repacking his trunks discovered two letters in an old glove, addressed to the Crown Prince of Norway; and from their being partly written in characters which could not be understood by the Governor,

they were sent forward immediately by express to Stockholm, to be deciphered. Sufficient, however, could be collected from the letters to warrant the suspicion of their being direct from the King of Denmark to the Prince Christian, ordering him to defend Norway as long as was in his power, as he would never give it up quietly to Sweden.

I beg leave to add, that the foregoing has been communicated to me by the principal Secretary to the Governor of this city, Count Rosen being at this time absent. Mr. Gulnpalm is in the confidence of the Court of Copenhagen: he was three years chargé d'affaires at Stockholm from that country.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

H. NEWMAN, Vice-Consul.

Mr. Alexander Gibbon to Earl Bathurst.

London, No. 14, Alfred Place, Bedford Square, April 16, 1814.

My Lord—I beg permission, at this critical moment, to lay the following important case before you, and earnestly to entreat your kind and solemn consideration thereof, as touching or concerning the entire fortunes and vital interests of a number of his Majesty's subjects, by no means inconsiderable merchants, and private individuals, both in this country and in the colony in question, namely, "Demerary."

On the sole security of a plantation in that colony: 1st. *Since April*, 1811, as merchants of London, and to prevent the absolute ruin of the estate, my house or firm has advanced very large sums of money, and there is at this moment due to it, or to me, individually, the sum of nineteen thousand pounds and upwards, after deducting or giving credit for all the crops received up to this day.

2ndly. There is due to other persons, merchants, or traders of London, on the sole security of the same plantation, the sum of more than fifteen thousand pounds.

3rdly. Also on the same security, to the Right Honourable Lord Reay, twelve hundred pounds.

4thly. Also on the same security, to a gentleman of London, whose name I am not at liberty to mention in an official communication, the sum of forty thousand pounds and upwards.

5thly. Also to Mr. Christopher Broome, of Berkhamstead, in the County of Herts, the sum of about ten thousand pounds, making in all the sum of about eighty-five thousand pounds sterling.

The first part of the second, and all the fifth and last of these sums, are secured by mortgages on the plantation The third and fourth are on bond or bill, or on open account.

The plantation itself, my lord, is the property of an English gentleman and his family, who have always been resident in England, but is subject to a first mortgage to a Dutch merchant, who is, and always has been, resident in Amsterdam, in Holland, for the sum of thirty-five thousand two hundred pounds, upon which he claims a very large arrear of interest, as having accrued, due to him, during the war just terminated.

The plantation, my lord, was a coffee plantation, and, from the unprecedented and unwarrantable measures of hostility adopted against our colonies and their produce by France, to which Holland was accessory, your lordship knows that coffee, as a West India production, whose chief consumption was on the Continent of Europe, became so much reduced in price or value, as actually to have been *for several years not worth the expense of freight, insurances, and other expenses of transportation to England and sale there.*

The plantation in question was, and still is, a very considerable one; but, from the necessary gradual depopulation of the negroes, by reason of the great disproportion in number between the sexes and otherwise, it has become impossible to work this plantation, as well as all others in the West Indies (taking them in a general view), to the same extent as formerly; and, although by the conversion which has been

made of its particular culture from coffee to sugar, and the high price of sugar, there are reasonable hopes that, under due and proper management, the whole debt due from this plantation or its proprietor (who has no other property) may be paid; yet, if it were now brought to sale, under sequestration by the laws of the colony, it would probably not sell for so much as the amount of the mortgage due to the Dutch merchant, with the arrears of interest on the same: whereby, in the event of such a sale, the Dutch mortgagee, being the first incumbrancer, would be paid, and the whole sum of eighty-five thousand pounds sterling due to the British creditors, and the value of the reversion of the plantation to its present English proprietor, would be both utterly and for ever lost to them and to this country, to the entire ruin of the greater part of them and of their families.

Their case is by no means singular, and your lordship, while you feel for them, sees that an individual national loss of eighty-five thousand pounds sterling, operated upon by a very small multiplier, becomes a consideration of high national importance to prevent, as to the mode of doing which, according to equity, justice, and good conscience, I presume not to give an opinion, but respectfully lay the following short case before your lordship:

The legal estate of and in the plantation in question has been, and now is, as your lordship knows, in the person of the first mortgagee, who is *the Dutch subject*. Permit me to suppose, my lord, that the plantation itself had been absolutely his, as well as the estate at law therein. Permit me further to suppose, my lord, that, at the conquest of the colony, this plantation, as being the property of persons resident under the dominion of France, had been taken into possession of administrators appointed by his Majesty's Government, to preserve the same during the war, in order to be restored to the proprietor at the end of the same. In that case, my lord, this plantation, like many others, must have become, as many have,

part of the primitive wilderness again (which, in cases of abandonment under a tropical sun, is not a tedious change), unless the administrators had been suffered to expend "public money" in its support, its own revenues having been utterly and entirely, for a number of years, inadequate to that support.

If such an expenditure of public money had been permitted, from a compassionate regard to the fallen and unfortunate condition of the Batavian enemy, permit me now to carry your lordship's attention to whither the country is now happily so nearly arrived, viz., to the period of peace, and very respectfully to ask whether, in justice, equity, or good conscience, or even in common modesty, our late enemy, having been accessory to modes of hostility unprecedented and unwarranted by the laws of nature and of nations, whereby had been so well nigh ruined his *own* estate in our public custody, whether such our late enemy could reasonably come forward and demand his estate *back again*, without repayment of the sums of public money so expended to preserve it during such unnatural hostility of the Government which that enemy himself obeyed.

But if such a proposition require no comment, surely, if it was further demanded by such late enemy not only to have his estate back without such repayment, but also that the British nation or Government should pay him interest for the whole period of such war, for the capital he had invested in that estate previous to the war, all mankind would be shocked at the unreasonableness and absurdity of such a requisition.

The English creditors, whose money has been invested in the supply and preservation of the plantation in question, leaving out all consideration of the proprietor reversionist, surely have a right to be in justice considered as the public whereof they constitute individuals in the foregoing case, which is precisely and literally THEIR case. They entreat

your lordship's consideration of the same, and that, in their behalf and that of others similarly circumstanced, some temporary measure of his Majesty's Government may be adopted, or kept in force, to prevent their interest from being lost, and themselves being ruined, by their property being suddenly swallowed up by summary proceedings in the colony by the first mortgagee, so lately their and the public enemy, until some final determination is taken concerning that colony and the British interest therein; for it is nineteen-twentieths British, both in capital and population, at a general pacification.

If anything further were wanting than the bare statement of the foregoing case to warrant, or rather to claim, the interference of his Majesty's Government, in the protection of the interests of his loyal subjects, it would be found in this important circumstance, namely, that though, for the sake of simplicity, it has been stated that the first mortgage is the property of a Dutch merchant, resident in Amsterdam, and although the fact be that the mortgage deed runs in his name, yet he is only trustee for others, or what is called in Holland, "director of the loan," which constitutes the consideration for this mortgage, and which is, in fact, the property of twenty, or perhaps one hundred persons, who have subscribed one hundred or one thousand florins each, more or less, to furnish the money for the loan thus secured, and which so loses, in a great measure, the character of private contract or individual claim—its entire loss could occasion the ruin of no one, for it has long been lost to the use of its proprietors; and therefore, in competition with such important individual British claims as I have herein had the honour of submitting to your lordship (the loss of which would entirely ruin many), it is entitled to the lesser consideration. But, even if, as between British and Dutch, their claims were less unequal, I submit to your lordship that there is no case to which the maxim "*ut res major valeat*" is more strictly applicable than to the present.

I entreat your lordship's excuse for the length of this letter, which I conclude, saying that, by me and those concerned with and like me in this matter, it would be received as an especial kindness, if your lordship would permit me to have the honour of a very short conversation, wherein I might state and explain what further is interesting in the premises.

I remain very respectfully, &c.,

ALEXANDER GIBBON.

Lord Keith to Lord Castlereagh.

Basque Roads, April 17, 1814.

My dear Lord—I have been here for some days, where generally every thing seems to have been as well received as is possible. I sailed in company with two large convoys: one of them, with the *troops* on board, was in sight of this anchorage yesterday, with a contrary wind. Had it been within reach of signal, I should have called the commander to anchor, as, under existing circumstances, there appears little occasion to incur expense and delay, by disembarking troops and landing stores in the Garonne or at Passages. I cannot precisely learn where Lord Wellington is at present; but I have written to his lordship and to Admiral Penrose, now in the river of Bordeaux, my opinion on the above subject, as it is natural to expect that orders will be sent from England in a short space for our guidance; but sea-voyages being at all times uncertain, obliges me to give your lordship the trouble of this letter, to request instructions. Perhaps by way of Paris is the shortest and most certain way to communicate with Britain.

A very pleasant part of duty remains, which is to congratulate your lordship on all the fortunate and great events which have of late taken place, under your more immediate eye and management, and to assure your lordship of the sincere esteem and high respect with which I have the honour to be your lordship's most obedient, most obliged, faithful servant,

KEITH.

Lord Keith to Lord Castlereagh.[1]

The General Officer commanding at Rochelle is very civil, but only receives us under a flag of truce, and expects our officers to show a passport before the Mayor. To this I object, as I only permit officers of rank to land at all. Nor can our Commissaries land to make purchases of meat and vegetables for the men, but through the medium of a French agent—*not perhaps the cheapest mode.* If your lordship would be so good as mention these circumstances in the proper quarter, I have no doubt orders would be sent to leave the management of the intercourse to the French general and my discretion, although the nations are not actually at peace.

I have the honour to be very sincerely, &c.,

KEITH.

Mr. Hamilton to Lord Castlereagh.

Foreign Office, April 18, 1814.

My dear Lord—As it is possible that you may still be detained at Paris for some time, I feel a great inclination to remind you of the different missions which ought to be filled up at an early period, but which will remain as they are, unless you express to Lord Liverpool your wishes on the subject.

1. Envoy and Secretary to Denmark.
2. Secretary to Sardinia.
3. Minister to Portugal.
4. Ditto to Hambro'.
5. Ditto to Wirtemberg.
6. Plenipotentiaries to treat with the Americans.

Gallatin and Boyard are now in England, one having come on his way to America, the other on his way to Gottenburg, to which place they are *now* both appointed. They both profess very amicable dispositions, and seem anxious to have un-

[1] Without date. Indorsed—"State of the Intercourse with the French Coast.—Mr. Gordon has acted upon this."—EDITOR.

official conversations with the heads or seconds in the departments of State. They hope to get out of the war with a safe conscience, by saying that, the war in Europe having ceased, the causes of their quarrel with us have ceased also.

I don't believe I have wished you joy on the fortunate termination of your labours on the Continent, which I do most sincerely. I only wish I could have shared a few of them with you. Should you wish to *aboucher* with any one on subjects not easily written upon, and not be willing to part with Robinson, you may give me your commands; though, for more than a few days, I should not even yet like to leave all the bother of the detail in Cooke's hands. He is getting much better.

Louis XVIII. comes to town on Wednesday next, dines at Carlton House Thursday, and on Friday or Saturday starts for Dover, to which place the Prince Regent will have accompanied him from Stanmore.

Yours, W. C. HAMILTON.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool.

Paris, April 19, 1814.

My dear Liverpool—In the present state of things, I am anxious as far as possible to put you personally *au fait* of *nuances* here, and to possess myself of your ideas, before I am driven to the necessity of acting upon them.

And first, as to our peace—we have agreed to enter upon its negociation with Talleyrand, under full powers from Monsieur, in order that it may be ready for signature on the King's arrival. With respect to the nature of the arrangement, we shall all be agreed to take our Chatillon *projet* as the basis; but, in the present state of things, there is just cause for some modification; and there is disposition in the Emperor of Russia inconveniently to favour a relaxation in our demands.

As far as I can judge, we shall be unanimously disposed to strip the arrangement of any thing bearing upon it the character of particular distrust. We propose to admit the French

Ambassador to the general Congress; and, having the English restitutions necessarily in hand as a security for the peace, we are disposed, by the Convention for the suspension of hostilities, to allow the evacuation of old France by the Allied troops, and of the fortresses beyond those limits by the French troops, to go hand in hand.

In this part of the case, I foresee the fleet at Antwerp will make the practical difficulty. I see the general feeling will be against our refusing to France liberty, as circumstances now stand, to withdraw those ships. The Emperor of Russia has already expressed to me his hope that this would not be pressed. In the other instances of fortresses to be surrendered, the French garrisons are to be allowed to evacuate *as friends*, and not *as enemies*, taking with them their arms and military equipment, leaving only what is considered, in military phrase, *les dotations de la place*. The reasoning will be—if the army is suffered so to retire, why not the navy? The former keeping their arms, the latter, in parity of reasoning, are entitled to retain and retire with their ships. This is not very correct logic; but the maintenance of the opposite principle will be unpleasant, against the temper of the Allies, and the enforcing it by siege now still more so. I wish, therefore, to know your feelings upon this point—whether you are disposed to reserve it as a distinct question for negociation, meaning to give it up ultimately, if every thing else is satisfactorily settled, as a mark of generosity to the nation—or, whether you see any and what modification to the question.

You will recollect, *we* never claimed the ships for ourselves—*we* considered them as the right of the captors. The engagement I obtained was, that they should follow the fate of the place, and not go to France; but this stipulation was against Buonaparte, not against the Bourbons. I am afraid we cannot now press this point without much odium. The value of the ships is, in itself, no great object. I understood from the Brabant deputies they were perishing fast, being built of green wood. If you can reconcile feelings to the measure, I myself

doubt the expediency of making this point a *sine quâ non*, as matters now stand in Europe. It is a pity they have survived to raise this unpleasant discussion.

With respect to the future limits of France—I hope the Emperor will not be disposed to press any departure from the ancient frontier which, in a military point of view, can be objectionable. The flat part of Savoy, not affecting the line of the Alps and Avignon, are the augmentation to which, from the first discussions at Chatillon, it was thought France might be suffered not unreasonably to aspire. I believe, upon similar principles, something in the Palatinate had been thought of; but this must depend upon German arrangements.

With respect to the power of France so augmented, I see no present cause for alarm; and there is a strong motive for giving to our peace with the Bourbons somewhat of a more liberal complexion.

With respect to our own peace, I consider Malta, the Cape, Mauritius, and Tobago, as *sine quâ non;* also the regulations limiting the French to a commercial occupation of their factories in the East Indies.

I should wish, as at present circumstanced, not to press the Saintes. It is not worth swelling the catalogue with a demand of this nature. It is easily reduced, at the outset of a war, and will not be strengthened by the Bourbons: their finances for years will be deplorably deranged. They have an army of officers to pension, and will find it difficult to keep things going.—Points may occur in the discussions upon which I can refer, but I wish to know your wishes as to the spirit in which we should conduct ourselves. I am myself inclined to a liberal line upon subordinate questions, having secured the Continent, the ancient family, and the leading features of our own peace.

I am, my dear Liverpool, in haste, ever yours, C.

Let me have an answer to this as soon as you can.

PS. I still feel great doubts about the acquisition in sovereignty of so many Dutch colonies. I am sure our reputation on the Continent, as a feature of strength, power, and con-

fidence, is of more real moment to us than an acquisition thus made. The British merchants ought to be satisfied, if we secure them a direct import. Holland cannot well refuse this, nor Sweden, if she acquires Berbice, which ought to satisfy. More than this I think Holland ought not to lose, even though compensated on the side of the Netherlands.

Prisoners of War in Great Britain.

Transport Office, April 19, 1814.

In Confinement.	French.		Danes.		Americans.	
	In Health.	Sick.	In Health	Sick.	In Health	Sick.
Chatham, Prison Ships	3,323	64	1,069	102	1,979	151
Dartmoor Prison	7,991	97	...	...	754	30
Greenlaw, near Edinburgh						
Norman Cross	5,416	66	...	...	1	
Perth, N. B.	6,380	19				
Plymouth { Mill Prison	1,946	139	...	...	...	4
Plymouth { Prison Ships	10,112	191	...	...	136	1
Portsmouth { Forton	3,001	50				
Portsmouth { Prison Ships	9,280	158	125	...	14	5
Portchester	7,136	92				
Stapleton, near Bristol	4,100	113	...	...	371	6
Valleyfield, near Edinburgh	4,014	72				
Yarmouth						
Dumbarton Castle	2					
Removing	4	...	...	...	40	
	62,705	1,061	1,194	102	3,295	197

TOTAL NUMBERS.

	On Parole.	In Prison.	Totals.
French Prisoners	3,594	63,766	67,360
Danish Ditto	49	296	1,345
American Ditto	101	3,492	3,593
In Britain	3,744	67,554	72,298
Prisoners abroad	221	4,311	4,532
Total	39,65	71,865	76,830

Lord William Bentinck to Lord Castlereagh.

Genoa, April 19, 1814.

My dear Lord—I have received your lordship's despatches and private letters of the 3rd and 5th April, brought by Mr. Werry and Major St. Laurent.—I am sorry you do not approve my proceedings with regard to Murat; but, if I could bring the whole case before you, and could fully impress you with the full knowledge I have had such ample opportunity of obtaining from his confidential adherents of his character, I think I might almost say you would entertain a different opinion. He resembles more the old Queen of Naples than any other person I ever saw. The result of both their characters amounts to a uselessness actively pernicious to all with whom they are concerned, and above all to themselves.

Your lordship perhaps thinks that he is offended by the decided language held by me. I take the liberty of enclosing a letter written me by Marshal Minutolo, with whom I have had a long conversation respecting Murat, and to whom I fully explained my regret at the course which he had pursued, so contrary to his honour and interests. The Marshal I had known well in the King of Sicily's service, and our conversation was private. He immediately reported it, and he sent me the King's answer.

The King is perfectly unmanageable. He is too weak to direct himself, and too distrustful to be guided by another. I am, however, confident that, had I been supported by General Bellegarde and Count de Milia, who is completely his creature, we could either have made him act, or placed his insincerity beyond all doubt.

I am happy to inform your lordship that Genoa was put this morning into our possession, at least partly, and will be evacuated the day after to-morrow: the garrison, consisting of at least 4,000 men, to march to France. In twenty-four hours the place would have been assaulted.

It is reported that General Bellegarde has concluded an

armistice with the Viceroy, but no official intelligence has been as yet received. Peace seems certain; but, if not taking place immediately, I shall, if required by Marshal Bellegarde, march upon the Po. If not required, I should propose, both by land and sea, to march towards France. I have begged Marshal Bellegarde's sentiments upon my future operations.

I remain, my dear lord, very faithfully yours,

W. C. BENTINCK.

[Enclosure.]

Le Maréchal de Camp Minutolo to Lord W. Bentinck.

Levanto, ce 13 Avril, 1814, à neuf heures du soir.

Excellence—Je suis parti en poste de Livourne, et j'ai couru nuit et jour, pour vous joindre dans l'intention de vous communiquer ce que S. M. m'écrit sur votre particulier. On m'avoit assuré à Livourne que vous aviez votre quartier général à Spezia. Ayant arrivé à Lerici l'on m'a supposé que vous étiez à Sestri, et dans cette assurance j'avois nolisé un bateau pour aller vous présenter mes respects en cet endroit. Chemin faisant, me trouvant pres de Levanto, j'ai parlementé avec une barque qui venoit de Chiavari. Le patron m'assure que votre quartier général se trouve à Nervi près de Gènes.

Je suis bien faché, mon Général de ne pas pouvoir aller si loin, car il faut que la nuit du 14 je me trouve à Livourne. Ne pouvant pas avoir l'honneur de vous présenter mes hommages personnellement, et étant dans le devoir de vous partager les sentiments de mon souverain, j'ai l'honneur de vous expédier un courrier, avec l'extrait de la lettre que le Roi m'a écrit à votre égard, et en réponse de ce que je lui ai écrit de l'entretien que j'ai eu l'honneur d'avoir avec vous le jour de votre dernier départ de Livourne.

Veuillez, mylord, m'honorer de votre réponse et de vos idées sur ce particulier, que je vous prie de me faire parvenir à Livourne par un courrier, que j'attends avec impatience.

Je vous félicite bien sincèrement de vos heureux progrès, aussi rapide que l'éclair: je compte et je souhaite recevoir

votre réponse de Gènes où vous allez porter la joye et le bonheur.

Croyez, mon Général, qu'il n'y a personne qui prenne tant d'intérêt que moi à vos succès. Veuillez me mettre souvent dans le cas de vous prouver la haute considération et la parfaite estime avec laquelle j'ai l'honneur de vous saluer.

Le Maréchal de Camp, MINUTOLO.

Extrait d'une Lettre de S. M. le Roi de Naples [Murat] au Général Minutolo.

Vous ferez connoitre à Lord Bentinck que j'avois été au moins aussi fâché que lui de n'avoir pu faire entièrement tout ce qu'il m'avoit demandé, mais que j'espère bientôt le convaincre qu'il a été dans l'erreur en me croyant décidé à ne pas agir contre la France, et que je veux lui prouver, à lui Bentink, qu'il n'a pas de meilleur ami que moi.

La campagne va s'ouvrir, et j'espère que toute l'Italie serat bientot délivré de la presance de l'ennemi. Je me flatte toujours que l'armée Italienne ne voudra pas se battre contre l'armée Napolitaine qui est aussi composée d'Italiens.

Je voudrais qu'il me mit dans le cas de lui prouver ma loyauté et mon sincère attachement. Souhaite-t-il avoir un de mes meilleurs généraux sous ses ordres? Veut-il avoir à sa disposition une partie de mes troupes?—qu'il parle, qu'il me fasse connoitre tout ce qui peut lui être agréable ou utile à ses vues, et je lui prouverai plus par les faits que par les expressions, le sincère dévouement qui m'attache aux progres et à la bonne cause de nos alliés (qui est aussi la notre) de même que l'amitié que j'ai pour un brave homme tel que lui, que j'estime et aime au dela de toute expression.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool.

Paris, April 20, 1814.

My dear Liverpool—I still wish you would persuade the Prince to invite both the Emperor of Austria and the King of

Prussia to visit England. I am confident we ought not to make Russia our *only* feature, for reasons I will explain when we meet; nor is it wise for us to make a Power exclusively popular, circumstanced as Russia is both towards France and us. Be assured, the Emperor will not *reciprocate* such a principle.

You can best judge how far this Junta would answer. So far as the King of Prussia is concerned, it would be all smooth: he *wishes* to go—falls naturally into the Emperor's wake—and, I know from the Chancellor Hardenberg, expects an invitation: indeed, he persuades himself that he has already been invited. The Emperor *of* Austria would be more reluctant, but still, I think, would go, if the Prince pressed it, and it was understood through me that it was really wished, and that his situation would be upheld.

The Emperor of Russia, from various circumstances, exploits, manners, &c., must make his brother Emperor, though the first in rank, the second in *éclat*. He always, however, personally treats the Emperor of Austria with the most perfect attention, placing himself *en seconde ligne*.

If the Prince sees the political advantage of this combination, I think he can work it out without any diminution of attention to Russia; but, in this case, he must either write himself to the three Sovereigns, or direct me *officially* to convey his wishes; and it ought to be done without delay, as the Emperor of Russia expects to set out from hence by the 15th May at furthest, for London.

I see no difficulty in executing this measure *now*, as far as the Prince of Sweden is concerned. We owe him no compliments, and he has business enough in Norway to look after. In this object, for our own sakes, we must assist him. We cannot punish the Swedes for his faults; and hesitation in our mode of acting will only add to our own difficulties, by encouraging the Norwegians to persevere. This is the feeling both of Russia and Austria. There is no other Allied Sovereign

that can take offence; and the line draws itself, when confined to the four great Powers who have conducted the whole. The conduct of Austria has been throughout so good, under difficult circumstances, and recently so very distinguished, that the Prince will raise himself and his Government by re-echoing the general sentiments; and I can assure you the influence of Austria in France not only has been, but still is of immense importance to the completion of our work. It is still more important to our views in the Netherlands. You may command her entire exertions on both points by good management, and without any sacrifice.

In haste, ever yours, C.

When I recommend you to dilute the libation to Russia, I am the last to wish it should be less palatable. The Emperor has the greatest merit, and must be held high, but he ought to be grouped, and not made the sole feature for admiration. The interview in England will have a sensible influence on the politics of the Continent. His Imperial Majesty is all kindness to me.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool.

Paris, April 20, 1814.

My dear Liverpool—Pozzo goes to-night to London. The Sovereigns here have thought it respectful to the King to send each a special mission of congratulation: this you have, I believe, already done. The former, however, is commissioned by the Emperor of Russia to confer with the King generally on the state of affairs here. Pozzo's own principles on this subject are good, at least sufficiently monarchical. He will, I have no doubt, be of use, and I should be glad you would see him, and support what appears to you reasonable.

My own notion is, that the King's personal and immediate presence in France is indispensable. The whole nation is released from their oaths to Buonaparte, but bound to *no one*. This is a dangerous state to be suffered to continue, in the

present state of the army, which is not as it should be. Monsieur is doing the honours *perfectly;* but business stands still. He reserves every point, and the weakness of the Government will become more felt every day. Some are of opinion that the King ought to treat whilst *dehors*, upon certain points in the Constitution. I doubt this. He would have more weight in his intercourse with the Senate and Legislative Body, if at Compiegne, or any point within the kingdom not remote from Paris.

The concession of the hereditary principle to the existing Senators is a great fault: had their functions and endowments been considered as personal, and for life only, no fair objection could have been made. As it is, if they cannot reform this arrangement, they must add progressively at least one hundred more members to the *chambre haute*—these will neutralize the faggots. Deducting *foreigners,* Senators without male heirs, and certain respectable persons, the number of nearly unfit subjects will then be reduced to thirty or forty. I think this is the greatest practical fault they have committed.

The article with respect to the *Culte* is ill drawn. Toleration, and even endowment, was indispensable, the provision being already granted to all; but the wording seems to countenance equal endowment, which is absurd.

The question of *appel* and *rappel* may, I think, be suffered to pass as a question on which neither party need insist upon a decision, at the hazard of national division, where all agree in the Bourbon principle.

The great object is for the King, without doing it in terms which might excite suspicion, to preserve to the three estates the clear and undisputed right of self-modification, without reference to primary assemblies. If the full prerogative of legislation is secured, and he is not in too great a hurry either to innovate or to obtrude the ancient families into too prominent notice, he will soon secure a strength amongst the men

who have now the influence in their hands, which will effect his purpose.

If Pozzo should be inclined to negociate, on the part of the French Government, with you upon money or other objects, I wish you to keep all these circumstances of influence in our own hands, and not to give the Russian Government the authority of his intervention.

I am, dear Liverpool, ever yours, C.

In a letter some time since, Lord Bathurst suggested that the restoration of prisoners should not make a part of the preliminary treaty; but after Russia acted, and France followed, none of the Powers could hold back.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool.

Paris, April 20, 1814.

My dear Liverpool—I shall not delay Jackson. He goes over to see his wife, who is unwell, and I shall send a messenger to-morrow or the day after, with our Convention for a suspension of arms. We had our conference to-day with Talleyrand. He agrees to the evacuation of all fortresses and territories beyond the French frontiers of January, 1792. There are words in the preamble which will leave the future limits open to negociation; but the surrender of Mayence, Luxemburg, Antwerp, &c., is sufficiently assuring as to the substance.

The *projet* in question was drawn by Talleyrand, with a provision for liberty to withdraw all arsenals, stores, ships, &c., from the places ceded, not making a part of the ordinary *attirail* of the fortress. This was specially intended to save the fleet at Antwerp. I objected, and stated the best reasons I could why this was not a consequence of the existing state of things. Talleyrand pressed it as essential to their influence with the nation, and Metternich urged me strongly afterwards to recommend that this point should not be insisted on. I referred to what had been before agreed upon, admitting, how-

ever, that the question was changed. After a good deal of discussion, it was agreed to save this case entire for ulterior negociation: but I cannot hope to succeed in it with anything like a cordial concurrence; and, if you can reconcile feelings at home to abstain from urging this claim, you will essentially strengthen the new Government, and preserve the high character we have hitherto established throughout these discussions.

Lord Camden to Lord Castlereagh.

Arlington Street, April 20, 1814.

Dear Castlereagh—I do not know if you have received a letter I addressed to you, at the first opening of that scene, which has ripened into the glorious events which are now celebrating all over Europe. My advice in that letter, which was written after the manifestation at Bordeaux, was to pause, at least, until it could be seen if a Bourbon spirit manifested itself more widely. From the reports which I had heard, I hardly flattered myself it was at all general; and indeed, unless the Allies had got to Paris, I think it would not have appeared widely.

Let me particularly congratulate you on the brilliant events which have taken place, as connected with your public character, to which they have given a tone which your most sanguine friends could hardly have dared to expect. Although I foresee some difficulties between you and your friend, the Prince of Benevente, I expect a very early termination to the war.

Ever yours, most affectionately,

CAMDEN.

Lord Castlereagh to the Lords of the Treasury.

Paris, April 20, 1814.

My Lords—The Chancellor of Prussia, Baron Hardenberg, having represented to me, in the strongest manner, the urgent

necessity in which his Government feels itself, of request from Great Britain an immediate advance of one hund thousand pounds sterling, either in cash or bullion, I h acquainted his Excellency that I have recommended to y lordships to comply with this application, and I am to de that your lordships will lose no time in taking the pleasur his Royal Highness the Prince Regent upon the subject.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH

Lord Castlereagh to Admiral Young.

Paris, April 20, 1814

Sir—The French Government has made a very earn representation to me of the extreme want of transports un which they labour, for the purpose of assisting in the tra port of prisoners of war, now about to be exchanged; and urged me to acquiesce in the application of the vessels nam in the enclosed list, and now at Flushing, to this service. have not thought it expedient, under all the circumstances the case, to decline acceding to this request; and I have the fore to beg that you will permit the said vessels to proce without molestation from Flushing, and I shall take t earliest opportunity of informing the Lords Commissioners the Admiralty of the communication which I have now ma to you.

This letter will be forwarded by the French Government the officer commanding the vessels in question, who will directed to deliver it to you.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

PS. In granting permission for the sailing of these vess from Flushing, it is not understood that they are to be co sidered as exempt from the Fourth Article of the Conventi already signed with France, it having been expressly arrang with the French Government that, for all purposes of d cussion, they are to be considered as actually remaining harbour.

Lord Wellington to Lord Castlereagh.

Thoulouse, April 21, 1814.

My dear Lord—Your brother Charles has just given me your letter of the 13th, and I am very much obliged and flattered by your thinking of me for a situation, for which I should never have thought myself qualified. I hope, however, that your lordship and the Prince Regent and his Government are convinced that I am ready to serve him in any situation in which it may be thought that I can be of any service. Although I have been so long absent from England, I should have remained as much longer, if it had been necessary, and I feel no objection to another absence in the public service, if it is necessary or desirable.

In regard to going now to Paris, your brother will inform you of the circumstances here, which would render my absence just now inconvenient and possibly dangerous to the public service. I shall know more, however, of the state of affairs in a day or two; and I will undertake the journey with pleasure, if I should find I can do so without public inconvenience.

Believe me, my dear lord, ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Clancarty.

Paris, April 21, 1814.

My Lord—Count de la Forêt, Minister for Foreign Affairs, appointed by the Provisional Government of France, has written to me, requesting an application from me to the Dutch Government, in order to procure the speedy enlargement of M. le Baron Louis de Malouet, Prefet of Laon, who was taken prisoner by the Russian troops, and is at the present moment at Utrecht. I have written to assure the Count de la Forêt that I should lose no time in complying with the wish expressed by him, and I have therefore to request that your Excellency will immediately make the necessary application

to his Royal Highness the P Sovereign's Government, in order to accelerate M. de 's return to Paris.

I ve, , CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Melville to Lord Castlereagh.

Admiralty, April 21, 1814.

My dear (–I 1 this by Mr. Mackenzie, whom, in compliance y n quest, we have sent to Paris, as Commissary for pr ers of ar. I have little to add on this subject to what we ve set forth in our letter to the Foreign Office; though, in probability, the case has been materially altered, since that r was written, by the decree of the French Government nounced in the newspapers), liberating the prisoners of the Allies.

Under any circumst I do not suppose that you would think of detaining the F h soners here, at an expense of about £100,000 per month, beyond the signature of the Preliminary Articles; though, I believe, they have usually been liberated finally on a Definitive Treaty only. There is one description of prisoners here, viz., those under the Baylen Convention, amounting to 280 officers and 1,200 privates, whom we are bound, I think, to send off forthwith, as the French appear to have liberated all the Spaniards.

It will be very desirable that a French Commissary should come here, for the purpose of taking sole charge of the selecting and sending to France the 67,000 prisoners in this country. The French Government, if you cannot prevail upon them to take immediate charge of their subsistence, should, for their own sakes, be considering of their being properly disposed of on their arrival at the ports of France: they would otherwise be in great want of everything. I enclose, for your information, a statement of their numbers.

We had a most interesting and splendid scene yesterday, on the entry of Louis XVIII. into London: he was much gratified, as were his family and attendants, with their recep-

tion. It was everything they could possibly have desired. He goes to Dover on Saturday; but, from the state of the tide, I do not think he can sail from thence before one or two o'clock on Sunday. The present arrangement is for his landing at Calais; but perhaps it may be altered to Boulogne. Lord Liverpool goes to Dover, as Lord Warden and Governor of the Castle. The Prince Regent has desired a Board of Admiralty shall also attend his Royal Highness there. I set off to-morrow.

You will, of course, hear fully from Liverpool on other more important matters. If you participate in his feelings respecting the Mauritius, I tremble for its being given up, which, I think, would produce a strong sensation in this country. I do not know, however, that he has formed any decided opinion on the point; and, after all, his views are generally very sound.

Believe me ever yours most sincerely,

MELVILLE.

Statement of the Number of Prisoners of War in Britain and Abroad.

	On Parole.	In Prison.	Totals.
French Prisoners . . .	3,594	63,766	67,360
Danish Ditto	49	1,296	1,345
American Ditto	101	3,492	3,593
In Britain	3,744	68,554	72,298
Prisoners abroad . . .	221	4,311	4,532
Total . .	3,965	72,865	76,830

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

The Hague, April 22, 1814.

My dear Lord—Mr. St. George, an *attaché* to this mission, is so desirous to take a journey to Paris for his private amusement and gratification, that, there being very little to do at present, and those remaining quite adequate to the performance

of any business which may occur during his absence, I have not hesitated to give him permission to absent himself for three weeks. He will be the bearer of this letter to you.

We have little at the Hague worth sending to Paris. The towns in Brabant, Flanders, and in the Dutch territories, occupied by the French, are daily declaring their adhesion to the re-establishment of the legitimate Government. Antwerp, Flushing, Bergen-op-Zoom, &c., have already declared: ships navigate through the Texel passage without molestation—in short, all is apparently coming round to a complete state of peace. You are, however, so much more in the way of receiving the best official intelligence of the state of our French garrisoned towns in these parts, viz., from the reports of the Commandants to the Provisional Government, that I think it unnecessary to say more upon this subject than that I have no doubt all will submit, not indeed to surrender to the force before them without directions from their Government, but, under such directions, to whatever orders they may receive.

I am happy to announce to you, that his Royal Highness has given up any present intention of proceeding to Paris, thinking that some inconvenience might arise to his affairs here, in consequence of the approaching assembly of the States General, by even a temporary absence at this moment, and, in short, adopting the opinion that both Fagel and I were so desirous of impressing.

Should you, however, think that the Prince of Orange's presence at Paris could be useful, you have only to say so, and I doubt not there will be little difficulty in gaining his immediate assent to the journey, without, as I should conceive, any detriment being likely to arise to his affairs here during his absence. I committed an error in my last, by conceiving that the unindemnified requisitions were the creatures of the wars consequent on the French Revolution. I now find that their origin is of an earlier date, as I now believe, as early as the wars of Louis XIV., a time when the

ambition of France for universal rule was as marked, though not so successful, as in later times. The principle, however, is not altered, and the abolishment of this practice would be one of the most beneficial boons which could be accorded to the world.

Our last Paris news comes no later than the 15th instant, and we are now at the 22nd. Judge, then, of the state of ignorance in which we exist; and in pity make some one send us newspapers, if they are all too idle or too much occupied to write.

I have received a letter this morning from the Duke of Cambridge, dated 18th, from Hanover: in this he mentions that two fine regiments of cavalry and a very complete brigade of artillery had marched, the week before, for the Rhine, and that the corps before Harburg, which had been relieved, should march as soon as equipped. I know not whether you mean that the army should continue to form in the Low Countries; probably it would be best till all should be finally settled: but it is quite right you should know that the Duke of Cambridge does not seem to relax in his efforts at Hanover, in order that such directions may be forwarded to him as may, under the change of circumstances, appear advisable.

Yours, my dear lord, most affectionately,

CLANCARTY.

Sir Thomas Graham to Lord Castlereagh.

Brussels, April 22, 1814.

My Lord—Having concluded an armistice yesterday with General Carnot, I came here to meet General Walmoden, who is very anxious about the march of the Hanoverian corps. I wrote two days ago to his Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge, to say that I had heard from Lord Bathurst on the 15th inst.; but that, as no mention was made about stopping the march of the troops, I could not give any opinion on the subject.

Count Walmoden will be able to inform your lordship of

their probable progress. Since I came here, I have received a letter from the Baron Adlercreutz, Chef de l'Etat Major of the Prince Royal's army, to say that he had just received orders to march the Swedish army back to Sweden, all but one division, (of eleven battalions of infantry, six squadrons of hussars, and three troops of horse artillery) which is commanded by General Boyé, and to be put under my orders.

This is a little puzzling to me, as Lord Bathurst desired me to signify to the Prince Royal that all the Hanoverians were to be withdrawn from his command; but at the moment, being anxious about the frontier of Brabant, and desirous that the Swedes should advance to assist in its protection, I withheld this communication; and, as he went soon afterwards to Paris, it never has been made to him, otherwise probably he would not have proposed putting these troops under my orders. In the event of Antwerp being by any means opened to us, Lord Bathurst seemed anxious that no Swedes should be allowed to enter it—only British and Dutch troops.

Most sincerely congratulating your lordship on the wonderful events that have resulted from the successes and perseverance of the Allies, I have the honour to remain your lordship's most obedient, humble servant,

THOMAS GRAHAM.

Lord William Bentinck to Lord Castlereagh.

Genoa, April 23, 1814.

My dear Lord—I have not been able as yet to send any officer to Marshal Murat, as directed in your despatch of the 7th of this month, from really not having a single officer of rank and talents fit for the situation. I propose, however, if peace is not actually made, to send Lieutenant-Colonel à Court, my military secretary, whom I can very ill spare. He ought to be a general officer.

I am under the necessity of forming here a provisional Government, which I shall do as soon as I can ascertain the

sons who may be acceptable to the people. I find that all ire their former independence and ancient form of Govern- nt, with some modifications. All are equally desirous of being annexed to Piedmont.

Prince Borghese not having consented to the armistice as posed by Bellegarde and agreed to by the Viceroy, the strian officer charged with this mission by Bellegarde has ne here to ask me to write a letter to Prince Borghese, and send troops to Nani, and I have complied with his wish. have sent a corps against Savona. I have informed the ng of Sardinia of the events in France, and have recom- nded to him to come here; and Sir E. Pellew has sent a ee-decker for his reception.

May I beg of you, if still at Paris, to allow Captain Milnes, aide-de-camp, to carry on my despatches to Lord Bathurst.

I remain, my dear lord, very faithfully yours,

W. C. BENTINCK.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool.

Paris, April 23, 1814.

My dear Liverpool—I believe, in my letter announcing my ther Charles's mission to Wellington, I forgot to mention I had anticipated your wishes with respect to the embassy Paris, which I sincerely hope he may be prevailed upon, if for a time, to accept. I quite agree with you as to the ortance of his personal influence in such a situation. I l take no step about the secretaryship of embassy, without municating with you. I could not, however, delay em- ing some person to transact matters of detail with the new rnment, and I have nominated Robert Gordon, who hap- l to be here with Aberdeen, on leave from the Hague. cts as commissary, each of the Allied Powers having a similar appointment.

hould be glad you would see both Fernan Nuñez and ral, and represent to them that, if they wish to be signing

parties to the treaty of peace with France, they ought to come over without delay. That Spain may not feel any slight, I have encouraged Pizarro to take upon himself to sign, in Fernan Nuñez' absence, the suspension of arms.

Since I last wrote, I have had reason to be confirmed in my opinion that the Emperor of Austria will not refuse an invitation from the Prince Regent. His Imperial Majesty, *as well as his Minister*, has an impression that all the confidence was not felt in their politics in London which they considered themselves entitled to expect. It is, therefore, natural they should wish to be assured that their presence is *cordially desired*. I believe the Emperor, if he went, would go with very few attendants, would wish to avoid parade, and return to Vienna, where the Congress is to assemble, after a stay of a fortnight, or at least three weeks, in London. I enclose you the address presented by the Senate to the Emperor, with his answer. It has done much good in putting down all Regency notions, which were popular in the army, and with those who feared the return of the ancient order of things.

As time presses, I am anxious to hear from you what the Prince wishes, with respect to his royal visiters, and also to have your final suggestions with respect to the form and substance of our definitive treaty with France, to which I will endeavour to conform as far as I can, without sacrificing useful influence and impressions on the Continent; and I hope you will leave me a discretion to act for the best.

I think I can so arrange with the Emperor of Russia, if the Regent should invite the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia, that he will feel it no reduction of the compliment paid to him. On the contrary, I think he would like to be surrounded by those Sovereigns who had joined his victorious arms, when he visits England, from whence he intends to proceed in person to Vienna. As none of these monarchs assume any state, while absent from their own dominions, I do not conceive the Prince could find it difficult suitably to lodge

them. The apartments at Kensington, the Queen's house, if it could be spared, the Duke of Cumberland's, the Duke of Cambridge's, Burlington, or any other large private house, would be quite as good as they are in the habit of occupying. Their wish, I know, is to avoid display. The Emperor of Russia spoke to me about this.

In haste, CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Liverpool.

Paris, April 23, at night [1814].

My dear Liverpool—I will forward the French ratification, if possible, to-morrow. As you may possibly wish to publish the Convention, as an article of intelligence, in the Gazette, before it is laid before Parliament, I send a few covering lines to Bathurst.

Hardenberg spoke to me to-night, with much earnestness, about his King and the Emperor of Austria going to England. The anxious wish of himself and others is to keep the intermediate Powers together, to guard against an inordinate influence in the great Powers at the extremities.

Yours ever, C.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Bathurst.

Paris, April 23, 1814.

My Lord—I have the honour to enclose to your lordship a Convention which I have this day signed with the Prince of Benevente, for a suspension of hostilities. Instruments precisely of the same tenour have been executed by the other Allied Powers. The object of the Allies, in concluding this Convention, has been to relieve the French nation, as early as possible, from the inconveniences of a state of war, now happily no longer necessary, and to lay the foundation of a peace in which the honour and interests of all the Powers of Europe, France included, may be justly provided for.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Bathurst.

Paris, April 23, 1814.

My Lord—I have the honour to transmit to you a copy of a letter which I have addressed to M. Haversaal, of the Commissariat department, relative to certain stores sent to Holland, for the supply of the Prussian army; and I have to request that your lordship will furnish the necessary directions to the proper department, in regard to the disposition of the brigade of Artillery referred to in the enclosed letter.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Bathurst.

Paris, April 24, 1814.

My Lord—I have the honour to transmit to your lordship a letter received from Baron Wetterstedt, with enclosures; also copy of an instruction which I have addressed to the Earl of Clancarty, under a flying seal to Sir Thomas Graham, with reference to the execution of the Convention signed yesterday with the French Government, for a suspension of hostilities by sea and land. I shall forward copies of this instrument this night to Field-Marshal the Marquess of Wellington and to Lord W. Bentinck, for the direction of their conduct.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Clancarty.

Paris, April 24, 1814.

My Lord—I enclose, for your lordship's information, copy of a Convention signed yesterday by the Allied Powers with the French Government. This instrument has been already ratified by the Sovereigns on the spot, and will be forthwith acted upon.

Your lordship will suggest to the Prince of Orange the

expediency of forming immediate arrangements for occupying such of the ceded places as actually belonged to Holland in the year 1792, and which are considered by the Allied Powers as forming an integral part of his Royal Highness's dominions.

Although the ratifications cannot be exchanged between the British and French Governments for a few days, your lordship will nevertheless enjoin, as far as it may fall within your power, his majesty's officers by sea and land to conform to the provisions therein contained; and you will also request his Royal Highness the Prince of Orange to give corresponding instructions to his naval and military authorities.

Your lordship will observe by the enclosure in my letter of this date, to Lord Bathurst, that the Prince Royal of Sweden's command in the Low Countries has ceased, and that, with the exception of one division of Swedish troops, placed under Sir Thomas Graham's immediate orders, the army of Sweden is to return home immediately.

I shall transmit this despatch under a flying seal to Sir T. Graham, in order that he may take, in concert with your lordship, the necessary arrangements for carrying the same into execution.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Note for Lord Liverpool and Mr. Vansittart, on the subject of procuring all Supplies of Specie Abroad through one Agent.

April 24.

The restoration of a free intercourse between the principal places of Exchange in Europe presents the means of applying funds for the use of the army under Lord Wellington, so long as it may remain in France, more directly and regularly through Paris, than the present circuitous mode of shipments from Holland.

It likewise opens a field for raising much larger sums without materially influencing the exchanges, whereby Great Britain may be enabled, by prudent management, to discharge the

current subsidies payable abroad more easily, and with less pressure upon the mercantile transactions of individuals, by making Paris the centre of exchange operations for that purpose.

The presence of a person confidentially entrusted with power to make arrangements to this effect, would be necessary for a short time only at Paris, after which they would proceed without difficulty, after a proper control in London only. The objects to be settled by the confidential agent would be—

1. To come to an exact understanding with the agents appointed by the Allied Courts to receive their respective subsidies, the principle of which would be to engage them not to draw, or commence any negociations of bills, for their demands, until after communication with the British agent, and a refusal on his part to supply them at the current exchange of the day.

2. To conclude an arrangement with the Commissary-General of the British forces in France, so that the supplies for that quarter may pass through one channel, and not be interrupted by his drawing in a confined money market, such as Bordeaux.

3. To make arrangements for the transmission of money from Paris, where it may be indispensably necessary to forward it in specie.

4. To conclude with the Russian Commissary upon the sum of £200,000 already agreed to be paid.

The advantage of this single agency for the collection and appropriation of the sums to be paid abroad by the British Government, whether for its own armies or for subsidies, must be obvious. The effect of several different agents, some of them little solicitous for the credit of Great Britain, selling paper upon London in the markets, and at the times, which may happen to be most convenient to them, must have a greater tendency to depress the exchanges against England than the operations of an exchange agent of great power and extensive connexion, collecting funds regularly, and with con-

stant regard to the interest of England through all the principal exchanges of Europe. This agent is always able and attentive to avoid pressing upon the weakest exchange. If there is much paper upon England in the Paris market, he supplies his immediate wants by drafts upon Augsburg, Vienna, or Amsterdam, and transfers the operation, if necessary, through other exchanges, till the moment is more favourable to reimburse himself from one or the other place by drafts upon London, or by remittances from thence.

In this manner, though in a more confined circle, Mr. Rothschild has hitherto realized a very large amount, and, under the direction of the Commissary-in-Chief, on the Continent, without in the least affecting the exchange; and it does not appear to admit of a reasonable doubt, but that the whole sums required by Great Britain for her expenditure abroad can be more economically secured by this system than by the scattered operations of various public agents, which are always likely to come in competition with each other, even when most secretly managed, and which are generally rendered doubly and trebly injurious, by the publicity with which they are conducted as national concerns.

Lord Castlereagh to Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Graham.

Copy. Paris, April 24, 1814.

My dear Sir—My despatches to Lord Clancarty and Lord Bathurst, which go to you under flying seal, will give you all the necessary information to enable you to concert with the enemy as to the surrender of the several fortresses on the side of Holland and the Low Countries. Those anciently belonging to the Dutch you will call upon the Prince of Orange to occupy. I have requested Count Münster to arrest, by letter to the Duke of Cambridge, the advance of the Hanoverians. I shall take steps also to countermand the Danes: and I should hope you would be enabled to dispense, without delay, with the divi-

sion of Swedes left under your orders. As there is no tonnage sufficient at Stralsund to convey the whole army across the Baltic, in one or even two operations, no time will be lost by the division in question retarding somewhat its march.

You will be sorry to [illegible] that Sir J. Hope has been wounded and taken. It a[illegible]s that, on the night of the 14th, the garrison of [illegible] made a sortie in force: after a loss of five or six h[illegible]dred men on each side, the enemy was obliged to r[illegible]re; but, Hope's horse being shot under him and himself w[illegible], he was laid hold of near the advanced picquets. This, [illegible] the affair of the 10th, near Toulouse, has been a painful [illegible]rifice, in consequence of the detention of the officers sent fr[illegible] hence. It is now, however, over; and we may worship [illegible] British army as long as we live, for what it has done for us and for the world.

Buonaparte, after exhorting his Guards to be as faithful to *the King* as they had been to him, set out for his island two days since. Campbell accom[illegible]s him, on our part, to see him safe. When introduced, Napol[illegible]n was very complimentary to the nation; spoke of Lord W[illegible]lington, of the campaigns in Spain and Portugal, and was pleased to pass a very high eulogium on your attack on Bergen-op-Zoom, which, though unsuccessful, he considered as doing the greatest honour to you and your troops.

I have deemed it advisable to detain Colonel Cathcart till our Convention was settled, which I hope you will approve.

Believe me, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

When you have read, and if you think fit copied, the despatches to the Hague and London, pray send them forward by the messenger. Pray also apprize the Danish Commander that he may arrest his march, and that a notice to that effect will be sent to his Court through Mr. Thornton.

Lord Castlereagh to General Sir Thomas Graham, K.B.

Copy. Paris, April 24, 1814.

Sir—I am to acquaint you that General Comte Kunigl has been appointed to receive, in the name of the Allied Sovereigns, possession of the several fortresses in Brabant, which are to be evacuated by the French, under the Convention signed yesterday.

As commanding in chief the Allied troops in that quarter, you will concert with the Austrian General as to the execution of this service, and make the necessary arrangements for garrisoning the same.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord William Bentinck.

Paris, April 24, 1814.

My Lord—I have the honour to forward to your lordship copy of a Convention signed yesterday with the French Government, for a suspension of hostilities by sea and land. Your lordship will regulate your proceedings in conformity to this instrument; and, in whatever may yet remain to be done to reduce the Viceroy, you will act in concert with Marshal Bellegarde.

I have this day received a despatch from Marshal Wellington, announcing that he had concluded an armistice with Marshals Soult and Suchet. The interruption of the communication for several days, gave occasion to a severe affair on the 10th, between the two armies, in the vicinity of Toulouse. The British army defeated that under Marshal Soult, with considerable loss, and obliged them to evacuate Toulouse.

On the [14th], the garrison of Bayonne made a sortie in force; they were driven back, with loss on both sides: but we have to regret the fall of General Hoy, and that Sir J. Hope,

in the obscurity of the night, having his horse shot under him and being himself wounded was made prisoner.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

The Hague, April 25, 1814.

My dear Lord—A letter, of which the accompanying paper is a copy, reached me yesterday from Mr. Johnson, who, I doubt not, has already communicated the information directly to you contained therein. It appears to me, however, to be of such consequence to the objects of the Allies, that misconduct of the nature of that detailed by Mr. Johnson should be immediately arrested, that, having communicated the matter to his Royal Highness the Prince of Orange, through M. de Fagel, his Royal Highness has determined to send a messenger immediately to Paris, with instructions to his Minister there on this and other points; and I have certainly very much promoted this determination, in order that, having the matter before you, you may be enabled to put a stop to these oppressive proceedings.

There has probably been some unfortunate omission of form in the appointment of M. de Vincent to supersede le Baron de Horst in the Government General of the Belgic provinces, by which this latter has been enabled to maintain his authority: this, you will surely think, ought to be immediately rectified, for exorbitant requisitions to the enormous amount which M. de Horst has thought proper to impose upon the already oppressed inhabitants of that country, are certainly very little calculated to conciliate the inhabitants to the views of the Allies, by leading them to accept a Sovereign of their nomination, however mild and just, and desirous to promote their real interests, that Sovereign may in fact be.

Although equally or perhaps more unjust, the conduct of the Swedish army does not in the least surprise [illegible]: no doubt

they have received special instructions upon this subject. It seems to have been the governing principle of their precious Prince, ever since his *rapid* and *most heroic* passage of the Rhine, to do as little good and as much mischief as possible, and more especially to lean heavy upon any country which either formerly belonged to the Dutch, or might be likely to form an addition to the territories of the Prince of Orange. For what possible reason are our subsidies paid to the Prince Royal, if he is to be left at liberty to levy all that is necessary for the subsistence and equipment of his most inefficient army, by oppressive requisitions on a people in whose liberation he had not the least share, and in whose prosperity we are not immaterially interested? Can any conduct be more calculated than that of M. de Horst and the Prince of Sweden to fortify an already sufficiently prevalent desire in this people to place themselves under French, in default of Austrian dominion, more especially since the restoration of the Bourbons? Can it conduce to the views of the Allies, and especially to ours, to place a country, as a barrier to France, enfeebled by the ruin and irritation of its inhabitants?

M. de Ternois writes word from Brussels, under date the 21st, that M. de Horst has received orders to stop the further levies of Brabançon troops; and that the British Commissary there has also received orders to refrain from furnishing them with arms and equipments. I do not know whether this is or is not true; but sure I am that, harassed and oppressed as this people seems to be, it would be the height of folly for the present to arm and organize a force which, with their known spirit, might possibly be used in opposition to all our wishes.

The Prince of Orange has, and naturally, felt these oppressions on his future subjects keenly; and you will be at no loss to discover, from the foregoing part of this letter, that I have not borne the account of them with entire philosophy. You will, I doubt not, take the earliest steps for their removal. Those which appear to me best calculated for this purpose, are

the immediate installation of General Vincent in the Government General, with injunctions to act to the utmost on the private instruction with which he was furnished by Prince Metternich, and the immediate removal of the Swedish troops. This might be insisted upon by us as guaranteeing the acquisition of Norway to Sweden, in the immediate conquest of which we are consequently interested: and, if their mountebank commander can, with their assistance, act with equal hostility against his enemies as he has against friendly countries, the subjection of Norway will not be a distant event. The Swedes might well be replaced in Belgium by the Hanoverians, British, and Dutch.

Deventer has surrendered. I send you an abstract of the capitulation. It is to be delivered up on this day to his Royal Highness. I send you also a copy of an armistice entered into between General de Rosen, the Swedish Commander before Maestricht, with the French Commandant of that place—a piece truly worthy of an officer of the Prince Royal: no recognition of the renovated Government of France; no mention even made of it in the articles, or the preface to them; and no communication thereon with, or notice taken of, the Prince of Orange's Commissaries, or of himself.

Upon this subject, and also upon the pretensions of M. de Sack, the Prussian Governor-General of the Bas Rhin, I send you copy of a Note received this morning from M. Fagel, and anxiously request you, in the midst of the multitude of permanent arrangements, in which you are, most happily for us all, concerned, that you will favourably regard our temporary interests, which may, however, become more than temporary, if every ordinate and subordinate agent is suffered to be guided by his own immediate caprice or advantage, to the detriment of the country over which he may be appointed, or have acquired a little brief authority.

Yours, my dear lord, most affectionately,

CLANCARTY.

[Enclosures.]

Mr. Johnson to the Earl of Clancarty.

Copy. Brussels, April 20, 1814.

My Lord—The following is an extract of a letter which I have just received from a correspondent at Malines, whose information is generally correct :—

" Carnot, ne pouvant plus cacher à ses soldats, ni révoquer en doute l'abdication de Napoléon, a publié un Ordre du Jour par lequel il autorise les troupes à prendre la cocarde blanche, et à adhérer à la cause des Bourbons, et qu'il réglera sa conduite future d'après les ordres qu'il recevra de Paris."

The Swedish army has at length opened the campaign with rather more activity than was expected or wished for. An order was yesterday issued for a requisition of 15,000 yards of cloth, for the use of the Swedish troops ; and it is impossible to imagine any kind of luxury or capricious extravagance which the officers of that army do not indulge in, at the expense of the unfortunate inhabitants of this country, who have already suffered so severely from the prolonged stay of the Prussian and Saxon army.

Some details on this subject would be ludicrous, if the consequences were not likely to be so melancholy. Last Sunday, that is, the day after Baron Horst received the intelligence that he was no longer Governor-General, he levied a contribution on the Belgian provinces of ten millions eight hundred thousand francs, which is to be paid immediately, on pain of military execution.

I have written to Lord Castlereagh by courier, to inform his lordship of the refusal of Baron Horst to resign, and of the consequent inability of General Vincent to enter on the duties of his station. I therefore expect that measures will soon be taken by the Allies to put an end to this disagreeable state of things.

I presume the Dutch Government is thinking of sending some Commissioner here ; but I trust it will not make choice

of Mr. Zuyl de Nyev , ill find some difficulty in getting rid of t xiet s which, on a former occasion, he th it erest of his Sovereign to form in this country.

M. Borell, who has b to the army of the Prince Royal, in t service of Pri of Orange, will be out of activity as so as the f leave this country, which is daily ex He a of gentlemanly manners and good sense, v quite suffi ent qualifications for the situation of Comm ier here: id, as he has been many years in habits of intimacy with G neral Vincent and myself, we should co-operate with him cordially and zealously. He is also universally liked in Brussels, and is certainly better calculated to conciliate the people of this country than a mere man of office or merchant from Amsterdam. I believe his Royal Highness has a personal re d for M. Borell, and I am convinced your lordship would serve the interests of Holland by recommending him for the situation in question.

The Prince Royal is expected here in the course of to-morrow, on his return from Paris.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

J. M. JOHNSON.

Mr. J. Fagel to the Earl of Clancarty.

La Haye, ce 25 Avril, 1814.

Milord—Son Altesse Royale le Prince Souverain m'ayant donné l'ordre d'informer votre Excellence des rapports qu'elle a reçus hier de ses Commissaires chargés de l'administration des anciens districts Hollandais situés dans le Pays d'Outre-Meuse, je crois préalablement lui rappeler que ces districts faisaient partie du Pays de la Généralité, sur le quel les Etats Généraux exerçoient, avant l'année 1795, tous les droits de la souveraineté. La ville de Maestricht se trouvait par conséquent dans cette même relation vis-à-vis de leurs Hautes Puissances, avec cette modification que les places de la Magis-

trature, étoient données, une moitié à des individus nommés par les Etats Généraux, l'autre moitié par le Prince Evêque de Liège.

Le Souverain actuel, voulant à juste titre faire valoir ces mêmes droits, n'a pas tardé à nommer de Commissaires, chargés de l'administration dans les districts sus mentionnés, et ceux-ci se sont, en conséquence, rendus à Liège. Il paroit aujourd'hui que le conseiller d'Etat Prussien de Sack, nommé Gouverneur Général du Bas Rhin, n'admet point la validité des justes prétentions de Son Altesse Royale et qu'il a donné des ordres afin qu'au moment de l'évacuation de la ville Maestricht les Commissaires du Prince soyent écartés de toute participation à l'administration civile de la dite ville, et qu'elle soit exclusivement réservée au Commissaire qu'il désignera à cet effet.

Une seconde information parvenue au Gouvernement de Son Altesse Royale par le canal de ces Messieurs porte que le Général-Major Comte de Rosen, commandant les troupes Suédoises devant Maestricht a signé, le 19 de ce mois, une suspension d'hostilités avec le Général Merle, Commandant supérieur de la dite ville. En vertu de cette capitulation, la garnison (qui à l'époque de la signature du dit armistice, paroissoit ne pas s'être soumise encore au nouvel ordre de choses en France) obtient un rayon, ou jouit un terrain de 3,000 toises autour de la place, rayon qui renferme dix-huit ou vingt villages.

L'inconvénient d'une pareille mesure et les résultats fâcheux, qui doivent nécessairement en dériver pour le bien des habitans de ces villages, sont trop évidents pour qu'il soit nécessaire de les retracer à votre Excellence. En lui exposant les simples faits, je suis chargé de la prier de les porter à la connoissance de Lord Castlereagh, et de vous demander, milord, de vouloir bien employer vos bons offices auprès de ce Ministre, afin qu'il veuille appuyer les réclamations que Messieurs de Spaen et de Reede, vont être chargé de faire.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, &c., J. FAGEL.

Abstract of a Convention [illegible] between General Bentinck and General Bar[illegible] the Surrender of the Town and Fortress of L[illegible].

Copy.

Article 1. The officers [illegible]ing the garrison recognise Louis XVIII. as their Sover[illegible] and offer to enter into his service.

2. On the 25th of April, the town is to be made over to the troops of the Prince of Orange.

3. One of the gates, the Brink Porte, to be given up to the Dutch troops twenty-four hours [illegible]vious to the evacuation.

4. The garrison to march out w[illegible]th the honours of war, and proceed to France by Valenciem[illegible] and Maubeuge.

5. A Dutch officer to accom[illegible]y the troops, on their march to the frontiers, and to attend to their supplies. A similar arrangement to be made with the Governor of Belgium, to ensure their passage through the Low Countries.

6. All the artillery, stores, &c., and everything that is not private property of the garrison, to be delivered over to Commissioners appointed to receive it.

7. Seven thousand florins to be paid, after the execution of this Convention, to the French Commandant, on account of the pay and appointments of the garrison.

8. Every kind of requisition and contribution to cease; and any that may have been made subsequent to the armistice, to be of no effect.

9. Invalids of the garrison to remain, and to be treated as Dutch troops, until they are able to return to France, when the means of conveyance are to be furnished them.

10. All the Dutch belonging to the garrison to remain, if they think proper, in Holland, for the service of their own country.

Concluded at Deventer, 21 April, 1814.

(Signed) General SCHINER.

R. BENTINCK DE BUCKHORST.

Convention concluded at Maestricht.

Copie.

Entre S. E. M. le Comte de Rosen, Général-Major au service de S. M. Suédoise d'une part, et de l'autre M. le Colonel du Genie Bodron de Noire-fontaine, muni de pouvoir de S. E. M. le Général de division Comte de Merle, commandant les troupes françaises de la 25me division militaire, et Commandant Supérieur de la place de Maestricht, il a été convenu ce qui suit.

Art. 1. Il y aura suspension d'armes à dater de ce jour, entre la garnison de Maestricht et les troupes Suédoises et alliées, formant le blocus de la place.

2. La garnison jouira du terrain à trois mille toises autour de la place: la ligne des postes Suédois établie à cette distance sera réglée d'accord, par des officiers délégués à ce sujet, en consultant les localités.

3. La garnison, tant que durera la suspension d'armes ne fera aucune sortie, ni enlèvement de vivres forcé, mais les habitans des campagnes seront libres d'apporter des vivres dans la place, and les troupes du blocus n'y mettront aucun empèchement.

4. Le passage sur le pont de Maestricht sera livré aux troupes Suédoises, qui se dirigeront sur le Rhin. Le passage se fera par bataillons, et à des distances telles que deux bataillons ne se trouvent pas en même tems dans l'enceinte de la place.

5. Les troupes Suédoises qui passeront par Maestricht, ne s'y arrêteront point, et ne pourront emporter de la place ni vivres ni munitions d'aucune espèce.

Fait en double aux avant-postes des troupes Suédoises employées au blocus le 19 Avril, 1814.

R. Rosen, Général-Major.

Bodron de Noire Fontaine.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord William Bentinck.

Paris, April 26, 1814.

My Lord—I forward to your lordship a despatch this day received from Earl Bathurst. I also transmit a letter to the Chevalier Rossi, inviting the [illegible] of Sardinia, in the name of the Prince Regent, to return [illegible] to his continental subjects. The other Allied Powers address a similar invitation to his Sardinian Majesty, to be delivered by an officer of suitable rank. I have to request your lordship will give this letter in charge to a British officer, and procure for him a passage on board a fast-sailing cutter.

Buonaparte is now *en route* to [illegible] point of embarcation. I have letters from Lord Wellington to the 20th. There is reason to hope that Sir J. Hope is not wounded. The King is expected here on the 27th.

I have the honour, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool.

Copy. Paris, April 27, 1814.

My dear Liverpool—The enclosed extract from a despatch from Count Zeppolin was given me by General Beroldingen, who is here on his way to London, with the necessary credentials. I told him I knew nothing of the circumstances of this case; that I had taken the necessary measures for establishing the relations between the two Courts, and had written to submit to the Prince Regent the name of a person to proceed as his Minister to Stuttgard; that I could, therefore, say nothing to discourage his immediately proceeding to London, in execution of the orders he had received; but that, as family discussions sometimes embarrassed political relations, if he wished me to ascertain confidentially what was felt by the Prince Regent's Ministers upon the incident alluded to, I would endeavour to do it.

Pray avoid, if possible, any interruption of intercourse with

Wirtemberg, as their troops have fought well, and their Prince Royal is a very fine young man, and respected by the whole army. The King is a tyrant, both in his public and private character; but, if he did no more harm than refuse the Chevalier a private audience, *in form*, the Prince will not feel it necessary to resent this.

This Minister intended for London appears a gentlemanlike man. Ever, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Pray answer this immediately.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool.

Paris, April 27, 1814.

My dear Liverpool—My brother Charles returned last night from Toulouse, having executed successfully the object of his mission. I enclose Wellington's answer. You will see he accepts. I shall write to say I have recommended the appointment to the Prince Regent, and leave him to regulate his own time of entering upon his new charge. As matters are improved in various directions since Charles left him, my brother thinks it not improbable that he may come to Paris.

In addition to a note to the Regent, recommending Wellington to the embassy, I enclose two others, recommending Foster and Canning for the missions to Denmark and Switzerland. I write to the former by the present messenger, and shall beg him to communicate with you upon it. Canning I can settle with, he being now here. Besides wishing to show him attention, I think he has a precision of understanding and a stock of principle in his mind, which is much wanted in Switzerland, where a new confederation has given rise to every complication in politics and government. If you will send out the necessary credentials, I will despatch him from hence: he is much required there.

I hope, from the course the Viceroy is pursuing, that Italy will wind up well. He is the best of the *Buonaparte school*, and has played an honourable and able part. If Buonaparte

had been enabled to maintain himself in the field in Fra
between Murat's rascality, and Bellegarde's timidity,
Lord William Bentinck's impracticability and Whigg
which seems to follow him everywhere, we should have
in danger of a serious disappointment in that quarter. A
is, we are masters, I hope, of the question now, in a mili
sense, and must weigh well the political complications, w
are not merely personal to the Sovereign claimants, but m
up with a great deal of internal and extensive jealousy amo
the mass of the Italian population.

I have given the accession to the treaty of the 11th, in
form received from Lord Bathurst. I did not feel it neces
now to provoke the question of the ultimate destination of E
after Napoleon's death. I think the form and nature of
peace will of itself preclude its becoming French, which, I
ceive, is your main object. Whether it shall belong to one
as formerly, to three, Italian Powers, is of secondary mom

I am impatient to hear from you on the terms of our pe
not feeling myself enabled, till I know the present impress
of the Government, to proceed to close quarters either
Talleyrand or the Allies. We are, however, employed on
liminary matter, which it is important the Allies should un
stand each other upon, before they finally conclude with Fra

I am, dear Liverpool, ever yours, &c., C

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool.

Draft. Paris, April 27, 181

My dear Lord—I enclose you a letter and its enclosu
from Sir Robert Wilson, which, your lordship will obs
with satisfaction, contains an account of the conditions o
armistice concluded between the Viceroy of Italy and Mar
Bellegarde; and I trust that this Convention will lead
satisfactory settlement of the complicated questions which
involved in the present state of Italy.

It appears, however, that Murat's conduct has been

equivocal and suspicious; and I shall take an early opportunity of writing to your lordship more at length upon this subject.

Lord Castlereagh to his Royal Highness the Prince Regent.

Copy. Paris, April 27, 1814.

Lord Castlereagh, considering the importance, under the present auspicious change that has taken place in the general system of Europe, as well as in the Government of France, that the embassy to Paris should be entrusted by your Royal Highness to a character of preponderating influence in the public estimation, presumes to recommend that your Royal Highness would authorize him to propose this trust, in your Royal Highness's name, to Field-Marshal the Marquess of Wellington, whose zeal and invariable devotion to your Royal Highness's service will, Lord Castlereagh persuades himself, on this, as on every other occasion, determine him to obey your Royal Highness's commands.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Bathurst.

Copy. Paris, April 27, 1814.

My dear Lord Bathurst—I have been a bad correspondent of late. Paris is a bad place for business. I had great pleasure in receiving Apsley. We shall make his stay here as pleasant as we can; and, if he does not incline to return with the stream to London, when the Emperor goes, I will try to give him some motive for extending his tour. I had some thought of proposing to him to go to invite the King of Sardinia to return to the Continent, but, upon talking it over with Robinson, we thought it hardly fair to ask him to undertake so long a journey, with a sea voyage at the end of it, at a moment when Paris is full of interest. If Wellington does not come here, which, from Charles's report, I think more than probable, I shall give Apsley the option of going to him, when I have something to say as well as send. You will see by Wellington's answer, which I send to Liverpool, that he

accepts the embassy. I shall leave him to choose his
time for entering upon its duties. His presence here will
all respects, be most useful and satisfactory to me.

Your arrangements, through Taylor, about Antwerp, w
everything I could wish, as matters then stood. Charles J
has no great claim to favour; but, as none of the Pow
could well justify a breach of treaty to Sweden upon
grievances, and, I must say, strong suspicions, we are justi
in entertaining of their General, and as Russia perseveres
execution of her treaty, I think we must, in good faith as
as policy, use our best endeavours to finish the business, wi
out suffering the people of Norway to embark in a contest,
which we must at least navally fight against them, under
stipulations of our treaty.

Murat is another sinner—whether to an extent that we
take notice of, I am not yet prepared to say; but the Vice
has given some strong evidence against him. The events
France have secured us there. If the war had continued
this side of the Alps, Italy would have soon become a dang
ous card, which was in itself a new source of alarm, intrig
and weakness. As it is, I hope we are escaping fast from
military difficulty, whatever may be the embarrassment of
political complication.

I have written to Graham about the Danes and Ha
verians, and shall, by the next courier, inform you of
arrangements taken for the surrender of the fortresses.

Yours, my dear lord, very sincerely, C

I shall write to Wellington about the return of his ar
and press here what he suggests. He talked to my brothe
recommending the sale of a large proportion of his horses.

Lord Castlereagh to Augustus Foster, Esq.

Copy. Paris, April 27, 181

My dear Foster—I have transmitted to Lord Liverpool
be laid before the Prince Regent, a recommendation to no

nate you to be his Minister Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Court of Denmark. I hope this destination may prove acceptable to you, and shall be obliged to you to see Lord L. upon it.

I have not been able to think of consular arrangements since I came upon the Continent, but shall be happy to fulfil my promise to the Duchess[1] as early upon my return as I can manage it.

Believe me to be, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord William Bentinck to Lord Castlereagh.

Genoa, April 27, 1814.

My dear Lord—I presume there will no longer be any necessity to continue the Italian levy. If they are to be disbanded, it is very important the intention should be made known to them as soon as possible, that the officers may not lose the opportunity of placing themselves in the new armies about to be formed by the restored Sovereigns. If I have your authority to announce the dissolution of these corps at a general peace, it will be sufficient, and I will undertake the rest, making such arrangements as to a few additional months' pay as circumstances may seem to require.

I send Lieutenant-Colonel à Court with this letter, to explain more fully the circumstances of the levy, and to receive your orders.

I remain, my dear lord, very faithfully yours,

W. C. BENTINCK.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Wellington.

Copy. Paris, April 27, 1814.

My dear Lord—I received with great satisfaction your letter by Charles, and shall write to-night to submit my sentiments to the Prince Regent upon the importance of your taking charge of his affairs at this Court, where personal weight,

[1] Mr. Foster's mother, the Duchess of Devonshire, second wife of the last duke.

c n, , lly requisite to mature the
a its t ious war. I cannot doubt
the r as v al Highness will embrace
any occas n of pr ring to h f your active services.

With r to] you should present your
creden I should v to n to your convenience, and
what your own judg (tate with respect to your
present charge. If you find y elf enabled to pay even a
cursory visit to Paris, we c k he matter over together—
if not, I shall be glad to receive uch suggestions as occur.
We hope to sign our peace with France, and that I shall be
enabled to set out from hence about the 15th of next month.
The Convention transmitted by the last messenger, clears
away much of the groundwork.

Pole arrived yesterday. I have stated to him what has
passed between us, and he seems disposed to postpone his
excursion to you, in the hope of se ing you here.

Believe me to be, (c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Wellington.

Draft. Paris, April 27, 1814.

My dear Lord—I beg to enclose to you a copy of a letter which I have received from Lord Bathurst, which will explain itself. If it should be consistent with your arrangements to direct the movement of your cavalry and horse artillery, according to the suggestion contained in Lord Bathurst's letter, I shall be much obliged to you to let me know, in order that I may take the necessary measures for settling their embarkation with the French Government.

Le Conseil Général du Département de la Dyle à Leurs Majestés Imperiales et Royales les Souverains et Hautes Puissances Alliées.

Copie.

Hauts et Puissants Alliés—Organes des habitans du ci-devant département de la Dyle, nous le croyons de notre

devoir de faire parvenir aux pieds de Vos Majestés les gémissemens d'un peuple autrefois si heureux, réduit maintenant à la plus affreuse indigence. Riche uniquement de son agriculture, la malheureuse Belgique voit enlever ses grains et ses bestiaux par des requisitions chaque jour redoublées ; les chevaux destinés au labourage sont uniquement employés au service militaire ; une epizootie destructive en a fait disparaitre plus de la moitié ; l'autre ne peut pas, même en partie, être employée à l'agriculture ; les campagnes, désolées et incultes réclament les secours les plus prompts, et nous sommes menacés des fléaux les plus redoutables. Les maisons des bourgeois et des paysans sont pleines de soldats, qui consomment jusqu'à leur dernière ressource, et qui accablent de mauvais traitement ceux qui n'ont plus de quoi satisfaire à leurs demandes.

Au milieu de cette désolation universelle, des contributions énormes sont exigées ; on les redouble dans le moment même où tous les Belges sont dans l'impossibilité de payer celles ordinaires.

Commerce, fabriques, agriculture, tout est détruit, tout reste anéanti sous les malheurs horribles de la guerre.

Vos Majestés ont traité avec tant de magnanimité cette France, dont nous avons été longtemps la victime, nous qui avons souffert des maux qu'elle nous a fait, comme tout le reste de l'Europe, serons jugés les seuls indignes de la commisération des hautes Puissances alliées !

Il n'est qu'une ressource pour notre Pays, dans l'état déplorable où il se trouve réduit—c'est de connoître le Souverain destiné à nous gouverner, à nous protéger, à nous garantir contre les maux qui finiront par anéantir la valeur du présent que Vos Majestés lui destinent. Nous supplions respectueusement Vos Majestés, au nom de l'humanité et par les pleurs et gémissemens dont nous sommes environnés, de vouloir bien prendre en considération l'excès des malheurs du peuple Belge, et de fixer son sort d'une manière invariable.

Qu'il lui soit enfin permis de se jetter aux pieds du Souve-

rain (Prov Vos tés doivent lui donner, en
le conju: s son] le t à périr.
No ni a' le ofond respect, &c.,
(Signé) J. s; H. I. G. DE MANDER LENNICK;
HU: ND AMERCOIT; D'OLMER ST. REMY;
D'A UR; J. LOYAERTES; C. VANDERFOFFEN;
H. LU

Bruxelles, ce 27 Av 1814.

Memorial from the Conseil Gé of the Department of the Dyle to the Governor-G ral of Belgium.

Copie.

Monsieur le Baron—Il est (circonstances où le patriotisme des Administrateurs doit leur faire fermer les yeux sur les malheurs des peuples pour s faire arriver à travers les sacrifices les plus pénibles au but (il doit assurer leur liberté et leur repos.

Telle étoit notre situation au moment de l'entrée des troupes des Hautes Puissances dans gique. A cette époque, il falloit armer la nation, pour s'oppo er au retour de la tyrannie françoise; il le falloit par tous les moyens; et tout délai, toute hésitation, dans les mesures à prendre pour y parvenir étoit un crime.

Il importait peu de savoir quel seroit le Souverain définitif du Pays; il falloit abattre le tyran de l'Europe; c'étoit le premier, le seul devoir.

Mais aujourd'hui que ce grand œuvre consommé, aujourd'hui que le besoin le plus pressant des Peuples délivrés est la paix et le repos, est-il sage, est-il prudent, de persister dans ce projet autrefois si nécessaire d'insurrection générale? Ce qui étoit utile il y a peu de semaines, ne pourroit-il pas être imprudent et nuisible aujourd'hui?

Nous sommes les témoins des malheurs qui accablent les habitans de la Belgique. Les logemens militaires, les réquisitions de vivres et de fourages, les entretiens d'étapes, transports

militaires, les contributions extraordinaires, les ont réduit dans un état d'épuisement que Votre Excellence imagine à peine.

Les moyens les plus énergiques ont été employés pour forcer la rentrée des contributions et l'exécution des réquisitions ; les moyens sont nuls, parceque les menaces de l'autorité supérieure ne paroissent rien à côté de ce que chacun a déja à souffrir. Et qu'est ce, en effet, que la menace d'exécution militaire pour des malheureux dont les maisons sont continuellement remplies de soldats qui y vivent à discrétion, et quelquefois (nous souffrons de devoir le dire) avec beaucoup de licence.

Les logemens militaires sont une contribution plus que quadruple de toutes les anciennes contributions françoises réunies ; et quand le peuple n'auroit que celle-là seule à supporter, il ne faudroit qu'un court espace de tems pour opérer sa ruine complete.

C'est dans un état de choses aussi désolant que V. E. a ordonné la convocation des Conseils Généraux pour aviser aux moyens de pourvoir à la dépense de l'armement des troupes Belges par un impôt extraordinaire. Elle aura senti que cette demande renfermoit deux difficultés reunies. La première est celle d'asseoir un nouvel impôt, dont la rentrée soit praticable, dans un moment où les moyens les plus violens ne suffisent pas pour faire acquiter l'impôt ordinaire.

La seconde est l'incertitude où nous sommes si cet armement si sagement projetté, si heureusement commencé, au milieu des dangers de la guerre, doit ou peut être continué au sein de la paix, et si nous ne courons pas le risque d'attirer sur nous l'animadversion de notre Souverain futur, en le chargeant dès maintenant de l'entretien d'une armée, qui deviendra peut-être pour lui une somme de dépense à laquelle il ne pourra ou ne voudra pas faire face.

Ne conviendroit-il pas, Monsieur le Baron, d'arrêter tout enrôlement ultérieur, jusqu'à, ce que nous soyons parvenus à connoître les intentions du Souverain que les Hautes Puissances alliées nous destinent ?

Monsieur le Secrétaire Général de la Guerre, notre Collègue nous a dit que l'entretien, l'armement, l'équipement et la solde de l'armée Belge telle qu'elle est aujourd'hui, n'excéderoit point pour une année la somme de 1,200,000 francs, pour tous les départemens de la Belgique ce qui porte la dépense d'un mois à 100,000 francs. Et supposant que le département de la Dyle est chargé d'un sixième de cette somme (ce qui est fort au-dessus des proportions établies) son contingent pour un mois seroit de 16,666 francs, 66 centimes. Nous supplions V. E. de vouloir bien suspendre tout armement et tout enrôlement ultérieur des troupes Belges, et de nous permettre de nous borner à chercher le moyen de pourvoir pendant un mois à la dépense de ces troupes, telles qu'elles sont aujourd'hui.

Si elle daignoit condescendre à cette demande, nous trouverions dans ses intentions bienfaisantes consignées dans sa lettre du 28 Mars dernier, à M. l'Intendant de la Dyle, des moyens à faire face à ces services, sans augmenter les impôts existans, et sans en créer de nouveaux. V. E. manifeste dans cette lettre la volonté de faire servir toutes les contributions arriérées de 1813, et tous les centimes additionels de celle de 1814 aux besoins spéciaux du département.

En supposant que tous les centimes additionels de 1814 soyent nécessaires à l'acquitemenent des fraix administratifs, ce qui ne sauroit être, puisque les canaux du Nord, de St. Quentin, la dépense de la nouvelle prison, et beaucoup d'autres dépenses, sont rayées du tableau de nos charges—en supposant, disons nous, que la totalité de nos centimes est absorbée par les fraix administratifs, ordinaires et extraordinaires, et que tout l'arrière de 1813 seroit employé au payement des réquisitions et de fournitures, il resteroit toujours disponible la somme destinée à l'entretien des routes pendant l'an 1814, puisque le produit du nouvel impôt des barrières doit faire face désormais à cette dépense.

Cette somme, destinée à l'entretien des routes, et faisant partie des centimes additionels, s'élève au-delà de 300,000

francs. C'est sur cette somme de 300,000 francs que nous supplions V. E. de vouloir bien mettre à la disposition de S. E. Monsieur le Comte de Murray celle de 16,666 francs, 66 cents. pour le contingent du département de la Dyle dans l'entretien d'un mois de l'armée Belge, dans l'état où il se trouve aujourd'hui.

Pendant ce mois, nous chercherons à connoître les intentions définitives des Hautes Puissances Alliées, tant sur la possession de ce Pays, que sur la continuation de l'armement ; nous ferons parvenir nos supplications au pied des Trônes, et nous nous flattons que V. E. elle-même ne se refusera pas à les appuyer.

Le caractère franc et loyal, qui la distingue, nous donne cette certitude qu'elle approuve intérieurement le désir de nous tirer d'un état d'anxiété, aussi cruel que celui dans lequel nous sommes plongés.

Si, contre notre attente, il falloit continuer et completer l'armement, si d'autres charges extraordinaires devoient encore nous être imposées, le moyen auquel nous serions forcés d'avoir recours, seroit celui d'un emprunt à la charge du Pays, à ouvrir à Londres, d'après l'autorisation des Hautes Puissances Alliées, d'engager, pour sureté du capital et des intérêts, les revenus et impôts ordinaires de la Belgique.

Ce moyen seroit le seul praticable, et c'est autant le sincère désir de satisfaire promptement aux demandes de Votre Excellence, que la conviction de l'inefficacité de toute autre mesure qui nous porte à lui soumettre l'idée de cet emprunt.

Il seroit bien plus avantageux au Souverain futur du Pays d'avoir à payer l'intérêt d'une dette constituée que d'avoir a réparer et soulager, pendant un long cours d'années, les malheurs d'un peuple complètement ruiné.

Si les propositions contenues dans ce Mémoire sont goutées par V. E.—si elle daigne approuver les moyens proposés, et déclarer que nous avons satisfait à ce qu'elle attendoit de nous —nous la supplions de vouloir bien nous faire connoître ses in-

tentions Samedi prochain, trente de ce mois, jour où nous nous rassemblerons de nouveau, pour aviser aux moyens de faire parvenir au pied des Trônes les supplications des habitans du département.

Nous la prions de vouloir bien accueillir avec bonté l'expression du profond respect avec lequel nous avons l'honneur d'être, &c.,

Les Membres du Conseil Général du Département de la Dyle.

[Here follow the signatures.]

Bruxelles, le 27 Avril, 1814.

The Right Hon. N. Vansittart to Lord Castlereagh.

Downing Street, April 28, 1814.

Dear Castlereagh—I send you this by the hands of Mr. Herries, the Commissary-in-Chief, whom I need not recommend to your entire confidence: you know how completely he possessed Lord Sidmouth's and Mr. Perceval's, as well as mine. In any pecuniary question which you may have to discuss, you will find his advice and assistance particularly useful.

We have thought it necessary to send him to Paris at this time, as being the great centre of subsidiary, as well as political, arrangements, with a view to bring the whole of our foreign payments into such a course as may be most beneficial to the Allied Powers, and least burdensome to ourselves. I need not remind you of the difficulties we have had to struggle with; but, when I look back upon them, and particularly on the enormous expenses of our Spanish war, I cannot but feel astonished that they have any way been surmounted. It has, indeed, sometimes been by expedients which only the necessity of the case could justify, but which it is now possible to supersede by more advantageous arrangements, in consequence of the prospect of peace, and the general revival of commercial relations.

The plan adopted of making our subsidies payable at London, and in sterling value, was upon the whole highly expedient; but it has been necessarily attended with this inconvenience, that it produced a competition among the agents of the Allied Powers injurious to the exchange. They were all anxious to obtain cash, and made their arrangements always in a hurry, and often very injudiciously. By lending them the greatest assistance practicable, and by our influence with the Bank and some very respectable houses concerned in the remittances, we have prevented this competition from producing effects so mischievous as it might otherwise have done.

We have of late, however, been able to procure very large sums of money in cash and bills, with comparatively little effect upon the exchange, by means of a house of very extensive connexions on the Continent. Through this channel we have actually received near £1,500,000 in the course of the present year, 1814; and I enclose a memorandum of our transactions with them, that you may judge of their extent and importance. I should, however, observe that, in addition to the supplies so furnished to Lord Wellington, we have sent him £400,000, taken from the Bank, and very considerable sums purchased by that corporation for us. As the parties have a house at Paris, I have no doubt Herries will be able by their agency to procure for you any sums you may have occasion to raise; and it is one of the principal objects of his mission to receive your directions on that subject. If the Ministers of the Allied Powers are willing to concert with him a system for the general conduct of their supplies, I have no doubt a saving may be effected much to their advantage; but I must say that, in our dealings with them, I have generally observed a sort of suspicion and jealousy in pecuniary transactions, not exactly corresponding with the openness and liberality of our proceedings. On this account I have constantly offered them the freest option to accept any mode of supply which I was able to offer them, or to try if they could find a better for

thereabouts. They have sometimes done so, and, I believe, have occasionally had cause to repent of it.

Whilst however, we are trifling dallings, and probably in a great degree owing to little interests of persons concerned in the transaction. With such parties I suppose you are surrounded, as I have been; but I have not met with any capable of [illegible] on a great scale, except those to whom I have referred. Irving, who, I understand, has lately been [illegible] was [illegible] by us in Holland, and [illegible].

We [illegible] arrangements abroad, respecting which I [illegible] to give you every detail, as well as [illegible] may have to consult with the [illegible]. With regard to affairs at home, Liverpool's letters [illegible] will give you the means of judging how [illegible]. The [illegible] are highly valued, and, [illegible] if they [illegible] to be the most [illegible] people [illegible].

The [illegible] regarding the Speaker was carried, as [illegible] by a majority of [illegible], but [illegible] I have an impression [illegible] I have mentioned privilege, [illegible] The Chief Justice was in [illegible] I understand the [illegible] speak and the [illegible].

[illegible] I [illegible] it is [illegible]. The [illegible] Ordinary [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

Lord Melville to Lord Castlereagh.

Admiralty, April 28, 1814.

My dear Castlereagh—I wrote to you some days ago on the subject of prisoners of war, and I have now only to state in addition, that we have received a letter, dated on the 19th inst., from our old correspondent, M. Riviere, in the Office of the Minister of Marine, soliciting the immediate discharge of a number of prisoners mentioned in a list which he sent, and, among others, General Simon, and sundry parole-breakers. We have intimated to the Transport Board that none can be discharged till the result of our communication by Mr. Mackenzie is known; and, as it appears by the Convention signed at Paris on the 23rd, that we may expect a Commissary from France, we shall wait his arrival, and allow him to regulate the liberation in any order he may think fit. In the mean time, however, we comply with any requisition from M. de la Chatre, for the release of prisoners. I am sorry to inform you that, in most of the depôts, the prisoners, or at least the great majority of them, are very far from being zealous Bourbonists.

I beseech you to use your best endeavours to secure the Saintes for this country. Our two naval establishments at Barbadoes and Antigua are miserable in point of secure anchorage, and they are the best of the English islands. Martinique is excellent; St. Lucia tolerably good, but very confined in point of space; Guadaloupe also is better than any of our own islands.

If the French are also to have the Saintes, which are almost as near to Dominica as to Guadaloupe, they will thus retain exclusively the whole secure anchorages in the Leeward Islands. They never made any use of the Saintes, and those small islands are wholly useless and without value, in a commercial point of view. I cannot help hoping, therefore, that when the French Government have the matter explained to them, when they see, as they must, in common fairness, that we are asking only what will still leave us far inferior to them

in respect to naval security and accommodation, they will not think us unreasonable.

N.B. If the Saintes are ceded to us, our two depôts at Barbadoes and Antigua would probably be abandoned, and transferred thither, if the necessary fortifications should not be too formidable in point of expense; but, even if that should not happen, we still should be in great want of that anchorage, in the hurricane season.

I have written you a very hasty letter, but we are all anxious on this last point.

Believe me yours most sincerely, MELVILLE.

Mr. E. Cooke to Lord Castlereagh.

Foreign Office, April 28 [1814].

My dear Lord—Permit me to remind you, that if you at once make a Definitive Treaty, it may be proper to adjust the time to be given for cessions and restitutions, &c., so as that as long a space shall be given as if a Preliminary Treaty had intervened, which is from three to six months.

May I hint also as to arrangements for recovering private debts, debts on mortgage, debts confiscated, &c., and British estates confiscated, and titles, &c.

The Convention gives high satisfaction.

Ever most truly and obediently, E. COOKE.

Mr. Hamilton to Lord Castlereagh.

Foreign Office, April 28, 1814.

My dear Lord—The ratification of your treaty will be forwarded to-morrow night. Lord Bathurst, on leaving the Office to-day, desired me to write you a line, recommending the signature of an additional article, stipulating for the mutual payment of debts contracted by prisoners of war, previous to their being liberated; but I conclude Lord Melville's letter sent by this messenger is on the same subject.

I have two further communications from the Admiralty, on

American privateers fitted out in French ports, and a complimentary testimony of the French Admiral Troude to the good treatment of the French prisoners of war at Portsmouth.

Major-General Oxholm is just arrived from Denmark. He is to be Governor-General of the Danish Islands, when restored, and is now in a way accredited to this Government for the purpose of facilitating the restitution on principles the most liberal to our merchants, offering even to extend the term beyond what was required, if wished.

I am, my dear lord, yours very faithfully,

WILLIAM HAMILTON.

Sir Thomas Graham to Lord Castlereagh.

S' Gravenwerd, April 28, [1814].

My Lord—Lieutenant-Colonel Cathcart brought me your lordship's letter and the despatches for the Hague early yesterday morning. As Count Kunigl is not yet arrived, I can do nothing relative to the necessary arrangements for the occupation of the fortresses of Brabant, which the French are to evacuate.

I rode over yesterday to the Hereditary Prince's head-quarters at Roxendaal, to acquaint his Royal Highness of the Convention, and found him just setting out for the Hague, where he would probably arrive as soon as the messenger. Of course the arrangements for occupying the Dutch fortresses will be made there.

If Count Kunigl approves of it, I shall put a British garrison in Antwerp, and move all the rest of the corps into Flanders, pushing on the head of the column as far as Ostend, which it would certainly be very desirable for us to hold.

I shall probably have my head-quarters at Brussels, according to the anxious wish of all the authorities there; and I hope I shall find General Vincent established as the Governor of Belgium.

The necessity of retaining the Swedes will depend entirely

on what troops of other Powers are left, or what your lordship may think necessary should remain in Flanders till the preliminaries of peace are settled.

I have the honour to remain, &c.,

THOMAS GRAHAM.

Sir J. C. Hippisley to Lord Castlereagh.

London, April 29, 1814.

My dear Lord—Your lordship may recollect that I mentioned to you last year that I had desired Dr. Macpherson (late Superior of the Scotch College at Rome) to communicate with M. Quarantotti, who is Vice-Prefet of Propaganda, on the subject of the securities—namely, the qualified *Veto*, and the *regium exequatur* on Papal rescripts. Macpherson also took with him letters from Dr. Poynter to M. Quarantotti on this subject.

Dr. Macpherson returned yesterday from Rome, and brings with him letters from the Vice-Prefet and Poynter, the result of a solemn deliberation held with *three other prelates* in the confidence of Pius VII., though M. Quarantotti *himself* possesses, by delegation from the Pope, *all the powers* excepting that of the actual appointment of Bishops.

The four prelates have decided that *Rome* shall yield to the provisions of the King's Government respecting *both* those points, but object to the extent of the oath constructively, as interdicting the liberty of argument in preaching, teaching, &c., which might be construed to extend injuriously to the Established religion—such a construction, say they, must be put on their ordinary practice, when inculcating what they consider as doctrinal truths.

To this effect M. Quarantotti has also written to Troy, not very grateful to him or Milner, after all their tergiversation. As this incident is of material importance, I have ventured to communicate it to your lordship, though your occupations must be little suited for intrusion.

As I am writing under J. Stephen's roof, I cannot but add,

that I am persuaded we shall all hail your lordship's return with one applauding voice.

I have the honour to be, &c., J. C. HIPPISLEY.

Mr. Charles Long to Lord Castlereagh.

Army Pay Office, April 29, 1814.

Dear Castlereagh—Mr. Boyd, whose name you will remember, as having been concerned in various pecuniary negociations, and particularly in those with the Austrian Government during the administration of Mr. Pitt, has requested Lord Melville or me to give him a letter of introduction to you. He will deliver this to you; and his first object is to obtain his books and papers, which have been long under sequestration: the rest of his case you will probably allow him to state to you.

I cannot omit this opportunity of congratulating you most sincerely upon all those glorious events, in the success of which you have taken so important a part. Robinson will have told you in what a fever of apprehension he found the country, lest peace should have been concluded with Bonaparte; and now the opinion is nearly as general that, unless the precise steps which were taken had been adopted, you would not have kept the alliance entire, and brought things to this happy result.

We want you in the House of Commons, but we all feel the importance of your putting things upon a right footing, before you come away.

Believe me yours ever most sincerely, CHARLES LONG.

Mr. E. Cooke to Lord Castlereagh.

Foreign Office, April 29 [1814].

My dear Lord—As I suppose your lordship will come over when you have signed the Definitive Treaty, I beg leave to suggest that, at the time of signature, you may have the ratification prepared, and bring it over with you, together with a

power for the Count de la Chatre to exchange it here. Thus there will be no delay, and you will be able, on your appearance, to present the Ratified Treaty yourself to the House, which will have a great effect. Your lordship will, of course, sign the treaty both in French and English.

I enclose the copy of a letter from the Vice-Consul at Gottenburg. If what is stated be absolutely authenticated, the course will be easy. Mr. Vansittart will mention the intended blockade in the House to-day. Baron de Rehausen is very uneasy; and Anker, the Norwegian agent, who was desired to return, has been arrested here upon an old mercantile transaction, and has been only bailed to-day.

Will not the state of New Orleans and of the Floridas now come forward? Will not France take measures to recover the one, and the Spaniards the other, from the Americans. By *letters* from Mr. Walsh, I read this morning, it appears that as late as the 13th of March, the spirit of the Americans was still for war, notwithstanding the conduct of the eastern States, who are said not to be strong enough to force a separation. The improvement of the interior of America in establishments and manufactures is stated to be rapid and astonishing. Lord Liverpool has offered to Hammond to be third Commissioner. He is sent to this day.

A Danish general, Count Oxholm, is arrived, who is to be Governor of St. Croix, and to receive the Danish islands back from us. He professes a wish to act in the most accommodating manner: if the news in the enclosed be true, will there not be a hitch?

Ever most truly and obediently your lordship's servant,

E. Cooke.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord William Bentinck.

Paris, April 29, 1814.

My Lord—I have the honour to enclose to your lordship copy of a despatch which I have addressed to General Camp-

bell, commanding his Majesty's troops in the Mediterranean, containing instructions as to the cession of the island of Corfu; and, as it appears that you are directed by Lord Bathurst to send a part of the force under your command to the Ionian Islands, it may be advisable that your lordship should give directions that the transports employed in this service should afterwards be applicable to the transport of the French garrison to the Continent, if Sir John Gore's means are insufficient for the purpose.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

[Enclosure.]

Lord Castlereagh to General Campbell.

Paris, April 27, 1814.

Sir—In consequence of the Convention lately concluded between the Allies and France, extracts of which I have the honour to enclose, it has become necessary to make an arrangement by which the island of Corfu may, under the stipulations of Article third, be given up by the French Commander; and Commissaries are to be respectively appointed by the Allies and France, in order to regulate this cession.

General Boulnoy has accordingly been directed by the French Government to act in that capacity on their part; and I am to acquaint you that his Royal Highness the Prince Regent has been graciously pleased, with the consent of the Allies, to select you on their part.

The instruction will be delivered to you by the above-named General; and you will concert with him the necessary measures for the occupation of the island. You will, however, take possession of it in the name of the *Allies generally*, and not specially of Great Britain. You will employ for this purpose such portion of the troops under your command as you may judge expedient, and you will take inventories of all such articles as, under the stipulations of the treaty, are to be given up by the French Commander. With regard to the

civil Government of the island, you will use your own discretion, and I have the fullest reliance upon your judgment and experience in the execution of that trust.

I shall furnish Admiral Sir John Gore with a duplicate of this despatch, and request him to give you the utmost assistance in his power, either in the removal of the French garrison to such port as may be agreed upon in common with the French Commissary, or in the transport of the British troops who still occupy the island.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Rev. Dr. Poynter to Lord Castlereagh.

London, 4, Castle Street, April 30, 1814.

My Lord—I beg leave to state to your lordship that I have received a letter dated Rome, February 16th, 1814, which I have the honour of presenting to your lordship, addressed to me by Monseignor Quarantotti, the Vice-Prefect of the Sacred Congregation of the Propaganda, invested by his Holiness Pope Pius VII. with full powers to transact business in his name; by which your lordship will observe that I am commissioned to solicit the generous interference of our most gracious Sovereign in favour of the claims of his Holiness, to recover all his temporal rights and States, in the course of the pending negociations and treaties for the establishment of a general peace.

It would be unnecessary for me to detail to your lordship the losses and sufferings of this venerable personage, Pius VII. It is known to the world that his capital and all his territories and possessions were unjustly and violently seized by the enemy; that his Holiness was carried off a captive into France; and that he experienced the most cruel treatment, in different prisons in which he has been confined.

But your lordship will observe, that these calamities are stated to have been brought upon the Sovereign Pontiff by his refusal to enter into a coalition with Napoleon against our most

gracious Sovereign; that Pius VII. firmly refused to accede to the unjust requisition of the threatening Emperor; and chose rather to expose himself to the loss of all his temporal dominions, and of his personal liberty, than violate the rights of friendship and gratitude, by which he acknowledged himself bound to Great Britain on many considerations, and particularly for the protection which had been given to the Neapolitan and Ecclesiastical States by the British fleet in the Mediterranean, in 1792, at the humble request of my predecessor, the late Dr. Douglass, to his Majesty's then Ministers.

Your lordship will see, by the letter from Rome, that I am charged, in the first place, to convey to his Majesty the strongest expressions of gratitude for the distinguished proofs of good-will and protection which have been manifested in favour of Pope Pius VII. and his States, and particularly for that gracious disposition which has been shown to relieve his Majesty's Roman Catholic subjects from the pressure of the penal laws, with which disposition M. Quarantotti expresses his eagerness to co-operate, by removing, as far as is in his power, every difficulty which may impede the attainment of so desirable an object.

Your lordship will remark that I am particularly commissioned most humbly and earnestly to supplicate his Majesty, in the name of M. Quarantotti, and of all the inhabitants of the Ecclesiastical States, to be graciously pleased to take the cause of the Sovereign Pontiff under his Royal protection, and, in the negociations for peace, to urge the liberation of the Pope and his Cardinals, and the reinstatement of his Holiness in the full possession of his civil rights and dominions; and that a strong confidence is expressed that the Sovereign of this great and generous nation will not refuse to use all his influence, in order to procure the restoration of those rights and possessions to his Holiness of which he was deprived, because he refused to declare war

against England; that it is also here observed, that the justice of the claim of the Sovereign Pontiff to his temporal States cannot be disputed, whether the nature of his title, or the length of possession, be taken into consideration; that it is acknowledged to be of great consequence to the harmony and tranquillity of Roman Catholic kingdoms, that the head of the Roman Catholic Church should be independent of any particular Sovereign; and that it is the earnest desire of Pope Pius VII. to promote peace and friendship amongst princes, to confirm subjects in the principles of obedience and fidelity to their respective sovereigns, to be as a common father to all, and to open his capital as a place of refuge and undisturbed tranquillity to Princes who may choose Rome as a place of retirement; and that the States and ports of his Holiness are declared to be open to all, but most particularly to the subjects of his Britannic Majesty, with whom the Sovereign Pontiff is anxious to live in perpetual harmony, and the most friendly intercourse.

On all these considerations, a strong hope is entertained that the heart of his Britannic Majesty will be moved to favour and support, in the pending negociations, the just claims of his Holiness to all those civil rights and possessions of which Pope Pius VII. was deprived by an armed force and by an open act of injustice.

His Britannic Majesty, by procuring the restoration of his capital and of all his territories to the long suffering and afflicted head of the Roman Catholic Church, will diffuse joy not only over the city of Rome and the Ecclesiastical States, but the whole Catholic community in every part of the globe; and he will exalt the admired character of this great nation, which, by its glorious exertions, has contributed in a distinguished manner to the restoration of peace and good order to Europe and to the world.

Such are the sentiments which I am instructed to express. In conveying these sentiments, and this humble supplication

to his Majesty, through the medium of your lordship, I have the honour to be, with great respect and high consideration, &c.,

WILLIAM POYNTER, Bishop of Halia,
and Vicar Apostolic in the London District.

[The substance of the long Latin letter from M. Quarantotti is so amply given by Dr. Poynter, as to render its insertion superfluous.—EDITOR.]

ADDENDA.

CONFERENCES AT CHATILLON.

Few of the readers of this work need be informed that on the result of the Conferences held at Chatillon in February and March, 1814, hinged the very existence of Bonaparte. The Minutes of those Conferences were not discovered in time to be introduced in the precise place which they should occupy: but they appear to me of sufficient importance to form a sort of supplementary addition to the present volume, notwithstanding the loss of the Report of the first Conference, and part of that of the fourth, which are not to be found among my papers.

EDITOR.

Memorandum.

BY SIR CHARLES STEWART.

Langres, January 27, 1814.

It may not be uninteresting to remark, that I have observed a very considerable change has taken place in the tone and sentiments of the leading persons with whom I have conversed between the periods of the passing of the Rhine and the arrival of the head-quarters at Langres.

The Emperor of Russia avowedly declares his purpose of

proceeding at all risks to Paris; and, without pronouncing himself as to the successor of Bonaparte, he does not conceal that to get rid of Bonaparte, and not to treat with him, is the object of his policy, leaving entirely out of consideration every idea connected with the memorable negociations of Frankfort, as much as if they had never existed, and in which he permitted his Minister to take a share. The immediate hangers-on and those who re-echo the Emperor's words—Baron Stein, Pozzo di Borgo, and a few others—are loud and vociferous in these sentiments; but there is a party, of which I believe Count Nesselrode, General Barclay de Tolly, and Prince Volkonski, may be reckoned, who are for considering more maturely our situation, and coming to one united object before a further advance is undertaken. In the idea of proceeding to Paris, the Emperor of Russia has been strongly seconded by the reports and advice that have been urged by Marshal Blücher, General Gneisenau, and the Silesian army. It is imagined that the military ball is at our feet, and we shall bitterly repent hereafter if we do not profit to the utmost of the present moment.

While I state this impression as coming from one channel of the Prussian military counsels, there is another which has regulated generally the operations and movements of the campaign, and which has great influence with the King, that is decidedly hostile to pushing things further without an understanding and negociation both on military and political grounds. General Knesebeck argues that the idea of now sending Caulaincourt to another rendezvous, (which the Emperor of Russia projected) would be ridiculing the trust with which he is charged in an unjustifiable manner—that by former proceedings we are pledged in *good faith* to declare the propositions on which we will treat with Napoleon; and that departing from what we have laid down in a shabby manner is unworthy of a great confederacy—that, should we do so, and by unforeseen calamity fail, our cause is *morally* lost, and we should in vain look for

reasons under which we could defend our proceedings. Conscientious men, like the King of Prussia and the Emperor of Austria, are converts to this reasoning, and I perceive it is strongly implanted in the mind of him who urges it.

With regard to the military objections, without going into much detail, I shall observe that, in proportion as an army increases its distance from its own line of supply, its means of transport diminish; without magazines in the country it enters, without money to hold out to those who might assist its wants, its situation becomes more critical and embarrassing. Great armies cannot be moved as partizan corps; strong lines of country, position, security as to communications, must mark those situations in which they can halt for any period, and from such positions, in order to move to others, specific points and strong posts must be given. As far as I understand the nature of the country occupied in France by the Allies, they have secured all the defiles and mountains between the great plain bounding Champagne and the Rhine: they state there are three great roads of communication that intersect France, and that run parallel with the Rhine from Geneva to Antwerp. The first proceeds by Belfort, between the Rhine and the Vosges, by Weissembourg, Deux Ponts, &c.; the second stretches by Besançon to Vesoul, Epinal, Nancy, Metz, Thionville, Luxembourg, &c. The third great feature of communication in this direction, and which the armies now stand upon, is Chalons, Dijon, Langres, and Joinville. This last line is marked by a chain of very strong country and the line of the Marne river, and the position, although extended, is said to be secure as to both flanks. If this is the case, it is evident a movement into the plain with either flank exposes the army more than as it at present stands — first, as to actual position, and, secondly, as to its subsistence. It is certainly improbable that the enemy can oppose us effectually, but it is a question of considerable doubt to my mind if one should incur risk without a more declared object.

Bonaparte is said to have the five corps of Marmont, Mortier, Ney, Milhaud, and Victor: he is averaged now at 80,000 men; but I remember Marshal Blücher's first report from Metz was, that he had opposed to him 60,000 men, out of which 40,000 might be armed. I state not this to exaggerate the enemy's force, but only to show the contradiction of accounts. I will suppose, however, Bonaparte to possess 120,000 men, exclusive of *levée en masse*, or what he can collect in Paris. The Allies, including everything on our line at present, are not 200,000. If his army stands by him, it is not at Paris he will remain, no more than the Russians did at Moscow: he will not shrink from sacrificing the capital, if he can make himself stronger and get a better military position beyond it. Supposing, while you are moving on Paris, (which Bonaparte holds out as a bait) he throws himself on our flank, either on the right, by collecting at Chalons, and moving into the strong country in our rear, and pushing for his fortresses on the side of the Low Countries, which Marshal Blücher's late movement to his left may afford him facility of doing, or by manœuvring on our left, relieving his fortresses of Besançon, Belfort, Huningen, and Strasbourg, our predicament may be disagreeable—I do not say dangerous, for I am quite of opinion that, unless by gross mismanagement, this cannot happen—but we come into a dilemma, and we do not arrive at our end, of getting rid of the man. We lose, also, in the mean time, the base of our operations in a country that is hostile. It must also be observed here that, in any advance from the present position, it must be made on the great road by Chaumont, and Bar sur Seine, and there are not corresponding lateral roads that are passable for other columns at this season of the year. We may certainly march on in *échelon;* but, as the troops cannot bivouac in this weather, without enormous loss in sickness, &c., and as the towns and villages will only afford cover for the army marching successively, great facilities are afforded for the enemy's operating upon us, and the columns following

each other upon the same track are exposed to greater difficulties, in point of finding resources in the country, than if they were enabled to take different lines. We must not, also, be blind to the power of the people in our rear, who might intercept every small party and supplies arriving. If any reverse occurred from these circumstances, the game of Kalouga and Moscow might be played over again, or rather that of Massena and Wellington, and reciprocal reproaches and the charge of having departed from justice and good faith would be thrown in our teeth in the end.

If the Allies could fairly come to an understanding as to a succession, I think we should at once risk everything, playing the bold game, and declaring we will not lay down our arms until the ancient Government was restored. There might be great excuse for this, even if we failed; our late successes might carry us to a noble, defined object, but not to a secret, managing game. Already we have long played with Caulaincourt; the crisis approaches in which a decision must be made. If England cannot persuade all the Powers to re-establish the Bourbons by a common assent, I do not think she will have good grounds for acquiescing in their secretly departing from a declaration made in the face of the world, for an unascertained result. I question, also, the policy of it to England's views, as far as one can discover the secret game.

It is almost needless to remark, if the Allies cannot make up their minds here before the hydra is crushed, how much more at liberty will they be to give vent to every feeling of jealousy and passion, when the monster is exterminated! Is it likely that France should express a national feeling, circumstanced as she is at this moment, with hostile armies in her bosom, Bonaparte surrounding Paris, with the French army still faithful to him, the *nouveaux riches* still denouncing the *ancienne noblesse*, turned from the Bourbons by Louis the Eighteenth's Proclamation. Is it not much more probable that the French, worn down by suffering, would take that

impulse that the most powerful nation would dictate to them, when Bonaparte is overthrown; and, from accounts to-day from Paris, I learn they are awaiting their fate in a sort of stupefaction: care must therefore be taken that this idea of submitting to the will of the nation is not a bugbear. Ample time has been given for the explosion of sentiment, if it existed. If it is to be created, much will depend on those who have most engines in the fire.

Supposing it was proposed to the Emperor of Russia to make a declaration for the Bourbons, in case of success—if he acquiesced in this, I think it would quiet and soften down many of the malcontents against a further advance until more daylight is seen. I am apt to believe pressing the Emperor to this object might be advantageous. His Imperial Majesty is taking a separate and a prominent part in receiving the deputations that have arrived, listening to individuals that have already poured in from different parts. This is objectionable, inasmuch as it is not done in concert, and his ideas are still in embryo as to the ends he looks to.

The affairs of the last two days seem to give an impression that the French will resist more than was imagined. Suchet, having crossed the Pyrenees, and being in march for Lyons, has occasioned the reinforcing the left of the line by the march of Coloredo's division. To arrive, then, at Paris without some fighting is hardly to be apprehended. The position of Moret, which is pointed out and talked of, commands the Seine, the Aube, the Loire, the Orleans canal—and all these feed Paris; but it commands them only inasmuch as they concentre in that point. The country affords nothing of position, no security of communications, and the armies there would be *en air*. This is the doctrine of those that are adverse to this plan—of its value I am not a sufficient judge; but I think we should see more clearly into the nature of this position before we bolt towards it. I confess, I am much staggered as to its advantage, when I conceive the three great Staff officers conducting

the three armies all against the movement forward; viz., General Radetzky, Prince Volkonski, and General Gneisenau.

I am for delay, and for venture of every kind when once we are of a mind: a noble object excuses a rascally proceeding, but a concealed, incomprehensible intention does not really carry sufficient temptation to incur the opprobrium of breaking faith, the risk of military difficulty, and finally, the possibility, even if success attends the first *démarche*, of being, at its close, in as difficult a position as before we embarked in it, as to an ultimate result.

CHARLES STEWART.

Minute of the Second Conference at Chatillon.

February 7, 1814.

The Plenipotentiaries met at half-past one o'clock. The Plenipotentiaries produced their full powers, and they were reciprocally examined. Copies were given by the four Allied Plenipotentiaries, and they each received a copy.

After this, *M. de Caulaincourt* observed that M. de Razumowski's full powers did not authorize him to sign a definitive Treaty; if Count Razumowski, however, thought himself authorized, it was sufficient.

Count Razumowski said he believed he was, but if M. de Caulaincourt had any observations, he would apply to his Court.

M. de Caulaincourt said it was sufficient.

Count Stadion.—In order to proceed with our business and continue our work, I will state with all the simplicity possible the propositions of the Allies.

M. de Caulaincourt.—That is exactly what I desire.

Count Stadion reads the Declaration:

"Les Puissances Alliées réunissant le point de vue de la sûreté et de l'indépendance future de l'Europe avec leur désir de voir la France dans un état de possession analogue au rang qu'elle a toujours occupé dans le système politique, et con-

sidérant la situation dans laquelle l'Europe se trouve placée à l'égard de la France à la suite des succès obtenus par leurs armes, les Plénipotentiaires des Cours Alliées ont ordre de demander

"Que la France entre dans les limites qu'elle avait avant la Révolution, sauf des arrangemens d'une convenance réciproque sur des portions de territoire au-delà des limites de part et d'autre, et sauf des restitutions que l'Angleterre est prête à faire pour l'intérêt général de l'Europe contre les rétrocessions ci-dessus demandées à la France, lesquelles restitutions seront prises sur les conquêtes que l'Angleterre a faites pendant la guerre.

"Qu'en conséquence la France abandonne toute influence directe hors de ses limites futures, et que le Chef de son Gouvernement renonce à tous les titres qui ressortent de ses rapports de souveraineté ou de protectorât sur l'Italie, l'Allemagne, et la Suisse."

M. de Caulaincourt.—With regard to France renouncing the titles of the Chief of her Government: she has already done so by the facts that have occurred. You have in your propositions generalized the question. France has stated in the most explicit manner she is ready to make the greatest sacrifices; I only desire to know what sacrifices you ask, and to know where I am.

Count Stadion.—The first thing we desire is that France should enter into her ancient limits.

M. de Caulaincourt.—Is not the evident interpretation of limits her ancient possessions? What are the compensations France is to receive? Establish the mass of compensations and the mass of sacrifices. I only ask you to place on one side of the paper what you ask, and on the other the sacrifices, and I will answer immediately. You have stated you are inclined to establish France in a *rapport* with the other Powers of Europe. France entering into her ancient limits without compensation would not be according to this declaration. Why

return on our misfortunes? Specify. If we fall into discussion, I could enter into the Frankfort basis. You have made declarations; a correspondence in writing exists. It is quite evident you have changed your intentions: I only desire to know in twenty-four hours what you wish—establish your decisions.

Count Stadion.—The proposition is established on our part as far as possible, at present.

M. de Caulaincourt.—We fall into discussion, and this I want to avoid.

M. de Humboldt.—France, entering into her ancient limits, desires such and such restitutions; it is for France to point these out.

M. de Caulaincourt.—You are all allies to England, you form but one whole: it is for England to declare what she will restore on France entering into her ancient limits. If you don't establish things in this way, I should return to the Frankfort basis.

Count Stadion.—The mass of sacrifices are, in the first instance, that France should return into her ancient limits.

M. de Caulaincourt.—It is not those who are to make the sacrifices that are to designate them.

M. de Razumowski.—Let us resume, and return to the general principle. Europe desires France to enter into her ancient limits; France's present position in Europe does not justify her in mixing in the affairs of Europe.

M. de Caulaincourt.—I can only understand limits as possessions: if you propose to France to enter into her limits, afford her facilities for this general arrangement. I am ready to hear and listen to any propositions for France. It is proposed on the part of Europe for France to enter into her limits. Put the question on her ancient state of possessions, and then say what possession affects England or any other Power. If there are objects of difficulty, France will remove all.

M. de Razumowski.—We speak of the limits of France in Europe.

M. de Caulaincourt.—The *rôle* I play here is not one of an agreeable nature; it is a *rôle de sacrifices.* Permit me to read the papers. If I have shown any eagerness in discussion, I hope you will do me justice. (Reads.) What results from this?—a new order of things in Europe. Why not establish immediately what that order is to be? What is it you wish?—your *projet* is with application—it binds by a general demand to all, and it applies to all.

Count Stadion.—The first demand is positive.

Sir C. Stewart.—Are you ready to declare for France, *in limine*, that she is willing to enter into her ancient limits in Europe?

M. de Caulaincourt.—It is impossible to make two questions of this, it can be but one.

M. de Humboldt.—France says, perhaps, I will enter into my ancient limits if England will restore so and so, and France should specify.

M. de Caulaincourt.—Tell me what you demand—you have but to prescribe—I will finish immediately. You tell me to enter into my ancient limits. You will not tell me what you will give me for this. Tell me only, if France will enter into her ancient limits, are you authorized to make the offer of the restitutions?

Sir C. Stewart.—It is for France to answer the first demand, and to *préciser.*

M. de Caulaincourt.—To know the sacrifices you ask, and the use you would put them to, is necessary. This cannot be taken divided.

Sir C. Stewart.—England's sacrifices will be for the state of Europe, not to France. I don't understand why we should have the charge of stating them.

M. de Caulaincourt.—Much will depend, if we accept our ancient limits, on the use you will make of such and such pos-

sessions. This can be a proceeding but on a statement of circumstances; for example, suppose you demand Belgium, the Departments of the Rhine, &c.: in order to say whether we will give this we should know the use you will make of them.

M. de Razumowski.—This of course must be taken *ad referendum.*

M. de Caulaincourt.—I beg you will explain what you will do with the concessions and sacrifices you desire, and the use you will make of them, and, if they are agreed to by me, is it peace?

Lord Aberdeen.—We cannot answer this question at present.

M. de Caulaincourt.—If I accept these propositions, do I finish the war? Little arrangements can be finished afterwards—preliminaries can always be signed in twenty-four hours.

Count Stadion.—I think our first question is clear.

M. de Caulaincourt now read a note of the manner in which he endeavoured to explain himself to-day, and observed—I have already said France would make great sacrifices to arrive at peace. I wish to know—1st, those sacrifices: 2ndly, the use they would be put to: 3rdly, to accept them and stop the war.

M. de Humboldt answered these three points in detail, and with ability.

M. de Caulaincourt.—If I yield to your proposal, will it bring us to a conclusion and stop the war?

Count Stadion.—We come certainly to make peace.

M. de Caulaincourt.—If I adopt your propositions, will it bring you immediately to peace, and make you state the compensations you will give?

Lord Aberdeen.—We will consider of this.

M. de Caulaincourt.—If you will permit me to adjourn for a few hours to reflect, I shall esteem it as a personal favour.

This was consented to.

The Plenipotentiaries met again in the evening at eight o'clock, and *M. de Caulaincourt* produced a note and proceeded to read it, which is annexed. When he had arrived at the passage in which *les limites naturelles de la France* is stated—

Count Stadion interrupted him, and said—He could not let this pass unnoticed; that Prince Metternich had never admitted this expression with M. de St. Aignan.

M. de Caulaincourt then said, that whatever M. de St. Aignan had heard from Prince Metternich, Count Nesselrode, and Lord Aberdeen, was on record; that M. de St. Aignan, after the Conference, wrote it down. His paper was read, and re-read by Prince Metternich, and alterations made in the handwriting of the Prince: he had this document to show. He did not cite it, or wish to enter into it to provoke discussion, but to prove he was justified in using the expressions objected to.

Lord Aberdeen said that he had animadverted strongly on these expressions with Prince Metternich; that, as to what passed with M. de St. Aignan, he objected in the strongest manner to that part of his minute relative to the Maritime Question; that however he thought it a wholly unimportant document, and forbore to alter any part of it lest such alteration should show that he approved of it; that he would now give in at the next *séance* a detail of what passed, with his notes, for the French Plenipotentiary's information.

M. de Caulaincourt declared that he did not bring this forward to embarrass, it was not his object, nor did he cite the basis then, and observe on the different one now proposed, to create discussion; he wished only to establish our text.

Count Razumowski declared he had no knowledge of the document alluded to, there was nothing about it in his instructions.

M. de Caulaincourt proceeded to read his paper, which, on some discussion, was agreed to be styled neither a *Declaration* nor a *Note*, but a Proposition.

The French Plenipotentiary was then asked whether he wished it should stand on the Protocol.

M. de Caulaincourt replied—As the Allied Paper was to stand on it, he thought his should do so likewise.

This was agreed to.

Count Stadion then said—The Allied Plenipotentiaries would take the French Plenipotentiary's paper *ad referendum.*

M. de Caulaincourt seemed much surprised that we were not now to proceed, and asked when we would next fix another Conference.

Count Stadion replied—We could not name the time, but that we would acquaint him when we knew and were ready.

M. de Caulaincourt agreed to send his written paper to Count Stadion half an hour after the Conference broke up.

Here the Conference closed.

Proposition of the French Plenipotentiary, referred to in Sir Charles Stewart's Minute of the Second Conference.

Séance du 7 Fevrier, 1814.

Le Plénipotentiaire de France renouvelle encore l'engagement déjà pris par sa Cour de faire pour la paix les plus grands sacrifices: quelqu' éloignée que la démande faite dans la séance d'aujourd'hui au nom des Puissances Alliées soit des bases proposées par elles à Frankfort, et fondées sur ce que les Alliés eux-mêmes ont appellé les limites naturelles de la France, quelqu'éloignée qu'elle soit des Déclarations que toutes les cours n'ont cessé de faire à la face de l'Europe, quelqu' éloignées que soient même leurs propositions d'un état de possession analogue au rang que la France a toujours occupé dans le système politique, bases que les Plénipotentiaires des Puissances Alliées rappellent encore dans leur proposition de ce jour; enfin, quoique le resultat de cette proposition soit d'appliquer à la France seule un principe que les Puissances Alliées ne parlent point d'adopter pour elles-mêmes, et dont cependant

l'application ne peut être juste, si elle n'est point réciproque et impartiale, le Plénipotentiaire Français n'hésiterait pas à s'expliquer sans retard de la manière la plus positive sur cette demande, si chaque sacrifice qui peut être fait et le degré dans lequel il peut l'être, ne dépendaient pas nécessairement de l'espèce et du nombre de ceux qui seront demandés, comme la somme des sacrifices dépend aussi nécessairement de celle des compensations. Toutes les questions d'une telle négociation sont tellement liées et subordonnées les unes aux autres, qu'on ne peut prendre de parti sur aucune avant de les connoître toutes. Il ne peut être indifférent à celui à qui on demande des sacrifices de savoir au profit de qui il les fait, et quel emploi on veut en faire; enfin si en les faisant on peut mettre tout de suite un terme aux malheurs de la guerre. Un projet qui développerait les vues des Alliés dans tout leur ensemble remplirait ce but.

Le Plénipotentiaire Français renouvelle donc de la manière la plus instante, la demande, que les Plénipotentiaires des Cours Alliées veuillent bien s'expliquer positivement sur tous les points précités.

Minute of the Third Conference.

Chatillon, February 17, 1814, at Night.

The Plenipotentiaries having met—

Count Stadion.—In communicating and settling the Protocol of the last Conference, I wish all that was unnecessary should be omitted, confining it in the direct line. We should not enter into all the details, but adhere to the proposition and answer, in which there would be great utility, as adhering to the mode of proceeding.

M. de Caulaincourt replied—In his note he had adhered to his sentiments and explanations, and that he could not take away his preamble. I have a right to adhere to it; it is the interest of my empire and of my Sovereign. I have not stated a word that can shock any Power or any person: I appeal to

facts known in the eyes of Europe. Will you take away my justification?

Count Razumowski remarked—How very far this diverged from the original plan, and that it would lead to recriminations.

Sir C. Stewart stated—M. de Caulaincourt's paper went into observations reflecting on the influence of the act of one of the Allies over the others.

M. de Caulaincourt observed—Anything offensive he would strike out.

Count Stadion said—Let me read the Protocol: it will explain itself. (Reads.)

M. de Caulaincourt observed on his finishing—It was taken word for word from what had been said.

Count Stadion replied—We thought the answer could begin at the recital of "le Plénipotentiaire Français," &c. We do not object to the last part, but to the first.

M. de Caulaincourt said—I have reason to wish the thing, but I protest against nothing.

Count Razumowski.—It is quite clear the Allies were justified in changing their basis by the success of their arms.

M. de Caulaincourt.—Still, for my own justification, it is necessary not to strike out anything which is essential. I have eight days ago given my Court an account of this transaction. Why begin again?

Count Stadion said—That is certainly a reason. It is necessary for us to insert here our Declaration. (Reads.)

M. de Caulaincourt.—I cannot prevent your inserting in the Protocol whatever you choose. This is my answer to your Declaration. Let us proceed. The Protocol of the last sitting is signed.

Count Stadion.—We now come to the most essential part—our conferences suspended. The letter addressed by the Duke to Prince Metternich, in which the armistice was proposed, and an offer made to put certain fortresses into the hands of the Allies, have been communicated to the Allied Courts.

ıave consulted; and, in order to extend the idea of the
tice into a more general notion, the Allied Courts have
ved on a proposal for a Preliminary Treaty with the same

M. de Caulaincourt.—I am well satisfied. This will shortly
ıng us to a conclusion.

Count Stadion reads the *projet* of the Treaty.

M. de Caulaincourt—Requests to have a copy of it. It
appears then that you demand the renunciation both of the
title and of the kingdom of Italy. He then asked what is
meant to be done with the King of Saxony, the King of West-
phalia, and the Viceroy of Italy. We cannot abandon the King
of Saxony, who is the only friend who remained faithful to us.

Count Stadion.—An answer will be given, and regulated by
a Definitive Treaty.

M. de Caulaincourt.—Do you mean to restore his kingdom
to the King of Saxony, and to the King of Westphalia? The
King of Westphalia has been recognised: he must conse-
quently have an indemnity. If the Allies do something in
his favour, France will make greater sacrifices; in the con-
trary case, France will have to make a double sacrifice: first,
of her own interests, and then of her friends.

Count Stadion.—If you put this question positively, I
might answer you, but it will be better to leave it for another
Conference.

M. de Caulaincourt.—It is of great importance to us to
know whether the Viceroy will be included. These are ques-
tions which I am bound to make.

Count Stadion.—The Allies reserve to themselves the right
of making their arrangements. France has no right t
inquire about the details.

M. de Caulaincourt.—It is however permitted to express
interest for a brother, a nephew, and a friend.

Count Stadion observed that the question put by M. (
laincourt was a question of *fact*.

M. de Caulaincourt assented to this.

Count Stadion thought the question was decided by the state of the war.

M. de Caulaincourt.—Possibly as to Westphalia, but not as to the Viceroy of Italy. He then repeated his demands with respect to the King of Saxony, the King of Westphalia, and the Viceroy of Italy.

Count Stadion referred him to the next Conference for an answer.

M. de Caulaincourt now adverted to the armistice which the Allies had refused to grant. He observed that this question was somewhat changed since he first proposed it.

Count Stadion.—Your Excellency is the best judge of that.

Here the Conference closed.

Declaration read by the Allied Plenipotentiaries at the Third Conference, on the 17th of February, 1814.

Le Plénipotentiaire de France a fait précéder sa Déclaration renfermée dans le Protocole du 7 de ce mois d'un préambule dans lequel il fait des rapprochemens entre les Déclarations antérieures et les propositions actuelles des Cours Alliées. Il leur serait aisé de répondre à ces rapprochemens ainsi qu'aux autres réflexions contenues dans ce préambule, et de prouver que la marche politique de leurs Cours dans les transactions actuelles a été constamment à la fois dirigée par l'intention ferme et inébranlable de rétablir un juste équilibre en Europe, et adaptée aux évènemens amenés par les opérations de leurs armées. Mais comme une pareille discussion serait entièrement étrangère au but de la négociation dont les Plénipotentiaires des Cours Alliées se feraient scrupule de s'écarter; comme elle ferait dégénérer les Protocoles de leurs Conférences en de véritables notes verbales; et comme ils sont fermement résolus de ne point se laisser détourner par quoi que ce fût, de la marche simple qu'ils ont annoncée dès le commencement; ils se bornent à déclarer de la manière la plus positive qu'ils

disconviennent entièrement de tout ce qui est énoncé dans le préambule de la dite Déclaration du Plénipotentiaire de France, et ils passent ensuite immédiatement à l'objet principal.

Minute of the Fourth Conference.

February 28, 1814.

This fragment appears to commence with the conclusion of representations made by the British Plenipotentiaries, or perhaps by those of the Allied Powers in general.—EDITOR.

.....are charged verbally to agree with your Excellency as to the period in which an answer can be received from your Court; and we are likewise charged to add verbally, that we are ready to discuss such modification as may be urged, but we are in no point, nor in any particle, to depart from the substance of the *projet* we have submitted.

M. de Caulaincourt replied—That we had interrupted without any ostensible reason for nine days the Conferences; could we therefore think it unreasonable that his Government had taken twelve to examine a *projet* of peace of such immense interest as we had given in? We had had three months to arrange our views of it, and it was pressing very hard upon him to give so little time. If he were to say to us, he would have his answer on such a day, eight or ten days hence, he might still be deceived. It really appeared best to him to wait some days longer, when he might be able to state something precisely; the question was really too important to decide with so much haste. "*Ensuite*, you know what impediments our couriers have met with going and returning."

Count Stadion said any delay was wholly accidental, that it was never intended.

M. de Caulaincourt added that, if the three days which the courier was stopped were taken away, the delay on their part would not be great. With regard to the proposition he made

to Prince Metternich, it was for an armistice, which the Allies declined. For his part, he had refused nothing; it would show how much he desired peace. He had made no hesitation on the question of maritime rights of England. He had accepted this principal point.

Count Stadion observed—He had never consented in the Conferences to the principal basis of the propositions.

M. de Caulaincourt said again—I speak of the maritime rights of England; *nous avons accordé cela.*

Count Stadion said—We have positive instructions to fix a term.

M. de Caulaincourt replied—What term must we fix on? Suppose we say ten days. I do not doubt that I may receive an instruction every moment; but since your *projet*, the armies have not rested one day in the same place; a sovereign cannot take such momentous decisions in one day. There has been no time from the military movements for the least consultation.

Count Razumowski said—We must fix a positive and direct time.

M. de Caulaincourt.—I think ten days.

Lord Cathcart said he conceived eight would be fully sufficient.

This was followed by a little discussion between eight and ten days, and it was at last settled that the 10th of March should be the day fixed.

M. de Caulaincourt said he doubted not he should communicate with us long before that.

Here ended the Conference, which was conducted with much harmony on all sides.

The Hon. Sir Charles Stewart to Mr. E. Cooke.

Chatillon, February 28, 1814.

My dear Cooke—The change that has taken place by the several checks that the Allies have had since I wrote last,

should in no degree diminish the certainty of our being able to force Bonaparte to the peace Europe desires. Of this I entertain no doubt, and the momentary embarrassments both in our counsels and operations will teach the members of the one not to be too mad in prosperity, and the projectors of the other neither to despise their enemy nor to vacillate and change their decisions every day. With respect to our *marche militaire*, as far as I can learn or form an opinion, our first disasters commenced after the battle of Brienne. Schwarzenberg was to march upon Troyes, and direct on Paris, while Blücher was to turn the enemy's left, joining with York, Witgenstein, Sacken, &c. This movement, as projected, was on an extended line; but no sooner was the decision made, than Schwarzenberg was appalled by fears for his left, and he makes his march from Bar sur Aube to Bar sur Seine; from thence he gets to Troyes, and, still terribly frightened for his left, in order to turn Sens and Nogent and the posts on the Seine, he extends himself so widely, that he neither had his own army in hand, nor was he able in the smallest degree to communicate with Blücher. In one's born days, there never was such gross mismanagement. When the great head-quarters arrived at Troyes, the left of Schwarzenberg's corps was extended beyond Osray and Montereau; a desperate cannonade was heard two days in the direction of Blücher on the right, and the grand army were incapable of moving thither to support; having so much extended to the left, and thus not liking to come back until they knew there was a great necessity, they remained at Troyes, and extended along the Seine, several days doing nothing. In the mean time, Bonaparte, with the same troops, (the guards and cavalry from Spain) marched from right to left, and from left to right, and successively squeezed Alryaschief, (by the by, he suffocated him in his embrace) Sacken, York, Blücher, Witgenstein, and the Prince Royal of Wirtemberg.

After all this bitter folly on our part, concentration was determined on, and these conquerors found out that they may out-manœuvre themselves, and that simple, uncomplicated movements with all your forces together and in hand is the way for great unlettered generals to succeed. Had our Leipzic plan been persevered in, had each army been together, Blücher, collected, would have retired, and Schwarzenberg would have been on Bonaparte, if he had followed him; but we must e'en manœuvre and alarm ourselves, right, left, and centre. Our total loss exceeds, I should think, 35,000 men, and sixty or seventy pieces of cannon. However, I am not sure this will not in the end be of advantage. I am clear our military position is better now than it ever has been, if turned with judgment to profit. We have suffered perhaps a moral defeat, but in every other sense we are more powerful than ever. The reserves of the grand army are all within a few days' march, and they are very numerous; and Blücher, joined by Winzingerode, Bülow, Strogonoff, and Woronzow, will have an army of 100,000 men, on that side alone, stronger than the French. You will have, however, from Robinson, such full details of what has passed, that it is absurd in me to write much, except upon the present moment.

With respect to our *marche politique*—at one time Bourbonists, at another grasping at any probability of peace—no fixed system of action. What Castlereagh has achieved is really wonderful; but for him, I do believe all would fall. It might be judicious to keep Caulaincourt a little in play, until you entered France, and saw what spirit you actually could rouse. Whatever of bad happens to us, we richly deserve; for whatever of good, we must thank Providence and Castlereagh.

Now, as to our work here—Caulaincourt individually wishes and works tooth and nail for a peace, as far as depends on him. He dreads Bonaparte's successes even more than ours, lest they should make him more impracticable. We have seen,

since the turn in affairs, that Napoleon has our disorder, and he talks now of successes altering terms. We must get back to the Frankfort basis. He cannot treat until we are out of France.

March 1, 1814.

I send you the result of our Conference yesterday with Caulaincourt, and I am happy in being able to close my despatch with an account of a victory of Schwarzenberg. You will see the details of it in Burghersh's despatch. I have just received the enclosed private letter from Castlereagh, and I must be off to Chaumont, so have no time for more. I hear Napoleon has given up all the political considerations, and the painful ones, in settling the armistice; and as the Commissioners are at it again, I think one will be concluded. God bless you. I hope you get on.

Yours ever most affectionately,

CHARLES STEWART.

Minute of the Fifth Conference.

Chatillon, March 10, 9 o'clock in the evening.

The Plenipotentiaries having met, the Protocol of the last Conference was signed in the usual form.

M. de Caulaincourt then said—I have to make a complaint relative to the arrest of a courier.

Count Stadion.—Are you sure of the fact?

M. de Caulaincourt.—I am certain he was stopped, and his despatches taken from him: they were taken by General St. Priest.

He reads his paper.

Count Stadion.—It appears your couriers take a different route from that indicated in the passport.

M. de Caulaincourt.—This one was conducted to the Russian advanced posts by the Cossacks, where his despatches were taken from him: he was afterwards sent to Chaumont.

Count Stadion.—I know he came from Chaumont.

M. de Caulaincourt.—I owe my thanks for his being sent from Chaumont.

Count Razumowski.—Do you wish this note to be inserted on the Protocol?

M. de Caulaincourt.—Certainly. I now wish to have the following observations inserted on the Protocol.

Reads his observations.

Count Stadion.—Is this your answer to our *projet?* I suppose we are to take it as a refusal.

M. de Caulaincourt.—It is not a refusal; they are only observations; I request you to examine them.

Count Stadion.—After waiting so long, we expected to have had a precise answer.

M. de Caulaincourt.—I refuse nothing. You perceive the objects upon which the observations particularly apply: I request you to consider them: they are not offensive in any manner; they are founded on facts.

Count Stadion.—We must take this as a refusal.

M. de Caulaincourt.—In no wise. I have observed on every point I could at present. You know the difficulties with regard to couriers; this will account for any delay on my part.

Baron Humboldt.—We demand an acceptance or a refusal.

M. de Caulaincourt.—La négociation tout en tout. Ces observations sont une espèce de réfutation.

Lord Cathcart.—Is it possible an answer may arrive before midnight?

Count Stadion.—It is certain the Duke's observations do not advance the negociations.

M. de Caulaincourt.—You know all that has passed in the interval. I have received an instruction to make these observations; there is nothing offensive in them; I hope they will conduce to moderate ideas.

Count Stadion.—Is it your intention to give us an answer—an acceptance or a refusal?

M. de Caulaincourt.—It appears to me that my observations are leading to an explanation of the modifications. I insert them on the Protocol, and I request you to consider them.

Count Stadion.—These observations are very far from advancing "*la besogne.*"

M. de Caulaincourt.—I am persuaded, however, you will take them into consideration.

Count Razumowski.—It is "un *tableau historique*," and nothing more.

M. de Caulaincourt.—You have inserted observations in the different Protocols: it appears to me, that in an affair of so much importance you cannot refuse to admit mine.

Count Stadion.—We have positive instructions, and must follow them.

M. de Caulaincourt.—You have allowed of modifications: I have made these observations to bring them on.

Count Stadion.—The question is, are the wishes of our Courts to be fulfilled?

M. de Caulaincourt.—You cannot refuse to examine my observations.

Count Razumowski.—Your observations reject our *projet.*

M. de Caulaincourt.—No; I have not rejected your *projet.*

Baron Humboldt.—We have orders to demand an answer. Our Conference must break up: we cannot discuss upon nothing.

M. de Caulaincourt.—I have made some observations: examine them; fix a time. When you propose a question, you cannot deny me the right of making observations on it. I am ready to enter into discussion afterwards.

Count Stadion.—Your word was given that on the 10th we should have a clear and precise answer.

M. de Caulaincourt.—You cannot refuse to consider my observations: to arrive at our end, we must enter into explanations. In an affair of this importance, I cannot be tied to

an hour, or a day. I am the most interested to bring things to a close: the war is in my country.

Count Stadion.—We cannot continue the Conference.

Lord Cathcart.—Our answer is in our Declaration.

M. de Caulaincourt then gave Count Stadion his observations and the enclosures.

Lord Aberdeen here stated, in reference to one of the enclosures, that M. de St. Aignan's paper was not an official one.

Here Count Stadion put up his papers, and we were all rising to depart, leaving ourselves completely at liberty, without declaring we would even refer to our Courts, or insert anything on the Protocol, to break up the Conferences to-morrow; when M. de Caulaincourt drew from his portfolio a paper, and said—"J'ai encore une déclaration à faire," which he read as follows, and said he did it *verbally,* to pursue our own form.

"Le Plénipotentiaire de France déclare verbalement que l'Empereur des Français est prêt

"A renoncer par le Traité à conclure à tout titre exprimant de rapports de souveraineté, de suprématie, protection, ou influence constitutionnelle, avec les pays hors des limites de la France;

"Et à reconnoitre l'indépendance de l'Espagne dans ses anciennes limites sous la souveraineté de Ferdinand VII.;

"L'indépendance de l'Italie;

"L'indépendance de la Suisse, sous la garantie des grandes Puissances;

"L'indépendance de l'Allemagne;

"Et l'indépendance de la Hollande, sous la souveraineté du Prince d'Orange.

"Il déclare encore que si pour écarter des causes de mésintelligence, rendre l'amitié plus étroite et la paix plus durable entre la France et l'Angleterre, des cessions de la part de la France au-delà des mers peuvent être jugées nécessaires, la France sera prête à les faire moyennant équivalent raisonnable."

We received this *Déclaration* without comment, except Lord Cathcart, who asked what colonies France had to cede.

M. de Caulaincourt answered—None; but that the French colonies we possessed were by conquest, not by cession.

Here we separated.

Minute of the Sixth Conference.

Chatillon, March 13, 1814.

The Plenipotentiaries having met, the Protocol of the last Conference was signed.

Count Stadion.—In consequence of what occurred at the conclusion of the last Conference, we have, on the part of the Allied Sovereigns, to make the following declaration on the Protocol.

He reads the instruction.

M. de Caulaincourt, after having read it over to himself, replied—I have to answer to this, that it can never be imputed to me that I am lengthening the march of the negociations, I only am desirous of entering into discussions absolutely necessary: you have offered to enter into the modifications of your propositions with a spirit of conciliation; I am desirous of discussing; everything that I could accept, I have already done; if I am not to discuss, it is a capitulation; I am in the position of a besieged place that has no choice.

Count Stadion.—If any of the reasons or answers which have been brought forward was in any shape a clear explanation, there might be discussion, but your observations are only irrelevant in every possible shape to the Conferences; it is only necessary to compare what you have written with what you have declared.

M. de Caulaincourt.—You cannot deny that you have declared you were ready to listen in an *esprit de conciliation* to what I may advance. I am anxious to discuss every point; I have admitted a great deal in the *déclaration verbale;* invaded as we are, it is not likely we should protract. We do

not refuse anything. You say I have not answered you, whereas I have yielded to you, as it were, by a stroke of the pen, an influence over a population of sixty millions of inhabitants, and I have yielded up seven millions; I have renounced, as it were, six-sevenths, and you pretend I have not given an answer, when I wish to discuss on the other seventh. You ask for everything *en masse*. What are the particular points you ask?—you cannot say I have shown a disposition to refuse.

Count Stadion.—Our demand is perfectly simple: we have one of three things to require, either an acceptance, a refusal, or a *contre-projet*. It is only in this manner we can proceed: dare I, therefore, demand of you, if everything you have not alluded to in your note is refused?

M. de Caulaincourt.—Everything not there is object of discussion.

M. de Humboldt.—You state what you can consent to, you have consented to, in the note *verbale*. It does not answer, nor do we understand it in the manner you appear to do.

M. de Caulaincourt.—The points not understood can be all objects of discussion. What are the objects on which the Allies are not satisfied?

Lord Aberdeen.—The first question on our *projet* is to enter into ancient France.

M. de Caulaincourt.—You say that you admit of modifications; without them, there would be no discussions. If I accepted your *projet*, there would be an end of negociation.

Count Stadion.—If you are of this opinion, we only beg you to do one or the other.

M. de Caulaincourt.—Suppose, then, you consider what I have given you in my *déclaration verbale* as a *contre-projet*.

Count Stadion.—This is impossible; it is not in the form usual in any manner.

M. de Caulaincourt.—Let us see. (He then refers to our *projet*, and reads the first and second Articles.) You see upon this first I enter into discussion, on the second I *renounce*.

M. de Humboldt.—I think the *contre-projet* should proceed article by article; the *déclaration verbale* is wholly silent on the first Article, that France should enter into her ancient limits.

M. de Caulaincourt.—I again repeat I have yielded to six of your propositions; you should explain yourselves more. I have renounced "à tout ce qu'il y a de départemens Français au-delà des Alpes."

Count Stadion.—This was not exactly understood from the *déclaration verbale;* however, there is a mode of proceeding positively prescribed to us.

M. de Caulaincourt.—Well, if you don't like this, will you take the Frankfort basis as a *contre-projet?*

Count Stadion.—No; positively not.

M. de Caulaincourt.—But if I take the Frankfort basis, I am ready to enter into discussion.

Sir C. Stewart.—I conceive we should instantly reject it *in toto.*

M. de Caulaincourt.—I assure you, I wish to get rid of all difficulties, and to accept everything I can. In wishing to take this basis as a *contre-projet*, would it not place us in a better state of negociation; if there are points to add, if England has any particular objects, I am ready.

Lord Cathcart stated—With regard to the Duke's ideas, as set forth, he had read papers and newspapers, but he knew nothing of the Frankfort basis; all that he did understand was the proceedings here.

M. de Caulaincourt then read Prince Metternich's letter to the Duke of Bassano.

Count Stadion.—I see we must take your proceedings as a refusal, and we must finish.

M. de Caulaincourt.—It is not a refusal.

Count Stadion.—I must be peremptory; our instructions are in writing, we cannot depart from them, we must finish.

M. de Caulaincourt.—This is strange, when I have met

your ideas; when I have renounced all influence of France *au-delà du Rhin.*

Count Razumowski.—This does in no shape answer our demand.

M. de Caulaincourt.—To do what you desire is a capitulation.

M. de Humboldt.—The Declaration you have made tells us nothing on points of our demands.

M. de Caulaincout.—I have given up all the French departments *au-delà des Alpes.*

Lord Aberdeen.—But is it not the custom to give a *contre-projet?*

M. de Caulaincourt.—I give as a *contre-projet* the basis established by yourselves.

Count Razumowski.—This is a rejection of our *projet.*

M. de Caulaincourt.—It is not; you will consider it as you wish; I depart from what you yourselves have laid down; I have gone a great deal beyond your wishes.

Count Stadion.—I consider this as a refusal.

M. de Caulaincourt.—I do not refuse; I beg you to consider what I have stated.

Sir C. Stewart.—Are we to understand from you that you will give no other *contre-projet* than what you call the Frankfort basis?

M. de Caulaincourt.—I give you this as a *premier contre-projet.*

Count Stadion.—We reject it entirely—we have our instructions.

M. de Caulaincourt.—If this is the case, I ask that the Conference may be adjourned for two hours, or until the evening.

Upon this the Allied Plenipotentiaries had a separate consultation, and it was agreed they should state the whole of their instructions to the French Plenipotentiary, adhere strictly to what was laid down, and abide the result.

On M. de Caulaincourt's entering the room again, *Count Stadion* said—We feel ourselves called on to state the whole of our instructions. If we have not one of our alternatives in a Conference within twenty-four hours, we must take the measures prescribed to us.

M. de Caulaincourt.—It appears to me you have asked a positive answer from me—I am alone, you are several—you must see my position; I must have time to consider.

Count Stadion.—We have orders to demand positively to be satisfied.

M. de Caulaincourt.—Consequently, you desire that I should decide on one of the three points.

M. de Humboldt.—We should not have a renewal of this sitting if you decide to give an answer to our object.

M. de Caulaincourt.—You have asked me to put in writing what I have said to-day, or to give an answer to one of your three points.

M. de Humboldt.—Not exactly that; all we desire is an answer to one of our three questions.

M. de Caulaincourt.—I will give you an answer in the evening, and I have to declare if I will answer your questions in twenty-four hours.

The Conference was adjourned to the evening, and, being resumed at nine o'clock—

M. de Caulaincourt stated that the Allied Plenipotentiaries had demanded an explicit and precise answer: in the situation in which he stood, he must put it to their indulgence to request permission to send an officer courier to his Court; he might be accompanied by any one the Plenipotentiaries would send.

Count Stadion.—It appears to me what we demand is a *contre-projet*, not a *projet* made in the form of a treaty, but *une réponse articulée;* there is no necessity for a *rédaction formelle.* We are of opinion you have had ample time to give

nct answer, and to consult with your Court. We
n days back to your own period; we have now
formal order from our Sovereigns not to wait longer
ty-four hours.

'aulaincourt.—You referred the Observations and the
m verbale of the last Conference to your Court; I
he time to send to my Court and to return. I have
on every point that depends on me. I ask of you to
discussion on the other points—you refuse it. I ask
nd a courier to my Court—you have the facility
ing yours. I am alone, and solely responsible; I
you *de me donner les moyens.*

Stadion.—Our orders are positive.

Humboldt.—It is our duty to have the answer in
ır hours.

Caulaincourt.—I think you should afford me the
hat place me in a situation to answer.

Stadion.—You should be informed that, although we
twenty-four hours after your Declaration, which we
t the last Conference, it was not that we wanted any
to our Courts; we were prepared with our pro-

Humboldt.—There is no question now about *rédaction*,
only the answers.

Caulaincourt.—You make the war felt, and it is
hat feels it; it is not she that wishes to delay

Humboldt.—It does not depend on us; we submitted
y to have the second Conference for a positive

Caulaincourt.—You have your couriers daily, I have
n days without receiving one. Everything that I
[have already done: if I had more instructions, I
t stop: in a question of such great importance, and
is the first time I have asked an indulgence, I

should think, if the desire of peace existed, it would not be refused.

The Allied Plenipotentiaries seemed desirous of conferring a moment together; the French Plenipotentiary left the room, and on his return the annexed Declaration was read by Count Stadion, as the decision agreed to by them.

M. de Caulaincourt.—You therefore refuse me permission to send the courier.

Count Stadion.—We do not refuse it, but you have heard our Declaration.

M. de Caulaincourt.—I will not accept the offer with this Declaration. If you refuse me, I must prepare a ***contre-projet***, and I will give it to you to-morrow evening.

Count Stadion.—We have done everything we could in the most amicable manner; we did not even resort to our last orders until we thought it absolutely necessary.

Lord Aberdeen.—I think the object of our Conference is now accomplished.

On a question of the hour of the Conference to-morrow evening, the French Plenipotentiary said that M. de la Bernardière was ill, and he might possibly not be ready in the evening, but positively the following morning.

On a question relative to the arrangement of the Protocol, the French Plenipotentiary seemed to wish the demand of the courier should not be inserted.

The Conference broke up, and this seemed to me not to be decided.

Declaration of the Allied Plenipotentiaries presented in the Sixth Conference.

Nous avons l'ordre de déclarer que la Négociation est rompue par le Gouvernement Français; que nous exécutons cet ordre en faisant cette Déclaration;

Que nous ne refusons pas au Plénipotentiaire Français l'envoi d'un courier à son maître, accompagné d'un officier au

quartier-général des Souverains Alliés; mais qu'à moins de recevoir des ordres nous ne pouvons agir qu'en conformité de la Déclaration ci-dessus.

The Hon. Sir Charles Stewart to Lord Castlereagh.

Chatillon, March 13, 11 P.M., 1814.

You will receive with this, my dearest Castlereagh, my private memorandum of the Conferences of this day. I should be tempted to enter a little at large on several points that have occurred, only that I find my opinion overruled, and I have therefore only the mortification of proclaiming at length I have been in error: as candour to you, however, is essential, I think we have not been decided enough in our *démarche*. We should have had our Conference, as ordered, the evening of the 12th; the clerks not having copied Caulaincourt's Declaration in the Protocol, was not a sufficient excuse for us to give delay. Our second Conference this evening was also very complaisant and complying; but it appears to me there is a secret wish in no case to break off. However, what I most complain of, and what I have had a serious argument upon with my colleagues to-night is, that they wish to relinquish the insertion in the Protocol of this day's proceedings, of the short Declaration which alone brought Caulaincourt to a point, and which marks in my mind the only firm and decided instructions both of our Courts and ourselves. It is unpleasant to me to differ from more experienced persons, but I cannot conceive why we should forego such evident advantages, as the demand to send a courier and delay till his return, the refusal on our part, the Declaration we made, and finally Caulaincourt's acquiescence and promise to give in his *contre-projet*. Our discussion has been warm, and although I shall be overruled, I shall have had the satisfaction of doing my best. But we are, I think, in points of importance, too polite, since the turn in our own affairs, not calculating what seems by your report (just received by Aberdeen) to have occurred,

more hopeful military position as to our own game,
ter success than we have yet seen in France; 6,000
s, and sixty pieces of cannon, is glorious retaliation
late small reverses. If you could but get Schwarzen-
move as he ought! You took no notice of my earnest
r when at Chaumont, and repeated in a letter many days
, to press the move on Arcis, Sezanne, &c., to the right. I
n now this is to be done. How different the effect eight days
! It will never be forgotten that the grand army have
en gazing useless and paralyzed during eight of the most
entful days of the campaign. The momentary interruption
f Blücher's operations, any halt in that quarter, all is attri-
butable to this. But I will not rail and croak more: give me,
however, credit for a little foresight.

Caulaincourt, I conclude, will give us now a *projet*, acceding to everything he dare; as yet, he has certainly gone no further than the Frankfort basis; but the absolute stand we made to-day on this, makes me believe he will yield the Netherlands, perhaps agree to ancient France, and fight chiefly about the fleet at Antwerp, fortresses, &c. The other main points, if we construe them as we like, and make him agree to our construction, he has already acceded to. He seems to have given up to-day the provisions for the Kings of Saxony and Westphalia, and the Viceroy of Italy. He was evidently embarrassed to-day and frightened. He spent all the period when he was absent between our sittings with De la Bernardière, who is ill. Your Treaty, and the whole management of that arrangement, and that which accompanies it, are *chefs d'œuvres*. Aberdeen has kept your messenger, and sends the result of the Conference and your military news to-night.

Minute of the Seventh Conference.

Chatillon, March 15, 1814.

The Plenipotentiaries having met, the Protocol of the last Conference was signed.

M. de Caulaincourt.—I will now proceed to read the *contre-projet* which you have demanded of me.

Which done—

Count Stadion remarked—It is impossible for the Allied Plenipotentiaries to make any reply to a paper comprehending so many details, without taking the same into consideration. I therefore propose that we should deliberate upon it and examine it, and inform you when our answer is prepared.

M. de Caulaincourt.—It is impossible for me to desire more. I should state to you also in addition that, notwithstanding this *contre-projet*, I am ready to enter into discussion with a spirit of conciliation on every subject on which you propose modifications, and which is contained in it.

After the Plenipotentiaries had risen from the table, M. de Caulaincourt stated that, with regard to the Protocol of the Conference, it should be inserted that the *contre-projet* was taken *ad referendum*. The Allied Plenipotentiaries objected to this, as *ad referendum* might apply to their Courts, whereas they only were desirous of examining the *contre-projet* among themselves.

A desultory argument of some length ensued; at last it was determined on that the same words should be inserted in the Protocol as in the former one, after the receipt of our *projet* by the French Plenipotentiary.

Here the Conference ended.

Minute of the Eighth Conference.

Chatillon, March 18, 1814.

The Plenipotentiaries having met, the Protocol of the last Conference was signed.

Count Stadion.—I have the honour to make the following Declaration to the Protocol, in the name of the Allied Sovereigns. (He then read the Declaration remarkably well, and with considerable effect, and added)—We have now verbally

to declare on the Protocol, that from this moment the Conferences of Chatillon are terminated.

M. de Caulaincourt.—You cannot surely refuse me the time to read over and answer this long Declaration, if it were only to suspend the *séance* for two hours.

Count Stadion.—We have the orders of our Cabinets to regulate the Protocol of this Conference this evening, but our powers are at an end.

M. de Caulaincourt.—To frame my answer, I ask but to suspend the Conferences—I ask to give my answer this evening.

Count Stadion—It is necessary *que vous la mettrez en forme de Protocole*, as we are not authorized to have any more Conferences. We shall immediately quit Chatillon.

M. de Caulaincourt.—I cannot consider the Conferences broken by the French Government, and shall remain for orders from my Court. But you shall have my answer *en forme de Protocole*. I, however, wish to make an observation. You state, in your note, that France has demanded territories and countries for princes of the family now reigning in France. France has made no condition of this sort: the Prince whom she wishes certainly to preserve, is a reigning Prince. You did not propose your *projet* as an *ultimatum:* I in no degree considered mine as such. I am ready to discuss and listen to every modification. You have refused to permit me to wait the return of a courier from my Court. You will, however, I hope, permit me to give my answer this evening.

After some discussion as to the hour, nine o'clock was fixed.

M. de Caulaincourt, on rising, said—I will be ready at nine o'clock. I am willing to enter into *toute espèce de modification*, toute espèce d'explication, qui peut entrainer à la paix.

The Conference was adjourned until nine o'clock in the evening; and, at the request of the Allied Plenipotentiaries, a farther adjournment was agreed to until one o'clock p.m., on the 19th.

Continuation of the Eighth Conference.

Chatillon, March 19, 1814.

M. de Caulaincourt began by stating—I will now proceed to read the answer to the Declaration of the Allied Sovereigns that I am desirous of putting on the Protocol.

He then read his answer in a moderate and quiet manner, and the answer is of that description.

Count Stadion.—As to what regards this document, we shall immediately transmit it to our Courts: with respect to our proceedings, and our stay here, we have already declared that they are at an end. We have now to state to you that, by a fault of the copyist, two paragraphs that should have been inserted in the Declaration were left out, and we desire, after reading them, that they should be added in their place.

He reads the paragraphs.

M. de Caulaincourt.—I cannot accept their insertion in this manner. I must regard your Declaration as a *pièce de Cabinet, une pièce de Congrès complète.*

Count Stadion.—If you refuse their insertion in their proper place, they must be added at the end of your counter-Declaration.

M. de Caulaincourt.—I certainly have no right to refuse: they should be added there. But you cannot return upon a *pièce* already presented. If you judge it *àpropos* to make any counter-Declaration in this *séance*, you are at liberty to do it. I cannot allow of these paragraphs being re-established in the text; you may add them to the Protocol if you will.

Count Razumowski.—We must then give the reason for this as it is.

M. de Caulaincourt.—You cannot ask the re-establishment of them in the text: if they had been in it, my counter-Declaration would have been different. I shall also now be obliged to answer them, if you insist upon them to complete your Declaration. Every Declaration made in the name of four Courts, after three days' deliberation, ought at least to be per-

without addition or error. You may judge and con-
as you please; certainly, I cannot receive them as
e—as a new Declaration, if you will.

Stadion then reads the paragraphs in the form of a
aration.

Caulaincourt.—There is one thing which is not exact;
emark it. You say—"*des places fortes:*" it was not
confidential offer; I only said—"*une partie des*
tes." If you quote passages, you should be correct.
erence to the paragraph in the Declaration, it was
e written—"*une partie des places fortes.*"

Caulaincourt.—I have now the following answer to
hese paragraphs.

ds his observations. He read them with acrimony;
peared they were only prepared in the event of our
g in the insertion of the two paragraphs.

Stadion.—We had also the honour to send you a
s morning.

Caulaincourt.—I received it just as I was getting into
ge. I shall have the honour of acknowledging its

Stadion.—We desire it should be noted on the Pro-

Caulaincourt.—You have declined the insertion of
cannot consent to this. I will send you my answer
hour.

Humboldt.—I am not aware you had insisted on the
of any note which we refused.

Caulaincourt.—You cannot put it on the Protocol.
refuse to sign it if you did. I only ask you to do
le moi as you have insisted *vis-à-vis de vous.* You
ed my notes about couriers, suspensions, &c.

Stadion.—If you peremptorily object, as it is a ques-
m, it is not worth discussing.

[1] Relative to the Pope.

Count Razumowski.—Only to have on the proceedings of the Protocol, as the *contre-projet* alludes to the Pope, that the Allies had the same reciprocity of interest for the object.

M. de Caulaincourt.—The note and the answer are sufficient.

Count Razumowski.—It is an object that does honour to both parties.

Count Stadion rising, said—We have only now to regret that we have not been more successful.

M. de Caulaincourt.—You cannot doubt how much I regret it, also. *Je le sens dans toutes les manières.*

After rising, there was some conversation with Count Stadion about M. de Caulaincourt's passports and convoy. He requested to have a few Cossacks; to have his passport signed by Russia as well as Austria; and he expressed a most anxious desire to go, even blindfolded, the shortest way to Bonaparte's head-quarters, for himself and one person at least, and not to go round by Sens. He begged this request might be submitted. He talked of being ready to go the day after to-morrow.

We then separated.

[In giving the Report of these Conferences, I wish it to be understood that the whole of the conversations were taken down by myself, having not the habit of short-handwriting, but a very quick pen. I freely admit that there may be many errors; and the translation afterwards was often difficult, and in many instances the idiom may be incorrect; but these Minutes formed a Report for the Cabinet not only, I believe, interesting but important, upon which I was much complimented by our own Ministers and those assembled at the Conferences.—EDITOR.]

END OF VOL. IX.

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F. Shoberl, Jun., Rupert Street.

[redacted]

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